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The European Union (EU) has increasingly used its external policy mechanisms 
to export the principles that it was founded upon: democracy, rule of law, social 
justice and, in particular, respect for human rights. This approach has long been 
evident in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which includes the 
Union for the Mediterranean states to the south. However, a number of these 
southern states have been thrown into disarray by the popular revolutions 
which swept through the Arab world in 2011; although these uprisings seem to 
share many of the principles which the EU has sought to promote, the 
implications for the EU’s role in the region are still far from clear. 
 
In order to assess the extent to which the EU has demonstrated an ethically 
normative foreign policy in response to the Arab Uprisings, this research sets 
out to establish which of the international norms that the EU promotes in the 
North Africa and Middle East (MENA) region can be considered ethical, and 
whether or not they can be differentiated from the EU’s “interests”. The 
discussion of ethics, norms and interests in EU external action is situated within 
the Normative Power Europe literature, which also provides the theoretical 
framework for the analysis that takes place in later chapters. It is shown that the 
EU correlates its promotion of some norms with international human rights 
discourse, and rhetorically advances itself as an ethically normative actor by 
highlighting the centrality of such norms to its international identity. 
 
The EU’s policy towards the MENA region is assessed before, during and after 
the Arab Uprisings, both at a regional and a bilateral level, the latter with 
regard to the particular cases of Tunisia and Morocco. The research draws on an 
analysis of official EU documents, secondary academic sources and interviews 
conducted in Brussels, Tunis and Rabat, in order to evaluate the EU’s evolving 
priorities in its southern neighbourhood. It is argued that despite a steady 
rhetorical commitment to ethical norm promotion in the region, the EU has 
consistently prioritised issues such as security and migration, with the 
exception of its immediate response to the uprisings in 2011. To explain this 
temporary and aberrant substantive shift, a hypothesis is presented drawing on 
Frank Schimmelfennig’s theory of rhetorical action, showing the consequences 
resulting from the intersection of the EU’s own rhetoric with the international 
attention garnered by the so-called “Arab Spring”. An analysis of policy 
responses to the Arab Uprisings not only sheds light on the nature, scope and 
limitations of ethics and norms in EU foreign policy, but also clarifies the nature 
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Background, context and relevance 
On 17 December 2010, Tarek Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, set himself 
alight in front of the municipal buildings of his hometown Sidi Bouzid. This extreme act of 
protest, against the perceived injustice of his relationship with the authorities of this small 
Tunisian city, not only provided the catalyst for a wave of social uprisings that spread 
rapidly across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), but also symbolised the early 
grievances of protesters throughout the region. In what came to be known as the “Arab 
Spring”, throughout the following months large groups of protesters gathered in the major 
cities of Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Syria, Jordan, Yemen and Bahrain. Few 
commentators, if any, had predicted the advent of a region-wide protest against 
entrenched authoritarian regimes, and although the specific demands differed from 
country to country, and even between different factions within national movements, the 
early months of these social uprisings represented an analogous wave of discontent 
stretching from the Maghreb to the Arabian Peninsula.  
The subsequent four years have seen those countries confronted by this wave of social 
uprisings take a multitude of different directions, from revolution to counter-revolution, 
suppression to dialogue, constitutional reform to civil war. There seems little relationship 
between the ensuing events, as each country’s historical, religious, political and ethnic 
divides have shaped the development of the initial protests. Nevertheless, throughout the 
early months of 2011 commentators drew region-wide comparisons between the protest 
movements.1 Much like Mohamed Bouazizi, protesters across the region called for social 
justice, political accountability and economic opportunities for themselves and their 
families. This very vocal, very public articulation of basic rights and values brought into 
sharp relief the policies of external actors across the region, not least the European Union 
(EU).  
																																																								
1 Hence the term “Arab Spring”, which was used widely to capture the sentiment of the protesters at the 
time. The term has largely fallen out of fashion within academic literature, and throughout this discussion 
the term ‘Arab Uprisings’ will predominantly be used in reference to the events in the MENA region during 
early 2011, prior to the dramatically different directions that each country took as a result. 
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Having long regarded the MENA countries as its southern neighbourhood, the EU found 
itself responding to a regional conflict between authoritarian regimes that it had largely 
supported, and an insurgent civil society espousing values that it had long promoted. 
Throughout the institutional development of its external action, the EU has increasingly 
claimed that it uses its external policy mechanisms to export the norms and principles that 
it was founded upon: democracy, rule of law, social justice and, in particular, respect for 
human rights. A rhetorical commitment to this approach has been particularly evident in 
the founding documents and reviews of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 
which includes the MENA states to the south, and features strongly in each subsequent 
treaty revision and external action communiqué.  
As will be shown in subsequent chapters, the substance of the EU’s policies to promote its 
core values in the MENA region rarely matched its own rhetoric prior to the Arab 
Uprisings in early 2011. Even as the wave of social protests swept across its southern 
neighbourhood, the EU initially attempted to support many of the authoritarian leaders 
with whom it had cultivated relationships based on trade and stability. However, as the 
protests became increasingly vocal, and highly visible on the international stage, the 
newly formed European External Action Service (EEAS) scrambled to provide coherent 
policy responses, many, as will be argued in this thesis, focussing on reinvigorating its 
commitment to democracy and respect for human rights.  
The level to which the EU has previously engaged, presently engages, and continues to 
engage with the political changes engulfing these neighbouring states, brings into sharp 
relief the association of foundational principles with foreign policy. The stated centrality of 
democracy and human rights to EU foreign policy raises questions regarding the basis of 
these rights, their specificity, the level of consensus, and the coherency and consistency of 
their external promotion. Furthermore, a rhetorical commitment to the promotion of 
ethical values such as human rights, with recourse to international norms that are 
themselves contested, leads to theoretical and substantive inconsistency with regards to 
policy implementation. 
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This thesis will provide a comprehensive analysis of EU policy towards the MENA region, 
before, during and after the Arab Uprisings. It will be argued that a significant shift in 
policy, albeit short-lived, occurred in 2011, and an explanatory hypothesis will be 
advanced to show what caused it and why it was not sustained. The hypothesis to explain 
the EU’s response to the early stages of the Arab Uprisings in its southern neighbourhood 
builds on Frank Schimmelfennig's (2001) theory of rhetorical action, and I will argue that 
the EU became rhetorically self-entrapped by the evident disjuncture between its rhetoric 
and action, and by failing to meet the standard of legitimacy it had created for itself. 
Within the context of the Normative Power Europe (NPE) debate, I will show that by 
presenting itself as a unique international actor, one both ethical and normative, the EU 
was compelled to align itself with the revolutionary movements in the MENA region, 
despite its previous support for the authoritarian regimes these movements sought to 
displace.  
An analysis of EU policy responses to the Arab Uprisings provides an understanding 
about the relationship between ethics, norms and interests in EU external action, which in 
turn clarifies the nature of the EU as an international actor.  Although much of the NPE 
literature focuses on the tension between ethics/norms and interests, often in terms of a 
dichotomy, the mechanisms explaining when ethics and norms matter, and when they take 
precedence, are understudied. One of the main contributions of this research, therefore, is 
to theorise how and why the EU promotes ethical norms, and more importantly, under 
which explicit conditions. Furthermore, the significance of inter- and intra-institutional 
tensions to the study of EU value promotion is also often overlooked, and will be 
examined in the context of Euro-Mediterranean relations, in general, and the Arab 
Uprisings, in particular. With these points in mind, researching the challenges presented 
to EU foreign policy by the Arab Uprisings sheds light not only on the nature, scope and 
limitations of ethics and norms in EU external action, but also on the concepts of ethical 
and normative power themselves. 
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Research design  
The topic for this thesis developed from my undergraduate studies in political science, 
followed by a Masters in International Relations that culminated in a thesis exploring the 
EU’s approach to value promotion in the South Pacific. Although the uniqueness of the EU 
as an international actor has led to an extensive volume of academic literature, the 
constantly developing nature of its foreign policy institutions necessitates that the core 
positions and assumptions be continuously revisited and refined. In particular, the 
increasing emphasis by the EU on the centrality of ethical norm promotion with regards to 
its external action raises a number of theoretical and practical issues, many of which are 
either understudied or insufficiently explained. 
The decision to use the EU’s response to the Arab Uprisings in 2011 as the context to 
explore these issues was academically stimulating, but not without its challenges. The 
EU’s policy towards the MENA region is richly documented, by both primary and 
secondary sources, and it is a particularly good case in which to observe the interplay 
between ethics/norms and interests, both from the EU’s various institutional perspectives, 
and from the point of view of the southern neighbours themselves. In the early stages of 
my research journey, however, there had been no major publications on the effect of the 
Arab Uprisings on the EU’s policies and relationships with the southern neighbourhood, 
and the events themselves were continuing to evolve in dramatically different ways. These 
considerations provided an opportunity to make a timely and relevant contribution to the 
field of European studies, while also developing previous research on the nature and 
substance of EU external action. The challenge was to construct a research design that was 
both coherent in terms of application and flexible in terms of responding to unfolding 
events on the ground.  
As Peter Burnham et al. (2008, pp. 42-43) state: 
[T]he function of research design is firstly ‘to develop the research questions, 
transform them into hypotheses, and organize these in a logical and 
consistent way so that they form a theoretical framework for the research 
[and secondly] to ensure that the procedures adopted within the plan are 
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adequate to provide valid, objective and accurate solutions to the research 
problems. 
 Much of the early research involved developing the theoretical framework to explore the 
primary research question: to what extent, if any, has the EU demonstrated an ethically 
normative foreign policy in response to the Arab Uprisings? The three main theoretical 
areas, which are covered in Part I of this thesis, were the role of ethics in international 
relations, the institutional development of the EU as an international actor, and the EU as 
a promoter of international norms. An engagement with these three fields of literature, 
outlined in the final section below, provided both the theoretical framework and the 
necessary premises for developing a hypothesis with which to inform the fieldwork which 
followed.  
Where the research process is concerned, the authors above also note that although there 
is an idealised version, whereby the journey is a sequence of straightforward steps 
undertaken in a clear and linear fashion, the reality is more often a series of re-evaluations 
of the research based on new findings and fresh insights which reinvigorate the research 
process (Burnham et al., 2008, p. 45). This latter version has certainly been the case, where 
initial presuppositions regarding the impact of the Arab Uprisings on the EU’s ethical 
norm promotion in the MENA region led to a certain path of inquiry, informed by 
research and interviews, which in turn resulted in the advancement of an explanatory 
hypothesis. It became apparent, however, that further research and interviews were 
required in order to provide a more academically rigorous approach to the formulation of 
the hypothesis, and also to the conclusions that could be drawn from it.  
The first reason for the development of a two-fold approach to the research design is that 
the EU pursues its relationships with the MENA countries both regionally, since the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership in 1995, and bilaterally. Although this has long been the case, 
the events of the Arab Uprisings have led to a number of transformations in EU policy 
towards the region, including an emphasis on more individually tailored approaches via 
each country’s Action Plan and Association Agreement. Be that as it may, the initial EU 
policy responses to the unfolding events of the Arab Uprisings were framed in regional 
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terms, as were many of the institutional developments that followed. This allowed for an 
inductive generalisation, based on the early research, as to a possible causal hypothesis 
with which to explain the changes, the details of which will be outlined in the final section 
below.  
The second reason for this two-fold approach is that first decade of research exploring the 
NPE concept largely centred on ‘the debate between normativity and realism [the 
relevance of which] has tended to fade’ (Rivetti & Cavatorta, 2015, p. 770) in terms of 
nuance and productivity. This is not to say that the paradigm is not beneficial for 
analysing and theorising the nature of the EU as an international actor, and, as stated 
above, it is particularly useful for exploring the relationship between ethics/norms and 
interests regarding EU external action. However, as Paola Rivetti and Francesco Cavatorta 
(2015, p. 770) state, in the context of research on EU foreign policy towards the MENA 
region, it ‘is now too simplistic to start from a theoretical stance and then look for evidence 
that either supports or negates the validity of a theoretical approach that would 
encompass what the EU is and does’. While at a regional level it is possible to form 
generalised conclusions about the nature of the EU as an international actor, be it 
normative, realist or a synthesis of the two, a more in-depth analysis of what the EU does, 
in this case concerning its bilateral relationships with specific countries in the southern 
neighbourhood, allows for a more complex perception of what the EU is.  
An initial research field trip to Brussels was undertaken, involving a number of interviews 
with EU officials and prominent think-tank members, which led to the formation of a 
tentative hypothesis to explain the EU’s responses to the Arab Uprisings on a regional 
level, presented in Part II of this thesis. However, as events progressed, both on the 
ground in the MENA region and within EU policy-making circles, and in light of the 
points mentioned above, it became apparent that further research was required to test 
both the hypothesis and evolving conclusions in a more case-specific fashion. This led to a 
second research field trip, this time to Brussels and North Africa, involving interviews 
with the EEAS, Council Working Groups, members of EU delegations, academics, civil 
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society groups and human rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The findings 
from this further stage of the research process are presented in Part III of this thesis.  
The selection of the bilateral cases was dictated by a number of factors, some of which 
related to practical necessity. In the region considered by the EU to be its southern 
neighbourhood, significant uprisings or protests during 2011 occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya, Syria, Jordan, Algeria and Morocco. Of these, the situations in Libya and Syria 
quickly descended into civil wars, inordinately reducing the capacity of the EU to 
maintain bilateral relations. In Egypt, the EU was deeply involved in the developments 
resulting from the initial protests in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, and initially it seemed like a 
rewarding candidate for further research. Two factors prevented this from taking place: 
firstly, that I was denied a visa in order to visit and conduct interviews, due to the 
sensitivity of the unfolding political situation; and secondly, that it became apparent that 
the extraordinary events taking place in Egypt, from the social uprisings to the election of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, and from the further uprisings to the counter-revolutionary 
election of the Sisi government, meant that any academic enquiry as to the impact on EU 
ethical norm promotion would require the entirety of a thesis. This left Jordan, Algeria, 
Tunisia and Morocco, and an eventual decision to focus on the latter two. While a single 
bilateral case study allows for a more in-depth analysis, the testing of the proposed 
hypothesis with regard to multiple Euro-Mediterranean relationships was considered to 
be more revealing, and only material constraints prevented the addition of further cases. It 
is hoped that further studies, both by others and myself, will be conducted with the results 
of this research in mind.  
Testing the hypothesis and conclusions deriving from Part II of the thesis in the context of 
the EU’s bilateral relations with Tunisia and Morocco, has both advantages and 
limitations. Although there is a certain homogeneity between these two countries in the 
northwest corner of the Maghreb region, there are a number of key ethnic, historical, 
economic and political differences. However, this is not a comparative study, but an 
exercise in observationally testing a hypothesis in order to clarify its utility as a theory, 
and establishing whether regional conclusions could be corroborated or refined within 
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more specific cases. This is not to say that certain comparisons cannot be made. Each 
country has developed its relationship with the EU in the context of the ENP framework, 
which has largely dictated the EU’s promotion of ethical norms in the region. Each 
country also experienced a significant uprising or social protest, although with very 
different results: in Tunisia the governing regime dramatically collapsed early in the Arab 
Uprisings, whereas in Morocco the regime was able to successfully reconfigure itself. The 
differences regarding internal political ramifications, and the resulting effect on the EU’s 
bilateral policies in terms of ethical norm promotion, inform many of the conclusions that 
derive from this research, and in point of fact, the combination of these two cases allowed 
for nuanced conclusions beyond my expectations. Furthermore, it is hoped that by 
undertaking this research, despite the practical limitations regarding the selection of 
bilateral cases, it will be possible to extrapolate to other cases in future research projects. 
Methodology, ethical considerations and limitations  
Throughout the research process, three principal methods of data collection and analysis 
were utilised: a thorough examination of EU policy documents; use of secondary sources; 
and extensive interviews conducted in New Zealand, Belgium and North Africa. One of 
the advantages of addressing the subject of EU external action is the wealth of available 
treaties, statements, communiqués, and overarching policy documents that exist. This is 
the case for the historical and institutional development of EU foreign policy, the regional 
approaches towards engaging with the southern neighbourhood, bilateral relations with 
the MENA countries,2 and, in particular, policies that relate to the increasingly central 
position of ethical norms. Furthermore, from a qualitative research perspective, a large 
body of complementary academic literature exists, and some of the key texts will be 
highlighted in the following section.  
Although this is a diachronic study, focussing on the change, or otherwise, in the 
promotion of ethical norms with regards to the EU’s external action over time, there are no 
distinct limits to the period of time involved. In Part II, which takes the EU’s regional 
																																																								
2 Many of the bilateral agreements and communiqués are written in French. Where there has been a 
translation made, the original text is provided in a footnote.  
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policy towards the southern neighbourhood as the level of analysis, some historical 
background is provided regarding the member states’ colonial relationships with the 
region, and also a brief outline of early European Community policies. Much of the 
relevant material dates from the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995, 
increasing in both scope and substance with the inauguration of the ENP in 2004. For 
obvious reasons, particular emphasis is placed on EU documents originating after the 
Arab Uprisings, especially those throughout 2011, during which time I argue that there 
was a significant shift in EU policy.3 The analysis of documents in Part III follows a similar 
pattern, mostly concluding at the end of 2015, which coincides with the most recent ENP 
review. 
Interviews were carried out in two stages, with support from the University of Otago, the 
Claude McCarthy Fellowship and the European Union Centres Network (EUCN) in New 
Zealand. The first research field trip took place in Brussels, where interviews where 
conducted at the EEAS, the European Parliament, Development and Cooperation – 
EuropeAid, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), and the 
German Marshall Fund. The second research trip took place in Tunisia, Morocco and 
Brussels, where interviews where conducted with a number of officials at the EU 
delegations in Tunis and Rabat, international human rights organisations, civil society 
groups, academics based in North Africa, Council Working Groups for the Maghreb 
region and human rights, and the EEAS. Additional interviews were conducted in New 
Zealand, with a visiting academic associated with the NPE literature, and by email with 
the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). With the exception of the email interview above, 
an open-questioning technique was utilised, generally over a period of one hour, whereby 
each interviewee was able to respond freely to individually tailored questions relating to 
their area of expertise.  
The interviews were conducted with approval from the University of Otago Human Ethics 
Committee, and a number of ethical considerations were observed. Each participant was 
																																																								
3 It is uncontroversial to state that EU policy-making, internally or externally, generally moves at a 
deliberate, almost ponderous, pace, and therefore the evidence that a substantive policy shift did occur 
during this period is a motivating factor to advance a hypothesis explaining why.  
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provided with an information sheet informing them of their right to decline answering 
any particular questions, and their right to be able to withdraw from the project at any 
stage without any disadvantage to themselves. Each participant was also provided with a 
consent form, in which they were given options regarding their anonymity: to be 
identified by name and, where relevant, position; to be cited by organisational affiliation 
only; or not to be cited at all. In some cases a digital recorder was used, although often the 
interviewee requested that it not be, due to the sensitivity of the information being given. 
Where recordings were made, every precaution was taken so that the data was only 
accessible to my supervisors and myself.  
Much of the early stages of this research project involved an extensive review of the 
available academic literature, with W. Lawrence Neuman’s (2003, p. 96) four goals in 
mind: 
• To demonstrate a familiarity with a body of knowledge and establish 
credibility. 
• To show the path of prior research and how a current project is linked to it. 
• To integrate and summarize what is known in an area. 
• To learn from others and stimulate new ideas. 
Although each of the chapters constituting this thesis is informed by a number of relevant 
academics and commentators, three particular bodies of literature provide the theoretical 
framework for the subsequent arguments, each set out in the three chapters of Part I 
respectively. An overview regarding the relevant fields of literature is provided in the 
summary of each pertinent chapter of the following section.  
There were some limitations to the research, beyond those already stated above with 
regards to case selection. In general, I was afforded access to EU officials from many 
different levels of the organisation, including high-ranking diplomats from the EEAS. 
There were, however, certain institutions within the EU that proved resiliently 
unresponsive to my repeated requests for an interview. Somewhat ironically, Members of 
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the European Parliament (MEPs) are almost completely unrepresented, declining all 
opportunities to respond to a member of the public. Furthermore, many EU officials, as 
can be seen on the list of interviews in the bibliography, requested not to be identified, 
either by name and position, or on occasion even by institutional affiliation. This was 
particularly the case during the research trips to Tunisia and Morocco, where there was an 
understandable reluctance to go on record with regard to sensitive material concerning 
certain subjects. While all of the interviews generated interesting points of discussion and 
an insight into the domain in question, I have generally included references only to those 
interviews that could be affiliated with some identifying feature.  
Finally, aspects of the explanatory hypothesis advanced in Chapter 7 draw on the premise 
that the international media coverage of the Arab Uprisings settled on a cohesive narrative 
that accentuated values such as freedom and democracy. While it was possible to find 
supporting evidence for this at a regional level, and some evidence with regards to 
Tunisia, there were fewer contemporary studies than I would have liked. It is hoped that 
with more research conducted on the media coverage of the Arab Uprisings in the future, 
particularly with regard to Tunisia, Morocco and other individual cases in the MENA 
region, there will be an opportunity to construct a more thorough timeline connecting the 
changing media narrative with events “on the ground”. For the moment, those studies 
that have been conducted support the hypothesis, and it is expected that future studies 
will as well.  
Thesis structure and argument 
This thesis is structured in three parts, which, as noted above, resulted from developments 
over the course of the research journey. Part I, consisting of three chapters, lays out the 
theoretical framework for the principal arguments and a number of secondary conclusions 
that emerged throughout the research and fieldwork. The subject matter explored in Part I 
concerns: the role of ethics in international relations; the institutional development of EU 
foreign policy and the designation of EU actorness; and the role of ethical norm promotion 
in the context of EU identity. Part II begins to address the impact of the Arab Uprisings on 
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the EU’s rhetorical commitment to ethical norm promotion, taking a regional approach as 
the level of analysis. To do this, Chapter 4 outlines EU policy and ethical norm promotion 
in the region prior to the Arab Uprisings, Chapter 5 examines the policy and institutional 
developments that emerged in 2011, and Chapter 6 focuses on EU policy towards the 
MENA region in the period that followed. Chapter 7 interprets the regional analysis, and 
advances a hypothesis to explain the policies and positions that the EU took in response to 
the Arab Uprisings. It also presents the primary and secondary conclusions to emerge 
from the regional analysis. Part III then examines both the hypothesis and conclusions in 
the context of the EU’s bilateral relationships with Tunisia and Morocco. The final chapter 
discusses the synthesised conclusions resulting from the regional and bilateral levels of 
analysis, and discusses the practical and theoretical implications of this research.  
The rest of this section presents a detailed overview of each chapter, including a synopsis 
of the principal argument and secondary conclusions.  
Part I 
Chapter 1 address the major issues and debates regarding the nature of ethics in 
international relations.  The purpose of examining the theoretical foundations of this 
academic discipline is twofold: it is a necessary endeavour to establish that there is such a 
concept as international ethics, so as to evaluate its role in EU foreign policy; and by doing 
so, to take certain positions which form the basis for later arguments. To answer the 
question of whether or not ethics are a feature of international relations at all, I present the 
contending positions of realism, liberalism and social constructivism. I show that whereas 
realist scholars limit or subordinate the role of ethics to the primacy of national interest, 
and liberal scholars acclaim it along universal lines, social constructivism provides an 
empirical case for both its existence and substance. Having established that ethical 
decision-making is a feature of international relations, I then outline moral justifications 
used to influence policy-makers when taking a particular ethical position. A necessarily 
brief examination of consequentialism, deontology, social contract tradition and rights-
based theory leads to the conclusion that the language of human rights has become the 
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leading paradigm when determining the ethical content of international relations, albeit 
with a number of issues which remain unresolved. Furthermore, a focus on moral 
justification highlights the tension between universalism and cultural relativism, a 
relevant dynamic in later discussions concerning the relationship between the EU and its 
southern neighbours. The final section of this chapter addresses the scope of ethical 
considerations in international relations, in particular the justification for intervention at 
all points of the coercive spectrum. Building on the premise that human rights has become 
the lingua franca of international ethics, I show that by taking an unequivocal standpoint 
on the debates in human rights discourse regarding classification, precedence and 
justifying principles, the EU has determined a justifiable scope for promoting human 
rights, and a sphere of responsibility for protecting them. The development of this 
position, and the policy mechanisms by which the EU attempts to achieve its goals, are the 
subject of the following chapter.  
As the introduction to Chapter 1 notes, although the field of ethics in international 
relations is a relatively new one, the literature that it draws upon dates as far back as 
classical Greece, and includes the most influential theorists from each of the leading 
International Relations (IR) theories. To address the question of whether or not ethics are a 
feature of international relations at all, I draw on literature from the realist, liberal and 
social constructivist traditions. With regards to the former, Charles Beitz (1979) and 
George Kennan (1985) extend the historical arguments of Thucydides and Niccolò 
Machiavelli, that there is no place for ethics in international politics, whereas Max Weber 
(1919), Hans Morgenthau (1952, 1967) and E.H. Carr (1949) offer more refined positions as 
to their subordinate role. Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) neo-realism rounds off the realist 
position, positing that the international structure precludes ethical consideration. Within 
the liberal tradition, arguments originating with Immanuel Kant are presented from the 
works of Michael Joseph Smith (1986, 1992), Mark Gismondi (2008) and Andrew 
Moravcsik (2008), each taking a particular ethical position along universal lines. From the 
social constructivist school of thought, contemporary theorists Richard Price (2008a, 
2008b), Martha Finnemore (1996) and Emanuel Adler (2012) outline the argument for co-
	 14	
constitution and the feasibility of moral progress. As is the case when engaging with any 
body of academic literature as part of a research process, certain positions are taken so as 
to form premises with which to construct further argument.  
Chapter 1 also addresses the issue of moral justification by policy-makers undertaking 
ethical decision-making, with reference to the competing frameworks of consequentialism, 
deontology, social contract tradition and rights-based theory. Although a necessarily brief 
outline of these frameworks is given, key thinkers from each approach make 
contributions: Jeremy Bentham (1996 [1789]) on consequentialist ethics; Immanuel Kant on 
deontological ethics; and David Mapel (1992) and T.M. Scanlon (1998) on contractualism. 
The outline of rights-based theory, and the subsequent section on scope and responsibility, 
draws on the work of contemporary scholars, such as Jack Donnelly (2001), Richard 
Shapcott (2000) and Stanley Hoffmann (1981), and makes reference to a number of 
relevant international documents that provide the basis of their arguments.  
Chapter 2 reviews the development of the EU’s external action since its inception, and 
outlines the various institutional contributions regarding the formulation and 
implementation of EU foreign policy. In the early parts of the chapter there is an emphasis 
on the ethical content of the treaties, communications, institutions and mechanisms of the 
EU’s relationship with the world beyond its borders. Having already established in the 
previous chapter that the language of human rights has become the basis of international 
ethics discourse, I focus on the evolution of this concept from an internal foundational 
principle to an intrinsic component of external action rhetoric. This analysis lays the 
groundwork for the arguments in Chapter 3, regarding the centrality of ethics to EU 
identity, and also serves to highlight another relevant dynamic with regards to EU 
external action, namely the inherent inter- and intra-institutional tensions between its 
various foreign policy-making actors.  
The final section of Chapter 2 concerns the nature of the EU as an international actor; 
specifically, whether or not the EU, as a supranational conglomeration of states, can be 
considered an actor in its own right. As this thesis is based on the fundamental premise 
	 15	
that the EU is indeed an international actor in its own right, the argument demonstrating 
this position is presented with reference to European and regional studies. The principal 
contributors are Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler (2006), Björn Hettne (2011), Mathew 
Doidge (2011), Fredrik Söderbaum and Luk Van Langenhove (2005), who build on 
previous positions taken by Gunnar Sjöstedt (1977) and Karen E. Smith (2003b) to counter 
the realist and liberal arguments against the attribution of EU actorness.  
Chapter 3 explores the relationship between ethics, norms and interests, within the context 
of contemporary NPE literature. This field of academic enquiry is a particularly useful 
framework to address the role of ethics in EU external action, as it includes discussion of 
each relevant theoretical issue associated with this research project. The chapter opens 
with an overview of the NPE debate, including the key arguments for and against. The 
key point of contention, that of ethics versus interests, is the basis of the following section, 
where I distinguish between self-regarding, collective and other-regarding interests, and 
identify the EU’s ethical norms as those with recourse to the UN’s declarations and 
covenants on international human rights. I establish that ethical norm promotion is an 
essential part of the EU’s self-perceived identity, and this position serves as a foundational 
premise for the hypothesis presented in Part II. The chapter concludes by addressing some 
of the relevant issues regarding the EU as an ethical norm promoter, which also inform 
some of the secondary conclusions that have resulted from this research.  
The theoretical discussion in Chapter 3 takes place within a well-defined body of academic 
literature, pertaining to the arguments and issues of the EU as a normative and/or ethical 
actor. Ian Manners’ (2002) seminal article “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in 
Terms?”, has led to over a decade of academic research exploring the relationship between 
the promotion of international norms and power within EU foreign policy. A number of 
authors have expanded on Manners’ work to put forth arguments for the EU to be 
considered either a normative power or an ethical actor, in particular Richard Whitman 
(2011, 2013), Helene Sjursen (2006a), Lisbeth Aggestam (2004, 2008, 2009), Sonia Lucarelli 
(2006) and Manners (2006c, 2008a, 2008b) himself. Consistently arguing against this 
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position have been Thomas Diez (2005), Adrian Hyde-Price (2006, 2008), and Richard 
Youngs (2004), although each from distinct and separate theoretical standpoints.  
Part II 
Having addressed the theoretical issues relevant to the EU as an ethical norm promoter in 
Part I, the four chapters that comprise Part II examine the impact of the Arab Uprisings on 
the EU’s southern neighbourhood policy by analysing it before, during and after the 
events of 2011, and by taking a regional approach as the level of analysis. 
Chapter 4 provides an analysis of EU policy towards the MENA region prior to the Arab 
Uprisings. The colonial history of certain EU member states is addressed, as this legacy is 
not easily separated from the EU as an actor in its own right by some of its partners in the 
southern neighbourhood. An overview of the earliest treaties and agreements between the 
European Community and its southern partners is followed by the launch of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership in 1995, which marks the beginning of the southern 
neighbourhood as a conceptualisation by EU policy-makers. The institutionalisation of the 
ENP in 2004 marks a shift towards bilateral agreements and differentiation, followed by a 
reinforcement of regionalism with the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008. 
The chapter concludes with an evaluation of EU policy objectives towards the MENA 
region prior to the Arab Uprisings, showing that a rhetorical commitment to ethical norm 
promotion gave way to priorities of stability and security.   
After a brief overview of the Arab Uprisings themselves, Chapter 5 assesses the various 
EU policy responses, overarching strategies, institutional developments, funding 
provisions and initiatives throughout 2011. The regional policy documents regarding the 
southern neighbourhood are closely examined, as are the establishment of the 
Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility (CSF), European Endowment for Democracy (EED) 
and the Support to Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) Programme. The 
EU’s financial responses to the dramatic events unfolding in the southern neighbourhood 
are assessed, as is the contemporary ENP review, the framework of which includes the 
above policy developments. The EU’s objectives for the MENA region in 2011 are 
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evaluated, and I argue that there was a significant shift in policy that made a renewed and 
substantive commitment to ethical norm promotion.  
Chapter 6 focuses on EU policy towards the southern neighbourhood in the period after 
2011, leading up to the ENP review in 2015. It begins with an overview of regional 
developments emanating from the Arab Uprisings, in particular the deteriorating security 
situations in Libya and Syria. I revisit the various policy measures established in 2011, to 
assess the EU’s ongoing commitment to them, or otherwise. A particular focus is applied 
to the EU’s support of civil society, via the CSF and EED, and positive conditionality, via 
the SPRING Programme, both essential elements of the EU’s approach to ethical norm 
promotion in response to the uprisings. The instability associated with deteriorating 
regional security and the resulting waves of refugees will be addressed, particularly with 
regard to their impact on the evolving ENP framework. Finally, the EU’s objectives in the 
region are evaluated, to identify elements of continuity and change from the previous 
chapters. I argue that in the period following 2011, the EU returned to a “business as 
usual” approach to the southern neighbourhood, once again prioritising self-regarding 
interests at the expense of ethical norm promotion.  
In light of this position, the shift in policy that occurred in response to the Arab Uprisings 
in 2011 demands further analysis. Chapter 7 is the culmination of the regional analysis 
taken in Part II, and is divided into four sections. The first provides an overview of the 
way in which the EU’s policy objectives towards the MENA region have changed and 
developed since the beginning of the relationship, particularly with regard to the EU’s 
promotion of ethical norms. I argue that despite a consistent rhetorical commitment to 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the region, with the exception of the EU’s 
2011 policy responses to the Arab Uprisings the EU has been unwilling, or unable, to 
jeopardise its “stability partnerships” with authoritarian regimes, who were seen as 
protecting the EU’s self-regarding interests concerning security and migration. The second 
section advances a hypothesis of rhetorical self-entrapment to explain the shift in policy that 
occurred in 2011, drawing on: Frank Schimmelfennig’s (2001) theory of rhetorical action; 
the EU’s prior commitment to ethical norm promotion as part of its external identity; the 
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role of the international media coverage during the Arab Uprisings; and the influence of 
the newly operational EEAS. The third section assesses the EU’s support of a burgeoning 
civil society in the southern neighbourhood, arguing that this represents one of the few 
features of the EU’s policy shift in 2011 to be clearly sustained in the period between ENP 
reviews. However, certain problematic issues relating to this are highlighted, drawing on 
theoretical elements presented at the end of Chapters 1 and 3. The final section assesses 
the EU’s use of political conditionality, in light of the “more for more” principle that 
featured as part of the 2011 policy shift, also drawing on theoretical elements presented at 
the end of Chapters 1 and 3. I argue that this approach has been a categorical failure, and 
needs to be thoroughly re-evaluated.  
Part III 
Chapters 8 and 9 take a bilateral level of analysis with regard to the conclusions and 
hypothesis that emerge from the research presented in Part II. The EU’s relationships with 
Tunisia and Morocco are analysed in terms of the EU’s policy objectives, before, during 
and after the Arab Uprisings. The observations from this approach are interpreted at the 
end of each chapter, following the schematic structure of Chapter 7: EU objectives; 
rhetorical self-entrapment; civil society; and political conditionality.  
I argue that Tunisia differs from the regional analysis, in that the EU’s focus and support 
for ethical norm promotion lasted longer than the 2011 shift, but that the pattern of a 
return to “business as usual” is still apparent. The hypothesis of rhetorical self-entrapment 
can be equally applied to the bilateral policy developments of the EU-Tunisia relationship, 
although there is less supporting evidence at this stage for the framing of the international 
media narrative. The positive aspects of the EU’s support of civil society to promote 
ethical norms are particularly pronounced in Tunisia, although the use of political 
conditionality for this purpose is mixed, at best, particularly in the context of a wider 
perspective. 
In the case of the EU’s bilateral relationship with Morocco, I argue that the 2011 shift in 
policy followed by a return to the prioritisation of issues such as security and migration is 
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corroborated with regard to the EU’s policy objectives. Concerning the rhetorical self-
entrapment hypothesis, Morocco provides a particularly interesting interpretation. 
Although there is a lack of specific analysis concerning the media coverage of the 
Moroccan protests and demonstrations, there is ample evidence to show that the EU itself 
contributed to an alignment of the Moroccan situation with wider regional events, 
including the credibility and appropriateness of the monarchy’s response, so as to 
maintain stability and justify its increasing levels of support. The positive aspects of the 
EU’s support of civil society are also evident in Morocco, although qualified by the 
continued influence of the monarchy, and the use of political conditionality is shown to be 
particularly inconsistent.  
The thesis concludes with a synthesis of the regional and bilateral levels of analysis in 
terms of EU objectives, rhetorical self-entrapment, civil society and political conditionality, 






































Chapter 1  
Theories of Ethics in International Relations 
Introduction 
The study of ethics within the discipline of International Relations (IR) theory is a recent 
academic development. Prior to the end of the Cold War, political theorists and 
international relations specialists had a tendency to downplay the topic (Bell, 2010b, p. 3), 
and there were still fewer attempts by contemporary moral philosophers and political 
theorists to investigate the ethical nature of relationships among international 
communities (Shapcott, 2010, p. vii).4 The last 20 years, however, have seen an exponential 
increase of the academic output in this area, and today there are numerous works in 
response to questions about the existence, substance and scope of international ethics. 
Furthermore, although the academic subject itself is relatively modern, the subject matter 
draws on the work of philosophers and theorists dating as far back as classical Greece, and 
includes all of the major contributions that have informed traditional IR theory.  
The purpose of this chapter is to address the major issues and debates regarding the 
nature of ethics in international relations. In order to assess the role of ethics in EU foreign 
policy, both in a general sense and regarding its response to the Arab Uprisings, it will 
first be necessary to answer the question of whether or not ethics are a feature of 
international relations at all. To do so, I will present the contending positions of the three 
leading IR theories: realism, liberalism and social constructivism. Whereas realist scholars 
limit or subordinate the role of ethics to the primacy of national interest, and liberal 
scholars acclaim it along universal lines, I will show that social constructivism provides a 
compelling case for both its existence and substance. Furthermore, social constructivism 
highlights the limitations of the liberal position and the extended possibilities with regard 
to the realist position. 
																																																								
4 This is not to say that the role of ethics was absent in discussions of foreign policy during the Cold War, but 
that it was limited to specific fields of study such as global poverty, intervention and, in particular, war. See 
Bell (2010a, p. 3) for examples of pioneering and significant literature during this period.  
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Having established that ethical decision-making is a feature of international relations I will 
then outline the various moral justifications that influence policy-makers when taking a 
particular ethical position. The categories of consequentialism, deontology, social contract 
tradition and rights-based theory are necessarily broad, but will focus the debate on the 
tension between universalism and cultural relativism, the issue of moral justification most 
relevant to this thesis. I will show that human rights discourse has become the leading 
paradigm when determining the ethical content of international relations, although a 
number of issues remain unresolved.  
The final section addresses the scope of ethical considerations in international relations, in 
particular the justification for intervention at all points of the coercive spectrum. Although 
this issue will be framed in terms of the debate between cosmopolitanism and 
communitarianism, the emergence of human rights as the lingua franca of international 
ethics will be the central feature. By taking an unequivocal position on the debates in 
human rights discourse regarding classification, precedence and justifying principles, the 
EU has determined a justifiable scope for promoting human rights, and a sphere of 
responsibility for protecting them. In later parts of the discussion, it will become apparent 
that some actors it engages with in its southern neighbourhood agree with neither the 
EU’s methods, nor its justifications.  
Addressing the issues regarding whether or not ethics are a feature of international 
relations, the basis of their moral justification and the legitimate scope for ethical 
consideration, will clarify both the substance of their role in EU foreign policy and the 
inherent tensions they give rise to with regard to external relationships. In order to do so, 
however, it will first be necessary to clarify the conceptual terminology relevant to such a 
discussion. 
Conceptual formalities  
The distinction between ethics and morality is a subtle one, yet has been subjected to 
intense philosophical debate (Hutchings, 2010, p. 7). The origins of each word come from 
Greek and Latin respectively, both being conceptual expressions of “custom” and 
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“tradition” within societies (Preston, 2001, p. 18). In contemporary usage ethics may refer 
to the way in which we conduct ourselves, both individually and as a community, based 
on our moral values. Ethics may also refer to the philosophical study of moral values: 
Ethics, or moral philosophy, asks basic questions about the good life, about 
what is better and worse, about whether there is any objective right and 
wrong, and how we know if there is (MacKinnon, 2006, p. 3). 
Ethics, therefore, can be both moral action and moral justification. Morality, on the other 
hand, can also refer both to an individual or societal code of conduct that informs ethical 
action, or is used to justify an ethical position (Gert, 2012). In light of this ambiguity, for 
the purposes of this discussion the words “ethics” and “ethical” will be used 
interchangeably with the words “morality” and “moral”.  
In the discussion of ethics and morality above, there are already a number of other terms 
that require clarification. The dichotomies of “good and bad” and “right and wrong” are 
an integral part of any coherent moral philosophy, yet are not confined to the discipline of 
ethics. It is possible to be a good or bad map-reader by taking the right or wrong direction, 
without any reference at all to morality. There is also no need to strictly define the terms in 
the situation above for clarity. However, this is not the case when the same terms are 
applied to ethical decision-making: 
Every theory or approach to ethics will, by its very nature, redefine the 
meaning of the fundamental terms it uses. The words make sense in the 
context of a theory or overall view of life. Once removed from that context, 
they become vague and almost impossible to define. (Thompson, 2008, p. 37) 
Rather than provide an overarching definition of terms such as “good”, “bad”, “right” and 
“wrong” here, even if that were possible, each theoretical approach to international ethics 
in the following section will include working interpretations, although not always 
explicitly stated.  
A further conceptual formality involves clarifying the units of analysis with regard to the 
role of ethics in international relations; or, to be more precise, to reject the use of just one 
formal unit of analysis as a clarifying concept. As with the terms above, the different 
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emphases that each ethical theory places on the actors most relevant or central to 
international relations is one of the defining features of its argument. Some theories will 
posit that international relations primarily concern the relationship between states via 
their foreign policy mechanisms. Other theories will focus on the existence, absence or 
changing nature of anarchy in the international system. Yet others will open with a 
premise concerning the equality of individuals, regardless of nationality. These 
distinctions regarding the inherent nature of international relations are necessary steps 
towards the different conclusions that each theoretical position makes.   
The final conceptual point to clarify involves the distinction that is often made between 
descriptive and/or empirical theories on the one hand, and normative5 and/or prescriptive 
theories on the other. This distinction is a misleading one, for a number of reasons. As 
Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (2008, pp. 6-7) point out, all theories in the study 
of international relations exhibit both empirical and normative aspects. They do not base 
this claim on the conventional epistemological explanation, that our values influence our 
theories from the moment we frame our questions about the world, nor do they challenge 
it as a valid reason to question the distinction above. Rather, they argue that all theories 
are “contending practical discourses”, combining an empirical assessment of the world 
with a normative identification of goals in order to answer the question of “how we 
should act?”. Each of the theoretical perspectives on the role of ethics in international 
relations includes this prescriptive quality, even if it involves the negation of ethical 
considerations altogether.6 The positions of the leading IR theories with regard to the role 
of ethics in international relations are the subject of the following section.  
Are moral considerations a feature of international affairs? 
The resurgence of academic interest regarding ethical issues in international affairs has 
been a defining feature of IR theory in the post-Cold War period. The traditional theories 
																																																								
5 The term “normative” has a number of different connotations, a point that will be further elaborated upon 
in Chapter 3. In this chapter, normative is used to mean the expression of a value judgment, denoting that 
which should be done, usually with ethical connotations.  
6 Vittorio Hösle (2004, p. 77) adds the further point, that even those who contest the normative quality of a 
theory are themselves making a normative validity claim. 
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of realism and liberalism have built on their classical literature to develop contemporary 
responses to ethical questions, and new theories, such as social constructivism, have 
emerged. This section outlines the positions taken by each of these three traditions 
concerning the most fundamental question of whether or not moral considerations are a 
feature of international affairs at all. I will show that social constructivism provides an 
empirical case for both the existence and substance of international ethics, and in later 
parts of this chapter, that socially constructed moral progress is compatible with the 
emergence of human rights discourse as the lingua franca of international ethics.  
Realism: the limits and subordination of ethics 
The realist tradition has had a significant influence on the field of IR theory since its 
conception, and is a particularly good entry point to the debate as to whether or not moral 
considerations are a feature of international affairs. It is commonly assumed that realists 
deny the existence of such considerations altogether, Charles Beitz (1979, p. 15) going as 
far as to suggest that the sentiment ‘moral judgments have no place in discussions of 
international affairs or foreign policy’ is a foundational claim of the realist approach. 
However, a closer examination shows that realists seldom argue for the nonexistence of 
international ethics altogether, but predominantly give them a limited or subservient 
status to other considerations.  
Although realism is an increasingly diverse tradition, there are four propositions that can 
be considered central regarding its approach to moral considerations in international 
affairs:  
• Anarchy. The absence of government makes international relations a 
qualitatively distinct domain of political action. 
• Egoism. Individuals and groups tend to pursue self-interest narrowly 
defined. 
• Groupism. Politics takes place within and between groups. 
• Power politics. Egoistic groups interacting in anarchy generate a 
politics of power and security (Donnelly, 2008, p. 150) . 
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The last proposition captures the relationship between the preceding three, giving an 
indication as to what the prevailing “good” is in the realist approach to international 
ethics: the pursuit of power to achieve security, more commonly referred to as the national 
interest.  
An outright denial of moral consideration is seldom a feature of the realist argument and 
is mostly confined to its canonical texts. The ancient Greek historian Thucydides (1962 
[c431BC], p. 360), considered by many to be the founding father of realism (Ahrensdorf, 
1997, pp. 232-233), wrote in his account of the Peloponnesian War that in the pursuit of a 
nation’s interest ‘the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak have to 
accept what they have to accept’. In the view of Renaissance political philosopher Niccolò 
Machiavelli, moral laws were inapplicable to the political realm, where a nation’s survival, 
longevity or glory were the only relevant goals (Nardin & Mapel, 1992, p. 66). George 
Kennan (1985, p. 206), who wrote that the primary consideration of government was to its 
own national interest, the characteristics of which had no moral quality, gives a more 
modern account of this uncompromising position.  
A more common approach by realist scholars is to acknowledge moral considerations but 
to give them a subservient status, in varying degrees, to the national interest. The doctrine 
of raison d’état dictates that the interests of states take precedence over all other interests 
and values, and that the national interest of one’s own political group is to be prioritized 
(Donnelly, 2008, p. 154).7 Furthermore, it is the duty of national leaders to pursue the 
national interest without considering the ethical standards they might hold as private 
individuals (Donnelly, 2008, pp. 155-156). Realists such as Arnold Wolfers (1949, p. 188) 
applaud the nobility that such “statesmen” must show in taking upon themselves ‘the 
responsibility for sacrifices of value in order that others, as a nation, may protect or attain 
the things which they treasure’. In each case the national interest, however that may be 
defined, is given greater value than moral consideration, although Wolfers (1949, pp. 194-
195) concedes that there may be some instances when national leaders are viewed 
																																																								
7 Which leads to a further realist critique of moral considerations in international affairs, namely the cultural 
relativity of morals themselves. The issue of moral universalism versus cultural relativism will be addressed 
later in the chapter.  
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favourably by their citizens for prioritising the latter over the former, usually where some 
form of more intangible benefit is concerned. 
The subservience of morality to national interest is sometimes justified as a matter of 
prudence. In this line of argument, it would be irresponsible and careless to pursue 
policies based on moral considerations that might undermine the primary goal of state 
stability. It is acknowledged that morality is a feature of international affairs, but that the 
necessity of pursuing the state’s interest requires decisions that will often run contrary to 
it. This position does, however, allow for some ethical decisions to be made, or, at the very 
least, to prudentially choose the lesser of two evils taking moral consideration into 
account.8 
The predicament of having to choose the amoral over the moral is sometimes referred to 
as “the problem of dirty hands”. Max Weber (1919), in a lecture on the vocation of politics 
given just after the end of World War I, contrasted the maxim “ethics of principled 
conviction” with “ethics of responsibility”. He argued that the former represented action 
based on absolutist morality and ultimate ends, a position incompatible with international 
affairs. The latter, however, represented the nature of statesmanship, characterised by the 
ability to responsibly navigate the relationship between morality and international 
politics. When these two domains inevitably proved irreconcilable, the proficient 
statesman was one with the ability to ignore moral considerations in favour of the national 
interest.  
A more nuanced version of the realist approach contextualises the national interest as an 
explicitly moral value in itself, one that takes ethical priority over other values. For Hans 
Morgenthau (1952, p. 33): 
The choice is not between moral principles and the national interest, devoid 
of moral dignity, but between one set of principles divorced from political 
reality and another set of principles derived from political reality. 
																																																								
8 Even Machiavelli (2000 [1532], p. 105), who previously denied the role of morals in political decision-
making, allows for this type of consideration. In his advice as to the conduct of princes, he states that 
‘prudence consists of knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to take the lesser 
evil’. 
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In his seminal work Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau (1967, p. 10) goes on to advance 
the ‘moral principle of national survival’, which evokes the paradox of a moral ground for 
an amoral foreign policy (Nardin & Mapel, 1992, p. 99). Tony Coady (2008, pp. 21-22) 
argues that the prudence discussed above is not only a part of morality but ‘a moral virtue 
in its own right’. It is a line of argument which leads to the conclusion by E.H. Carr (1949, 
p. 159) that ‘[a]cts which would be immoral in the individual may become virtue when 
performed on behalf of the group person’. 
Yet another realist approach concerns the irreconcilable tension between moral 
considerations and national interest with regard to the realities of international politics. 
On this view, the anarchic character of the international arena, combined with the 
ontological self-interest of human nature, places constraints on the possibility of ethical 
interaction. The enduring quality of international anarchy rests on the premise that only 
the institution of government can temper a Hobbesian “state of nature”, an institution that 
is non-existent beyond the level of the state.9 Michael J. Smith (1986, p. 13) states that this 
is a ‘defining feature of realist thought [...] shared by virtually everyone calling himself a 
realist’. In this ungoverned space our interactions are dictated by human nature, the 
egoistic quality of which is another central tenet of realism. Not only will unconstrained 
self-interest overwhelm individual moral consideration, but, according to Reinhold 
Niebuhr, this tendency becomes magnified collectively to the point where moral action by 
groups is barely possible (McKeogh, 2007, pp. 197-198). 
The most complete account concerning the influence of the anarchic global system on the 
contingency of moral consideration in international affairs is provided by neo-realists, also 
known as structural realists. Kenneth Waltz (1979, pp. 99-119), the foremost proponent of 
this position, argues that the condition of international anarchy, resulting from the absence 
of world government, invariably leads states to attempt to ensure their own survival by 
pursuing policies based on the distribution of material capabilities between them and 
																																																								
9 The “state of nature”, which distinguishes the international arena from domestic society, is famously 
described by Hobbes (1968 [c1651], p. 185) as a domain in which ‘it is manifest that during the time that men 
live without a common power to keep them in awe, they are in that condition which is called war, and such 
is a war of every man against every man’. 
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other states. According to Arash Pashakhanlou (2014, p. 299), as Waltz makes the 
assumption 
that states are unitary actors that only differ in their capabilities and have to 
take care of themselves in the anarchic system, the balance of power 
[between them] becomes an ‘iron law’ as states can only ensure their 
survival by making sure that none of their rivals grows too powerful.  
Structural realists/neo-realists such as Waltz, therefore, ‘argue that appeals to human 
nature are unnecessary because structure determines the recurrent features of 
international politics’ (Crawford, 2011, p. 159). The national interest becomes devoid of 
domestic influences, and politicians’ only consideration is to that which expands the 
state’s capabilities in order to ensure survival in an anarchic environment. Adam 
Humphreys (2013, p. 864) notes that Waltz ‘pursues a kind of theory in which ethics and 
reflexivity have no role’, although he adds that Waltz ‘shares with his fellow realists a 
deeply ethical orientation towards the international’, in which the maintenance of peace 
and order is the primary goal. 
The tension between the national interest and moral considerations in international affairs 
is a defining feature of the realist tradition, from the outright denial of the latter in the 
canonical writings to the prioritisation of the former in contemporary literature. In 
contrast to classical realists, such as Carr and Morgenthau, who argue that moral norms 
do feature in international affairs, albeit in subservience to the national interest or as the 
pursuit of the national interest itself, neo-realists such as Waltz argue that states’ conduct 
in their dealings with one another is not at all amenable to moral evaluation (Fabre, 2013). 
The following section will provide a liberal critique of the various positions that realists 
have taken in this discussion, and outline an alternative view of international ethics. 
Liberalism: the primacy of a universal morality 
The liberal tradition in international relations is often considered to be the ethical 
alternative to the amoral conclusions of realism (Gismondi, 2008, p. 4). As with realism, it 
is a diverse range of arguments, including idealism, new liberalism, liberal 
internationalism and the Kantian or universalist tradition. Although there are numerous 
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points of difference between them, in particular regarding the centrality of states to the 
evolution of the international system, there are several core assumptions relevant to moral 
considerations in international affairs:  
• An optimistic view of human nature and community life; 
• The primacy of morality over power politics; 
• The priority of human rights and constitutional government; 
• The important role of law and international institutions in building 
political order (Amstutz, 2005, p. 56). 
Liberals of all persuasions believe that progress towards a more peaceful and cooperative 
world, in which the universally applicable rights of individuals are valued and protected, 
is possible. Thus, the prevailing “good” for the liberal tradition, that which frames moral 
consideration in international affairs, is the achievement of such a world. 
One of the foremost liberal critiques of the realist tradition is that it spectacularly 
overstates both the anarchic quality of international relations and the capacity of human 
nature for moral consideration within such a context. Rather than perceiving the world as 
an eternally competitive zero-sum game, liberals emphasise our natural inclination 
towards peaceful relations with one another and our capacity for cooperation, both at an 
individual and collective level.  That is not to say that we are indifferent to our national or 
self-interest, only that we are willing and capable of achieving these goals to the benefit of 
all. As Michael J. Smith (1992, p. 203) notes in this context, ‘[h]uman nature, far from being 
an obstacle to the eventual triumph of rational arrangements, will eventually express its 
true interests in peace and a thoroughly reformed international system’. 
Liberals and other non-realists have long contended that the notion of a Hobbesian war of 
all against all in the international arena is categorically false. Shortly after Machiavelli 
wrote The Prince, in which he impressed upon his new monarch the futility of moral 
consideration, his contemporary Desiderius Erasmus penned The Education of the Christian 
Prince and The Complaint of Peace. In both he implored the leaders of his time to reject the 
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assumption that ‘violent conflict and organized war are somehow inherent in the human 
condition’ (Bok, 1999). That the international arena is anarchic, inasmuch as it lacks the 
rule enforcement of an over-arching authority, is uncontested by liberals. This does not 
entail, however, that states will necessarily compete against one another aggressively 
without any regard to moral norms of behaviour. Whilst international anarchy may be a 
complicating factor in the realisation of liberal objectives, it is by no means pernicious.  
Contemporary liberals point to evolving global norms around human rights, the 
development of international law and the proliferation of international institutions as 
examples of an increasingly cooperative and interdependent world. It is an empirical 
claim, albeit a selective one, and also the basis of the liberal tradition’s normative 
dimension. As Mark Gismondi (2008, p. 5) notes, in an ideal liberal world 
human dignity would be recognized and protected by an effective system of 
international laws maintained and supported by international institutions 
and states accountable to those institutions for their behaviour. 
By this rationale, international institutions, be they governmental or non-governmental 
organisations, have the capacity to regulate anarchy and facilitate our natural inclination 
for cooperative behaviour (Keohane, 1989, pp. 1-20).  
Much of the liberal tradition’s approach to moral consideration in international affairs can 
be traced back to Immanuel Kant, in particular to his seminal article in 1795 “Perpetual 
Peace: A Philosophical Sketch”. Kant’s argument for a world republic of democratically 
sovereign states rests on the premise that it is possible to rationally comprehend universal 
principles that can govern and protect the inherent rights of all individuals (Rauscher, 
2012). The essence and impact of Kant can be seen in Cécile Fabre’s (2013) summary of 
liberal internationalism: 
Human beings are subject to their passions, fears, and appetites. But they 
also have the power rationally to determine their own actions, and in 
particular to do what is right, even when doing the right thing conflicts with 
what they want. The realm of the right is delineated by a set of universal 
moral principles. Those principles are discoverable by reason and are 
binding on all human beings irrespective of time and place. More precisely, 
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individuals, rather than states, are the primary locus of moral concern and 
respect.  
Realists and non-realists alike keenly contest the universality of the “good” and the 
“right” in liberal theory. The moral philosophy which underpins these opposing positions 
will be discussed later in the chapter, and the consequent implications of a universalist 
position for foreign policy-making, particularly that of the EU, will be a recurrent feature 
of this thesis.  
The realist argument that state behaviour is subject to a unique form of morality, divorced 
from the ethical considerations that characterise domestic society, is also disputed by 
liberalism. In its most extreme cosmopolitan form, state boundaries disappear altogether, 
discussed later with regard to the scope of moral responsibility in international affairs. 
What is relevant here is the interaction between domestic politics and foreign policy, both 
potentially geared towards the promotion and protection of individual human rights. The 
Kantian tradition emphasises the importance of domestic democratic accountability to the 
achievement of world peace, leading to a general liberal perspective that the structural 
relationships of states will evolve positively in response to domestic conditions 
(Gismondi, 2008, p. 18). A contemporary version of this position is offered by Andrew 
Moravcsik (2008, pp. 234-237), who argues that states act instrumentally to achieve goals 
that reflect the demands of domestic individuals and groups. From this line of argument, 
the universally held ethical convictions of certain liberal societies can conceivably develop 
into a moral crusade in the realm of international affairs.10 
Realists critique the liberal tradition on the grounds of ethical naïveté as to the reality of 
international relations, and of moral imperialism in the application of universal values to 
all contexts. Liberals, on the other hand, argue that the realist tradition massively 
exaggerates the competition and aggression inherent in human nature and state 
behaviour, and that a realist position lacks the normative dimension necessary for an 
																																																								
10 It should be noted, however, that Moravcsik himself did not draw normative or utopian conclusions from 
his argument about the nature of state preferences (Simpson, 2008, p. 257). 
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evolving international arena. Stanley Hoffmann (1981, p. 2), who has a foot in both camps, 
writes that narrow realists 
present a picture of the world that is both descriptively inaccurate and 
normatively undesirable [whereas] liberal visions of global order are 
implausible and that ‘ideal’ theorizing about international affairs has “little 
relevance to reality’.11 
While both traditions acknowledge the existence of moral considerations in international 
affairs, neither offers a satisfactory account of the relationship between international actors 
in an increasingly globalised and interdependent world. Realist claims that evolving 
international norms around ethical responsibility are driven by national interest alone 
cannot explain the burgeoning development of institutions catering to the promotion and 
protection of human rights. On the other hand, liberal claims that these developments owe 
their legitimacy to universal values are both overly utopian and self-defeating. Despite 
their claims, neither has adequately navigated a path ‘between the extremes of relativism 
and an inflexible absolutism’ (Gismondi, 2008, p. 4; Rosenthal, 1999, pp. 2-3). An 
alternative to these two traditions, one that provides a more coherent account of both the 
limits and possibilities for moral considerations in international affairs, will be outlined in 
the following section.  
Social constructivism: co-constitution and the feasibility of moral progress 
The emergence of social constructivism as a leading theoretical contender in the 
contemporary study of International Relations has coincided with the accelerated changes 
to the global system in the post-Cold War era. The process of globalisation has highlighted 
the range and impact of ethical issues such as human rights norms and democratic values 
(Seckinelgin & Shinoda, 2001, p. 1). Constructivists have introduced a paradigm that 
characterises the way in which moral considerations feature in international relations, and 
introduced arguments regarding the mechanisms by which they make a substantive 
impact on the behaviour of international actors. Richard Price (2008a, p. 317) notes that: 
																																																								
11 Hoffmann (1981, p. 12) provides a particularly sharp critique of the structural and philosophical basis of 
Weber’s “ethics of responsibility”, which he refers to as ‘tragic’, ‘depressed’ and ‘tormented’. 
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As a research program, one of its main substantive contributions to the field 
has been to show that moral norms – and thus ethics – matter in world 
politics.  
The empirical claims that constructivists make as to the influence of moral norms on 
international relations challenge not only the scepticism of the realist tradition, but also the 
utopianism of the liberal tradition.  
At the heart of constructivism lies the ontological premise that international actors, 
institutions and interactions can only be understood with regard to the social construction 
of each. The behaviour of actors is determined by perceptions of identity, both of 
themselves and others, which in turn is influenced by individual and collective meanings 
associated with the objects of interaction. Rather than view interests as fixed or exogenous, 
constructivists insist that ‘interests are formed and transformed through states’ 
interactions within the international system, and that ideational structures (of norms, 
rules, and beliefs) matter crucially’ (Fabre, 2013). This is not to say that material forces are 
not relevant to an actor’s socially constructed interests, but that ‘material forces must be 
understood through the social concepts that define their meaning for human life’ (Hurd, 
2008, p. 301).12 Interests, therefore, are derived from the social interaction between actors, 
and between actors and structures. 
This last point is particularly relevant to the role of moral considerations in international 
affairs. Although many non-constructivists, including some scholars from the realist and 
liberal traditions, posit a constitutive relationship between structures and agents, 
constructivism has introduced a theoretical perspective that goes beyond a separation 
between the two. The mutual constitution of structures and agents is summarised by Ian 
Hurd (2008, p. 304): 
A constructivist approach to co-constitution, by contrast, suggests that the 
actions of states contribute to making the institutions and norms of 
international life, and these institutions and norms contribute to defining, 
																																																								
12 To be clear, it is evident that the material external environment necessitates action and contributes to 
interests, both short- and long-term, but the range of responses available to an actor will be influenced by 
particular ideational structures, which are likely to change and evolve over time. 
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socializing, and influencing states. Both the institutions and the actors can be 
redefined in the process [emphasis added]. 
A state’s interest, therefore, contributes to the shaping of the organisations and norms that 
constitute the international arena, but is also shaped in turn by the development and 
transformation of these same institutions. 
With regard to moral considerations in international affairs, their contingency is not 
conditioned by perceptions of external threat or the receptivity of decision-makers to 
domestic preferences, although both may be an influencing factor. Nor is international 
anarchy a structural constraint leading to amoral necessities.13 Not only is the international 
system itself socially constructed by the interaction between structures and agents, its 
influence on state behaviour reflects an ideational aggregation of norms. Martha 
Finnemore (1996) takes this line of argument further, saying that ‘[s]tate interests are 
defined in the context of internationally held norms and understandings about what is 
good and appropriate’. It is one thing, however, to say that norms matter regarding what 
is considered good, but quite another to identify from the range of international norms 
that which constitutes the “good”.  
A common critique of constructivism is that it represents a descriptive ontology that, at 
best, avoids normative or prescriptive positions altogether, or, at worst, precludes the 
possibility of such positions being taken. As Price (2008b, p. 1) asks: 
How does one even approach the task of formulating robust answers to 
questions of ethics that can respond to charges of subjectivism and 
relativism when coming out of an intellectual tradition that suggests all such 
judgements and the complexes of intersubjective meanings that make them 
possible are themselves but time- and culture-bound constructions?  
Whereas much empirical work has been undertaken by this tradition to show that 
ethics/norms “matter”, and to outline the mechanisms by which they are diffused in 
international relations, the challenge for contemporary constructivist scholarship has been 
to show why certain socially constructed norms should be valued over others.  
																																																								
13 For a full account of the constructivist interpretation of international anarchy, see Wendt (1992, 1995). 
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The response has been to articulate a position that emphasises the possibility of moral 
progress in international affairs, one that transcends the scepticism of the realist tradition, 
but also recognises limits not accepted by the utopianism of the liberal tradition. Whereas 
realists argue that the advancement of global morals is unrealisable, either due to the 
nature of the international system or to the necessary prudential decisions made by actors 
within it, constructivists make an empirical argument as to the co-constitutive 
development of international norms, some of which may be ethical, with regard to both 
structures and agents. Whereas liberals base their normative prescriptions on universally 
held values, constructivists provide evidence as to what is actually achievable in a diverse, 
socially constructed reality.  
Emanuel Adler (2012, p. 102) notes ‘that if constructivism is about anything, it is about 
change’ and that its “added value” is the recognition of change as the evolution of social 
structures and the development of new constitutive norms and rules. Progressive moral 
change, from the constructivist viewpoint, 
represents a moral improvement upon the current social and political 
constellation, so in that sense the present – and the standards of ethics 
situated in the present – always form something of a contingent historical-
cultural baseline from which change is judged (Price, 2008b, p. 40). 
However, although this position provides a temporal dimension for assessing the “good”, 
there is still some room for contention as to the value of progressive moral change without 
an accompanying ethical defence as to its desirability. While the development of 
international norms such as the Ottawa Convention banning landmines may seem self-
evidently good to some, there is by no means unanimous acceptance of it as an example of 
moral progress.14  
In order for the constructivist tradition to provide a coherent normative component that 
validates the “goodness” of moral progress, further ethical justification is necessary. 
However, the purpose of this section has been to establish that moral considerations are 
indeed a feature of international affairs, the basic premise that this thesis rests upon, and 
																																																								
14 For example, see Kenneth Anderson’s (2000) critique of the Ottawa Convention. 
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that social constructivism provides a convincing argument as to their existence, substance 
and associated limits and possibilities. The justifications for taking a particular moral 
position in international relations will be addressed in the following section.  
Justifying moral considerations in international affairs 
When taking moral considerations into account, international actors rely on a range of 
contending approaches to justify actions based on ethical imperatives, or inaction based on 
moral prohibition. The purpose of this section is to outline some competing frameworks 
for justification, so as to better understand the way in which ethics is applied to policy later 
in the discussion, and to establish human rights discourse as the contemporary framework 
for ethical considerations in international affairs. It will be, at best, a superficial account of 
the moral philosophy underpinning those decisions influenced by moral considerations, 
and the categories of consequentialism, deontology, social contract tradition and rights-
based theory are necessarily broad. Nevertheless, an outline of these approaches will 
clarify not only the moral justifications of the relevant actors to this discussion, in 
particular the EU, but also the major issues of contention concerning their relationships.  
The most pervasive issue with regard to moral considerations in international affairs is the 
tension between universalism and cultural relativism. At its simplest, the issue can be 
framed in the following way:  
If morality is entirely objective, how can we explain well-known differences 
between cultures and between individuals on specific moral questions? But, 
on the other hand, if morality is merely subjective, why is there so much 
concurrence between societies at the most basic level of morality? (Harbour, 
1999, p. 103) 
Cultural relativists object to any moral justification that maintains universal applicability 
across time and space, and defend the legitimacy of community-specific moral 
frameworks. Yet, most theories of moral justification succumb to what Veronica Pin-Fat 
(2010, p. 3) refers to as the “metaphysical seduction”, namely ‘a desire to locate a 
foundation for universality so that an international ethic can, indeed, apply to everyone on 
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a global scale’. The way in which each of the following frameworks addresses this tension 
will inform later parts of the discussion. 
Consequentialist ethics 
As the title suggests, consequentialist ethics focuses on the ends, or consequences, of an 
action for its moral justification. This is not to say that the goals or intentions of an action 
are not relevant, or that the means by which they are achieved are without moral value. It 
is to say, however, that goals and means acquire their moral legitimacy from, and are 
therefore subordinate to, the results of the action itself. This ends-based theory of ethics 
provides no uniform criteria by which to judge the “goodness” of the result. There is no 
intrinsic “rightness” or “wrongness” of any particular action from this standpoint, insofar 
as it conforms to an articulation of the “good”, however that may be defined.  
The realist tradition, as shown earlier, differentiates the morality of states from the 
personal morality of individuals, or the morality of the domestic sphere. It is not an 
amoral position, as has been widely assumed, but one in which the national interest has 
moral priority. It is fundamentally a consequentialist-based tradition, in that it argues for 
rational and prudential decision-making directed to the ends by which the national 
interest is secured (Amstutz, 2005, p. 50). It represents a form of ethical egoism in that the 
unitary interest of each state is the goal of ethical action in international affairs. The 
national interest, in its most straightforward form, provides ‘the value to be pursued and 
defended, while a foreign policy limited to and by the pursuit of that national interest and 
a prudent consequentialism provides a responsible limit on state action’ (Williams, 2005, 
p. 169). 
The realist tradition is not alone, however, in drawing on consequentialist ethics to justify 
moral action. Utilitarianism, one of the most influential expressions of ends-based ethics, 
has inspired a number of strands within the liberal tradition. Its founder, 18th century 
philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1996 [1789], p. 11), argued that human beings are governed 
by an attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain, leading to a principle of utility which 
recognises this subjection. From this premise, moral legitimacy is to be found in the utility 
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of ends that maximise the former and minimise the latter. However, although individual 
happiness is the weighted criteria, it is the aggregation of happiness at a societal level that 
provides moral justification.15 This requires a concomitant value of individual worth, the 
central postulate of the liberal tradition, and an impartiality of decision-making that 
maximises ‘the good of all sentient beings everywhere’ (Ellis, 1992, p. 173).  
Although contemporary liberals provide a more nuanced account of the individual, one in 
which the value of fundamental rights transcends philosophical hedonism, some positions 
within the tradition take a limited consequentialist approach towards the achievement of a 
universally-defined conception of the “good”. Realists also take a consequentialist 
approach towards the moral justification of action, narrowly defining each state’s national 
interest as the ends-based criterion. Both positions are subject to the foremost critique of 
consequentialism, namely that there appears to be ‘no constraints on the means we may 
use to promote the good’ (Cummiskey, 2013). For some liberals it is morally justifiable to 
invade another country if the result is the transformation from authoritarianism to 
democracy, thus ensuring the universal right to political participation for its citizens. For 
some realists it is morally justifiable to use targeted drone strikes in the name of national 
security, regardless of the collateral damage to civilians. Both scenarios would be subject 
to a passionate denunciation from large segments of the international arena, principally 
along the lines that the end does not justify the means.16  
Certainly there is no account of international ethics that can abstract itself from its 
entailing consequences, although, as will become apparent below, some deontological 
positions imply that this is possible. Social constructivists, for example, value the 
procedural utility of international norms, but do not afford them the status of moral 
justification. However, a purely consequentialist approach to ethics faces a number of 
challenges in an increasingly interdependent world: the uncertainty and unpredictability 
of outcomes; the justification of actions considered unpalatable by others; and, most 
																																																								
15 John Stuart Mill, Bentham’s student and successor, was explicit as to this universalistic extent of moral 
justification (Ellis, 1992; Mill, 1998 [1863]).  
16 It should be noted that some consequentialists might also object to the above scenarios, by taking a wider 
view of the consequences, i.e. the suffering of citizens subjected to invasion or drone strikes. 
	 42	
importantly, the acceptance of a subjective articulation of the “good”. A refutation of this 
last point is taken up in the following outline of deontological ethics.  
Deontological ethics 
Whereas consequentialist ethics prioritises the results of action for moral justification, 
deontological ethics determines ethical decision-making on the basis of goals and 
intentions. It is distinguished by the rules, maxims and principles that indicate the 
“rightness” or “wrongness” of these goals and intentions, the character of which are 
absolute and universally applicable. Consequently, certain outcomes, however desirable, 
can be considered immoral if the means by which they are to be achieved do not 
correspond to a particular articulation of the “good”. It is also an agent-centred, or agent-
relative, position, in that actors acquire duties and obligations as a result of the absolute 
values that inform moral action.17 How then, from a deontological perspective, should 
decision-makers determine a standard for moral justification?  
Throughout history there has been a proclivity to establish moral claims in an appeal to 
the divine testament of religiously based ethical traditions. By this account, sometimes 
referred to as Divine Command Theory, the ‘duty or right to be obeyed is revealed by a 
divine authority and ought to be followed regardless of the consequences’ (Preston, 2001, 
p. 48). Appeals to the Christian/Judaic Ten Commandants or Islamic shari’a law, to name 
but two traditions, acquire a universal legitimacy that extends beyond the particular 
community to which these moral truths have been revealed by scripture. As William 
Schweiker (2013) notes: 
Historically the dominant moral teaching among the religions is the claim 
that a specific religion has the one true morality and other peoples must 
either conform to it, live by their own customs within its specified limits, or 
be treated as morally reprobate.  
Although, according to this approach, religious scripture provides the principal 
foundation for moral authority, within the Christian tradition it has also been possible to 
comprehend absolute principles by way of natural reason (Hutchings, 2010, pp. 38-39). 
																																																								
17 For a full account of the central role of agents to deontological ethics, see Portmore (2013). 
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During the medieval period, it was understood that a universally applicable natural law 
was accessible to all human beings, albeit one which corresponded to the prevailing 
conception of God. The idea that there were moral laws inherent in humanity, and able to 
be grasped rationally, was a central feature of the deontological ethics expressed by Kant 
during the Enlightenment period (Hutchings, 2010, p. 39).  
Kant, who Mark Amstutz (2005, p. 36) refers to as ‘the father of rule-based analysis’, 
argued that moral justification for action was to be found in the categorical imperative. The 
two key dimensions of this principle are that persons are to be treated and valued as ends 
rather than means, and that individuals should act in accordance with maxims that they 
would will to become universal law (Amstutz, 2005, p. 36). Unlike consequentialism, there 
are no moral standards relative to particular states or communities, and no situations 
where means acquire moral justification on the basis of ends. Furthermore, while Kant 
accepted that human beings are susceptible to their passions and emotions, he argued that 
we are also able to use our powers of rationality to arrive at universal maxims regarding 
“what should be done unto others” simply be reasoning what we would have “others do 
unto us”.  
The profound and enduring influence of Kantian ethics on the liberal tradition cannot be 
overstated. As Gismondi (2008, p. 9) argues:  
Liberals disenchanted with utilitarianism eventually adopted much of 
Kant’s philosophy as well, especially his ethics. Particularly in recent 
decades, Kantian thought has been the most common source of ethical 
theorizing among liberal thinkers.  
Kant has been the foundational source for liberal internationalists, who find in his work 
the intellectual justification for many, if not all, of their reforming mechanisms: 
international law; economic liberalism; international institutions; the pacific effects of 
accountable governance; and, for the less statist-orientated, a cosmopolitical world order 
(Franceschet, 2002, p. 79). However, just as Kantian philosophy provides much of the 
framework for the liberal approach to international affairs, so too does it provide the 
object of its foremost critique. The requirement of a universal or absolutist morality by 
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Kantian ethics, or indeed any deontological position, is considered inflexible and 
inappropriate by contending theories. Realists, such as E.H. Carr and George Kennan, 
argue that morality is relative to a specific interpretation of national interest, and warn 
against the assumption that the values of a particular community have validity for other 
people (Donnelly, 2008, pp. 150-151). Constructivists contend that universal principles are 
both counterintuitive and limit the possibility of constructing a substantial global ethic.  
The metaphysical seduction of applying universal principles to evolving global norms and 
international law is understandable. However, disregarding the legitimacy of culturally 
relative contentions in the international arena can lead to a more serious indictment than 
cultural eminence:  
In one sense, liberal universalism reflected a hopeful expectation that the 
commonalities of human societies could transcend cultural differences and 
serve as the basis for a global ethic of peace and justice. Yet that 
universalism also became the basis for a moral justification of liberal 
imperialism (Gismondi, 2008, p. 9). 
The charge that a deontological ethics in the hands of a dominant international actor 
entails moral imperialism is a persistent feature of contemporary discourse on 
international ethics. The way in which the EU approaches the role of ethics in international 
affairs will be discussed extensively in the following chapters. It should be noted here, 
however, that it draws heavily on a liberal deontology for its theoretical justification. 
Taking a universalist approach in its relationships with other actors, particularly those 
actors whose competing moral values are an inherent feature of social and political life, 
creates tensions and challenges for policy decision-makers. The situation is further 
compounded by the colonial history of EU member states, leading to charges of neo-
colonialism regarding its promotion of absolute values. An elaboration of this last point 
will be taken up in the discussion of ethics and intervention later in this chapter.  
The contractarian tradition 
There is clearly no neat dividing line between different approaches to moral justification. 
The results of actions are always relevant, and bear some relationship to foundational 
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principles. The contractarian tradition adds another layer to discussions about 
international ethics, not by offering an alternative to consequentialist and deontological 
positions, but by providing tools for examining social and political relationships with each 
in mind (Preston, 2001, p. 55). It is particularly relevant to moral considerations in 
international affairs, by virtue of its emphasis on voluntary consent to agreements through 
mutually respectful interaction. 
At the heart of the contractarian tradition is the social contract, the agreement that binds 
independent parties together on the basis of rights and responsibilities. It is a 
predominantly hypothetical construct,18 a device by which claims of moral justification 
derive their normative force from the agreement of the parties involved. It has two 
fundamental elements: a characterisation of the initial situation, where the rules of 
morality or justice are absent; and a characterisation of the parties to the contract, with 
differing conceptions of their motivations and capacity for rational interaction (Cudd, 
2012).  
There are two distinct strands to the contractarian tradition, both with practical and 
theoretical implications for moral considerations in international affairs. Traditional social 
contract theorists follow Hobbes’ lead in positing an anarchic “state of nature” as the 
initial situation, in which rational individuals would value reciprocity and cooperation as 
a means to pursue their own interests. This position assumes that each party would have 
shared motivations and roughly equal capacities, a situation not reflected in the 
international arena. Furthermore, unlike the domestic contract which emerges from these 
conditions, traditional contractarians ‘saw little or no reliable reciprocity in international 
society [and] they concluded that duties of justice between states were relatively weak or 
nonexistent’ (Mapel, 1992, p. 181). The best that can be hoped for, in terms of international 
morality, are agreements that limit the adverse effects of each actor’s pursuit of their own 
interests.   
																																																								
18 Although some academics do accord it a historical reality, particularly in the service of gender and racial 
oppression; see, for example, Pateman (1988) and Mills (1997). 
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Many contemporary contract theorists, on the other hand, take a Kantian approach to the 
justification of moral principles. Rather than rational self-interest providing the motivation 
for consent to the contract, it is the pursuit of a moral code that can be rationally accepted 
as universally applicable. As Gerald Gaus and Shane Courtland (2011) argue, the Kantian 
line of social contract thought holds 
that rationality requires that we respect persons, which in turn requires that 
moral principles be such that they can be justified to each person. Thus, 
individuals are not taken to be motivated by self-interest but rather by a 
commitment to publicly justify the standards of morality to which each will 
be held. 
It is a distinctly liberal approach, in that it not only posits an inherent value in the 
individual, but also attributes to them a rational appreciation of universal morality. This 
universality carries over to state motivation in the formation of international agreements 
and institutions, being dictated by an absolute conception of moral duty (Mapel, 1992, p. 
184). As such, it is susceptible to the same critiques as the Kantian deontology of the 
previous section.19 
A more refined articulation of contemporary contract theory, and one with particular 
relevance to the transposition of moral philosophy to international affairs, is 
contractualism. Unlike the Kantian contract, which seeks to base social and political 
agreements on universal principles that all would agree to, contractualists base 
institutional agreements on principles that no one can reasonably object to. T.M. Scanlon 
(1998, p. 153), whose influential work has become synonymous with this position, argues 
that:  
An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be 
disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behaviour 
that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general 
agreement.  
																																																								
19 It may appear sacrilegious not to include John Rawls in a discussion of contractarianism, particularly as he 
is credited with reinvigorating the tradition in the contemporary era. Although Rawls does provide a 
particularly nuanced version of social contract theory, his characterization of the initial situation is fashioned 
to include ethical restraints of a deontological, or Kantian, nature. As such, the same problems arise 
regarding culturally relative conceptions of the “good”. For a brief overview of Rawls contract theory, 
including this critique, see Hutchings (2010, pp. 36-38). 
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It is a subtle difference, but one with far-reaching implications. The self-interested 
motivation of the Hobbesian position is rejected, but so to is the universal starting point of 
the Kantian position. Although parties to the contract are still autonomous and rational 
agents, agreement to principles is to be reached by mutually respectful interaction. It is an 
essential feature of all social contract theory that the rules and constraints placed on each 
consenting party must be justifiable to them (D'Agostino, Gaus, & Thrasher, 2012). 
Contractualism, however, is distinguished by the process leading to the underlying 
principles that are converged upon: 
It invites us to think of a valid principle for the regulation of a certain type of 
situation as one that is worked out through a process in which parties to the 
agreement with distinct points of view participate as co-deliberators, each 
with an equal voice, in working out what the principle ought to be (Kumar, 
2013). 
It is a challenging and demanding requirement, but one that endeavours to bring together 
universalists and cultural relativists in an attempt to formulate foundational principles with 
which to construct institutions that each party can consent to, or, at the very least, no party 
can reasonably object to. With regard to moral considerations in international affairs, it 
highlights both the successes and failures of ethical consensus, nowhere more so than in 
burgeoning regime of international human rights.  
The language of human rights 
Although the idea that individuals possess fundamental rights is rooted in Enlightenment 
philosophy, the development of institutional protection for human rights in the 
international arena is more recent, rapidly becoming a ubiquitous feature of the modern 
era. Their centrality to contemporary discussions about moral considerations in 
international affairs has developed in a way that ‘they have become a kind of lingua franca 
of ethics talk so that much of the discussion about ethics in international relations takes 
place making use of the vocabulary of rights’ (Vincent, 1992, p. 267). 
Each of the moral justifications discussed above includes some reference to fundamental 
rights, although with differing implications. Social contract theorists assign certain 
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essential rights when characterising the nature of consenting parties to the agreement; 
deontic theorists ground moral claims on unalienable individual rights, albeit with 
differing conceptions as to their basis; and even consequentialists, who often stand 
accused of sacrificing individual rights to the achievement of a collective “good”, are 
compelled, for this very reason, to outline a bulwark of rights-based constitutional 
protection.20  
Yet the ever-increasing recourse to the language of human rights in terms of moral 
consideration in international affairs in no way signifies a point of convergence with 
regard to the divisive issues discussed previously. On the contrary, the development of 
human rights institutions, in the context of increasing globalisation, has intensified 
debates about moral justification. As Hoffmann (1981, p. 95) notes, all the incompatibilities 
between ethics and international politics are acutely represented in human rights 
discourse: 
• The structure of the international milieu which limits opportunities 
for moral action; 
• The conflicts of value systems which result in very sharp 
disagreements on conceptions of human rights and on priorities; 
• The difficulties of assessment and evaluation are all manifest [which] 
lead repeatedly either to failure, or to confrontation, or to distorted 
uses of the human rights issues for purposes of political warfare at 
home or abroad.  
All of these issues are present in the relationship between the EU and its neighbours in the 
MENA region, and will be discussed at length in the following chapters. First, however, it 
is worthwhile briefly investigating the very concept of a “human right”.  
The term “human right”, in its most basic and literal interpretation, postulates that all 
individuals are entitled to certain rights by virtue of their humanity. The classification, 
precedence and moral justification of human rights diverges across time and space, but 
																																																								
20 J.S. Mill, for example, speaks freely of rights, but ultimately explains them by reference to moral notions 
such as utility (Holmes, 2007, p. 183). 
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they are invariably held to be universally applicable. David Boucher (2009) notes the 
historical process by which the idea of human rights developed out of the natural rights 
tradition during the Enlightenment era, but argues convincingly that they are conceptually 
different. Rather than being pre-societal or divinely ordained, contemporary 
understanding of human rights rests on an international convergence recognising their 
efficacy in promoting human welfare in the context of modern society: 
There is shared commitment [at the international level] that if human life 
and its flourishing is valued above all else, then special protections, and 
modes of assistance to promote the ideas in theory and practice, are required 
(Boucher, 2009, p. 358). 
Contemporary international human rights norms posit a relationship between individuals 
and government, principally states, by which the latter is obliged to respect and uphold 
the equally held rights of the former. The institutionalisation of this relationship, however, 
brings us back to the issues highlighted by Hoffmann above. 
Following the end of World War II, and partly as a reaction to the widespread awareness 
of the gross atrocities committed during it, a number of international institutions began to 
develop with the express purpose of promoting and protecting human rights. There are 
now well-established conventions on human rights in Europe, Africa and the Americas, 
which include mechanisms for the prosecution of rights violators in these regions. At the 
forefront of this movement, both in the post-World War II era and today, is the United 
Nations (UN). The preamble to the founding charter of the UN includes a reaffirmation of 
‘faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, [and] 
in the equal rights of men and women’ (United Nations, 1945). Subsequently, there have 
been numerous UN treaties and agreements outlining a comprehensive schedule of civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights, resulting in a ‘significant body of 
international law of human rights that has developed through the codification of norms, 
rules and directives in binding conventions’ (Amstutz, 2005, p. 90). Be that as it may, 
despite a widespread acceptance that global human rights norms are justifiably 
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established,21 there remain sharp divisions regarding the classification of certain rights as 
being fundamental, and the precedence of some rights over others.  
The UN’s role in promoting global human rights norms, and even the idea of fundamental 
human rights itself, has been persistently criticized as being heavily dependent on a 
Western and liberal conception of morality and politics. Although there have been 
numerous academic works highlighting cultural agreement for the UDHR (see Schmitz & 
Sikkink, 2012, pp. 517-518), and widespread acceptance of the ICCPR and ICESCR, there 
have also been cultural challenges to universal applicability regarding any definition of a 
human right. In the context of this discussion, for example, there is a sharp division 
between the EU’s position, which bases its commitment to international ethical 
considerations firmly on the UN’s International Bill of Human Rights,22 and that of its 
Middle Eastern and North African neighbours, whose conception of human rights is 
heavily influenced by deontic and religious values. All of the MENA states incorporated 
into the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy and Union for the Mediterranean, with the 
exception of Israel, are also members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, which 
countered the UN’s interpretation of human rights in 1990 with the Cairo Declaration on 
Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI). Although there are many points of agreement between 
the UDHR and CDHRI, there are also clear points of departure and incompatibility.23 The 
latter’s non-negotiable edict that all human rights are only defendable when in accordance 
with shari’a law leads to a tension between universals in the context of the ENP and UfM. 
It is a tension which can only be resolved by a departure from the extremes of both radical 
universalism and radical cultural relativism (Amstutz, 2005, p. 88). 
																																																								
21 At the time of writing, both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) had been ratified by over 160 
states. It is widely accepted, together with the comprehensive endorsement of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), collectively know as the International Bill of Human Rights, that these documents 
have reached the status of customary international law (Charlesworth, 2008; Donnelly, 2001; Meron, 1991; 
Reidel, 2011; Tomuschat, 2010). 
22 The relationship between the EU’s position on international ethics, as evidenced in its foundational 
documents, and that of the UN, will be outlined in detail in the following chapter.  
23 Articles 24 and 25 of the CDHRI unambiguously state that all rights and freedoms are subject to Islamic 
shari’a (Organisation of the Islamic Conference, 1990), the interpretation of which is frequently criticized as 
being contrary to features of the UDHR, such as freedom of religion and gender equality. 
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The language of human rights as a form of contemporary moral justification offers a 
paradigm for addressing both the limits and possibilities for ethical considerations in 
international affairs. It represents a social construction of evolving norms and beliefs that 
is not dependent on deontological foundations or recourse to the primacy of particular 
cultural values. Furthermore, it entails negotiated primary principles with recognition not 
only of what is “good”, but also of what will work. As Jack Donnelly (2001, p. 139) argues, 
although human rights discourse has achieved hegemonic status in international politics, 
‘there is nothing fixed or inevitable about this political model or the list of rights with 
which it is associated’. It is not the purpose of this discussion to address the practicalities 
and mechanisms of this evolving process, but to highlight here that human rights have 
become the paradigm by which ethical considerations in international affairs are justified, 
notwithstanding the associated and inherent ethical tensions, both theoretical and 
operative, that impact upon relationships between international actors. This rights-based 
paradigm takes a contractarian approach to the process of moral justification, arriving at 
an ethical code that its proponents argue can be rationally accepted as universally 
applicable. The EU, as will be shown in the following chapters, not only adheres to the 
universality of international human rights discourse, despite its critics, but is also vocal 
regarding both its validity as a moral justification, and its centrality to the EU’s own 
international identity. Where the role of ethical norm promotion in EU foreign policy is 
concerned, the language of human rights provides the context for the strengths, 
weaknesses, limitations and possibilities of its policies, particularly those involving the 
MENA region.  
Having established that ethical considerations are a feature of international affairs, and 
outlined the moral positions that justify them, the final section of this chapter will address 
the resulting implications with regard to scope and responsibility.  
Scope and responsibility 
As noted above, the language of human rights has become the lingua franca of ethical 
considerations in international affairs, despite the ongoing debates regarding 
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classification, precedence and justifying principles. These points of contention are 
intensified when international actors determine the justifiable scope of promoting human 
rights, and the sphere of responsibility for protecting them. Individuals, states and 
international institutions must increasingly address questions such as:  
• When gross human rights violations occur in global society, who is 
responsible for halting and punishing such evil? 
• Are foreign governments morally responsible, individually or 
collectively for minimizing human suffering from poverty, hunger, 
torture, genocide, and war? 
• Do citizens from one state bear moral responsibilities for the personal 
security and well-being of persons in other states? 
• When governments carry out mass murder and genocide against 
their own people, how should foreign states respond? (Amstutz, 
2005) 
The very concept of human rights entails that all persons are included in a global 
community of moral concern, yet there is no consensus as to their legitimate role in foreign 
policy, let alone the form that an effective policy might take. The legitimate scope of 
ethical foreign policy will be discussed next, followed by the ethics of international 
intervention. 
Cosmopolitanism versus communitarianism  
There are no states in the international system, democratic, theocratic, monarchic or 
otherwise, that completely disregard the evolving institutions and norms of global human 
rights. As Thomas Risse (2000, p. 17)notes: 
National governments that want to participate in the global human rights 
discourse might still object to specific accusations of norm violations. But it 
is virtually impossible for them to deny the validity of global human rights 
norms themselves without risking being labeled as ‘‘pariah’’ states.  
UN membership alone requires a commitment to the protection of domestic rights and the 
promotion of international rights, although at both levels this commitment is often 
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undertaken nominally at best. Even those actors accused of gross human rights violations 
are careful to frame their behaviour in terms that attempt to justify it, either within the 
framework of international human rights norms, or by calling attention to the 
acknowledged points of contention.  
Those international actors, including the EU, who consider the UN Bill of Rights to be a 
universally held code of moral justification, take a cosmopolitan approach to the 
legitimate scope of ethical foreign policy. By this rationale, human beings are considered 
to comprise a single moral community, to be treated equally regardless of diversity. 
Although cosmopolitanism is an increasingly broad classification, all forms emphasize the 
morally arbitrary nature of borders, which leads to three forms of moral argument: 
• Focus on human beings as individuals of moral worth with general 
entitlements; 
• The grounding of personal or collective behaviour by principles that 
include moral responsibility to humanity;  
• A personal ethics of responsibility to suffering fellow humans 
(Beardsworth, 2011, pp. 23-24). 
 While these arguments establish a sense of responsibility to others beyond national 
communities, it is by no means clear to what extent this should influence foreign policy 
decision-making. There is a wide scope for interpreting positive duties to others, such as 
international justice and aid, and potential conflicts between negative duties, such as non-
harm and the consequences of humanitarian intervention. Furthermore, however much 
international actors take cosmopolitan values seriously, including the associated moral 
universalism, few, if any, do so at the expense of national preferences and geo-strategic 
interests.24 
																																																								
24 The extent to which the EU does so will be the main focus of discussion in Chapter 3. It is worth noting 
here, however, that Ian Manners, whose arguments regarding the nature of the EU are a central feature of 
the aforementioned chapter, states that the EU has a powerful self-image ‘as a union of people promoting the 
Kantian cosmopolitan rights of hospitality to strangers, common rights to the earth’s surface, and universal 
community’ (Manners, 2006a, p. 39). 
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The foremost critique of a cosmopolitical scope to the role of ethics in international affairs 
comes from communitarianism.25 Communitarians affirm that ‘the community rather than 
the individual should be the primary focus of philosophic and political attention [and that] 
individuals remain important, but the moral significance of individual lives is inextricably 
bound to communities’ (Muirhead, 2013). Therefore, the rights-based claims of 
individuals, although relevant, can only be understood in the context of the duties owed 
to their political communities, and moral justification is both local and particular. The 
debate mirrors that between universalists and cultural relativists discussed above, but 
goes beyond the issue of how to justify moral considerations. Communitarians argue that 
the implications of ethical pluralism, and lack of consensus regarding human rights 
institutions, are such that it is indefensible to enforce the associated norms and laws 
against those who do not share the cultural assumptions that underpin them (Shapcott, 
2010, p. 9). Rather than borders being morally arbitrary, as cosmopolitans suggest, 
individual rights and freedoms can only be supported in relation to morally-relevant 
sovereign states (Cochran, 1999, p. 12).  
The issue of state sovereignty is at the centre of debates regarding the scope of moral 
consideration in international affairs. Whereas the UN Charter introduced a conception of 
human rights that has led to their codification in international law, and the comprehensive 
ratification of binding covenants, it also emphasised the absolute nature of state 
sovereignty.26 The doctrine of state sovereignty supports exclusive competence in the 
domestic realm, and communitarians, amongst others, maintain that human rights have 
moral relevance only within this jurisdiction. The doctrine of universal human rights, 
however, offers ‘one of the most powerful critiques of sovereignty as the concept is 
currently understood, and the practices of human rights law offer concrete examples of 
shifting understandings of the limits of sovereignty’ (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993). Human 
rights norms, as conceived by the UN and the EU, represent a radical and subversive 
																																																								
25  The debate on ethical scope in international affairs has been framed in terms of a 
cosmopolitan/communitarian divide since the introduction of the concept in a seminal work by Chris Brown 
(1992).  For a critique of this dichotomy, see Shapcott (2000). 
26 In particular Article 2, which emphasizes the political independence and domestic jurisdiction of states, in 
their relationships with both other states and the UN itself (United Nations, 1945). 
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challenge to the international system of sovereign states. John Charvet (1998) argues that a 
cosmopolitan ethical position entails a duty-bound obligation ‘to seek to bring about the 
universal reception of the ideal order’. Nowhere are the implications of basing the “ideal 
order” on the UN’s interpretation of international human rights more apparent than in the 
concept of intervention. 
The ethics of intervention 
There is a vast body of literature devoted to the subject of humanitarian intervention, 
concerning its legality, effectiveness and moral justification. For the most part, the debate 
on each of these areas focuses on military intervention, where the stated aim is to provide 
emergency aid relief or prevent massive human rights violations. With regard to moral 
justification, all of the issues discussed previously are present within the debate: differing 
conceptions of justifying principles; the clash of universal and culturally-relative values; 
lack of consensus as to the classification and precedence of rights-based claims; the 
legitimate scope of moral concern; demarcation with respect to a sphere of responsibility; 
and the sacrosanct nature of state sovereignty.  
Although the concept of intervention is not a central feature of the analysis presented in 
this thesis, there are some facets relating to its less coercive forms that are relevant. As the 
purpose of this discussion is to assess the role of ethical norms in EU foreign policy, 
particularly in response to the Arab Uprisings, I will take a broader approach to the 
concept of intervention. At the time of writing the EU has not intervened militarily in the 
ongoing social and political upheaval in its southern neighbourhood, although member-
states have participated in the bombing of Libya and Syria during this period. In its 
broader conception, intervention includes both direct and indirect uses of power, with 
military mechanisms being at the most coercive end of the spectrum. At the least coercive 
end of the interventionist spectrum is traditional diplomacy and aid provision, but EU 
policy-makers have in the last 30 years increasingly advanced a middle path of political 
conditionality.  
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In a general sense, political conditionality describes policies that demand economic or 
political changes in a target country in exchange for beginning or continuing cooperation 
(Nolting, 2001, p. 100). This cooperation could take the form of aid programmes, political 
support, investment, economic development or membership of a regional organisation. 
The types of conditionality demands that have been identified as having developed over 
three generations are: economic structural adjustment policies in the 1980s; human rights 
and good governance considerations from 1989; and social policy concerns over the last 
decade (Burnell, 2008, pp. 296-297). Although proponents of conditionality argue that they 
are offering a choice to rational actors, namely this incentive in exchange for that domestic 
adjustment, there is debate as to exactly how coercive such a relationship is. 
From an international law perspective, the controversy regarding military intervention is 
well documented.27 Article 2(4) of the UN charter, which states that members are obliged 
to ‘refrain in their international relations from the use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any other state’, comes into contention with Chapter 
VII, which grants the option of force to Security Council decisions in the vaguest of terms 
(United Nations, 1945). At the less coercive end of the interventionist spectrum, the UN’s 
position is even more vague. General Assembly Resolution 2131, passed in 1965, declares 
that: 
No state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, 
armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats 
against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, or 
cultural elements are condemned (Pease & Forsythe, 1993, p. 292, emphasis 
added).  
Yet less coercive forms of intervention, notably political conditionality, have become the 
norm in the UN’s relationship with its member states, and this has also been the case with 
regard to the EU’s external relations. The justification for both rests on a shared perception 
as to the nature of international human rights.  
																																																								
27 For an excellent overview, see Holzgrefe and Keohane (2003). 
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By asserting that rights derive from individual persons, and by taking a cosmopolitical 
view of state sovereignty, the EU makes the legitimacy of states contingent on the 
protection and promotion of those rights. Sovereignty, by this rationale, becomes a 
responsibility, namely to protect and promote the rights established in the UDHR and 
international covenants. Should a state be unable or unwilling to fulfil this responsibility 
to protect, or is itself the perpetrator of human rights violations, then the international 
community may take the responsibility to act in its place (Evans & Sahnoun, 2009, p. 304). 
Where gross human rights violations are concerned there are clearer protocols to guide the 
balancing of rights-based ethical claims with scope, responsibility and sovereignty.28 
However, where political conditionality is concerned, there is a substantial range of 
interpretation for when state legitimacy is forfeit and intervention is justified. This in turn 
leads back to the ethical issues previously discussed, in particular the clash of universal 
and culturally relative values, and charges of moral imperialism where disparities of 
power are involved.  
This, and many of the other issues and theoretical positions presented in this chapter, will 
be relevant to later discussion about EU policy towards the MENA region before, during 
and after the Arab Uprisings. The main purpose of this chapter has been to establish that 
moral considerations are indeed a factor of international affairs, to show that human rights 
discourse has become the paradigm by which such considerations are discussed, and to 
address some of the main features of the EU’s approach to such considerations, in 
particular universalism, a cosmopolitical worldview and the use of conditionality. The 
following chapter will focus on the evolution of EU external action, its foreign policy 






28 Such as the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) framework regarding 
the international norm of “Responsibility to Protect”, which was unanimously adopted my UN member 
states in 2005. For an overview of this evolving norm, in the context of both international ethics and 






Chapter 2  
The Foreign Policy of the European Union 
Introduction 
In the vast amount of literature written about the EU’s foreign policy there are widely 
divergent arguments as to the nature of the EU as an international actor. The predominant 
debates concern whether or not the EU, as a supranational conglomeration of states, can 
be considered an actor in its own right, and, depending on one’s subsequent position, the 
priorities of its policy formulations. Following on from this latter point are questions 
relating to the EU’s ability and effectiveness in achieving its foreign policy goals.  
This thesis is based on the premise that the EU is indeed an international actor in its own 
right, and the argument demonstrating this position will be presented at the end of the 
chapter. Before doing so I will review the development of the EU’s external action since its 
inception in the 1950s and outline the various elements of institutional architecture 
regarding the formulation and implementation of EU foreign policy. Throughout the early 
parts of this chapter, there will be an emphasis on the ethical content of the treaties, 
communiqués, institutions and mechanisms of the EU’s relationship with the world 
beyond its borders. Having established in Chapter 1 that the language of human rights has 
become the basis of international ethics discourse, I will focus on the evolution of this 
concept from internal foundational principle to intrinsic component of external action 
rhetoric. The inherent inter- and intra-institutional tension between the EU’s various 
foreign policy actors will also be considered in this chapter, as this will be relevant to later 
discussion regarding EU policy towards the MENA region.  
Although many of the developments and issues addressed in this chapter are relevant to 
the EU’s policy towards its southern neighbours, the detailed substance of this 
relationship, and the specific policy responses following the Arab Uprisings, will be 
provided in Part II. The purpose of this chapter is to understand the evolution of the EU as 
an international actor, including the impact of institutional dynamics on, and the role of 
value promotion in, its foreign policy. This will allow a thorough examination of the 
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relationship between ethics, norms and interests in Chapter 3, which will in turn provide 
the framework for understanding the complexities of EU decision-making when faced 
with the social upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa since late 2010.  
The development of EU external action 
Although intellectuals and political leaders had variously entertained the idea of a 
politically integrated Europe for centuries (Irwin, 2010, p. 16), the likelihood of such a 
union had little relevance until midway through the 20th century. The new political 
landscape that emerged from the ashes of World War II, however, set the stage for a series 
of cooperative agreements that would eventually lead to a union of European states 
capable of collective external action. 
Background 
The genesis of the EU as it currently exists can be clearly identified in the establishment of 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. The agreement between France, 
Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg to create a supranational body 
regulating the production and trade of primary industries set two fundamental 
precedents: it provided a framework of institutional relationships that have continued to 
this day;29 and, more importantly, it set in motion a process of integration that would 
radically alter the relationship between European states. As John van Oudenaren (2005, p. 
33) notes: 
For the first time European states had transferred sovereignty from the 
national level to central institutions [and this] supranationality was to 
become the decisive feature of European integration. 
Six years later the founding members of the ECSC established the European Economic 
Community (EEC), laying ‘the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe’ (EEC, 1957). Primarily concerned with economic integration and the development 
of a common market, the founding Treaty of Rome did not contain external relations 
																																																								
29 The foundational treaty of the ECSC established four institutions: the High Authority (precursor to the 
European Commission), the Council of Ministers (precursor to the Council of the European Union), the 
Common Assembly (precursor to the European Parliament), and the Court of Justice.  
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objectives, although it did provide the framework for collective trade negotiations (K. E. 
Smith, 2003a, p. 10). 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the process of European integration focussed on 
institutional development and internal economic cooperation, being ‘inward-looking to 
the point of almost entirely excluding attention to the place of the EEC in the world’ 
(McCormick, 2011, p. 414). However, with the prospect of enlarging the union to include 
Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway, leaders at The Hague summit in 1969 agreed to 
pursue a more united approach to international affairs. The resulting European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) was a tentative step towards EEC member states taking a collective 
position on the international stage, although the regular meetings between foreign 
ministers took place outside of the formal institutional structure. The Luxembourg 
Report’s stated objectives, of ‘consulting regularly [and increasing] their solidarity by 
working for a harmonization of views, concertation of attitudes and joint action when it 
appears feasible and desirable’ (EEC, 1970), were purposefully vague, allowing for 
member states to continue responding to international events via national foreign policy. 
The EPC did prove useful in coordinating a “European” response to some issues, notably 
the unfolding changes in east-west relations, and it laid the groundwork for more 
cooperation between Community member states regarding external action (Van 
Oudenaren, 2005, pp. 42-43).30 Throughout the 1980s, a number of international events 
provided opportunities for the Community to take a collective stance through the 
mechanisms provided by the EPC framework, but it was hampered by the 
intergovernmental nature of process, and the necessity to reach consensus between each 
member state regarding every decision. As Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan 
(2008, p. 46) note, the formal separation between the EPC and European level institutions 
was unsustainable in practice, as the EPC required the Community’s economic 
																																																								
30  Although Desmond Dinan (2010, p. 66) notes that it proved to be an inadequate instrument for 
coordinating responses to crises associated with these unfolding changes, such as the 1979 Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan.  
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instruments when initiating sanctions against Poland and Argentina in 1982,31 and South 
Africa during the mid-1980s,32 and required the Community’s economic support for 
assisting peace initiatives in Central America during the same period. Nonetheless, the 
coordination between member states on issues beyond the borders of the European 
Community, despite the structural challenges, strengthened the necessary conditions for 
the actuality of an eventual collective foreign policy.  
The EPC was formally institutionalised by the conclusion of the Single European Act 
(SEA) in 1987, the first major treaty revision since the founding of the EEC with the Treaty 
of Rome. Although external action remained primarily an intergovernmental concern, the 
new compact bound member states ‘by legal agreement rather than just a political 
commitment to consult together in the foreign policy sphere and to seek to develop 
common actions’ (Van Oudenaren, 2005, p. 300). Not only did the preamble to the SEA 
provide an intimation of the member states’ evolving appreciation of common interests, 
but it also hinted at the association of core values with external action: 
AWARE of the responsibility incumbent upon Europe to aim at speaking 
ever increasingly with one voice and to act with consistency and solidarity 
in order more effectively to protect its common interests and independence, 
in particular to display the principles of democracy and compliance with the 
law and with human rights to which they are attached, so that together they 
may make their own contribution to the preservation of international peace 
and security in accordance with the undertaking entered into by them 
within the framework of the United Nations Charter (EEC, 1987; K. E. Smith, 
2003a, p. 11).  
																																																								
31 After the declaration of martial law, with regard to the former, and during the Falklands crisis, with regard 
to the latter.  
32 The sanctions against the apartheid regime of South Africa in the mid-1980s constituted the high point of a 
significant chapter in EU-South Africa relations specifically, and the EPC in general. As Martin Holland 
(1994, p. 4) highlights, the EC-South African relationship represented the longest EPC policy undertaken by 
the Community, which ‘originated in 1977, experienced several policy transitions and developments, but 
was still an agenda item at the final EPC meeting held on 27 October 1993’. The many restrictive and positive 
measures enacted towards South Africa (Holland, 1988, pp. 95-124) [ADD see AS PREFIX] during this 
period, facilitated by the EPC, ‘helped the Community enhance its reputation as a defender of human rights’ 
(M. E. Smith, 2008, p. 180). Furthermore, although relations between the EU and South Africa began to 
normalise with the establishment of democratic rule in 1994 (Fioramonti & Kotsopoulos, 2015, p. 465), the 
1993 ‘inclusion of South Africa as the first and only topic for joint action outside the immediate geo-political 
interests of the Union symbolized, amongst other things, the Union’s global aspirations as an international 
actor’ (Holland, 1995, p. 562). 
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Although founding principles, such as human rights and democracy, had frequently 
featured in EEC policy documents as an essential feature of what the Community is,33 for 
the first two decades of the EPC their external promotion had been limited to declaratory 
diplomacy and dialogue (K. E. Smith, 2003a, p. 101). The late 1980s signalled a shift 
towards a more proactive stance, conflating core Community values with international 
standards and the associated conviction regarding duty-bound propagation. Following the 
conclusion of the SEA, the European Council (1988) issued the Rhodes Declaration, stating 
that the EEC and its member states would 
demonstrate solidarity to the great and spreading movement for democracy 
and full support for the Universal Declaration on Human Rights [...] and to 
promote the Western values and principles which Member States have in 
common.  
This sentiment would be a significant feature of the next major attempt to articulate a 
unified international position via the Treaty of Maastricht. 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy 
With the entering into force of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, formally know as the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU), the EU ‘made unequivocal claims that it would pursue from then 
on a foreign policy which was intended to be common although not necessarily single’ 
(Ciceo, 2012, p. 39). The TEU established a three-pillar system to distinguish between the 
supranational and intergovernmental areas of responsibility for the ever-expanding 
Community. The intergovernmental pillars, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), were designed to maintain national control of these 
areas in relation to the European Community (EC) pillar, which represented the central 
institutions of the supranational union. However, as will become apparent later in the 
chapter when discussing the role of each institution, these separations were to become 
																																																								
33,Article 1 of the Declaration on European Identity, for example, lists representative democracy and respect 
for human rights, as well as the rule of law and social justice, as fundamental elements of European identity 
(EEC, 1973, emphasis added).  
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progressively blurred. In this section I will focus on the content of the CFSP,34 including 
the increasingly significant role of value promotion as a feature of external action. 
The end of the Cold War was a significant motivating factor in the establishment of the 
CFSP. The structure of the preceding ECP was unable to cope with the collapse of 
communism that had occurred in Central/Eastern Europe, and new foreign policy and 
security structures were required to fulfil the widespread expectation that the EU should 
use its increasing political influence to ensure stability, both around its borders and 
further afield (Cameron, 2007, pp. 28-29). The CFSP endeavour also enjoyed high levels of 
public support, with opinion polls revealing that citizens across the EU favoured closer 
cooperation in matters of foreign policy (Cameron, 2007, p. 29). The discrepancies between 
the public’s expectations of the EU as an international actor and its capabilities prior to the 
CFSP was described by Christopher Hill (1993) as a “capability-expectations gap”, and 
there was a clear momentum within the Community not only to strengthen external 
cooperation, but also to provide clearer foreign policy objectives.  
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008, pp. 48-49) identify several motivating factors, within 
a geostrategic context, concerning member states’ rationale for creating the CFSP, which 
are key to understanding its nature: firstly, strengthening European integration and 
managing their interstate relations amidst geopolitical instability; secondly, managing 
inter-institutional relations, and those between member states and the Commission; 
thirdly, strengthening European identity and managing public relations; and finally, 
																																																								
34 A key feature of the CFSP was the inclusion of a defence dimension, with Article 17 of the TEU calling for 
a ‘progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence’ (European 
Union, 1992). For four decades, following the failure to establish the European Defence Community in 1954, 
defence functions had fallen within the domain of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) alliance 
and/or national governments (Cameron, 2007, p. 73), but the TEU paved the way for a more collective 
approach within the Community framework. The culmination of this initiative was the European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP), later renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) by the Treaty of 
Lisbon. Although these policies are a significant feature of the CFSP, the defence dimension of EU external 
action falls beyond the scope of this discussion. The security dimension, on the other hand, will be an 
important aspect of the relationship between the EU and its southern neighbours, particularly with regard to 
border controls and international terrorism, in later chapters. The implications of the EU developing its 
military capabilities, framed in general terms, will also be a feature of the debate on normative power, 
discussed in Chapter 3. For a detailed analysis of EU defence policy, see Howorth (2005), Dover (2010) and 
Cameron (2007, pp. 73-89). 
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creating an effective and credible European foreign policy.35 Each of these motivating 
factors in themselves contained keenly contested positions, between and amongst the 
national and supranational actors involved, and both the formulation and ratification of 
the CFSP took a considerable amount of time. Fraser Cameron (2012, p. 35) brings 
attention to ‘the sheer number of actors involved in the CFSP [...] each with their 
bureaucracies, interests and ambitions’, also noting the ‘frequent squabbling between the 
Commission and the Council over issues of competence’. Yet, despite the seemingly 
insurmountable number of issues needing to be resolved, the CFSP emerged in November 
1993 as the framework for a new chapter in the evolution of a joint European external 
action.  
Although the TEU contained only generally-framed objectives for the establishment of the 
CFSP, such as the promotion of international cooperation and the consolidation of core 
values such as democracy, rule of law and human rights (European Union, 1992, article 
J.1), the official communications which followed set out a progressively coherent 
articulation of priorities. At the Lisbon meeting of the European Council in 1992, CFSP 
objectives had already been refined to include 
promoting regional political stability and contributing to the creation of 
political and/or economic frameworks that encourage regional cooperation 
[and] promoting and supporting good government (European Council, 
1992). 
The promotion of good governance and democracy36 would be a defining feature of the 
Community’s developing relationship with the newly independent states in 
Central/Eastern Europe, and strongly influence the formation and structure of the ENP a 
																																																								
35 Although paradoxically, for some member states, such as the UK and Denmark, the CFSP represented an 
opportunity to achieve exactly the opposite, by limiting the role of the EU on account of members states’ 
fundamental differences (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 49). 
36 The loosely defined term “good government” evolved into the more comprehensively articulated “good 
governance”, which included rule of law, impartial judiciary, anti-corruption measures and democratic 
accountability. Holland (2004, pp. 119-120) highlights the difficulties regarding early attempts to effectuate 
this evolution during the Cotonou Agreement negotiations between the EU and the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific Group of States (ACP) in the late 1990s, noting the resistance by ACP partners to its inclusion and 
problems arriving at an agreed joint definition. The newly associated concept of democratic accountability, 
and its associated freedoms with regard to the electoral process, would eventually come to be included as an 
essential right in itself, which will be discussed in Chapter 3.  
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decade later. A communiqué from the European Commission (1995b, p. 10) to the Council 
and the European Parliament expanded the importance of democracy promotion to all 
external relations, and clearly outlined the interdependence of democracy, human rights 
and development: 
[T]he strict, complementary link between human rights and democracy: if 
human rights are a necessary condition for the full development of the 
individual, democratic society is a necessary condition for the exercise of 
those rights, providing the framework for individual development.  
Furthermore, the communiqué was unequivocal as to the source, legitimacy and 
universality of the principles it was committing to, stating that ‘no provision of a national, 
cultural or religious nature can override the principles enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights’ (European Commission, 1995b, p. 10). 
Arguably the most significant development in the nature of the EU’s collective 
relationships with third parties has been the inclusion of a “human rights clause” in all 
bilateral agreements as part of the CFSP. This clause allows for the termination or 
suspension of agreements if partners are deemed to have committed violations of human 
rights, as determined by the EU, and requires signatory parties to enter into political 
dialogue regarding the augmentation of EU values (European Commission, 1995a; Horng, 
2003). The human rights clause has become an essential feature of the EU’s bilateral 
agreements since the mid-1990s, and featured not only in the EU’s relationships with 
prospective members, but also in its evolving sense of the neighbourhood beyond its 
borders.  
Enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy 
In the foundational treaty of 1957, the original members of the Community optimistically 
extended an invitation to ‘all states that shared their ideals to join in the process of 
integration’ (Cecchini, Jones, & Lorentzen, 2001, p. 155). However, by the end of the 20th 
century the sheer number of potential candidates, following the breakup of the Soviet 
Union and collapse of communism in Central/Eastern Europe, generated considerable 
debate as to the specificity of shared ideals, and the implications of unabated expansion. 
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The 15 contemporary members37 were faced with a choice between fully engaging with 
stabilising reforms in Central/Eastern Europe, to be achieved by widening the Community 
with conditional membership, or closing ranks in order to deepen the integration of 
economy, institutions and the CFSP (Van Oudenaren, 2005, p. 339). Moreover, the 
prospect of further expansion would radically alter the external boundaries of the 
Community, which, as Richard Whitman (1999, p. 145) notes, would ‘redraw the line 
within Europe between those who become Member States and are full participants in the 
CFSP and those who remain outside the EU and are potential subjects of the CFSP’. 
In 2004 the EU experienced its most extensive expansion to date, welcoming two 
Mediterranean countries and eight of the Central/Eastern European countries to the 
European Community. 38  As with previous enlargements, the increasingly different 
conglomeration of historical experience, economic structure and political priorities led to 
parallel efforts to further deepen the process of integration (Kaiser & Elvert, 2004, p. 2). 
More than at any other time in its history the EU found itself in a position to influence, 
with the prospect of membership, the institutional structures of external actors. The acquis 
communautaire 39  set out a comprehensive articulation of the EU’s legislation and 
institutions, and the requirement that prospective members implement the necessary 
reforms to conform with the entirety of the acquis communautaire shows that the EU’s 
enlargement policy, to an impressive extent, had also become its most successful foreign 
policy (K. E. Smith, 2005a, p. 271).  
As well as deepening the Community’s integration in terms of legislation, institutions and 
identity, the 2004 enlargement resulted in a radical shift of EU perceptions regarding its 
“near abroad”. In terms of external action and foreign policy, the changing membership 
transformed ‘relationships between those admitted and their neighbours left outside, 
previously shaped at least in part by the common status of exclusion’ (Hill, 2002, p. 95). 
																																																								
37 Three previous waves of enlargement had occurred, with the accession of: the United Kingdom, Ireland 
and Denmark in 1967; Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 1980s; and Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995.  
38 The Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
39 The body of common rights and obligations, containing the legal framework set out in the EU’s treaties, 
agreements, declarations, instruments and legislation, which is binding on member states and must be 
accepted by candidate countries before joining the EU (European Commission, 2013a).  
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Furthermore, the far-reaching scope of the 2004 enlargement signalled a shift in 
momentum by the Community towards future expansion. As early as 2001, the European 
Convention had proposed formalising a policy by which the EU would ‘develop a special 
relationship with its neighbouring states, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and 
good neighbourliness characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation’ 
(Van Oudenaren, 2005, p. 328).  In 2002 the Council called for the development of a New 
Neighbours Initiative, which in turn led to the Commission issuing its Wider Europe 
Initiative the following year. Although the language of the initiative was suitably 
benevolent, calling for a zone of prosperity and a “ring of friends” (European 
Commission, 2003), the policy was clearly set out to differentiate between neighbours 
based on the likelihood of potential membership.  
The ENP was adopted in 2004, with the explicit goal of promoting relationships with 
neighbours to the south and east of the newly enlarged EU based on shared values and 
economic cooperation, but without the enticement of membership. 40  It replaced or 
incorporated a number of regional and bilateral agreements between the EU and its 
neighbours, notably the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also known as the 
Barcelona Process. According to Sir Michael Leigh (Interview #1, 6/11/2013), the European 
Commission’s Director-General for Enlargement between 2006 and 2011, there is a clear 
similarity between the structure and content of the ENP, and that of the membership 
application process. In order to receive the trade, aid and economic benefits on offer by the 
EU, partner countries must implement extensive Action Plans regarding political, social 
and economic reforms. Although specific to each country, ENP Action Plans are similar in 
outline, including: 
Political dialogue; economic and social co-operation; trade-related issues, 
market and regulatory reform; co-operation in justice and home affairs; 
sectoral issues such as transport, energy, information society, environment, 
research and development; the human dimension, including people-to-
																																																								
40 The ENP includes: the eastern states of Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan; and 
the southern states of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Israel, the Palestinian 
Authority (European Commission, 2015d). The ENP does not include Russia, Turkey, or the Western 
Balkans, all of which have either unique relationships with the EU, or are at varying stages of membership 
negotiations.  
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people contacts, civil society, education and public health (Cameron, 2007, 
pp. 109-110). 
As noted above, many of the required reforms are appropriated directly from the acquis 
communautaire, with the expectation that the non-membership benefits on offer are 
significant enough to warrant them. Unsurprisingly, where the promotion of ethical 
norms is concerned, particularly with regard to those values that are culturally contested, 
this conditional approach has not always proved very successful. A comprehensive 
outline, regarding the details and evolution of the relationship between the EU and its 
southern neighbours following the adoption of the ENP, will be provided in Part II of this 
thesis. The following section examines the various institutional mechanisms that 
contribute to EU foreign policy decision-making.  
Institutional framework of EU foreign policy 
The evolution of the EU institutional framework can be seen as the result of an ongoing 
compromise between differing visions of European integration. In each subsequent treaty 
negotiation there have been those willing to cede more control of policy-making to 
centralised institutions representing the interests of the EU as a whole, and those 
determined to maintain the control of policy-making by national governments. This 
dynamic is most evident in the field of external relations, with intergovernmentalists, on 
the one hand, attempting to keep control of decision-making within the Council, where 
national representatives are able to promote or safeguard their interests, and 
supranationalists, on the other, attempting to empower the Commission, and, to a lesser 
extent, the European Parliament. This is, of course, an over-simplification, and this section 
will provide a more nuanced account of the functional interaction between the main 
external policy-making institutions, including the areas of tension with regard to decision-
making and competency.41 
																																																								
41 The term “competency” in the EU lexicon refers to a distinction between fields in which the EU alone is 
able to legislate and adopt binding acts (exclusive competency), fields in which the EU and member states 
are both able to legislate and adopt binding acts (shared competency), and fields in which the EU is only 
able to provide a supportive role (supporting competency) (European Union, 2010). 
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Council of the European Union 
The Council of the European Union, also know as the Council of Ministers, is one of the 
key policy-making institutions of the EU, having existed in various forms since the 
inception of the Community in the 1950s. It shares legislative responsibility with the 
European Parliament, voting new proposals into EU law via Qualified Majority Voting 
(QMV), in some cases, and by unanimity in others. 42  Foreign and security policy, 
considered one of the most sensitive areas of compromise between member states, 
requires decisions to be taken unanimously. This, in effect, gives each of the 28 national 
governments43 the right of veto in all matters relating to the CFSP, and also results in 
extensive bargaining and diplomacy in order to reach collective decisions. In terms of 
composition and competences, the Council represents the main foreign policy decision-
making body in the EU, both politically and legally (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 
69).  
The Council brings together various configurations of national government ministers 
associated with particular policy areas. It is important to note that the ministers are 
domestic politicians, and therefore ‘driven by national political interests, ideology, the 
popularity and stability of their home governments and the attitude of those governments 
towards European integration’ (McCormick, 2011, p. 191). This is not to say, however, that 
shared EU goals are not relevant, or that there are not significant overlaps of interest. With 
the responsibility for signing off on international agreements and steering economic 
policy, the sheer output of joint positions, regional and bilateral documents, and guiding 
communiqués by the Council, point to a functional institutional mechanism. Nonetheless, 
issues present in European politics, such as blurred and overlapping roles, inter-
institutional conflicts, and differing sources of authority, are most strikingly extant in the 
Council (Johnston, 2005, p. 113).  
																																																								
42 It should be noted that neither the Council nor the European Parliament have the right to propose new 
laws, which is the exclusive domain of the European Commission, although there are a number of informal 
channels by which both institutions can generate debate regarding legislative initiative.  
43 Following the 2004 enlargement phase, Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Union in 2007, and 
Croatia joined in 2013.  
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Almost all of the EU’s external policies, including trade and development cooperation, are 
dealt with by the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), previously incorporated into the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the GAERC 
‘covered not only foreign and external security policy but also a range of general affairs, 
including enlargement policy and aspects of budgetary policy’ (Buonanno & Nugent, 
2013, p. 280). Following the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the latter policies are 
dealt with by the General Affairs Council, allowing the Foreign Affairs Ministers of each 
member state to meet regularly in the format of the FAC to make legally binding decisions 
on all aspects of the CFSP, chaired by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy. 44  However, much of the negotiation and compromise 
necessary to reach foreign policy decisions is undertaken by national representatives in the 
plethora of committees and working groups within the Council’s substructure, most 
notably the Political and Security Committee (PSC). To add yet a further level of national 
sovereignty to the foreign policy output of the FAC, the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER), representing each of the 28 member states’ EU Ambassadors, 
manage and direct much of the preparatory work by the committees and working groups, 
arguably dictating the FAC agenda (Corbett, Peterson, & Bomberg, 2012, pp. 59-60).  
The Council of the European Union is not to be confused with the European Council, 
which brings together the Community’s heads of government or heads of state in summit 
meetings 4-6 times per year. Presenting a highly conspicuous composition of member state 
interaction and discourse, particularly in comparison to the less visible functioning of the 
Council of Ministers, the European Council has been responsible for setting the agenda on 
every significant issue faced by the Community since the 1970s. Where external action is 
concerned, Article 26 of the TEU states that: 
The European Council shall identify the Union’s strategic interests, 
determine the objectives of and define general guidelines for the common 
																																																								
44 A position strengthened by the Treaty of Lisbon, merging the posts of High Representative for Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and the European Commissioner for External Relations and European 
Neighbourhood Policy. This new position, which also ‘leads the conduct of the CFSP and CSDP, manages 
the EU’s external aid budget, and heads the newly-created European External Action Service’ (Buonanno & 
Nugent, 2013, p. 281) will be outlined in more detail later in this chapter.  
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foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications. 
(European Union, 1992) 
With the agenda-setting capacity of the European Council, and the decision-making and 
legislative capacity held by the Council of the European Union, it is clear that member 
states hold many of the cards regarding external policy decisions. Furthermore, the post-
Lisbon Treaty establishment of a more permanent European Council President, elected by 
the member states themselves, has been viewed by intergovernmentalists ‘as a useful 
counterweight to the President of the Commission (Corbett et al., 2012, p. 61). This 
highlights the ongoing issue of reconciling national interests with the EU’s collective 
foreign policy ambitions, both in terms of competency and the substance of external policy 
itself. 
European Parliament 
Although some form of parliamentary assembly has existed since the inception of the 
Community, the first directly elected European Parliament formed in 1979. Despite 
initially being given little more than advisory capacity with regard to policy and decision-
making, it has acquired increasing oversight and legislative powers with each subsequent 
treaty revision. It now ‘co-decides nearly all EU legislation in what amounts to a bicameral 
legislature consisting of the Council and the Parliament’ (Corbett et al., 2012, p. 63). It also 
has the capacity to exert considerable influence over appointments to the Commission,45 
and authority to veto both the constitution and implementation of the EU’s budget.46 In 
terms of the CFSP, the foundational treaties provide little in the way of formal 
parliamentary contribution to decision-making, yet the European Parliament has shrewdly 
and aggressively used the powers it does have to play a more active role, launch its own 
initiatives and make the other EU institutions pay more attention to its opinions 
(McCormick, 2008, p. 88).  
																																																								
45 Which it has done on two notable occasions, forcing the withdrawal of Rocco Buttiglione and Rumiana 
Jeleva from their nominations to the first and second Barroso Commissions respectively. 
46 Most prominently when it forced the resignation of the Santer Commission by refusing to approve the 
1999 budget amidst fraud and mismanagement allegations.  
	 73	
One of the main instruments whereby the Parliament is able to influence foreign policy 
decisions is the consent procedure, formally know as the assent procedure, by which it has 
veto power over association and cooperation agreements with third countries. As 
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008, p. 95) point out, although this power is rarely used, 
the Parliament has 
on a limited number of occasions refused its assent, delayed its assent, or 
threatened to refuse or delay its assent, in protest against specific (mostly 
human rights) problems in third countries. 
Another instrument of indirect leverage is the budgetary control that it possesses 
regarding all of the EU’s expenses relating to aid, development and cooperation. Changes 
to decision-making resulting from the Lisbon Treaty, in particular, have given this 
institution power of approval over certain trade measures, consent on all trade agreements 
and the requirement that other institutional actors provide reports outlining the progress 
of trade negotiations (K. E. Smith, 2014, p. 42). One of the foremost examples of the 
Parliament indirectly exerting influence over external affairs has been the use of this 
mechanism to insist on the inclusion of a chapter in the 1994 EU budget entitled the 
‘European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights’ (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 
2008, p. 95). This initiative resulted in the 2006 launch of the European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights, which will feature in later parts of this thesis with regard 
to the EU’s response to the Arab Uprisings.  
The principal institution within the European Parliament associated with EU external 
action is the Foreign Affairs Committee, which includes the Sub-committee on Human 
Rights and the Sub-committee on Security and Defence. Although deriving no formal role 
from the constitutional organisation of EU foreign policy decision-making, these 
committees have been hugely influential in the consistent promotion of a human rights 
and democracy dimension to the external agenda. The impact of the European 
Parliament’s voluminous output of reports, resolutions and questions to the Council 
regarding the EU’s global role in the promotion of human rights and democracy is 
lamentably understudied. Since 1983 it has published an annual report and resolution on 
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the state of human rights in the world, and Karen E. Smith (2003a, p. 104) argues that it 
was the Parliament’s keen interest in how the Community responded to this issue that 
changed the nature of the EEC’s relationship with developing countries during this 
period. The 1994 ‘European Parliament and Human Rights’ report clearly states that 
human rights are universal, inseparable from democracy and ‘the key element in the 
Community’s relations with third countries, whatever the countries or type of relations 
involved’ (European Parliament, 1994). Furthermore, a report prepared in 2005 for the 
Sub-committee on Human Rights is unequivocal in its view that the EU’s position on the 
promotion of human rights and democracy lacks consistency, coherence and commitment, 
and that, furthermore, it is the European Parliament’s role to address these issues 
(European Parliament, 2005).  
Despite its limited competence in foreign policy, the European Parliament ‘has shown its 
relevance on many occasions where external relations are concerned’ (Telò, 2013, p. 38), 
displaying an increasingly assertive role in the EU decision-making process. It is clear the 
European Parliament aspires to be more associated with the process of foreign policy 
decision-making, and its efforts to do so have arguably contributed to the elevation of 
value promotion in terms of both EU policy output and identity. However, it is exactly 
this development that Esther Barbé (2008, p. 55) argues is responsible for a continued 
effort by member states to curb Parliament’s power in foreign policy matters, perceiving 
its efforts to be at odds with their national interest.  
According to Lauri Buananno and Neill Nugent (2013, p. 282), the European Parliament 
‘has always been rather on the margins of the CFSP and CSDP in that it has been confined 
to an advisory position’, and although this has not essentially changed after the Lisbon 
Treaty, it has strengthened its role by successfully demanding that it be consulted on the 
main aspects of these policies. Notwithstanding, despite the fact that the European 
Parliament is increasingly involved with all matters pertaining to EU external action, and 
often provides the most vocal critique of partners’ human rights abuses and democratic 
deficiency, its influence remains limited in comparison with other institutions.  
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European Commission 
At the heart of the EU’s supranational ambitions is the European Commission, the 
executive body charged with upholding the Community’s interests both internally and 
externally. The functions of the Commission include: 
initiating policy, mobilizing support for European proposals, providing 
legislative drafts, brokering compromises, mediating interests, representing 
the Union’s economic interests to the outside world, guarding the 
application of the acquis, and monitoring national implementation of EU-
programs (M. W. Bauer, 2005, p. 159). 
The President of the Commission, proposed by the European Council and elected by the 
European Parliament, heads a cabinet of Commissioners comprising of one nomination 
from each of the member states, who in turn preside over Directorate-Generals associated 
with key policy areas. They, and their supporting infrastructure of civil servants, are 
expected to represent the interests of the EU itself, leading to points of tension with the 
Council and Parliament, each representing the interests of member states and European 
citizens respectively.  
The European Commission is a principal actor regarding the EU’s external relations, being 
responsible for negotiating international trade agreements, processing membership 
applications and coordinating the extensive aid and development cooperation 
programmes. The TEU stipulates that the Commission ‘is to be fully associated with the 
work carried out in the CFSP field’ (Piana, 2005, p. 410), and it is charged with ensuring 
consistency of EU foreign policy across the many overlapping areas of responsibility and 
between different Community actors. However, as Buonanno and Nugent (2013, p. 282) 
point out, the CFSP policy areas 
are populated by an extremely large number of significant policy actors, 
many of them with differing views as to what the purposes and aims of EU 
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foreign and external security policy should be and how they should be 
pursued.47 
This is not only the case between EU institutions, where the Commission’s interests are not 
always aligned with those of the Council or Parliament, but also within the European 
Commission itself. The Directorate-Generals associated with the EU’s external action 
include: Enlargement; EuropeAid Development and Cooperation; Foreign Policy 
Instruments Services; Home Affairs, which deals with border security; and Humanitarian 
Aid. Unsurprisingly, there is often tension within the Commission between differing 
priorities and approaches. Keukeleire and MacNaughton (2008, pp. 90-91) argue that the 
although the Commission has been highly active in developing long-term policies, it fails 
to ensure they are promoted or implemented: 
This paradox can be partially explained by the dislocation between those 
parts of the Commission involved in strategic policy-making (with clear 
foreign policy goals) and those responsible for the subsequent policy 
implementation and day-to-day management (where the respect of 
budgetary and other rules prevail).  
Therefore, inter-institutional and intra-institutional dissidence features in both the 
formation of EU external policy, in terms of priorities and goals, and its subsequent 
implementation, in terms of resources and practical implications.   
Where the promotion of values and principles are concerned, the Commission has played 
a particularly significant role in the negotiation of bilateral and multilateral agreements. 
Not only has the content of the EU’s accords with third countries contained an ever-
increasing emphasis on human rights, rule of law, democracy and good governance, but 
there has also been a corresponding recourse to the implementation of conditionality with 
which to promote them. This trend can be traced back to the 1980s, when the Commission, 
under pressure from Parliament, began to incorporate both value promotion and 
conditional mechanisms into its trade, aid and development agreements (K. E. Smith, 
																																																								
47 These authors also note that the plethora of different actors and policy positions involved with external 
action was particularly evident during the 2011 Arab Uprisings, a point which will become evident in later 
chapters (Buonanno & Nugent, 2013, p. 283). 
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2003a, p. 104).48 Following the end of the Cold War, when the carrots of membership and 
association were sufficiently coveted to induce significant social and political reform on 
the part of the EU’s neighbours, this approach became a key element of the EU’s external 
action. As noted earlier, the acquis communautaire was heavily influential in establishing 
the ENP framework. Subsequently, where the promotion of ethical norms in the southern 
neighbourhood is concerned, conditionality has featured prominently in the EU’s 
relationships with the region. This has led to a number of issues relating to consistency, 
coherency and efficacy, which will be addressed in later chapters. 
Before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the Commission played an important role in 
the EU’s external relations, and in areas such as trade it continues to have exclusive 
competence (Cameron, 2012, p. 57). However, with the creation of the High Representative 
and the EEAS, the Commission has lost much of its direct influence concerning EU foreign 
and security policy, although there are many areas of indirect influence where the 
Commission’s powers remain strong (Buonanno & Nugent, 2013, p. 282).   
European External Action Service 
The final institutional feature of EU foreign policy to be outlined, before addressing the 
subject of EU “actorness”, is the recently established EEAS. The Treaty of Lisbon was 
widely believed, prior to its ratification in 2009, to potentially ‘make a more significant 
difference to the functioning and impact of the EU as a global actor than any single 
document since the founding Treaty of Rome (Howorth, 2013, pp. 65-66). As well as the 
EEAS, it created the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (HR), in the latest attempt by the EU to further consolidate a united front 
on the international stage. Catherine Ashton, the inaugural incumbent to this position, 
was charged with coordinating all aspects of the EU’s external relations, and was expected 
to bridge both the inter- and intra-institutional divides. The HR participates in meetings of 
the European Council, chairs the FAC and PSC, is a Vice-President of the European 
																																																								
48 A particularly clear example of this dynamic, and its subsequent development, is the relationship between 
the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states, which will be outlined briefly in 
Chapter 3.  
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Commission and consults regularly with the European Parliament. The EEAS, also 
established via the Treaty of Lisbon, is the organisational support structure to enable the 
HR to fulfil the many requirements of her mandate. Telò, Mario (2013, p. 37) argues that 
this new face of EU external action as ‘an unprecedented institutional creation which 
provide the huge advantages of an information-gathering opportunity’, on account of the 
numerous embassies and delegations around the world to come within its remit, with 
Buonanno and Nugent (2013, p. 281) adding that the new position of HR ‘involved a 
radical departure’ by merging the previous posts for ‘the purpose of improving EU 
foreign and external security policy co-ordination’.  
The Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS stated 
that the new institution would be ‘a functionally autonomous body of the Union under the 
authority of the High Representative [and] ensure consistency between the different areas 
of external action and between those areas and its other policies’ (Council of the European 
Union, 2010). Despite this, the formation of the EEAS has been plagued by rivalries 
between the Community’s different foreign policy actors, reflected in the intense 
negotiations prior to the Lisbon Treaty. As Leendert Erkelens and Steven Blockmans  
(2012, p. 277) note, in the process of political compromise regarding the design and the 
institutional positioning of the EEAS, 
the Commission and (European) Council tried to jealously protect as many 
of the competences attributed to them by the Treaty of Lisbon, in the face of 
a rebellious Parliament which was out to seek an expansion of its own 
powers in the field of EU external action.  
The Commission succeeded in retaining control of important foreign policy instruments 
relating to humanitarian aid, the ENP and development funding, as well as retaining 
budgetary control over many EU foreign policy functions where the EEAS or Council 
takes the lead in conducting the action required (M. E. Smith, 2013, p. 1308). The European 
Parliament was also able to increase its influence over the EU’s external action, gaining 
more rights to consultation, oversight and budget control in matters relating to the EEAS 
(Raube, 2012, p. 79). Member states, as well as retaining veto power over foreign policy 
direction in the European Council, also used the EEAS negotiations to secure substantial 
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representation in the ranks of the new service for their national diplomats (Juncos & 
Pomorska, 2013, pp. 1334-1335).49 Ana E. Juncos and Karolina Pomorska (2015, p. 243 & 
248) argue that the EEAS ‘is a microcosm of broader dynamics in European foreign policy’ 
and ‘can be considered illustrative of the various tensions and paradoxes [...] such as 
member states’ opposition to more integration, coupled with increasing demands for 
coherence’. 
Rather than fulfilling the role envisioned in the Lisbon Treaty, as a coherent focal point 
through which the many EU institutional actors coordinate external action, the EEAS has 
added to the complexity of foreign policy decision-making.50 Although the Lisbon Treaty 
increased the potential for the HR to act as a “foreign policy entrepreneur”, able to submit 
proposals in the area of CFSP and jointly submit proposals with the Commission in other 
areas of external action, she is still constrained by institutional rules requiring unanimity 
for CFSP decisions (Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, 2013, p. 1320).  Karen E. Smith (2014, p. 
42) maintains that following the Lisbon Treaty changes, ‘there are still competing 
dynamics at play in EU foreign-policy-making: intergovernmentalism and a strong desire 
by member states to control the process while still taking advantage of the politics of 
scale’. Yet despite these constraints, the HR and the EEAS have succeeded in becoming 
notably visible foreign policy actors, principally representing the EU in external affairs. 
This has been particularly evident in the EU’s response to the Arab Uprisings, the outset of 
which coincided with the EEAS becoming fully operational. According to Sir Michael 
Leigh (Interview #1, 6/11/2013), the early days of the Arab Uprisings were characterised by 
familiar “turf wars” between different EU institutions, and HR Ashton set out to 
consolidate her new role and differentiate the EEAS from the Commission. I will argue in 
later chapters that to do this, the HR, and by extension the EEAS, contributed to the 
narrative of the Arab Uprising in terms of ethical norms, having already associated her 
tenure with the vision of the EU as a normative power based on those same values.  
																																																								
49 In both the Brussels-based institutional organisation and in the EU’s worldwide delegations, the control of 
which shifted from the Commission to the EEAS with the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty.  
50 For a full account of how the EEAS is situated within the EU’s foreign policy decision-making framework, 
see Carta (2013). 
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The EU as an international actor 
Having traced the evolution of EU external action, and provided an overview of the 
principal institutional actors, in the final section of this chapter I will outline the case for 
the EU to be considered as an international actor in its own right. Much of the literature 
concerning this debate conflates the type of actor that the EU represents, which is the 
subject of the following chapter, with the issue of whether or not the EU demonstrates 
actorness distinguishable from its member states. With regard to the relationship between 
the EU and its member states, there has clearly been a developing trend to formulate 
common foreign policy positions within coherent institutional mechanisms. The TEU 
states that ‘the Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a 
whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies’ 
(European Union, 1992). With the formation of the EEAS, there is now an institutional 
structure in place not only to maintain and develop consistency between member states, 
but also between different internal actors associated with external policies. This is not to 
say that the EU now speaks with one voice on behalf of its member states, or that member 
states are not influential in promoting their national interest within the framework of EU 
external policy; there are still a number of occasions where differences in policy between 
member states can lead to dramatically different positions taken in response to 
international events. However, in analysing the role of ethical norm promotion in EU 
foreign policy, there is clearly such a policy to consider, the content of which reflects the 
consensus of the member states. This is particularly the case in the southern 
neighbourhood, where matters of trade, aid, development policy, security and value 
promotion are all governed by Action Plans and Association Agreements negotiated by 
the EU.  
Despite there being distinguishable EU policies that represent the interests of its 
community of member states, from its inception the EU has been the subject of 
considerable debate regarding how to assess its role on the international stage. This debate 
has not only centred on the impact of both its internal and external policies on other actors, 
but also on the status of the EU in relation to other actors. The complexities of its 
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institutional structures, the ambivalence of some member states to comprehensive 
integration and the centrality of intergovernmental decision-making in key areas of 
external policy, have all contributed to a reticence amongst academics and commentators 
to ascribe actorness to the EU. Until recently, the principal response to the increasing 
international influence of the EU has been to attribute to it the quality of presence, which 
David Allen and Michael Smith (1990, p. 21) define as 
a combination of factors: credentials and legitimacy, the capacity to act and 
mobilize resources, the place it occupies in the perceptions and expectations 
of policy makers.51 
Acknowledging the EU’s considerable presence in international affairs, Karen E. Smith 
(2003b, p. 104) argues that ‘other international actors cannot fail to notice its resources (it is 
the world’s largest trading bloc), and its internal policies (such as agricultural or monetary 
policies) affect other international actors’. However, she also agrees with Gunnar 
Sjöstedt’s (1977, p. 15; K. E. Smith, 2003b, p. 105) assessment that the EU ‘is not always able 
to translate its “presence” into “actorness”, or the ability to function actively and 
deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system’. 
At the heart of the quandary is the emphasis placed by rationalist theories of International 
Relations on the centrality of the nation state. Realists and neo-realists, assuming power to 
be a zero-sum game in which states vie between one another in an anarchic international 
arena, believe that regional organisations such as the EU are temporary alliances for which 
to do so (Peterson, 2012, p. 218). Thus, the EU can only be explained as an instrument 
through which its member states secure their interests, rather than an actor in its own 
right. Neo-liberals, although viewing international organisations in a more cooperative 
light, also emphasise the role of the nation state in international affairs, regarding 
institutions such as the EU as ‘facilitating arenas for regional co-operation with no 
actorness of their own’ (Wunderlich, 2012, p. 655). It has been left to the constructivist 
tradition to make the case for the EU as a foreign policy actor, much of it within the 
context of European studies and regionalism literature. 
																																																								
51 The concept of international presence draws on earlier works, in particular Hanrieder (1978) and Young 
(1972). 
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In framing the EU as an international actor “under construction”, Charlotte Bretherton 
and John Vogler (2006, pp. 24-35) note three intersecting processes that combine to shape 
the Union’s external activities: the opportunity to act within the constructs of the external 
environment; the presence of the EU, in its ability to exert influence beyond its borders, 
both materially and ideationally; and the capability to use appropriate policy mechanisms 
to formulate effective policies. Building on this framework, Björn Hettne (2011, pp. 28-29) 
ascribes the EU with actorship, noting that the presence and capacity of regions are of a 
similar quality to larger nation states when the former are understood as processes, or 
actors in the making.52 All three authors, amongst others,53 highlight the importance of 
constructed identity in the process by which the EU is developing as an international 
actor. Others downplay the importance of ideational and normative aspects, preferring to 
recognize the EU’s regional actorness on the basis of presence and capacity directed 
towards action triggers, namely, the goals, interests, principles and emergent situations 
which provide the necessary predicates for action (Doidge, 2011, pp. 39-40; Wunderlich, 
2012, p. 657). John Peterson (2012, p. 220) goes further, critiquing the constructivist 
approach to the EU as a global actor for setting the bar too low when faced with the 
institution’s inaction or incoherence.  
I argue here, and in the following chapter, that understanding the EU as an actor under 
construction, in that its development is influenced by evolving ideational constructions, is 
fundamental to both the type of actor it represents and the ascription of international 
actorness. As shown above, with each subsequent treaty revision the EU has extended its 
external mandate and reiterated the centrality of core values and principles. Fredrik 
Söderbaum and Luk Van Langenhove (2005, pp. 249-250) maintain that despite continuing 
debates as to its status, the EU has become, following the Maastricht Treaty, a recognisable 
force in the international areas of ‘trade, development cooperation, the promotion of 
regional integration, democracy and good governance, human rights and, to an increasing 
extent, also in security policies’. More recently it has been argued that the Lisbon Treaty 
																																																								
52 Hettne (2011, p. 29) attributes this understanding to the new regionalism approach, whereby regions ‘are 
not geographical or administrative objects but potential subjects’. 
53 For example, many of the key authors associated with the Normative Power Europe concept in the 
following chapter.  
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has redefined the EU’s role in international affairs (Buşe, 2011), and that with its coming 
into force the EU has now become an international actor (Howorth, 2012).  
The EU remains a unique global entity, in that its ongoing structural development makes 
it impossible to conceptualise as a fixed or classically defined actor. When viewed through 
the constructivist lens, however, it is precisely this process of renegotiation and 
reinterpretation, both internally and vis-à-vis its external relations, that determines the 
identity, role and actorness of the EU (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, p. 22). Furthermore, this 
process takes place in a mutually constitutive relationship with the changing international 
environment, which has often provided the impetus for revising and consolidating 
common external policy positions (M. E. Smith, 2006, pp. 290-291). The EU’s considerable 
presence as a trading power has been employed to achieve increasingly coherent foreign 
policy objectives, such as structural economic reforms and the promotion of core values. 
Indeed, it has been a central objective of recent EU trade policy to harness the forces of 
globalisation and ‘spread, through the negotiation of trade agreements, the European 
model of society to the rest of the world’ (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2005, p. 266). It remains to 
be seen, in Parts II and III of this thesis, whether or not the EU has been successful in 
utilising its considerable presence as an international actor to promote ethical norms and 
an acceptance of European values in its southern neighbourhood, particularly in response 
to the Arab Uprisings.  
The following chapter will conclude Part I, by establishing the type of actor the EU 














Chapter 3  
The EU’s promotion of ethical norms 
Introduction 
Having established that the EU is an international actor in its own right, and outlined the 
development of its foreign policy mechanisms, the discussion in this chapter now turns to 
the type of international actor the EU represents. As Sonia Lucarelli (2006, p. 1) notes, 
discussions pertaining to the EU’s relations with the rest of the world have changed since 
the end of the Cold War and the establishment of the TEU, with an increasing emphasis on 
understanding and conceptualising the EU as a political entity which both participates in 
world politics, and is also partially constituted by that participation. Much of the 
contemporary debate regarding the EU as a particular actor has taken place within the 
Normative Power Europe literature, stimulated by Ian Manners’ seminal 2002 article 
“Normative Power Europe: A contradiction in terms?”. According to Richard Whitman 
(2013, p. 171): 
Manners’ article and subsequent work has stimulated a neo-normative turn 
in theorising the EU’s international presence. The key contribution of 
Manners has been to stimulate a prolific set of debates over the visions, 
ideations, values and principles of the Union. For over a decade there has 
been a preoccupation with the patterns and the extent of the implementation 
of various norms within EU policies.  
This field of academic enquiry within European Union studies is an especially useful 
framework in which to address the role of ethics in EU external action, and will be the 
main theoretical framework with which to interpret the EU’s promotion of ethical norms 
in response to the Arab Uprisings later in the thesis. The NPE literature puts forward a 
particular characterisation of the EU, albeit one that is contended, and also represents a 
contemporary paradigmatic approach to the study of Europe (Parker & Rosamond, 2013, 
pp. 229-230). Furthermore, the NPE literature concerns itself with questions about EU 
identity relating to both the classification and justification of its international norm 
promotion, including competing theories regarding the relationship between ethics, norms 
and interests. As Manners (2008a, p. 46) himself states, a normative power approach ‘aims 
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to contribute to a better understanding of what principles the EU promotes, how the EU 
acts, and what impact the EU has by attempting both to analyse and to judge the EU’s 
normative power in world politics’. 
This chapter begins with an outline of Manners’ original argument and an overview of the 
various issues and claims that have been discussed within the literature since. The key 
points raised are the distinctions between contrasting types of power, differing 
conceptions of the term “normative”, and some of the principal arguments for and against 
the idea of the EU as a normative and/or ethical power. This is followed by an analysis of 
the competing roles that ethics, norms and interests play in the context of EU external 
action, including further critiques of the NPE concept, and a differentiation of those norms 
considered ethical for the purposes of this discussion. The subsequent section will 
demonstrate the importance of ethical norms to the EU’s self-perception and articulation 
of its international identity, which is a key premise in the argument put forward in Part II 
regarding its response to the Arab Uprisings. The final section discusses some 
contemporary issues relating to the NPE debate, which will be particularly relevant to the 
secondary conclusions that have resulted from this research, and are presented in later 
chapters.  
Normative Power Europe? 
Although there is an ongoing academic discussion about what type of power the EU is or 
has, there is a general consensus that the EU is a unique international actor. In the 
contemporary literature on European studies, the concept of EU power has attracted a 
number of qualifying prefixes in an attempt to provide its distinguishing characteristics: 
civilizational, responsible, ethical, gentle, quiet super-, post-modern super-, structuring, 
transformative, soft and normative (Gerrits, 2009, p. 2; Whitman, 2013, p. 3). The genesis of 
these conceptualisations can be traced back to John Galtung’s (1973) characterisation of the 
European Community as an ‘ideological power’ and, in particular, François Duchêne’s 
(1973) characterisation of the European Community as a civilian power, or idée force. 
Manners’ articulation of normative power, arguably the most influential argument to 
	 87	
develop from this lineage,54 is presented as a departure from previous debates that solely 
contrast civilian power, where influence is exerted largely through diplomacy and 
economic leverage, with military power. According to Duchêne (1973), Europe ‘must be a 
force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards’ promoting 
values that are part of its ‘inner characteristics’. Jan Orbie (2005, p. 126) notes that Manners 
acknowledges this normative dimension in Duchêne’s work; however, Manners (2002, pp. 
236-237) rejects the centrality of the state with regard to the concept of both civilian and 
military power, and also the use of civilian forms of power as the means by which the EU 
achieves its goals, which he clarifies as economic power, diplomatic cooperation and 
recourse to supranational institutions. As Manners (2002, p. 238) states, ‘by refocusing 
away from debate over either civilian or military power, it is possible to think of the 
ideational impact of the EU’s international identity/role as representing normative power’. 
In the endeavour to understand the role of ethical norm promotion in EU external action, 
the purpose of this thesis, the NPE framework provides two key points of interest: firstly, 
the basis of the EU’s predisposition to be a promoter of international norms; and secondly, 
the means by which the EU achieves its normative goals. With regard to the first point, 
Manners (2002, pp. 240-241) argues that the EU’s normative difference derives from the 
uniqueness of its historical context, the hybrid nature of its polity and the evolution of its 
political-legal constitution. The sui generis nature of the EU as a political entity is given as 
the ontological basis for its international identity and external action, informed by the 
founding principles upon which the EU was historically conceived, politically constructed 
and constitutionally established. As Steve Wood (2009) notes: 
The normative power concept comprises what the EU professes and wants in 
value or ideational terms, notably democracy, human rights, civil freedoms 
and the rule of law; and how the EU aims to encourage and secure these 
values and ideals, especially beyond its borders [emphasis added]. 
																																																								
54 ‘In 2007, scholars at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) meeting voted Manners’ article 
among the five most important, essential and seminal academic pieces published over the previous ten 
years’ (Forsberg, 2011, p. 1184). 
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The second relevant point of interest provided by the NPE debate concerns Wood’s latter 
assertion, namely how does the EU encourage and secure its values and ideals as a norm 
promoter? In order to differentiate normative power from civilian and military power, 
Manners (2002, pp. 244-245) provides six forms of norm diffusion: contagion, 
informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion and the 
cultural filter.55 What unites these six forms of norm diffusion for Manners is the absence 
of coercion, where EU values and principles are externally promoted as a benign by-
product of the EU’s cultural, economic and political relationships with its partners.56 
Manners (2002, p. 239) argues that although the EU possesses civilian power, such as 
leverage via trade and development aid, and “fledgling” military power capabilities, 
greater attention needs to be given to the ideational nature of its normative power, which 
gives the EU the ‘ability to shape conceptions of “normal” in international relations’. 
Whitman (2013, p. 174), a consistent proponent of NPE, adds:  
Although the civilian power thesis is based on the relative absence of 
physical force and military capabilities, it still inherently acknowledges the 
importance of material power, whereas normative power focuses on ‘non-
material exemplification found in the contagion of norms’ through imitation 
and representation of the EU which has become a pole of attraction.  
The EU, according to Manners and Whitman, is presented as a normative power based 
upon the normative quality of both what it is, and what it does.57  
																																																								
55 Contagion: the unintentional diffusion of ideas from the EU to other political actors; informational 
diffusion: the result of strategic and declaratory communications by the EU; procedural diffusion: the 
institutionalization of a relationship between the EU and a third party; transference: conditions incorporated 
into EU exchanges of goods, trade, aid or technical assistance with third parties; overt diffusion: as a result of 
the physical presence of the EU in third states and international organizations; the cultural filter: the impact 
of international norms and political learning in third states and organizations leading to learning, adaptation 
or rejection of norms (Manners, 2002, pp. 244-245). 
56 It is interesting to note that Manners does not view the conditionality associated with norm diffusion by 
transference as coercive, and this will be discussed at length later in this chapter.  
57 It should be noted that Manners (2002, p. 252) final assertion in his seminal 2002 article is that that the EU 
should act to extend its norms into the international system, which, as Hiski Haukkala (2011, pp. 45-46) 
points out, is itself a prescriptive statement. Within the NPE literature the word ‘normative’ has come to 
mean all things to all arguments, with few attempts made to clarify the term itself. Nathalie Tocci (2008, pp. 
4-5) differentiates between neutral and non-neutral interpretations of the term, with the former being 
associated with any actor’s conception of “normal” in international affairs, and the latter having an ethical 
dimension regarding what an actor wants, how it acts and what it achieves. Tuomas Forsberg (2011, p. 119) 
lists five criteria regarding normative power: normative identity, normative interests, behaving normatively, 
normative means and normative ends. For the purposes of this discussion, the EU is considered a normative 
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A prominent critic of the EU as a normative power has been Adrian Hyde-Price, who 
argues from a structural realist perspective that the EU is neither normative nor ethical. In 
his view, an inherent weakness of NPE stems from the tendency of liberal idealist theories 
to ignore the existence of economic and military power dynamics inherent in the strategic 
environment within which it operates (Hyde-Price, 2006, p. 218). By this rationale, the 
EU’s power to shape conceptions of normal in the international arena stems not from its 
ideational appeal, but from the material benefits associated with trade, aid and the 
prospect of membership. Hyde-Price (2008, p. 29) concludes that ‘where the pursuit of a 
normative or political agenda is feasible, the ethical dimension of the EU’s foreign and 
security policy should be limited to a modest set of three principles of statecraft rooted in a 
Weberian “ethic of ultimate ends”, namely: prudence, scepticism and reciprocity’.  
Other critics of NPE have pointed to the increased development of EU military capabilities 
as evidence that its power is neither normative nor civilian. Thomas Diez (2005, p. 623) 
points to the obvious development of the ESDP, ‘including the Rapid Reaction Force and 
various political and military committees to govern military efforts on EU level’, and 
Karen E. Smith (2005b, p. 12) argues that the EU’s acquisition of military capabilities is a 
fatal blow to its civilian power credentials, as it entails a willingness to back up diplomacy 
with force. Annika Björkdahl (2011, p. 103) agrees that the EU is now prepared to utilise 
military force in the management of conflicts and promotion of human values and norms, 
but argues that military and normative power can, and should, coexist.  
Manners (2006c, p. 183) has responded directly to these critiques, claiming that while 
increased militarization of the EU does weaken its normative claims, it would ‘not 
necessarily lead to the diminution of the EU’s normative power, if critical reflection 
characterized the process’. He also argues that the process of EU foreign policy 
integration, combined with the European public’s sensitivity to the use of force, acts as a 
																																																																																																																																																																																								
actor on the basis that it is both a promoter of international norms (albeit selectively) and a prescriber of 
those norms as universally accepted measures that should be adhered to. Although neither of these two 
positions are necessarily ethical, it will be shown later in this chapter that there are ethical norms which the 
EU promotes, based on international human rights discourse, and that these are a legitimising aspect of the 
EU’s self-perceived identity. Analysing the EU’s means of norm diffusion will also inform secondary 
conclusions in later chapters.  
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pacifying and de-securitizing influence on the traditional foreign policy of its member 
states. Whitman (2011, p. 11) adds that ‘there is a tendency to remain within peaceful, non-
coercive confines of constructive instruments rather than military force. Therefore, there is 
not necessarily a contradiction between normative power and an actor’s possession, and 
even use, of military power, if the latter is ‘subordinated to the more fundamental 
normative ethos’ (Forsberg, 2011, p. 1188).58  
Regardless of the theoretical implications to NPE with regard to increased militarization 
within the EU, the concept remains relevant to a discussion about the role of ethical norm 
promotion in EU foreign policy. Although the EU has engaged militarily in humanitarian 
missions, it has not, as yet, done so for the purpose of promoting international norms, 
such as democracy and human rights.59 The following section addresses the relationship 
between ethics, norms and interests, so as to differentiate those ethical norms that 
potentially influence EU external action, and to highlight the tensions that exist between 
norms and different types of interests. 
Ethics, norms and interests 
One of the reasons that the NPE paradigm has stimulated the volume of heated debate 
within European studies that it has, is that it is notoriously difficult to make unambiguous 
statements as to the clear separation between ethics, norms and interests. 60  Lisbeth 
Aggestam (2008, p. 8) observes that ‘a distinctive feature of both national and European 
foreign policy discourse since the end of the Cold War is the extent to which ethics, power 
and interests have been brought closer together’. Where the concept of normative power is 
concerned, the situation is further complicated by the fact that a norm can be defined as 
both a principle of right action with ethical connotations, and alternatively, that which is 
																																																								
58 It should be noted that the EU does ‘take a leading role in peace-keeping operations, conflict prevention 
and in the strengthening of the international security [...] drawing on civilian and military assets’ (EEAS, 
2016a, 2016c), as part of the CSDP. It also plays a prominent role in the observation of elections worldwide, 
which it considers vital for the promotion of human rights and democracy (EEAS, 2016b).  
59 Unlike the United States (US), to which the normative power of the EU is often compared when discussing 
the means of norm diffusion; see, for example, Kagan (2003). 
60 Diez (2005, p. 625) goes as far as to argue that it is nonsensical to even assume a normative sphere without 
interests, such is the overlap between norms and strategic interests. 
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considered normal in the international arena (Forsberg, 2011, p. 1190). These two usages 
are not always differentiated, and both EU policy-makers and academic commentators are 
prone to conflating the two definitions when discussing the legitimacy, or otherwise, of 
external action. As noted above, it is neither inherently ethical to be normative in either 
sense of the word, and one of the purposes of this chapter is to identify those norms that 
the EU considers both central to its identity as an international actor, and morally 
justifiable to promote in the global arena. Therefore, in this section I will highlight four 
junctures in which the EU’s promotion of international norms relates to, or intersects with, 
the advancement of its short- and long-term interests, and then differentiate those ethical 
norms relevant to later chapters. 
The structural benefits of international norm promotion 
It would be uncontroversial to say that the promotion of norms and the advancement of 
interests are often intertwined, particularly where the EU is concerned. At the first 
juncture between norms and interests, the EU, representing the largest market and trading 
power in the international arena, clearly benefits from a world in which disputes are 
resolved according to rule of law, and neighbours achieve stability via their citizens’ 
acquisition of basic rights and democratic accountability. As far back as 1992 it is possible 
to find references to an awareness within EU policy-making circles that European interests 
and the structure of the international arena were strongly connected:  
With the new phase now beginning, the CFSP should contribute to ensuring 
that the Union external action is less reactive to events in the outside world, 
and more active in the pursuit of the interests of the Union and in the 
creation of a more favourable international environment (European Council, 
1992, p. 18). 
Where the ENP is concerned, Esther Barbé and Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués (2008) note 
that it presents the EU as “a force for good” while at the same time serving European 
interests by creating a ring of well-governed democratic states, and Zaki Laïdi (2008, p. 15) 
argues that the ENP is an example of the EU doing geopolitics with norms, as it is 
specifically designed to set up a virtuous periphery of development, democracy and good 
governance in the interests of safeguarding its security and stability. Richard Youngs 
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(2004) goes further, arguing that that the EU’s norm promotion is indistinguishable from 
the achievement of its strategic interests, and that human rights norms are used selectively 
and instrumentally in the interests of European security. The essence of these arguments is 
that the EU uses the promotion of international norms, ethical or otherwise, to secure a 
neighbourhood in which its interests are secured.61  
This long-term approach to external action has been described by Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan (2008, p. 25) as structural foreign policy, resulting from globalisation and 
post-Cold War instability, which they contrast with conventional foreign policy: 
• Conventional foreign policy is orientated towards states, military 
security, crises and conflicts [...] 
• Structural foreign policy refers to a foreign policy which, conducted 
over the long-term, seeks to influence or shape sustainable political, 
legal, socio-economic, security and mental structures [emphasis in 
original]. 
Laïdi (2008, pp. 4-5) goes on to argue that the EU is structurally inclined to impose norms 
on the world system, partly because it lacks influence over other actors, such as the United 
States regarding environmental treaties, or China regarding human rights. However, the 
issue concerning whether or not the EU prioritizes norms over interests is more relevant to 
shorter-term considerations, as opposed to the long-term achievement of a beneficial 
global environment reflecting the EU’s foundational principles. Although there is evidence 
to suggest that EU policy-makers are aware of the long-term structural benefits associated 
with their promotion of norms, as noted above, the primary justification for these policies 
is consistently with recourse to international treaties and covenants that maintain the 
universality of the underlying principles. In light of this, a more useful conceptual 
framework is provided by Alexander George and Robert Keohane (1980, p. 221), who 
differentiate between 
																																																								
61 In terms of Arnold Wolfers’ (1962, p. 73) renowned distinction between mileu goals, namely those which 
aim to shape conditions beyond national boundaries, and possession goals, which aim to enhance or preserve 
things to which an actor places value, the authors above argue that these are one and the same thing with 
regard to EU external action. 
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the usually promoted and emphasized self-regarding interests (where the state 
in question is first and foremost the interested party), the less emphasized 
collective interests (where several states and actors enjoy advantages in 
common) and the usually ignored other-regarding interests (where the 
interests of other actors are dominant, but where the state in question can 
derive indirect benefit from the improved situation of other actors).     
(Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 21, emphasis in original)  
If, for the purpose of this distinction, we take the EU as analogous to a state actor in the 
international arena, its promotion of human rights and democracy is framed as an other-
regarding interest that rhetorically legitimises the EU’s self-perceived identity. This point 
will be elaborated upon below, as it is an important premise regarding the hypothesis 
presented in Part II. In terms of the structural benefits associated with ethical norm 
promotion, described above, the collective nature of such outcomes, according to EU 
policy-makers,62 does not entail a critique that the EU is a purely interest-driven actor. 
However, there are certain self-regarding interests that are either separate, or at odds, with 
EU’s norm promotion, and these will be addressed next. 
Norms versus self-regarding interests 
Structural benefits aside, when discussing the normative nature of the EU, ethical or 
otherwise, the NPE literature has largely followed Manners’ lead when it comes to 
categorising those norms that contrast with “interests”. In his 2002 article, Manners 
identifies a number of core norms that inform EU external action, based on the principles 
enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the UDHR. With 
reference to specific articles in the TEU, he argues that the ‘EU is founded on and has as its 
foreign and development policy objectives the consolidation of democracy, rule of law, 
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Manners, 2002, p. 241).63 
Although Tocci (2008, p. 6) notes that it is problematic to make a straightforward 
juxtaposition between norms and strategic interests, which she argues as including 
protection of commercial interests, migration management and security issues, it is 
																																																								
62 It should be noted that not all actors in partner countries of the MENA region perceive the EU’s policies in 
this light, which will become evident in the bilateral analysis of Part III.  
63 In this and later works, Manners (2002, 2008a) goes on to add a number of minor norms, which include 
social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance.  
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precisely these areas of self-regarding interests that are compared to norms in criticisms 
that the latter are used to secure the former. This is the case when Youngs (2004) argues 
that there has been an overemphasis on the ideational nature of the EU’s value promotion, 
and that human rights norms, as the most significant aspect of European strategy, are 
equally used to secure strategic interests in keeping with instrumental power politics. 
Furthering this line of argument, Hyde-Price (2006, pp. 226-227) specifies policies 
regarding the neighbourhood as characteristic of member states using EU value 
promotion to secure strategic interests. Despite this critique, it is argued here that there is 
a distinction between some interests that are clearly self-serving, such as security and 
migration control, and exported norms, in both senses of the term “normative” outlined 
above.  
Where Euro-Mediterranean relations are concerned, security and migration are two self-
regarding interests that had been of particular concern to the EU leading up to the Arab 
Uprising. Since its inception the Barcelona Process has been described in terms of security, 
often broadly defined, and migration, which have both been deemed to take precedence 
over normative values, despite the EU’s own rhetoric. Eduard Lecha (2010, p. 233) labels 
the EMP project a ‘regional security partnership’, and Sarah Wolff (2012, p. 1) argues:  
The initial positive spirit of the Barcelona Process was overtaken by 
realpolitik concerns that led Europeans to be less forceful about the 
promotion of normative principles such as democratization. Instead it seems 
that EU internal security concerns of migration, border control, security and 
energy took precedence. 
Prior to the transformation of the EMP/Barcelona Process to the ENP in 2004, the 
European Security Strategy (ESS) noted: 
The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of 
economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European 
Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean 
partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation 
in the framework of the Barcelona Process. (European Council, 2003, p. 8) 
In the same document the key threats were identified as: terrorism, with explicit mention 
of Islamic fundamentalist groups; proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs); 
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regional conflicts, with specific mention of the Middle East; state failure; and organised 
crime (European Council, 2003, pp. 3-5).64 Visne Korkmaz (2008, p. 154) contends that 
these threats are ‘based on the basic insecurities in the region and reflects the logic of 
western security documents [whereby the] Mediterranean is therefore becoming an area 
covering both security discourse and security practice for the Europeans and the Union’.  
Whereas perceived threats to internal security from the southern neighbourhood have 
been a dominant feature of Euro-Mediterranean relations since the Barcelona Process, it is 
arguably migration from the region to Europe that has emerged as the dominant self-
regarding interest for EU policy-makers. This is partly due to the coalescence with other 
key threats, such as organised crime and the export of Islamic terrorism, and partly due to 
a pronounced increase in migration, both before, and particularly after, the Arab 
Uprisings, as a result of economic stagnation and regional conflicts. George Joffé (2008, p. 
147) argues that the threat of transnational terrorism has led to the normative objectives of 
the EMP becoming securitised, and that the ‘signifier of this process has been the way in 
which the approach to the issue of migration as a security concern has been modified’. 
Paul Cardwell (2009, pp. 174-177) agrees, noting that while the original Barcelona 
Declaration and its supplementary documents contained only limited references to 
migration, since 2005 there has been an explicit linkage between migration and security 
issues, in general, and with the threat of terrorism, in particular. 65  The key to 
understanding both security and migration as self-regarding interests is that there are no 
international norms by which the EU is able to clearly justify or govern its policy-making 
in this area. As Diez (2013, p. 201) notes, ‘there is no undisputed [international] norm in 
favour of migration’,66 much less so regarding security.  
																																																								
64 A 2008 report by the European Council (2008) concerning the implementation of the ESS, offered nothing 
new with regard to the identification of key threats, or the Mediterranean area, essentially honing ‘the basic 
thrust of the ESS without setting any completely new directions’ (Bendiek & Kaim, 2015, p. 1).  
65 It was during this period that the EU established the European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders (FRONTEX) as a means of increasing coordination on migration issues 
with third countries as part of its external relations (Demmelhuber, 2011, pp. 817-818).  
66 The term “migration” has become extremely politicised, particularly in Europe as a result of the huge 
numbers of people fleeing conflicts in Syria, Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan in 2015. Diez is clearly not 
including refugees such as these, as there are related international norms, such as the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. In order to avoid making ill-informed value judgements, I have avoided terms such as 
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The increasing prioritisation of security and migration within the context of Euro-
Mediterranean relations has resulted in overlapping EU policy frameworks and initiatives, 
so that ‘internal tensions between EU objectives have become increasingly obvious, co-
ordination difficulties more pronounced and short-term security interests of EU Member 
States de facto prioritised’ (Marsh & Rees, 2012, p. 143). As will be shown in Chapter 4, the 
promotion of core values with recourse to international norms in the MENA region, 
despite being heavily emphasised by the EU’s own rhetoric, was often superseded by the 
self-regarding interests of security and migration prior to the Arab Uprisings. Both inter-
institutional and intra-institutional dissidence occurred, between EU external mechanisms 
associated with human rights, rule of law and democracy, on the one hand, and security 
and migration, on the other. Although this thesis will focus mainly on the tension between 
ethical norms, discussed below in terms of other-regarding interests, and issues such as 
migration and security, discussed above in terms of self-regarding interests, there is one 
other classification of norms that must be addressed: technical norms associated with 
collective interests.    
Technical norms as collective interests 
As noted earlier in this chapter, a norm can be defined as both a principle of right action 
with ethical connotations, and, alternatively, that which is considered normal in the 
international arena. With regard to the latter definition, there are a host of competing 
positions as to what is considered normal in the international arena, ranging from 
contending principles of political theory to metaphysical differences regarding legal 
justification. The issue of clashing “universalities” will be taken up later in this chapter. 
The definition of a norm as a principle of right action, however, is central to the EU’s 
justification for its external value promotion, whereby the ethical connotations legitimise 
both the action and the actor. According to Manners (2008a, p. 47), ‘[t]he ethics of the EU’s 
normative power are located in the ability to normalize a more just, cosmopolitical world’. 
Given that Manners also described normative power as the ability to shape conceptions of 
																																																																																																																																																																																								
“economic migrant” or “illegal immigration”, choosing instead to speak about “migration” as a generalised 
term, and to use refugees for those clearly escaping violent conflicts.  
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normal in the international arena, it is not difficult to see how it has become common to 
find the terms “ethical” and “normative” used interchangeably within the NPE literature. 
However, as Whitman (2013, p. 175) points out, in other instances Manners uses the term 
normative in the sense of how policy should be, to distinguish it from ethical, which relates 
to the “genuineness” of foreign policy. The crucial question, therefore, is: what areas can 
be considered ethical about the EU’s promotion of norms? 
In addressing Manners’ substantive normative principles at the heart of EU external 
action, Owen Parker and Ben Rosamond (2013, p. 233) characterise the core norms as 
liberal principles, rendered cosmopolitan to the extent that they increasingly 
trump any specific concerns of sovereign states that may conflict with them 
and are, in theory at least, increasingly advocated and upheld in 
transnational and European jurisdictional spaces.  
There is no doubt that the consolidation of democracy, rule of law, and respect for human 
rights are increasingly advocated and upheld in transnational and European jurisdictional 
spaces, but it is often overlooked within the NPE literature that one of the liberal 
principles that the EU has consistently and vigorously promoted is in the sphere of trade 
and economics. As Parker and Rosamond (2013, p. 236) go on to point out in the same 
article: 
In particular, attention is drawn to the fact that a central aspect of the EU’s 
liberal character – its economic liberal character – has been relatively 
neglected in this literature. This is surprising inasmuch as the regulation of a 
transnational market is such a (if not the) central facet of the EU inside or 
outside [emphasis in original].67 
Democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and liberal free-market reform are all 
norms which the EU promotes through a variety of external mechanisms, including 
Association Agreements and Action Plans with third parties in the MENA region. It is also 
the case that each of these norms can be considered as EU interests, keeping in mind 
George and Keohane’s conceptual distinctions: liberal free-market norms as a collective 
interest in terms of the trade and economic opportunities that are generated as a result; 
																																																								
67 For a full account of this position, see Chad Damro (2012). 
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and norms regarding democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights as other-
regarding interests, although they may indirectly produce structural benefits conducive to 
the EU in the international arena. However, only the latter policies, in particular 
democracy and human rights, can be considered ethical norms in the context of EU foreign 
policy, which bases its commitment to international ethical considerations firmly on the 
UN’s International Bill of Human Rights, and frames the promotion of such norms as a 
cosmopolitical duty.  
The purpose of making this distinction is to put to one side the many technical norms 
associated with liberal free-market reform, trade and economics. It is a significant decision 
to take, and not one taken lightly. The position of this author is that the many technical 
norms associated with the EU’s liberal economic character are a constant feature of the 
EU’s external action, but are not necessarily self- or other-regarding, and certainly not 
ethical:68 
In short, the EU has indeed been involved in a ‘normative’ process of 
gradually exporting its rules and practices to the neighbourhood. However, 
these rules differ considerably from those norms stipulated in the 
‘normative power Europe’ concept. Pertaining predominantly to the 
integration of third states into different aspects of the EU’s internal market, 
the transferred rules and practices focus on regulatory convergence and 
efficient economic governance (Del Sarto, 2016, p. 220). 
Not only are these technical norms a constant feature of the EU’s relationships with its 
partners, in the southern neighbourhood and beyond, according to the EU they equally 
benefit both parties. While this is a particularly controversial statement, and could 
generate an entire thesis in itself, a classification of liberal economic rules and practices as 
technical norms and collective interests allows for a much more revealing analysis 
regarding the interplay between (other-regarding) ethics/norms and (self-regarding) 
interests.  
																																																								
68 Although many EU policy-makers, academics and NPE commentators would certainly argue otherwise.  
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The EU’s ethical norms as other-regarding interests 
As argued in Chapter 1, international ethics and human rights have become closely 
aligned, and increasingly the language of human rights has developed into a paradigm of 
contemporary moral justification in international affairs. Proponents argue that human 
rights discourse is not dependent on deontological foundations or recourse to the primacy 
of particular cultural values. Critics, in particular cultural relativists, argue that moral 
justification based on human rights succumbs to Veronica Pin-Fat’s “metaphysical 
seduction”, namely the attribution of universality so that it can be applied to everyone on 
a global scale. With regard to the promotion of ethical norms, EU policy-makers fall 
strongly into the former camp. When Helen Sjursen (2006a, p. 248) asks, ‘[a]re some norms 
of a more universal character than others, in the sense that they may be considered 
principles having intersubjective transcultural validity?’, the EU position is framed in 
terms of the lingua franca of human rights, with reference to the UN treaties and 
agreements regarding specification. The hegemonic status of human rights discourse in 
international politics, despite ongoing debate regarding classification and precedence, is 
evident in the regional and bilateral relationships between the EU and its southern 
neighbours. Although the conception of human rights in the MENA region is heavily 
influenced by deontic and religious values, there are formal covenants by all parties to 
develop and support the ethical norms promoted by the EU according to its own standard 
of moral justification. Regardless of the sporadic levels of commitment to such ideals 
shown by all parties, which will be discussed at length in subsequent chapters, it is the 
language of human rights which informs the ethical content of certain EU norm promotion.  
As will become apparent in the analysis of official documents pertaining to the EU’s 
southern neighbourhood policies in Part II, the promotion of democracy and human rights 
are consistently highlighted as ethically normative priorities. It is interesting to note the 
development and evolution of democratic values within the framework of EU ethical 
norm promotion, with democracy reaching its contemporary status as a ‘universal 
aspiration’ (Babayan & Viviani, 2013, p. 7). As ethical norms are those norms justified with 
recourse to the UN’s International Bill of Human Rights, it would be expected that 
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political rights receive the same weighting as found in those documents.69 The promotion 
of liberal democracy, however, has been framed by the EU as a principal ethical norm, and 
has become increasingly influential to EU external policy-makers, particularly in the 
MENA region. As Michelle Pace (2009, p. 39) points out:  
Since the 1990s, in the post-cold war context of the collapse of communist 
rule, the EU has been pursuing an almost messianic quest for the 
internationalization of liberal democracy abroad, as a key foreign policy 
instrument in its external relations. The European model of liberal 
democracy has been taken as a necessarily ‘good’ thing and its pursuit 
supposedly as a primary goal in and of itself. 
Pace (2009, p. 41) goes on to note that the EU promotes human rights and democracy 
through its various policies and programmes with third countries via the human rights 
clause incorporated into all EU agreements as an essential element.  
Although Nelli Babayan and Alessandra Viviani (2013, p. 7) contend that the EU does not 
strictly differentiate between the primacy of either human rights or democracy, regarding 
them as mutually constitutive and interdependent, the latter has repeatedly come to 
supersede the former in EU policy. It is often overlooked that since the evolution of the 
human rights clause in the 1990s, democratic principles have not only been specifically 
included, but also invariably emphasised. In fact, as will be demonstrated in later 
chapters, in the MENA region democracy has been elevated to cardinal status within the 
echelon of rights incorporated into the EU’s ethical norm promotion. Nonetheless, as 
Aggestam (2008, p. 10) points out: 
Not only do ethical considerations have to be weighed against strategic 
interests; ethical principles themselves may conflict, and more often than not 
choices may have to be made between alternatives, both of which are 
morally ambiguous.  
																																																								
69 Which is limited to Article 21 of the UDHR, stating that ‘[t]he will of the people shall be the basis of the 
authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures’ 
(United Nations, 1948), and Article 25 of the ICCPR, which states ‘[t]o vote and to be elected at genuine 
periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, 
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors’ (United Nations, 1966). 
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Therefore, not only do tensions exist between ethics and interests, but also between ethical 
norms themselves; it is now ‘recognized that the promotion of human rights and 
democracy does not always work hand and hand and may indeed have destabilizing 
effects that end up contradicting the original objectives’ (Aggestam, 2009, p. 36). 70 
Regardless of this contention, human rights, and democracy as one of those rights, are 
firmly established in EU rhetoric as ethical other-regarding interests, namely the ethical 
norms that it has a duty to promote.  
The purpose of this section has been to draw attention to the relationship between ethics, 
norms and interests, so as to highlight the tension between ethical norms, as other-
regarding interests and self-regarding interests, such as security and migration. The 
objective has also been to identify the “ethical” in the EU’s norm promotion, which I have 
argued are those norms with recourse to the UN’s International Bill of Human Rights, 
including an emphasis on democratic principles. In the following section I will 
demonstrate the centrality of ethical norms to EU identity and to the legitimisation of its 
external actions.  
Ethical norms and EU identity 
It is no surprise that discussions about NPE have coincided with an increasing rhetorical 
emphasis on the centrality of ethical norms and values to EU foreign policy. As Whitman 
(2011, p. 2) notes ‘[t]he scholarly interest in the normative and value-driven features of the 
EU can be surely predicated upon the developments in the area of foreign policy 
cooperation and the accompanying emphasis on the importance of values and norms for 
conduct of external relations by EU policy circles’. With each subsequent treaty revision 
the EU has not only sought to develop a more coherent approach to external action, one 
that represents the shared interests of its member states, but also attempted to establish a 
sense of cohesive identity amongst the member states, with recourse to the externalisation 
of their shared internal values. 
																																																								
70 This point will be relevant to later analysis concerning the role of ethical norm promotion in the context of 
EU responses to the Arab Uprisings, particularly in the case of Tunisia. 
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Institutional rhetoric 
As noted in Chapter 2, the origins of the effort to create coordinated foreign policy with an 
identity linked to the Community’s foundational values can be traced back to the EPC 
between member states in 1970, and the linkage of human rights and democracy 
promotion with a singular external identity featured in both its formal institutionalisation 
via the SEA in 1987, and the subsequent Rhodes Declaration by the European Council in 
1988. With the establishment of the CFSP in 1992, which member states resolved to 
implement in the interest of reinforcing European identity (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 
2008, p. 333), the promotion of core values began to be both a defining and legitimising 
feature of EU external action.  
The post-Maastricht Treaty convention of including a human rights clause in all bilateral 
agreements as part of the CFSP has been arguably the most significant development in the 
nature of the EU’s collective relationships with third parties, allowing for the termination 
or suspension of agreements if partners are deemed to have committed violations of 
human rights. This was followed by the drafting of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, which, as Manners and others (Manners, 2002, p. 241; Von 
Bogdandy, 2000, p. 1307) note, established the protection of human rights as both a 
founding principle of the EU, and a prerequisite for its legitimacy. Further evidence as to 
the centrality of human rights and democracy promotion to EU external action, as both 
guiding and legitimising principles, can be found in the 2001 communiqué from the 
Commission to the Council and Parliament, on the EU’s approach to promoting these 
values in third countries. This communiqué cited the Charter of Fundamental Rights as 
the guiding document to the EU’s external approach, to which protection of human rights 
and democratisation would be essential objectives (European Commission, 2001a, p. 3). 
Commenting on the Commission’s statements, Rosa Balfour (2006, p. 14) notes the 
implication that the EU considers itself in a privileged position to pursue such objectives, 
adding that much ‘institutional rhetoric has been spent on the EU’s role in promoting 
principles of democracy and human rights’. Balfour’s observation regarding institutional 
rhetoric is significant, as the EU has consistently and increasingly used each major treaty 
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and policy document to rhetorically enforce an external identity that is legitimised by a 
commitment to ethical norms.  
In the 2003 ESS there is a clear articulation of the EU’s responsibility to the preservation 
and strengthening of international order, and the role of ethical norm promotion in 
fulfilling that duty: 
Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and 
in building a better world. [...] The development of a stronger international 
society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based 
international order is our objective. [...] Spreading good governance, 
supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of 
power, establishing rule of law and protecting human rights are the best 
means of strengthening international order (European Council, 2003; 
Lucarelli, 2006, p. 3). 
Forsberg (2011, p. 1186) posits the connection between Manners’ formulation of the NPE 
concept and its increased adoption by policy-makers, and also that the ESS, lays out the 
self-identity of the EU as a “force for good”. The Lisbon Treaty, the prevailing 
constitutional reform at the time of writing, is unequivocal as to the role, basis and 
justification of ethical norm promotion with regard to external action:  
The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the 
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and 
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, 
the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality 
and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter 
and international law. (European Union, 2007b, p. 23, Article 10a)  
Manners (2008a, p. 48) argues that it is the constitutionalisation of normative principles in 
the highly contested Lisbon Reform Treaty which ‘marks the crystallization and 
culmination of norms and practices which have been evolving over the past 15 years’, and 
in his seminal NPE article (2002, p. 241), he states that the EU’s ‘constitutional norms 
represent crucial constitutive factors determining its international identity’. The Lisbon 
Treaty’s establishment of the EEAS and the position of HR further added to the centrality 
of ethical norms to the EU’s international identity, as Catherine Ashton began her tenure 
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building on the EU’s established strengths as a normative power, and strongly associating 
with the vision of the EU as a “civilising force” (Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, 2013).  
Certainly the inaugural HR and the EEAS were resolute, in the early days of their 
operation, with regard to their rhetorical commitment to the centrality of human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law to the EU’s external identity, particularly, as will be shown 
in later chapters, in response to the Arab Uprisings.  
The ultimate institutional contribution to the centrality of ethical norm promotion 
regarding external action has been the 2012 EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on 
Human Rights and Democracy, which Special Representative for Human Rights Stavros 
Lambrinidis (2014, p. 2) argues ‘put human rights at the heart of EU foreign policy’. The 
EEAS (2014a) states that:  
The Framework sets out principles, objectives and priorities, all designed to 
improve the effectiveness and consistency of EU Policy as a whole. Together 
with the Action Plan, it provides an agreed basis for a truly collective effort, 
involving EU Member States as well as the EU Institutions. 
Despite this development coming after the EU’s response to the Arab Uprisings in 2011, it 
is the culmination of a continuous trend by EU policy-makers to align the EU’s identity as 
an international actor with the external promotion of its core values. The result of this 
phenomenon is that the promotion and preservation of this socially constructed identity, 
particularly with regard to the perception of other actors, has essentially attained the 
condition of (self-regarding) interest, one that frequently requires rational action to secure.    
A unique point of consensus  
Although there are many divergences within the NPE literature concerning the 
relationship between ethical norm promotion and interests, however the latter are defined, 
there is a broad consensus as to the importance of ethical norms with regard to the EU’s 
self-perceived international identity. Manners (2006b, p. 176) himself states that his 
conception of normative power reflects the EU’s ‘commitment to placing universal norms 
and principles at the centre of its relations with its member states and the world’, and 
argues from a “post-national perspective” with Sonia Lucarelli (2006, p. 211) ‘that there is 
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a clear relationship between values and principles in EU foreign policy on the one side, 
and EU identity on the other’. Key policy-makers involved in the rhetorical framing of 
external action have increasingly portrayed the EU as a unique type of international actor 
which displays a principled behaviour in foreign policy that derives from its particular 
nature (Lucarelli, 2006, p. 2), thus mirroring the initial argument put forward by Manners’ 
original articulation of the NPE paradigm. 
Lucarelli (2006, p. 1) notes that the NPE literature has provided a particularly thorough 
examination of ‘the way in which the EU is constituted as a political entity by the values, 
images71 and principles [...] which shape the discourse and practice of the EU’s relations 
with the rest of the world’, adding (2006, p. 8) that conceptualising the EU as a process 
partially explains the influence of self-representation by the representatives of its own 
institutions, whereby the ‘EU project’ and ‘EU self’ are both intertwined and compounded. 
Laïdi (2008, p. 4), despite taking a unique social preferences approach towards NPE, also 
sees a relationship between what the EU is and how it constructs its external identity: 
There is a strong homothetic relation between the way Europe is constructed 
and the way in which it sees the world, [helping] to understand why the 
preference for international norms is at the same time the product of a 
specific history and the ideal-type through which Europe represents itself to 
the world.  
Despite differences in theoretical approaches, conclusions and underlying premises, there 
is near unanimity as to the rhetorical importance that the EU attaches to its external 
promotion of ethical norms.  
Even those academic commentators that have provided the strongest critiques of NPE 
agree that the EU’s ethical norm promotion is a crucial part of its international identity. 
Karen E. Smith (2003b, p. 107) writes that ‘[e]ven though it does so inconsistently, the EU 
seems quite committed to promoting human rights for their own sake, as an expression of 
its identity’, and Diez (2005, p. 614) argues that ‘the discourse of the EU as a normative 
																																																								
71 In this context, images are ‘the pictures we have, based on our experiences and cultural traditions of the 
relationships between the physical and social worlds [which] provide the cognitive frame within which 
values are defined and translated into principles and political action’ (Lucarelli, 2006, p. 10). 
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power constructs a particular self of the EU [...] while it attempts to change others through 
the spread of particular norms’.72 Diez (2005, p. 614) goes on to make a significant point 
about the importance of normative power as the only form of identity that can be agreed 
upon by the EU’s diverse set of internal actors. Expanding on this line of argument, Diez 
(2005, p. 620) states:  
The discursive construction of the EU as a normative power is not found in 
isolated statements only. This normative discourse is one that most EU 
politicians – in Council, Commission and Parliament as well as on the 
member state level – engage in unless they are committed Eurosceptics. 
There may well be disagreement about the development of the EU’s military 
capacities between Council and Commission, and between different member 
states and different directorate-generals, yet the representation of Europe as 
a force for peace and well-being is nearly consensual.  
Hyde-Price (2008, pp. 29-30), another foremost critic of NPE, agrees that there is a broad 
consensus among member states as to the distinctive role that the EU plays in 
international politics as a “force for good”, adding ‘it is evident that political elites in 
member states have increasingly sought to present the EU’s foreign and security policies 
as distinctly “ethical” in character’.73 In light of the many inter- and intra-institutional 
tensions between EU policy-makers noted in Chapter 2, it is perhaps understandable that 
the other-regarding interests associated with ethical norm promotion would provide the 
platform for cohesive identity, as opposed to self-regarding interests that may be 
contested, or unevenly distributed between member states. 
The rhetoric of legitimacy 
The EU has utilised the promotion of human rights and democracy as a means to establish 
an external identity based on what it is, and also to represent its evolving actorness in the 
international arena. Although the resulting arguments lead to a variety of conclusions, this 
basic premise is the cornerstone of the NPE paradigm, and, increasingly, a widely 
																																																								
72 It should be noted that Diez’s (2005, p. 614) argument regarding the EU’s self-construction of identity is 
framed within a critique of the way in which the EU then contrasts its identity against an image of others in 
the ‘outside world’.  
73 Hyde-Price (2008, p. 30) cites empirical evidence presented by Aggestam’s (2004, pp. 241-245) study of the 
relationship between EU foreign policy and its “Big Three”, namely Britain, France and Germany. 
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acknowledged facet of EU institutional rhetoric. 74  The claim that EU ethical norm 
promotion has had a unifying effect regarding the internal dynamics between institutions 
and member states in the area of foreign policy is broadly accepted. Sir Michael Leigh 
(Interview #1, 6/11/2013), former Director-General for Enlargement, argues that despite 
their many divergences on external policy, member states support the promotion of 
human rights, and see it as an EU identity issue. Bernard Savage (Interview #4, 
26/11/2013), Head of the European External Action Service Maghreb Division, adds that 
member states and institutions, notably the European Parliament, have identified value 
promotion as the EU’s “value-added”, and the feature of EU identity that sets it apart from 
other international actors. However, there is less agreement regarding the issue of 
legitimacy where the actual substance of policy is concerned. According to Chris J. 
Bickerton (2011, p. 25), currently one of the main concerns for both scholars and policy-
makers is to identity sources of legitimacy for EU norm promotion. 
Despite Bickerton’s claim, the contested legitimacy of its ethical norm promotion is of 
much more concern to academics than EU policy-makers. As noted many times above and 
in previous chapters, the EU’s justification for both its internal and external advancement 
of human rights policies is with recourse to the universal principles found in the UN’s 
International Bill of Human Rights. It is clear that, both internally and externally, ideals 
such as human rights and democracy have become ‘key identity markers of the EU as a 
would-be carrier of universal values’ (Aggestam & Hill, 2008, p. 99), and that rhetorically 
the EU’s commitment to such ideals is natural in terms of its self-perception as an ethical 
power (Mayer, 2008, p. 69). Manners (2002, p. 244) states that the reinforcement and 
expansion of these norms allow the EU ‘to present and legitimate itself as being more than 
the sum of its parts’, and Aggestam (2008, p. 4), although disagreeing with Manners as to 
the unidirectional nature of normative power, argues that the normative globalisation that 
																																																								
74 In fact, the close correlation between the arguments put forward by proponents of NPE and the rhetoric of 
EU policy-makers has led some to question the conception of the EU as a normative, civilian or ethical 
power. Helen Sjursen (2006a, p. 235) goes as far as saying that the close correspondence of this concept with 




occurred following the end of the Cold War ‘has had a profound effect in legitimizing and 
enabling the EU to assume a more assertive role in foreign, security and defence policy’.  
The EU’s discursive construction of identity, to borrow a term from Diez, and its rhetorical 
legitimisation of foreign policy, is increasingly based on the universal validity of its ethical 
norms, and a commitment to promote those norms as part of its external action. However, 
this consistent rhetorical commitment to the centrality of ethical norms as guiding values, 
in terms of both the substance and implementation of external policy, creates a standard of 
legitimacy to which the EU can be held accountable. According to Frank Schimmelfennig 
(2001, p. 66), continuous rhetoric of this kind creates the prerequisite for effective shaming, a 
process by which an actor must honour its previous commitments in order to avoid 
inconsistency, and maintain credibility with other actors. By this rationale, the EU was 
previously unable to deny enlargement to Central/Eastern Europe without contradicting 
its legitimating discourse as the bastion of liberal democracy, and threatening the 
credibility of those actors in opposition (Krebs & Jackson, 2007, p. 56). Actors supporting 
enlargement were able to effectively shame those who opposed it, by showing that their 
opposition was inconsistent with their agreed standard of legitimacy.  
Schimmelfennig’s theory of rhetorical action will be outlined at length in the regional 
analysis of Part II, and will provide the framework for a hypothesis explaining the EU’s 
substantive, albeit short-lived, shift in policy in response to the Arab Uprisings. Having 
said that, it is worth briefly highlighting some of the key features of his argument, and, in 
particular, my adaptations of it, so as to better contextualise the crisis of legitimacy that 
occurred for the EU as a result of the Arab Uprisings. Schimmelfennig’s mechanism of 
rhetorical action involves three specific stages: rhetorical commitment, which provides the 
basis for rhetorical argumentation, which in turn leads to rhetorical entrapment. The first stage 
requires an actor’s prior identification with values and norms, which, as shown above, 
creates a standard of legitimacy. Under certain conditions other actors may call to account 
inconsistencies between rhetorical commitments and actual behaviour, during the second 
stage of rhetorical argumentation. Whereas the actors supporting enlargement in 
Schimmelfennig’s case study utilised this shaming process intentionally, a key point of 
	 109	
difference regarding my adapted argument is that the rhetorical argumentation was 
provided by the Arab protesters themselves, and the subsequent media framing of their 
struggle, neither of which had the intention of changing EU policy. Thus, the third stage of 
Schimmelfennig’s theory becomes rhetorical self-entrapment in this particular case, whereby 
the EU is shamed by the evident disjuncture between action and a prior commitment to a 
standard of legitimacy.  
The purpose of this section has been to show the importance and centrality of ethical norm 
promotion to the EU’s construction of its international identity, and to its justification of 
external action. As shown above, there is substantial evidence to be found in its treaties 
and communiqués to corroborate this claim, and, as Hartmut Mayer (2008, p. 62) notes in 
the context of NPE, ‘ethical aspirations and civilian norms can be found in abundance in 
the EU’s official rhetoric’. The rationale for this is two-fold: that the other-regarding nature 
of ethical norm promotion is a distinct policy area which transcends inter and intra-
institutional tensions; and that recourse to the international standards articulated by the 
UN provides legitimacy to the EU’s claim to be a ‘power for good’ (Solana, 2007). 
However, as Aggestam (2008, p. 1) argues, the EU’s external role, which has resulted from 
a contemporary search for collective purpose and legitimacy, is ‘articulated in a discourse 
of universal ethics’ [emphasis added]. The implications of this assumed universality will be 
taken up in the following section.  
 “Normative” issues 
The arguments outlined so far in this chapter, differentiating EU ethical norm promotion 
and showing its centrality to establishing and legitimising EU external identity, provide 
the framework for the hypothesis presented in Part II. However, there are two key issues 
that arise from an analysis of the NPE literature in the context of ethical norm promotion, 
which are particularly relevant to secondary conclusions resulting from this research, 
presented in later chapters.  
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Universalism 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the most pervasive issue with regard to moral considerations in 
international affairs is the tension between universalism and cultural relativism: the latter 
holding that ethical decision-making is relative to specific cultural communities over space 
and time, whereas the former is distinguished by the rules, maxims and principles that 
indicate the “rightness” or “wrongness” of goals and intentions, the character of which are 
absolute and universally applicable. The EU approach to the role of ethics in international 
affairs has been shown to draw heavily on a liberal deontology for its theoretical 
justification, framing its ethical norm promotion in the contemporary discourse of 
universal human rights. However, as Manners argues (2008b, p. 37), ‘a norm-based 
international system will only be achieved through normative power that persuades 
others of the universality of such norms’ [emphasis in original]. Notwithstanding, the 
ethical norms which the EU promotes, based on the UN’s Bill of Human Rights, are norms 
which ‘have overwhelmingly been produced within a space that is self-defined as the 
West [underscoring] an ambiguity about the geopolitical framework within which the 
European normative power is supposed to take place’ (Postel-Vinay, 2008, pp. 38-41). The 
difference between the EU’s perceived legitimacy resulting from a universally-held code 
of moral justification, on the one hand, and an international sphere in which that 
universality is contested, on the other, leads to a point of tension which is relevant to the 
relationship between the EU and its southern neighbours.  
The issue concerns the charge that a deontological ethics in the hands of a dominant 
international actor entails moral imperialism, where a contested universality is imposed or 
coerced, a situation that is further compounded by the colonial history of EU member 
states. According to Fraser Cameron (2007, p. 189), the legacy of colonialism continues to 
impact on the way in which the developing world views Europe, and a number of authors 
have levelled the charge of neo-colonialism at the EU’s practice of norm promotion, 
including those ethical norms with perceived international legitimacy. Whereas Whitman 
(2011, p. 4) states that ‘NPE rejects any affiliation with colonial or neo-colonial practice’, 
and Manners (2006c, p. 184) argues that that his conception of normative power, as 
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wielded by the EU, differentiates itself from civilian power by transcending its Eurocentric 
and neo-colonial perception of the world, Alex Pritchard (2013, pp. 423-425) counters that 
the inherent Kantian, and therefore problematic, universalism of the EU’s approach to 
ethics completely negates this position, whereby both the ethical norms and the means of 
evaluating them can be contested. Aggestam (2008, pp. 6-7) also raises the troubling 
prospect that the EU’s self-image as a “force for good”, based on contested universal 
ethics, leads to an identity discourse which could be perceived as incipient cultural 
imperialism. 
However, the framing of ethical norm promotion within international human rights 
discourse is less contested regarding the EU’s relationship with its southern 
neighbourhood than it seems, despite ongoing academic debate. While it is important ‘to 
critically reflect on the origins of the human rights agenda and its availability for 
manipulation by western powers’ (Onar & Nicolaïdis, 2013, p. 295), it is also the case, as 
has been noted above, that where institutional rhetoric is concerned, the MENA region has 
largely accepted the legitimacy of the EU’s promotion of ethical norms. This recognition is 
crucial, as Forsberg (2011, p. 1187) shows: 
The idea that the normative goals that the EU fosters are shared on a global 
level helps to counter the criticism that the EU’s attempt to act as a 
normative power can be seen as a form of cultural imperialism which 
continues the mission civilatrice of the European colonial states in a new era. 
While the shared institutional rhetoric between the EU and the governments of its 
southern neighbourhood goes some way towards countering the charge of moral 
imperialism, although not conclusively, the situation becomes more complicated where 
the EU’s relationship with civil society actors in the region is concerned.  
Hyde-Price (2008, pp. 33-34) argues that the cosmopolitan norms and values that support 
conceptions of the EU as an ethical or normative power assume an underlying “harmony 
of interests” that transcends the ‘particularist claims of discrete political communities’. 
While there is evidence to support the claim that a harmony of interests exists between the 
EU and the governing institutions of states in the MENA region, at least rhetorically, this 
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is clearly not the case across the range of diverse civil society actors. Whereas the ENP and 
Association Agreements lean heavily on the idea of shared values, societies in the Middle 
East and North Africa are influenced by deontic and religious values which are at odds 
with the universalism inherent in the EU’s ethical norm promotion. This is particularly the 
case with civil society actors that take shari’a law as the first and foremost authority where 
ethics are concerned, itself an ethical and normative position.   
As will be shown in later chapters, the increased centrality of ethical norm promotion to 
EU external action has recently been matched by an increased commitment and 
willingness to engage with civil society actors in the MENA region. However, the non-
negotiable nature of universal human rights as a legitimising principle has led to the 
exclusion of certain actors, particularly Islamist political parties and other civil society 
organisations with religious foundations. There has been a disconnect between the 
rhetoric of shared values, joint responsibility and locally-led reformation, on the one hand, 
and the lack of dialogue and institutional relationships with large, and often influential, 
segments of civil society, on the other. This disconnect has become increasingly 
pronounced as Islamist civil society actors have entered the mainstream political spectrum 
as a result of the social changes associated with the Arab Uprisings. An analysis of this 
issue in the context of research presented in later chapters will allow for some prescriptive 
conclusions with regard to the efficacy of ethical norm promotion by the EU in the MENA 
region.   
Political conditionality  
The second issue that arises from an analysis of the NPE literature in the context of ethical 
norm promotion concerns not only the efficacy of EU policy in the MENA region, but also 
the ethical justification that underpins it. If it were only the case that ‘the cosmopolitan 
nature of the EU’s principles’ (Whitman, 2011, p. 4) resulted in ‘a commitment to placing 
universal norms and principles at the centre of its relations with its member states and the 
world’ (Manners, 2006b, p. 176), then questions of efficacy would be superfluous, and 
ethical justification would be upheld, albeit by the EU’s own criteria. However, as shown 
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earlier in this chapter, both Manners and Whitman also argue that the normative quality 
of EU external action stems from both what it is, and what it does. The “elephant in the 
room”, certainly during the early stages of the NPE debate, has been whether or not the 
EU’s means of norm promotion are in keeping with the principles that underpin them, in 
particular, the coercive nature of political conditionality.  
In practice, a wide variety of means can and have been utilised to promote ethical norms 
such as human rights and democracy, ranging from military power, at the most coercive 
end of the interventionist spectrum, to traditional diplomacy and aid provision, at the 
least coercive end. However, as noted in Chapter 1, EU policy-makers have in the last 30 
years increasingly advanced a middle path of political conditionality, whereby economic 
benefits are offered or withheld on condition of political and social changes in the partner 
country. With regard to the spectrum of interventionist means, Tocci (2008, p. 9) states that 
some authors have classified soft methods based on joint ownership, 
engagement, persuasion and cooperation as more ‘normative’ than coercive 
methods such as conditionality, sanctions or military action. Methods based 
on joint ownership, cooperation and dialogue in principle hedge against the 
dangers of imposing allegedly ‘universal’ norms through sheer power and 
against the needs and desires of local populations in third countries.  
It is interesting to note that Tocci characterises conditionality as a coercive method, 
together with sanctions and military action, whereas Manners (2002, p. 245) includes it in 
his description of transference, which he characterises as being absent of coercion. 
Haukkala (2011, pp. 48-49) believes that Manners’ understanding of the EU as a norm 
promoter betrays too passive an understanding of its role, and that it is only through 
material incentives that the EU is able to facilitate change in its neighbourhood.75 At the 
heart of the issue regarding its coercive nature, or otherwise, is the level of choice available 
to the EU’s partners where political conditionality is concerned. 
EU policy-makers are inclined to side with those contributors to the NPE literature that 
emphasise the ideational and immaterial nature of ethical norm promotion, whereby 
																																																								
75 Although Haukkala’s argument is framed with the EU’s European neighbours in mind, with an emphasis 
on potential membership as one of the material incentives, his point is equally relevant to the southern 
neighbourhood.  
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norms are diffused via non-coercive means of socialisation and influence. When 
negotiating agreements within the ENP, the EU stresses the concept of “co-ownership”, 
and the freedom of partners to ‘choose how far they want to deepen their political and 
economic ties with the EU’ (Raik, 2006, p. 88). The European Commission (2004b) goes so 
far as stating that the ‘EU does not seek to impose priorities and conditions on its partners 
[and there] can be no question of asking partners to accept a pre-determined set of 
priorities’.76 Yet, as Kristi Raik (2006, p. 88) argues, this is a dishonest representation in 
light of the conditions which are set, and the level of choice available to the recipients: 
The impression of the neighbours having freedom to choose is quite 
deceptive [...] The EU is obviously far stronger economically and politically, 
which makes the relationship inherently unequal, but nevertheless the 
rhetoric of “equal partnership” is commonly used.  
Other authors also highlight the inequality of power between the EU and its neighbours, 
referring to an ‘asymmetric form of dialogue’ (Björn Hettne & Söderbaum, 2005, p. 539), or 
‘highly asymmetrical bilateral relationships that help to facilitate an active transference of 
its norms and values’ (Haukkala, 2011, p. 46).77 In light of these arguments, it is imperative 
for both the efficacy and underpinning moral justification of the EU’s ethical norm 
promotion that its partners perceive the means to be as other-regarding as the values.  
If, as Tocci (2008, p. 9) suggests, weak actors are under no illusion as to their lack of parity 
with strong actors, then it is possible that EU ethical norm promotion depends on non-
conditional means for both its efficacy and legitimacy. However, the ENP ‘claims to use 
political conditionality as the main instrument of norm promotion’ (Bicchi & Lavenex, 
2015, p. 872), and a reaffirmation of conditionality has been a significant feature of the 
EU’s response to the Arab Uprisings, in the form of its “more for more” policy. An 
																																																								
76 The origins of this language and approach can be found in many previous trade, aid and development 
treaties with third parties, but is most evident in the EU’s relationship with the ACP countries via the 
Cotonou Agreement, and its prior incarnations as the various Lomé Conventions. The official position on the 
Cotonou Agreement lists the equality of partners as a fundamental principle, and highlights co-ownership of 
development strategies, the pivotal role of dialogue and the fulfilment of mutual obligations (European 
Commission, 2000).  
77 Critiques which mirror precisely those of the abovementioned Cotonou Agreement, which was described 
as ‘a situation of total power asymmetry, where the normative consensus of the EU leaves little room for 
concessions’ (Elgström, 2000, p. 195), and ‘served only to emphasise the David versus Goliath nature of the 
association’ (Flint, 2008, p. 162). 
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analysis of this policy in light of the issues raised here regarding coercion and 
conditionality will provide some context for evaluating its efficacy in later chapters.  
********************** 
Part I of this thesis has engaged with the main theoretical and practical issues relevant to a 
discussion regarding the EU’s promotion of ethical norms, which will inform an analysis 
of EU policy towards the MENA region before, during and after the Arab Uprisings. 
Chapter 1 addressed the role of ethics in international affairs, the associated moral 
justifications, and issues pertaining to contemporary human rights discourse. Chapter 2 
outlined the institutional development of the EU’s foreign policy architecture, including 
intra- and inter-institutional tensions and the evolution of internal values to central 
features of external action, and presented the EU as an international actor in its own right. 
Chapter 3 has discussed the relationship between ethics, interests and norms within the 
framework of the NPE paradigm, showing those norms that the EU considers ethical, and 
demonstrating their significance regarding legitimisation of the EU’s self-perceived 













































EU policy towards the MENA region prior to the Arab Uprisings 
Introduction  
Having addressed the theoretical issues relevant to the EU as an ethical norm promoter in 
Part I, and having also established the centrality of value promotion to EU identity, in Part 
II of this thesis I examine the impact of the Arab Uprisings on the EU’s southern 
neighbourhood policy. A regional approach is taken as the level of analysis, reflecting the 
EU’s own institutional approach since the development of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership in 1995. As will be shown below, this has not always been consistently 
applied, with a shift in emphasis towards bilateral agreements in the ENP, followed by a 
renewed emphasis on regionalism with the formation of the UfM. However, the over-
arching themes of EU policy-making towards the MENA countries are consistently framed 
in regional terms, with substantial issues concerning the relationship with individual 
partners contained in the bilateral Action Plans and Association Agreements. 
Furthermore, the initial EU policy responses to the unfolding events of the Arab Uprisings 
were also framed in regional terms, as were many of the institutional developments that 
followed.  
There is no doubting the importance of the Mediterranean states and Middle Eastern 
periphery to the EU, which is the main trading partner of all countries in the region and 
the largest foreign investor in its southern neighbourhood (Cameron, 2012, p. 137). The 
relationship between Europe and the MENA region is a protracted one, with EU and 
member state objectives developing over a long period of time. This chapter presents an 
outline of EU policy and ethical norm promotion in the MENA region prior to the Arab 
Uprisings in 2011, commencing with a brief overview of the historical background 
regarding member states’ colonial relationships with the region, and then an equally brief 
outline of early European Community policies. The launch of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership in 1995 marks the beginning of the MENA region’s conceptualisation as the 
southern neighbourhood by EU policy-makers, further developed with the inauguration 
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of the ENP in 2004 and the UfM in 2008. The sections relating to each of these institutional 
frameworks will begin to assess the competing dynamics of ethical norm promotion and 
the self-serving interests highlighted in Chapter 3, so as to identify the exact nature of EU 
foreign policy objectives in the region prior to the Arab Uprisings at the end of the 
chapter. This will allow for a comparison with the policy and institutional developments 
that emerged in the period which followed the Arab Uprisings in Chapter 5, which I argue 
represented a significant shift in the EU’s position, albeit one which occurred briefly.  
Colonial legacy 
Although the focus of this thesis is on EU foreign policy, in particular the role of ethical 
norm promotion in the context of the Arab Uprisings, it is worth briefly outlining the 
colonial interactions between EU member states and the MENA region prior to the 
establishment of the European Community in 1957. Not only does this serve to highlight 
the geographical and political impact that Europe has had on the region, but also, as will 
be shown below, the influence of European colonialism on the contemporary events 
associated with the Arab Uprisings. 
At the height of its power, the Ottoman Empire extended across all parts of the Middle 
East and North Africa that would later be part of the EU’s conception of a southern 
neighbourhood. During the 19th century, during the long, slow decline of Ottoman power 
and influence, European states, notably France and Great Britain, began to extend their 
empires into the region. The cohesion of the MENA region, which had been maintained by 
the Ottoman Empire during its grandeur, became increasingly threatened, politically and 
economically, by the European powers from the early 1800s, resulting in each specific 
territory establishing preferential trades links with the European colonisers (Romagnoli & 
Mengoni, 2013, p. 55). Many states succumbed to direct colonialism during this period, 
with the British occupying Egypt from 1882, and the French occupying Algeria and 
Tunisia in 1830 and 1881 respectively. Prior to World War I, the French also took control of 
Morocco in 1912, in conjunction with Spain, and Italy occupied Libya from 1911.  
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The European influence on the geographical delineation of the region, already a factor in 
the colonisation of North Africa, reached its culmination in the Middle East during World 
War I and the period that followed. Benjamin MacQueen (2013, p. 51) argues that ‘the 
most direct manifestation of European control was the territorial definition of the new 
political entities, each of which would form the modern-day states of the Middle East and 
North Africa’. The Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916 ‘formally divided the eastern Arab 
world into spheres of British and French influence’ (MacQueen, 2013, p. 45), resulting in 
Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine becoming mandated territories. Not only did 
European colonialism directly influence the geographical demarcations of the region, but 
it also had real and long-term structuring effects on its political institutions and political 
cultures (McDougall, 2011, p. 45).  
An enduring consequence of European colonial influence on the states that now constitute 
the EU’s southern neighbourhood is the degree to which the region’s contemporary 
governing structures are perceived to be illegitimate by their own citizens. The governing 
regimes that took control of the post-colonial successor states, which emerged from the 
wave of independence that swept across the region in the 1960s and 1970s, inherited the 
mantle of unaccountable governance, and have been subject to anti-imperialist critiques by 
their persistently disenfranchised people (McDougall, 2011, p. 61). The influence on the 
contemporary Arab Uprisings is twofold: firstly, and most obviously, as a motivating 
factor in the popular movements which swept across the region during the early parts of 
2011; secondly, and more pertinently where EU policy is concerned, is the perception of 
external powers by autonomy-seeking protest movements. The colonial legacy of EU 
member states is not easily forgotten by local populations, exacerbated by the EU’s close 
relationships with the authoritarian regimes that the Arab Uprisings sought to displace. 
Consequently, as will be discussed in later chapters, charges of neo-colonialism that may 
result from the external promotion of contested values must be addressed seriously by EU 
policy-makers in relation to emerging political and civil society actors.  
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The European Community 
The relationship between the EU and its neighbours to the south stretches as far back as its 
institutional origins, although early ‘policies towards the Southern Mediterranean were 
strongly coloured by colonial legacies and economic interests’ (Marsh & Rees, 2012, p. 
147). As Syuzanna Vasilyan (2011, p. 178) notes: 
The ties between the EU and its southern neighbours are almost as old as the 
European Community itself [dating] back to 1957 when a protocol was 
inserted in the Treaty of Rome providing for the conclusion of agreements 
between the EC and former European colonies Morocco, Algeria and 
Tunisia.  
By the end of the 1960s, bilateral trade agreements had been signed with most of the 
countries in the MENA region, offering trade concessions and limited market access. In 
1972 the Community launched the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), leading to 
cooperation and Association Agreements with a number of its southern neighbours. 
Although the focus continued to be on economic development and trade preferences, the 
GMP represented the first occasion in which the Mediterranean was identified as a region, 
foreshadowing the EU’s comprehensive regional approach twenty years later.  
In the wake of the previous year’s oil crisis, the European Community attempted to 
establish cooperation with members of the Arab League through the Euro-Arab Dialogue 
in 1974, but the initiative foundered on disagreement regarding the inclusion of the 
Palestinian issue (Adler & Crawford, 2004, p. 27).78 In the early 1980s, however, a Euro-
Mediterranean policy started to emerge as a result of growing interest in developing 
cooperation schemes, and also forms of political, economic and cultural dialogue (Emara, 
2010, p. 197). The New Mediterranean Policy (NMP) was launched in 1989, quickly 
followed by the Renewed Mediterranean Policy in 1991, which included provisions 
highlighting environmental and human rights protection (Marsh & Rees, 2012, p. 147). By 
the mid-1990s, the EU was increasingly concerned about political, economic and social 
																																																								
78 The insistence by the Arab League that the Palestinian issue be put firmly on the agenda, and the 
reluctance by the Europeans to do so, marked the first case in which this Middle Eastern conflict impacted 
negatively on EU-Mediterranean relations, and it would continue to do so for many decades thereafter 
(Pace, 2011, p. 305).  
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crisis emanating from its southern neighbours, not least the potential spill overs into 
Europe of both the civil war in Algeria and Islamic extremists in Egypt (Pace, 2009, p. 41; 
2011, p. 305). In turning to face the challenges of political instability, rising Islamic 
extremism and increasing migratory flows from its southern neighbourhood, the EU 
formulated and launched its Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995. 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
Also know as the Barcelona Process, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership contained three 
stated objectives:  
• A political and security dialogue to achieve a common area of peace and 
stability based on respect for human rights and democracy; 
• An economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of 
a Free Trade Area to create a zone of shared prosperity and to 
support economic transition in the partner states; 
• A social, cultural and human partnership to encourage understanding 
between peoples and cultures and exchanges between civil 
societies. (ENPi, 2015a, emphasis in original) 
Richard Youngs (2002, p. 55) points out that the new Barcelona Process ‘was significant in 
enshrining, for the first time, co-operation over the promotion of democracy and human 
rights as an integral part of EU–Mediterranean relations [and that this] new agenda was 
formalized at the regional level within the EMP’. Although there had been some 
intimation that ethical norm promotion was an increasingly prevalent concern for EU 
policy-makers in the composition of bilateral Association Agreements, the EMP was the 
first time that a regional approach had been taken, notably with the assent of the southern 
neighbours themselves. The Barcelona Declaration stated that ‘the signatory states 
“undertake to” develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems, respect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and respect pluralism in their societies’ 
(Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 276). Be that as it may, such lofty ambitions were 
plagued from the outset by inconsistencies in policy, tension with other foreign policy 
objectives, and a state-centric approach to the concept of partnership. 
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To promote the principles of human rights, rule of law and democracy, included in the 
political and security objective, the EU had a range of tools available, including economic 
incentives via Association Agreements, economic support through the MEDA 
programme, 79  aid associated with EIDHR, 80  and political dialogue at various levels 
associated with each of the three stated objectives (Balfour, 2006, p. 124). Nevertheless, as 
Judith Kelley (Kelley, 2006, p. 46) argues, the following decade underscored the difficulties 
of the Commission to build consensus among member states regarding coherent human 
rights and democracy policy in the region. She also refers to a 2002 NGO report, which 
criticises the EU on its failure to establish mechanisms for ensuring that agreements with 
its Mediterranean partners were both consistent and coherent with overall policy 
regarding accordance with the human rights clause (Kelley, 2006, p. 46). Despite a 
continuous trend of political despotism across the region, and numerous instances of 
human rights abuse, the EU seemed unable, or unwilling, to employ the full range of tools 
at its disposal towards the objective of ethical norm promotion. By 2000 the Commission 
admitted that the dialogues on human rights had not been ‘sufficiently frank and serious’, 
and by 2001 the European Parliament declared that the Barcelona Process had seen ‘no 
significant progress in the past years’ (Balfour, 2006, p. 124). 
The most widely accepted rationale for the EU’s lack of progress in its promotion of ethical 
norms in the MENA region following the Barcelona Declaration is that it was subservient 
to, and/or incongruent with, the EU’s interests of security, migration and trade 
liberalisation. With regard to the latter, Irene Menéndez and Richard Youngs (2006) argue 
that by focusing on economic reform and trade liberalisation, the EU not only pursued 
agreements which were ‘strongly skewed to its own advantage’, but also ‘weakened the 
EU’s purchase on political issues’. They also note, however, that many had predicted that 
																																																								
79 Based on the MEDA Regulation (coming from the French term MEsures D'Accompagnement), this is the 
‘principal instrument of economic and financial cooperation under the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. It 
was launched in 1996 (MEDA I) and amended in 2000 (MEDA II). It enables the European Union (EU) to 
provide financial and technical assistance to the countries in the southern Mediterranean’ (European Union, 
2007a).  
80 At the request of the European Parliament in 1994 ‘all budget headings for resources devoted to promotion 
of human rights and democracy were gathered under the label European Initiative for Democracy and 
Human Rights and a single budget line’ (Bicchi, 2009, p. 64). 
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political reform would naturally follow in the wake of the EU’s economic and trade 
policies (Menéndez & Youngs, 2006). The same cannot be said for the relationship between 
ethical norm promotion and the EU’s security interests. George Joffé (2008, p. 154) argues 
that prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
a new security agenda, one which involved migration directly and was 
related to both illegal migration and the phenomenon that was to be 
increasingly associated with it, transnational violence, had also begun to 
emerge and, in the end, overshadowed the normative objectives of the 
Barcelona Process.  
The direct result of this new security agenda was a reluctance by the EU to pursue 
policies, particularly the promotion of democracy, which might in any way destabilise the 
governing regimes to the south: 
EU governments acknowledged that their key concern would be to ensure 
that any political change did not engender instability in the short term. No 
European government maintained that the democracy promotion agenda 
should, in the Mediterranean case, contain any aspiration to undermine 
incumbent regimes (Youngs, 2002, pp. 59-60). 
The costs of failing to pursue ethical norm promotion in keeping with the rhetorical 
emphasis placed in overarching policy communiqués were overshadowed by the benefits 
of strong, authoritarian regimes in the southern neighbourhood taking proxy 
responsibility for stemming migratory flows, and most importantly, subduing extremist 
Islamist actors that the EU increasingly perceived as a threat.  
Heightened concern about Islamic extremists also had the effect of severely limiting the 
efficacy of the EU’s attempts to foster bottom-up initiatives with Mediterranean civil 
society. As well as representing the beginnings of a regional approach to the EU’s relations 
with the southern neighbourhood, the Barcelona Process also signalled an intent by EU 
policy-makers, at least rhetorically, to allow co-ownership of the relationship with its 
neighbours. The use of partnership to replace policy in the foundational accord suggested 
mutual responsibilities and shared benefits, yet it quickly became apparent that acceptable 
partners were limited to ruling regimes and civil society actors with already-shared 
values. Michelle Pace (2011, p. 306) argues that: 
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This flawed conception of civil society in the Mediterranean was brought to 
the fore when it became evident that the EU only deals with a limited core of 
secular, liberal groups that speak the EU’s language, and excludes, for 
instance, groups inspired by religious faith.  
Menéndez and Youngs (2006) add that a neglect of Islamist moderates contributed to 
reinforcing the perception in the Arab world that the EU’s promotion of democracy in the 
region was a policy conceived as a means of undermining Islamic identity. Although some 
ground has been made up since the outbreak of the Arab Uprisings in late 2010, the 
elevated status of Islamist groups across the political spectrum that resulted only served to 
further amplify the EU’s shortcomings in reaching out to potential civil society partners in 
the preceding period.  
After ten years of engagement with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, neither the EU 
nor the partners in the MENA region had much to show in terms of tangible progress in 
political reform. Much of the trade liberalisation which had occurred had little or no effect 
on the types of exports most likely to benefit the Mediterranean partners, and entrenched 
authoritarian regimes continued to commit human rights abuses on their citizens, be they 
Islamic, secular or otherwise. EU policy-makers could rightly point to the systemic and 
institutional measures put in place for cooperation, and the increased forums for 
economic, political and cultural dialogue. Nonetheless, ethical norm promotion remained 
substantially bereft, all the more apparent in light of the ambitious rhetoric, and in 2003 
the Commission published the tellingly titled ‘Reinvigorating EU Actions on Human 
Rights and Democratisation with Mediterranean Partners’. The following year, in an 
attempt to reinvigorate and redefine the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in its entirety, 
the EU launched the ENP.  
European Neighbourhood Policy 
Initially conceived by the Council’s request for developing a New Neighbours Initiative in 
2002, which in turn led to the Commission’s Wider Europe Initiative the following year, 
the ENP was adopted in 2004 as a means of differentiating between potential members 
and peripheral neighbours. According to Sir Michael Leigh (Interview #1, 6/11/2013), 
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former Director-General for Enlargement, although it was originally developed with post-
enlargement Eastern Europe as the focus, in particular Ukraine, participation in the ENP 
was actively pursued by the southern Mediterranean states. Florent Parmentier (2008, p. 
101) argues that the resulting policy 
emerged out of the dilemma over membership that faced the EU, offering an 
uneasy and varied mix of proposals and plans for closer cooperation with a 
very diverse group of countries. In essence, the ENP is a process of norms 
diffusion in the European “near abroad”, largely influenced by the EU’s 
security concerns and realized under the constraints of the “enlargement 
fatigue”.  
Having decided to incorporate the southern neighbourhood into the new ENP, EU policy-
makers sought to reinvigorate the Barcelona Process with a new dynamic, amidst 
generally-felt frustrations in Europe at how few results had been produced from its 
various cooperation initiatives (Johansson-Nogués, 2004, p. 246). Although the ENP did 
not replace the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, it did attempt to supplement and 
support its objectives, notably through the addition of bilateral Action Plans to 
complement its regional policies.  
Despite the fact that the EMP had initiated a uniquely regional perspective for the 
southern neighbourhood, one that would be reinforced with the launch of the Union for 
the Mediterranean in 2008, the ENP signalled a recognition by EU policy-makers as to the 
intrinsic diversity of its neighbouring partners, particularly those to the south. One of the 
key ideas behind the ENP ‘is that each partner country engages with the EU depending on 
its willingness and capacity to progress with economic and political reform’ (Pace, 2011, p. 
307). In practice, this differentiated approach was institutionalised through individual 
Action Plans with each partner in the MENA region, designed to complement the 
substance or negotiations with regard to Association Agreements. According to official EU 
rhetoric, the ENP 
builds on common interests and on values — democracy, the rule of law, 
respect for human rights, and social cohesion [...] The ENP is a jointly owned 
initiative and its implementation requires action on both sides, by the 
neighbours and by the EU (EEAS, 2015f). 
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The Action Plans themselves, negotiated between the Commission and partner countries 
to cover a period of three to five years, include a wide range of objectives, including 
ethical norms such as democracy and human rights, on the one hand, and “mutual” 
interests such as security and market reform, on the other. While the EU stresses the joint 
ownership of the underlying process of the Action Plans, monitoring and assessment of 
political, social and economic reforms is carried out almost entirely by the EU itself.  
While acknowledging that the Action Plans heralded a new era in Euro-Mediterranean 
relations regarding the prominence given to respect for human rights and democratic 
principles, Pace (2007, p. 663) critiques their lack of clear strategies, procedures and 
timetables to achieve these objectives. In light of the lack of progress in promoting these 
norms leading up to the Arab Uprisings, this appears to be a valid point. Sir Michael Leigh 
(Interview #1, 6/11/2013) stated that early criticism of the ENP included the lack of vision 
as to what it entailed in the future, the relationship between the one-size-fits-all regional 
approach and the bilateral Action Plans, and structural overlaps with existing institutional 
arrangements, adding that ‘the partner countries had no real intention of implementing 
these far-reaching reforms to which they had signed up’. Although the ENP Strategy 
Paper stressed the shared nature of values such as human rights and democracy, noting 
that each of its neighbours was a signatory to the UDHR and accompanying conventions 
(European Commission, 2004a, p. 12), the reality faced by EU policy-makers was that any 
social or political reform had to be heavily incentivised, inverting the issue back to the 
EU’s own commitment to its policies.   
At the heart of the problem for EU policy-makers is the tension between ethical norm 
promotion, a central facet of its self-proclaimed international identity, and the self-
regarding interests of its member states and the Community itself. It should be noted, in 
light of the arguments presented in later chapters, that it is the former that consistently 
dominates EU rhetoric regarding the region. Zaki Laïdi (2008, p. 15) notes that the ENP, 
like any EU policy, rests on explicits and implicits:  
What has been made explicit is that Europe has an interest in being 
surrounded by a ‘ring of friends’ that have the characteristic of being 
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economically prosperous, politically stable and well-governed. What has 
been left unsaid is a desire to avoid unintentionally importing security risks 
into the Union from unstable or little developed countries in the form of 
uncontrolled migration, Mafia-like conduct or terrorist action.  
The European Commission’s (2004a, p. 13) ENP Strategy Paper makes clear that the EU 
will pursue and deepen its relationships with its Mediterranean partners based on the 
latter’s commitment to promoting the “shared values” associated with ethical norms, yet 
both sides of the partnership feared the destabilising consequences of those policies. In the 
years between the launch of the ENP and the outpouring of social unrest that swept across 
the MENA region, trade and security agreements continued to be implemented, despite 
widely acknowledged deficits in political accountability and continuing human rights 
abuses. Not only did the Commission suffer clearly conflicting objectives, but the Council 
of Ministers was also constrained by the commercial and strategic interests of the member 
states. The European Parliament did issue a number of statements highlighting concerns 
regarding the lack of progress in areas relating to ethical norms, but with little institutional 
impact. It was in this context that one more overarching regional initiative was launched 
to reinvigorate Euro-Mediterranean relations prior to the Arab Uprisings.  
Union for the Mediterranean 
Whereas the ENP had sought to incorporate a bilateral element into the overarching 
framework of the EMP, the 2008 launch of the Union for the Mediterranean re-emphasised 
the regional approach. A representative of the UfM Secretariat (Interview #28, 22/4/2014) 
stated that the added value of the UfM’s structure, specifically the complementarity of a 
new regional initiative with existing bilateral relations, was that it based the partnership 
on an “equal footing”, emphasising the principles ‘of co-presidency, co-decision and 
shared responsibility between North and South’. Originally conceived by Nicolas Sarkozy 
during his successful candidacy for the French presidency, the UfM represented an 
acknowledgement that the Barcelona Process had failed in its main objectives, and an 
effort to reinvigorate Euro-Mediterranean relations through intergovernmental 
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infrastructure projects (Pace, 2011, p. 308). 81  The new institution’s Paris Declaration 
declared that this fresh impulse would be achieved in at least three very important ways: 
• By upgrading the political level of the EU’s relationship with its 
Mediterranean partners; 
• By providing for further co-ownership to our multilateral relations; 
• By making these relations more concrete and visible through 
additional regional and subregional projects, relevant for the citizens 
of the region (ENPi, 2015c). 
According to the Union for the Mediterranean (2015) Secretariat, established in Barcelona 
to underscore the jointly-owned nature of the new initiative, the UfM framework is 
inspired by the goals set out in the Barcelona Declaration, including the promotion of 
democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Nonetheless, as will be shown 
below, the UfM has been widely perceived as an initiative that further marginalised the 
promotion of these ethical norms.  
For all their faults with regard to lack of progress in promoting ethical norms in the 
MENA region, both the EMP and ENP remained committed, at least rhetorically, to 
advancing these objectives. The ENP’s Action Plans provided an institutional basis for 
political reforms to be pursued by the EU’s Mediterranean partners, and substantial 
commitments by which the EU could support them to do so. Yet despite the intense 
negotiations by the Commission to “Europeanise” the Sarkozy-inspired UfM initiative, the 
resulting institution was almost entirely focussed on commercial projects. Kristina Kaush 
and Richard Youngs (2009, pp. 964, 967) argue that 
the main issue is that the UMed [UfM] is expressly designed to push the 
focus of relations between Europe and North Africa away from the most 
sensitive political areas. The initiative is widely hailed by Mediterranean 
officials as ushering in a welcome focus on pragmatic and technical 
cooperation, unencumbered by sensitive political issues [...] The focus on 
																																																								
81 Richard Whitman and Ana Juncos (2009, p. 201) note that Sarkozy’s original plan for the UfM was an 
attempt to reshape not only EU foreign policy, but also French foreign policy, with many also detecting an 
intention to frustrate Turkey’s membership aspirations. However, after intense negotiations between 
member states, Sarkozy’s French-led initiative was co-opted by EU policy-makers to be a complementary 
addition to the existing EMP and ENP frameworks.  
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human rights and democracy has virtually disappeared from view. The 
UMed rolls back the EMP’s acquis on democracy and human rights.  
This is not to say that Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in areas such as solar power, 
maritime transport, civil protection, education and small businesses are unimportant, or 
that an investment in these areas at an institutional level will not contribute ultimately to 
useful political dialogue and partnership. As an overarching policy initiative that sought 
to redefine the existing EMP and ENP frameworks with a new institutional architecture, 
however, the relegation of ethical norm promotion to a byproduct of economic 
cooperation represented a marked departure from the preceding accords.  
The addition of the UfM to the many bureaucratic levels and overlaps of the Euro-
Mediterranean relationship highlighted the extent to which the promotion of human 
rights and democracy had tapered off in favour of self-regarding interests prior to the 
Arab Uprisings. Khalid Emara (2010, p. 198) argues that Sarkozy’s Mediterranean vision 
was undoubtedly shaped by his perception of the region through a security lens, which 
entails a ‘defensive posture’ regarding relations with the southern neighbours. Such a 
position would explain the emphasis on commercial cooperation, regardless of the 
political reforms that were nominally required by the ENP’s Action Plans. Whereas the 
logic of the ENP was of conditional cooperation determined by the neighbours’ progress 
in reforming their domestic spheres, the ‘underlying logic of the UfM was one of 
compartmentalising Euro-Med relations, by sidelining political questions and proceeding 
unabated with economic cooperation through the promotion of specific projects’ (Tocci, 
2012, p. 3). Rosemary Hollis (2012) states that by mid-2011, as the Arab Uprisings 
dominated the agenda of the fledgling EEAS, it ‘was evident that the UfM was moribund 
[and is now regarded] as an illustration of how far the EU had departed from the idealism 
which had suffused its earlier pronouncements and initiatives for promoting reform in the 
Arab world’. As will be shown in the following chapter, a feature of the EU’s response to 
the Arab Uprisings has been the Commission’s sidelining of the UfM in its bid to restore 
the required legitimacy of its ethical norm promotion. 
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EU foreign policy objectives in the region 
In order to lay the basis for an analysis of the EU’s policy responses to the Arab Uprisings 
in terms of change or consistency, this last section provides an overview of its objectives in 
the region prior to 2011, both in terms of rhetoric and substance.  
Ethical norm promotion 
The Barcelona Process heralded a new era in Euro-Mediterranean relations, taking a 
uniquely regional approach to the way in which Europe perceived its southern 
neighbourhood. An additional novelty of the new regional accord was the formalisation, 
for the first time, of a commitment to pursue the promotion of human rights and 
democracy as an integral feature of the partnership. The EMP placed considerable 
emphasis, according to Steve Marsh and Wyn Rees (2012, p. 148), on ‘international law 
and basic values as the underpinnings of confidence-building measures and regional co-
operation’. However, although the MENA partners willingly accepted both the 
regionalism and normative aspects of the Barcelona Process, they showed no inclination to 
take the necessary steps towards political reform, and their refusal to ‘respect their 
engagements was paralleled by the reluctance of the EU to use the Barcelona provisions to 
exert pressure on the states that failed to observe these principles’ (Keukeleire & 
MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 276). Despite the EU’s ambitious rhetoric, the first ten years of the 
EMP failed to make any significant gains with regard to the promotion of ethical norms in 
the region. 
The ENP signalled the reinvigoration of Euro-Mediterranean relations, in the context of a 
newly enlarged EU. It also complemented the regional EMP policies, with which it co-
existed, by the addition of bilateral Action Plans. For Pace (2007, p. 669), the ENP’s Action 
Plans represented a moment of EU normative power by which the Community constituted 
itself as a “force for good”, although she notes that the democracy and human rights 
clauses they contained had never led to the suspension of agreements on the basis of those 
norms being violated. Radwan Ziadeh (2009, p. 6) argues, in fact, that 
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the ENP is serious about its emphasis on reform and the human rights 
situation, and [as it] is more specific and precise than previous programmes 
and its progress, or the lack of it, can more easily be measured, including the 
provision and efficiency of new democracy- and human rights-related 
incentives for the southern Mediterranean countries.  
The intention to provide such democracy- and human rights-related incentives led to the 
re-launching of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights in 2006, 
which Federica Bicchi (2009, p. 75) has criticized as promoting politically uncontroversial 
human rights over democracy, and in comparatively easier countries. As part of its key 
objectives, the EIDHR highlights the strengthening of civil society’s role in promoting 
human rights and democratic reform (European Commission, 2015i),82 but it is exactly this 
vision of genuinely pluralistic MENA societies that the EU had become wary of in the 
context of contemporary security concerns regarding the region.  
The disjuncture between the EU’s increasing rhetoric about the centrality of ethical norms 
to its Euro-Mediterranean policies, on the one hand, and its concerns about the 
implications of those policies should they succeed, on the other, is succinctly articulated 
by Rosa Balfour (2006, p. 127): 
In the Southern Mediterranean, the political and ethical problems 
surrounding the promotion of human rights and democracy abroad are 
caught up in the dilemma between maintaining some kind of regional 
stability and the perceived destabilising consequences of encouraging 
pluralism. 
Elisabeth Johansen-Nogues (2004, pp. 246-247) also notes the tension between political 
reforms, such as democracy and human rights, and short-term stability issues, such as 
border management, and Richard Whitman (2011, p. 15) observes an ambivalence about 
the EU’s balance between material gain and moral impulses, despite the rhetorical 
importance of its core norms in its relations with its neighbours. If, as these authors 
suggest, ethical norm promotion was not a primary objective of EU foreign policy in the 
																																																								
82  The connection between a functional civil society and ethical norm promotion in the southern 
neighbourhood had been explicitly stated in the European Commission’s (2001b) Strategy Paper for the 
region five years earlier, but as will be shown in later chapters, it would take the events of the Arab 
Uprisings before a committed approach to this policy would take place. 
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southern neighbourhood prior to the Arab Uprisings, what objectives was the EU actually 
seeking to achieve?  
Stability and security  
Leading up to the wave of social unrest that swept across the MENA region in 2011, Euro-
Mediterranean relations had achieved a status quo largely unchallenged from either side of 
the partnership. Although the promotion of democracy and human rights continued to 
feature heavily in the EU’s rhetoric regarding its regional policies, and a number of its 
initiatives, such as the ENP Action Plans and the re-launched EIDHR, included provisions 
on how to do so, the EU was limited by its perception of the Mediterranean through a 
security lens. Not only did this approach impact on the EU’s own commitment to ethical 
norm promotion, but it also required the cooperation of authoritarian regimes across the 
region, which in turn provided them with leverage against the pursuit of political 
reform.83 Whilst the EU was under no illusion as to their poor human rights records or 
lack of political accountability, authoritarian leaders across the MENA region were seen as 
the only viable partners in a security discourse: 
These regimes were perceived as guarantors of stability with no desirable 
alternative. The EU accepted the political status quo in the Arab countries 
and rulers like Egyptian Hosni Mubarak, Tunisian Zen Din Ben Ali or even 
Libyan Muammar Qaddafi were perceived as important partners. Naturally 
the main victim was a democratization component of the structural foreign 
policy (Brtnický, 2011, p. 48). 
Thus, where instruments such as Action Plans and EIDHR projects were utilised, the 
ultimate objective of these initiatives was ‘securing the EU’s own concerns about 
(in)migration, security, and stability rather than “transformation” in the MENA’ (Pace, 
2009, p. 45). Franz Eder (2011, pp. 441-442) notes that where the issue of ‘terrorist 
migration’ to the EU was concerned, the ‘linkage of migration and border security with 
economic conditionality [had] been particularly striking’, especially when ‘a linkage of 
economic incentives with democracy and human rights [had been] missing’.  
																																																								
83 Thomas Demmelhuber (2011, pp. 814-815) cites Libya as an example, showing that the close cooperation 
required to stem migratory flows, such as joint border controls and resettlement agreements, helped foster 
the elite’s grip on power and perpetuated the mechanisms of authoritarian rule.  
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Key to the symbiosis that emerged from the development of the EMP to the ENP, and 
finally to the UfM, was the increasingly-shared perception between Euro-Mediterranean 
partners as to the threat posed by Islamist actors in the region. Pace (2007, p. 670) argues 
that the EU appears to have been complicit with authoritarian regimes in an effort to 
sideline Islamist reform movements, and had focused on containing change by seeking 
stability and security through their normative policies, rather than allowing 
Mediterranean societies to “flourish”.84 Eder (2011, p. 431) also notes the perception of EU 
policy-makers that counter-terrorism efforts could be endangered by the promotion of 
democracy, and argues that ethical norm promotion had been superseded by ‘the desire 
for regional stability and greater trade relations and energy security’. The securitisation of 
the region had resulted in stability being the most conducive state of affairs in order to 
achieve EU objectives, such as stemming the flow of migrants and, often related in the 
eyes of EU policy-makers, preventing the import of Islamic terrorism. The result, prior to 
2011, was the development of what Timo Behr (2012b, p. 76) refers to as a ‘stability 
partnership’, in which the EU had jettisoned the normative objectives of its Mediterranean 
policies in favour of close relationships with autocratic, western-orientated regimes, who 
promised to act as a bulwark against radical Islam and provide regional stability. 
The Arab Uprisings brought into sharp relief the inconsistencies between the EU’s rhetoric 
regarding its Euro-Mediterranean policies, which emphasised the centrality of promoting 
democracy and human rights to facilitate a ring of “well-governed friends”, and its 
willingness to forego a normative agenda in the interests of maintaining stability in the 
region to achieve its security-related objectives. As Thomas Diez (2013) notes, the 
democratic uprisings in the Arab world have provided the biggest challenge to the 
																																																								
84 In a subsequent work, she cites the lack of serious pressure exerted on the Mubarak government in Egypt 
on democratic reform, arguing that there seemed to be a shared understanding amongst EU member states 
that pushing Arab-Mediterranean regimes on political reform issues, such as human rights and rule of law, 
would potentially lead to Islamist actors who challenged the status quo regarding counter-terrorism 
strategies (Pace, 2011, pp. 43-44). The European Council on Foreign Relations (2011, p. 22) also uses Egypt to 
demonstrate the EU’s “paralysis” prior to 2011, in the apparently straightforward choice between dictators, 
such as Hosni Mubarak, and Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood; an apparent choice, it goes on to 
say, that the Arab Uprisings demonstrated as inherently false.  
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conceptualisation of the EU as a normative power, questioning both its ability and 
commitment with regard to its promotion of ethical norms.  
In the following chapter I will outline the EU’s response to the Arab Uprisings throughout 






















EU policy in response to the Arab Uprisings 
Introduction 
The social uprisings that swept across the MENA region in late 2010 and early 2011 took 
the world by surprise. Despite subsequent analysis highlighting the social, political and 
economic factors which contributed to the Arab Uprisings, academic commentators and 
policy-makers at the time were more inclined to highlight the entrenched nature of 
authoritarian regimes in the region, rather than its potential for the wave of revolutionary 
events which transpired. As noted earlier, in the five years which have followed the social 
uprisings in the MENA region each of the countries affected have taken widely divergent 
paths, from revolution to counter-revolution, suppression to dialogue, constitutional 
reform to civil war. However, throughout the early months of 2011 protesters across the 
region made significantly congruous claims for social justice, political accountability and 
economic opportunities, leading commentators to portray a cohesive region-wide 
movement dubbed the “Arab Spring”. The EU, faced with an extensively reported and 
very public articulation of basic rights and values in its southern neighbourhood, 
scrambled to produce a coherent and appropriate response. 
As will be shown in this chapter, despite a cautious, and at times ambiguous, early 
response to the uprisings, EU policy-makers throughout 2011 initiated a range of 
documents, communiqués, financial assistance packages and institutional developments 
to support the transitions taking place in the MENA region. As Richard Whitman and Ana 
Juncos (2012, pp. 151-152) argue, 2011 ‘presented a major juncture for the ENP: never 
before did the EU produce as many strategy documents on the ENP in one year as it did in 
2011 [...] nor was the increase in the ENP budget ever as significant in relative and 
absolute terms’. This is particularly notable in light of the customary deliberate and 
gradual approach normally associated with changes in EU policy, and forms part of the 
rationale for choosing 2011 as a justifiable focus in an attempt to interpret and apprehend 
EU external policy.  
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Each of the significant changes and initiatives put forward as a response to the Arab 
Uprisings by the EU in 2011 will be outlined below, with a particular focus on those which 
sought to reaffirm and augment its commitment to the promotion of ethical norms in the 
region. After brief overviews of the uprisings themselves and the EU’s initial reaction to 
them, I will outline the major regional policy documents put forth, the institutional 
developments, additional financial responses and general implications regarding the ENP. 
The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the EU’s foreign policy objectives in the 
region throughout 2011, in order to assess the changes and continuities with previous 
policy.   
The Arab Uprisings 
The self-immolation of Tarek Mohamed Bouazizi, in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid on 
17 December 2010, was not the first or last extreme act of protest against the injustice of 
authoritarian regimes in the MENA region, but it provided a catalyst for the wave of social 
uprisings that became know as the “Arab Spring”. Bouazizi’s desperate act ‘was captured 
on film and transmitted almost instantaneously via the electronic social media, giving rise 
to an irrepressible feeling of revulsion and anger that seemed to empower the people [of 
the region]’ (Clark, 2013, p. 46). Within weeks, popular social protests had spread rapidly 
across the region, further inspired by the removal of Tunisian President Zine El Abdine 
Ben Ali, who fled the country on 14 January. The streets of Egypt’s Cairo, Libya’s 
Benghazi, Yemen’s Sana’a, Bahrain’s Manama and Syria’s Dera’a erupted in massive 
protests ‘demanding reform, accountability and real guarantees for human rights’ 
(Amnesty International, 2012b, p. 2). In a show of unity, and with similar demands, large 
groups of protesters also gathered in the major cities of Algeria, Morocco and Jordan. By 
mid-2011, regimes had also been toppled in Egypt and Libya, a civil war had erupted in 
Syria, and protests had been subdued in Algeria, Morocco and Jordan with a mix of 
violent repression and reform initiatives.85 
																																																								
85 Although the outbreak of protests in Bahrain and Yemen have been included above for context, this 
discussion will focus on the events and responses within the EU’s conception of its southern neighbourhood.  
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As noted above, there have been a number of attempts to analyse the social, political and 
economic factors which contributed to the Arab Uprisings, events which not only were 
largely unforeseen, but which overturned established theories regarding the entrenched 
nature of authoritarian regimes in the region. Stephen Saideman (2012, p. 717) argues that 
the events in Tunisia inspired the rest of the Arab world due to the shared properties of 
‘high unemployment, a corrupt regime, a frustrated public and more information about 
the regime from outside the country’. Thomas Olesen (2014, pp. 71-76) describes the self-
immolation of Tarek Mohamed Bouazizi as a central injustice-symbol, which came to 
represent grievances and motivate protests across the region.86 Sir Terrence Clark (2013, p. 
46) states that ‘a set of common ideas of justice and dignity has taken hold and is 
struggling to find expression in countries in which democratic political institutions have 
been suppressed since before the memory of most of the essentially youthful populations’. 
The emphasis on youth is also taken up by Mark Haas and David Lesch (2013, p. 3), who 
note the “youth bulges” across the MENA region, particularly in those countries which 
experienced the most dramatic protests, and the well-documented propensity of young 
populations to act upon social and political grievances.87 
The shared social, political and economic conditions leading up to the Arab Uprisings 
were matched by the congruous intensity of the protests, which swept rapidly through the 
region:  
It was as if a tightly wound coil of frustration caused by years of oppression, 
human rights violations, misrule and corruption was suddenly unsprung, 
releasing an energy and power that ordinary people until then had neither 
experienced nor realized that they possessed (Amnesty International, 2012b, 
p. 1).  
The regional protests also shared a number of similarities and linkages in terms of social 
mobilisation:  
																																																								
86 Olesen (2014) draws comparisons between a number of central injustice-symbols to present an argument 
explaining the nature of dramatic cross-border diffusion in events such as the Arab Uprisings.   
87 For a comprehensive account of the region-wide uprisings, including contexts, causes and comparisons, 
see Gerges (2014). 
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[T]hey all involved massive numbers of protestors who appeared to be 
autonomous from the usual political actors, and including some grassroots 
groups active in past cycles of contention. They also all employed social-
networking sites, combined with older web applications and Internet tools, 
in conjunction with face-to-face gatherings and the deployment of quite 
radical, contentious performances, amongst them the physical occupation of 
public spheres (della Porta & Mattoni, 2014, p. 1). 
Furthermore, Youssef Mohamed Sawani (2012, p. 385) argues that ‘it is clear from the 
examination of the content of slogans and the discourse of people in city squares or the 
theatres of combat of the Arab Spring that something of a unified psyche was generated’. 
As shown below, this unified narrative would be a defining feature of the accompanying 
widespread media coverage. 
The events of the uprisings were ‘marked by intense levels of both internal and external 
communication flows’ and subsequently ‘morphed into a regional phenomenon awash 
with transnational discourse on its causes, constituents, and consequences’ (Christensen & 
Christensen, 2013, pp. 352, 354). According to Douglas Kellner (2012, p. 40): 
The synergy of global media television coverage, internet and social 
networking documenting and promoting the uprisings, the fusion of many 
artists and cultural critics with the movement, and the coming together of 
multiple organizations and social strata helped circulate the Tunisian 
Uprising to Egypt and then the Egyptian Uprising to the entire Middle East 
and beyond. 
The media coverage of the Arab Uprisings widely aligned itself with the various protest 
movements, articulating a narrative based on freedom, justice and the provision of basic 
rights. News media in the UK granted early recognition to the aims and grievances of the 
protesters, legitimising them well in advance of elite political statements, which only 
adopted ‘a more supportive position toward the demonstrators, their civil rights and 
legitimate claims for democracy’ following the demise of governing regimes (Cottle, 2011, 
p. 654). In a study of US media framing with regard to the Arab Uprisings, Azmat Rasul 
and Mian Asim (2014, p. 86) show that despite a historical tendency to maintain silence 
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towards political suppression and human rights abuse in the Middle East,88 ‘Western 
media was able to comfortably relate itself to the popular demand of restoration of 
democracy during the Arab Spring protests’. Kellner (2012, pp. 45-46) also notes that there 
was often saturation coverage of the uprisings on global TV networks such as CNN, BBC, 
and Al Jazeera, which have an “agenda-setting capacity”, with Al Jazeera, in particular, 
becoming ‘an indispensable source of news and information and a material force in 
promoting and encouraging the democratic uprisings through positive representations of 
the demonstrators and negative ones of the repressive regimes’.89  
In attracting the extensive international media coverage that they did, the severity of these 
events alone, taking place on the geographical periphery of the Community, required a 
clear and comprehensive response from the EU. However, it was the shared rhetoric of the 
initial social uprisings in the southern neighbourhood, and a cohesive media narrative 
framed in terms of democratic accountability and basic human rights,90 that brought into 
sharp relief the EU’s role in the region, in particular the disjuncture between its own 
rhetoric and prior policy implementations. As Sven Biscop and Stefan Borg (2015, p. 81) 
state, ‘[in] Tunisia people rose in revolt demanding exactly what Europe stands for, but 
they saw the EU as an obstacle rather than an ally in their struggle’. It was this sentiment, 
shared widely across the MENA region, which directly challenged the legitimacy of its 
self-perceived international identity, and which the EU sought to address with its policy 
responses in 2011. 
																																																								
88 For a full account, see Hafez (2007), who is cited by Rasul and Asim (2014) with regard to this position.  
89 Further research by Jae Sik Ha (2017, p. 295) has shown that ‘journalists and experts could propose their 
preferred frames of the Arab Spring, while government officials were generally not visible as writers of 
opinion pieces. For this reason, the perspectives of liberalism and idealism, with an emphasis on 
multilateralism and democracy, were more frequently revealed in the media narratives of the Arab Spring 
than were the perspectives that dominate realism’. 
90 For a full discussion on the moral framing of social protest, see Cristina Flesher Fominaya and Antonio 
Montañés Jimenéz’s (2014) discussion in the context of transnational diffusion studies. Although Fominaya 
and Jimenéz introduce moral framing in terms of Argentinian protesters publicly shaming unpunished post-
dictatorial criminals, the concept derives from James Jasper’s (1997) The Art of Moral Protest and is equally 
relevant with regard to the Arab Uprisings. 
 
	 142	
Early EU response 
In its 2010 assessment of the ENP, the European Commission candidly acknowledged that 
democratic reforms had slowed in the MENA region, and that human rights standards 
had slipped (Whitman & Juncos, 2011, p. 198). This observation, however, did not result in 
any premonition that a lack of political accountability, and aspiration for the provision of 
basic rights, would be driving forces in the wave of social uprisings that swept through 
the Arab world at the end of that same year. Sir Michael Leigh (Interview #1, 6/11/2013), 
former Deputy Director-General for the ENP and former Director-General for 
Enlargement, stated that when the uprisings started in late 2010 the EU did not know 
what to do, and that for the first three months of 2011 all kinds of press outlets talked 
about ‘the deafening silence from Europe’.  
In the early stages of the Arab Uprisings, the EU found itself caught between its well-
established objective of regional stability and its rhetorical commitment to the values 
articulated by the Arab protesters. According to an Amnesty International (2012b, p. 49) 
report: 
The EU, one of the region’s closest neighbours and key international 
interlocutor, initially responded to the rebellions and repression slowly and 
inadequately given the scale of events. The initial reaction was limited to 
sanitized statements calling for restraint by all sides and negotiations. The 
EU continued its long-standing relations with repressive states in the region, 
and opted for diplomatic advances rather than openly condemning human 
rights violations.  
The early EU response maintained the legitimacy of existing regimes, such as Zine El 
Abdine Ben Ali’s in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak’s in Egypt, reflective of the political and 
financial capital invested in their stability and security partnerships across the region.91 
Combined with the EU’s long-term preference for regional stability was its more short-
term institutional shortcomings, as evidenced by the side-lining of the EU’s common 
institutions by certain member states, resulting in the incapacity to form common policy 
																																																								
91 For a more detailed outline of the EU’s early response to the individual states most affected in early 2011, 
see Sally Khalifa Isaac’s (2013, pp. 43-46) overview of its initial “perplexed” reactions, and Peters (2012).  
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(Behr, 2012b, pp. 78-79).92 Not only were there various intra- and inter-institutional 
tensions, highlighted in Chapter 2, evident in the EU’s early response to the Arab 
Uprisings, but they also came at a time when the EEAS had only just become fully 
operational following the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty two years earlier. 
In its report to the European Parliament, Council and Commission in December 2011, the 
EEAS (2011b, p. 1) acknowledged the challenges it had faced in launching its new service, 
including the uprisings in the southern neighbourhood:  
The political and economic context for the launch of the EEAS has been 
particularly challenging. The global economic crisis and tensions within the 
euro zone, together with the Arab Spring, have dominated the international 
agenda. At the same time, public administrations across Europe are under 
acute budget pressure, with  consequences for the diplomatic services 
of Member States. This is hardly the ideal backdrop for the launch of a new 
service for the external relations of the Union.  
As Whitman and Juncos (2012, p. 151) argue, the Lisbon Treaty foreign policy innovations 
had not yet become fully operational at the time of the Arab Uprisings, creating a 
“capacity deficit” regarding the EEAS response, and constraining the High Representative 
in pulling together the different mechanisms of EU external relations. However, as the 
EEAS (2011b, p. 2) report at the end of 2011 went on to point out, the Arab Uprisings not 
only presented a foreign policy challenge, but also offered ‘the historic opportunity to rise 
above the debate on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty to deliver new substance to the 
EU’s external action [...] bringing together the different tools at our disposal – something 
the High Representative and the EEAS were created for’.  
It is perhaps unsurprising the EEAS would highlight the difficulties and challenges posed 
by the uprisings to its formative period, in order to head off critiques of its policy 
responses to these momentous events. In fact, according to the European Council of 
Foreign Relations (2011, p. 22), the Arab Uprisings were 
																																																								
92 Nowhere was this more apparent than in the inability of the EU to provide a coherent and unified 
response to the social uprisings in Libya, where the UN-mandated no-fly zone was implemented by France 
and the United Kingdom via NATO, rather than the EU’s institutional architecture (Schumacher, 2011, p. 
116). 
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a crisis made for the EEAS and High Representative Catherine Ashton, 
[taking place] in a part of the world where the EU [had] real interests and 
influence [and creating] a historic opportunity for the EU to develop a 
values-based foreign policy in its neighbourhood. 
As noted in Chapter 3, Catherine Ashton had associated her tenure with a vision of the EU 
as a normative and “civilising” force, and the uprisings presented an opportunity to bring 
the promotion of ethical norms at the heart of these concepts to the fore. As Sophie 
Vanhoonacker and Karolina Pomorska (2013, pp. 1326-1327) argue, a ‘way for the HR and 
the EEAS to gain attention is by linking EU action to broader international objectives or to 
particular strengths of the EU as an external actor [and] the “jasmine revolutions”93 were 
ideal focusing events for the HR and her service to assert themselves’.94 The success of 
such an approach depends on setting the agenda by linking a foreign issue to a larger 
moral cause, or perhaps the EU’s reputation as a strong promoter of human rights 
(Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, 2013, p. 319), and in the case of the Arab Uprisings, the HR 
and the EEAS were presented with both opportunities. The global media coverage quickly 
settled on a cohesive overarching narrative that depicted a unified regional protest on the 
basis of values at the heart of the EU’s self-constructed identity. As will be shown in the 
remainder of this chapter, the EU, led by the HR and the EEAS, correlated the Arab 
Uprising narrative with their own ethical norm promotion in the region, and provided an 
increasingly coherent and proactive response to the events unfolding in the southern 
neighbourhood. 
After the initial period of uncertainty and reluctance to diverge from its stability emphasis 
towards the southern neighbourhood, the EU began a substantive adjustment of its 
policies. As Timo Behr (2012a, p. 7) notes, in early 2011, ‘EU policy-makers realized that it 
was futile to try and stem the tide of change. Instead, the EU now sought to realign its 
																																																								
93 An alternative term for the Arab Uprisings. 
94 It should be noted that Vanhoonacker and Pomorska (2013) are highly critical of the EEAS and HR’s 
failure to take these opportunities, accusing them of lacking a proactive approach and overly deferring to the 
member states. The argument outlined here, however, is that despite its hesitant early reaction, the many 
policy responses and institutional innovations that were put forward in 2011 represent an appreciation and 
utilisation on the part of the HR and EEAS of the opportunities presented by the uprisings in the southern 
neighbourhood.  
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position with the demands of the Arab protesters’. This shift was articulated fully by the 
Commission’s President José Manuel Barroso in March 2011, when he announced that ‘I 
think it is our duty to say to the Arab peoples that we are on their side! From Brussels, I 
want to specifically say this to the young Arabs that are now fighting for freedom and 
democracy: We are on your side’ (Barroso, 2011c; Behr, 2012a). Furthermore, he 
acknowledged the historical significance of the Arab Uprisings for both the MENA region 
and Europe, saying that the ‘events unfolding in our southern neighbourhood are a 
rendezvous with history. Europe will rise to this challenge and support the current 
transformation processes’ (Barroso, 2011c). The EEAS became quicker in its issuance of 
statements and increasingly firmer in its condemnation of violent acts perpetuated by the 
autocratic regimes seeking to clamp down on popular dissent (Echagüe, Michou, & 
Mikail, 2011, p. 329). Maja Bozovic (Interview #26, 28/01/2014), Chairperson of the 
Mashreq/Maghreb Working Group (MAMA) in the Council of the European Union, 
highlighted the chaotic nature of this early period, going from one crisis to another with a 
series of Council conclusions and sanctions, reacting quickly to changing events in a way 
unprecedented in the group’s previous work with North Africa. However, as the year 
progressed, the EU’s reformed policy settled into a series of cohesive initiatives and 
support packages, tailored around a renewed commitment to ethical norm promotion.  
Regional policy documents 
Three significant policy documents were released in 2011, which sought to provide a new 
approach and critical review of both EU development policy, to make it more strategic and 
targeted, and the ENP, so that ‘countries undertaking political reforms towards democracy 
and rule of law would receive additional support from the EU’ (European Commission, 
2014c, p. 8). 
A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity 
The first of these overarching policy documents was released in March 2011, entitled ‘A 
Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity’ (PfDSP). In it, the European 
Commission and High Representative (2011c, pp. 1-2) acknowledged that a ‘radically 
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changing political landscape in the Southern Mediterranean requires a change in the EU’s 
approach to the region [and that] this new approach should be rooted unambiguously in a 
joint commitment to common values’. As well as explicitly framing the communication as 
a direct response to the Arab Uprisings, there is ‘a clear mea culpa on behalf of the EU, 
which recognizes the double standards it has maintained in many of its neighbourhood 
countries’ (Echagüe et al., 2011, pp. 229-230). Andrea Teti (2012, p. 267) argues that the 
PfDSP acknowledged the perceived contradiction between the promotion of values, such 
as democracy and human rights, on the one hand, and interests such as security or 
migration, on the other, describing itself as ‘a paradigm shift in terms of the way the EU’s 
strategic policy objectives for its external relations are conceived and pursued’. In terms of 
this discussion, three aspects of this “qualitative step forward” between the EU and its 
southern neighbourhood are worth highlighting: the renewed focus regarding ethical 
norms, with an emphasis on joint-ownership; differentiation and conditionality as the 
basis for the new approach; and strengthened commitment and awareness with regard to 
the importance of civil society.  
In terms of renewing the focus on the centrality of ethical norms in the EU’s relationship 
with the MENA region, the PfDSP made clear the connection between the values 
articulated by the protesters in the Arab Uprisings and those that the EU represents: 
The changes now underway carry the hope of a better life for the people of 
the region and for greater respect of human rights, pluralism, rule of law 
and social justice – universal values that we all share [...] While 
acknowledging the difficulties the EU has to take the clear and strategic 
option of supporting the quest for the principles and values that it cherishes. 
(European Commission and the HR, 2011c, p. 2)  
In light of the points made earlier in the chapter, it is interesting to note that Rosa Balfour 
(2013) describes the PfDSP as an example of the EEAS delivering its own strategies in 
response to the Arab Uprisings, by finding creative ways to act as a ‘policy entrepreneur’. 
As well as correlating the values of the uprisings with those of the EU, the PfDSP 
reiterated throughout the communication that democratic accountability in the form of 
free and fair elections should serve as the “entry qualification” for the type of partnership 
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on offer with the EU, and posited “minimum benchmarks” regarding standards of human 
rights and good governance, although it is rather less clear what those benchmarks might 
entail. Although not stated explicitly, democratic reform is presented as the bedrock of the 
partner’s transition process, by which other objectives, such as human rights and rule of 
law, can be achieved. It also goes to great lengths to emphasise mutual accountability and 
joint ownership of the process by which the EU provides support for the transition process 
that individual countries in the MENA region experience, offering aid and assistance only 
in response to overtures from its neighbours.  
As well as requiring evidence of tangible progress and a clear indication that the EU’s 
support and assistance are welcomed, the PfDSP highlighted differentiation and 
conditionality as the guiding principles for the new approach. According to the European 
Commission and the High Representative (2011c, p. 5), the PfDSP 
represents a fundamental step change in the EU’s relationship with those 
partners that commit themselves to specific, measurable reforms. It is an 
incentive-based approach based on more differentiation ("more for more"): 
those that go further and faster with reforms will be able to count on greater 
support from the EU. Support will be reallocated or refocused for those who 
stall or retrench on agreed reform plans [emphasis in original]. 
The policy represented the dual approach that the EU had developed over the course of its 
relationship with the southern neighbourhood, being presented within the regional 
context of the ENP, but also acknowledging the many differences between its partners in 
the region; differences further accentuated by the dramatic events of the Arab Uprisings. 
Inherent in the “more for more” approach is both positive and negative conditionality, 
together with the associated issues highlighted in earlier chapters, regarding levels of 
choice between asymmetrical partners, and the imposition of culturally contested values.95 
Regardless of the theoretical implications, Rafaella Iodice (Interview #5, 29/11/2013), Head 
of the Regional Programmes Neighbourhood South Unit in the Directorate-General for 
																																																								
95 In an attempt to provide a prescriptive evaluation regarding the efficacy of the EU’s promotion of human 
rights and democracy in the MENA region following the Arab Uprisings, the “more for more” approach will 
be discussed in both the regional and bilateral analysis in Parts II and III, with regard to the relevant sections 
at the end of Chapters 1 and 3, discussing conditionality in the context of intervention and Normative Power 
Europe respectively.  
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Development and Cooperation-EuropeAid, argued that the “more for more” approach 
represented a significant change following the Arab Uprisings, and has had real 
implications in terms of the actual amount of money which is available for each country. 
She also affirmed the relevance of overarching policy documents, such as the PfDSP, 
asserting that the “more for more” approach does feed into actual EEAS policy, resulting 
in the EU trying to modulate, within budget constraints, what is available to each partner 
on the basis of how far they are willing to go with reforms.  
The final aspect of the PfDSP to highlight here is its strengthened commitment and 
awareness with regard to the importance of civil society. Although the role of civil society 
organisations (CSOs) has increasingly featured as part of both the EU’s regional and 
bilateral policies in the MENA region, the PfDSP made explicit their importance in 
promoting the values articulated in the early months of the Arab Uprisings: 
A thriving civil society can help uphold human rights and contribute to 
democracy building and good governance, playing an important role in 
checking government excesses. A range of non-government (NGOs) and 
civil society organisations (CSOs) can provide much-needed support for the 
reforms and involvement in areas close to citizens’ concerns such as human 
rights, the environment, social and economic development. (European 
Commission and the HR, 2011c, p. 6)  
Teti (2012, p. 273) argues that the ‘rationale for this effort is the transformative potential of 
civil society, which the text emphasizes in a classically liberal vein, viewing civil society as 
a counterweight to the authoritarian impulses or plain inefficiencies and inertia of the 
state’. As will become apparent in later chapters, the EU has indeed expanded its 
recognition and support of CSOs in the southern neighbourhood, particularly in countries 
such as Tunisia. However, as will also become apparent, issues concerning consistency 
and selection bias with regard to Islamist organisations remains an issue. 
A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood 
A second overarching policy document was released in May 2011, entitled ‘A New 
Response to a Changing Neighbourhood’ (NRCN). Although this communication 
represented the final stage of an ENP review initiated the previous year, and addressed 
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both the eastern and southern dimensions of the partnership, there are a number of 
references to the momentous changes unfolding in the MENA region at the time, with 
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria mentioned specifically. Like the PfDSP, the NRCN 
accepted that EU policy had had limited success regarding political reform in the 
neighbouring countries. It also acknowledged the need for a different approach in light of 
the rapid pace of reforms occurring in the region, although Teti et al. (2013, p. 70) note the 
NRCN’s emphasis on the ‘positive dimensions of previous EU policy, the way in which 
the EU’s strategic objectives were correct in spirit if not in practice’. The language 
throughout the communication underscored the freshness and innovation of the EU’s new 
approach, as its title suggests, as well as providing, where the southern neighbourhood is 
concerned, a clear continuity with the themes and initiatives of the PfDSP.  
As with the PfDSP, the European Commission and High Representative (2011b, p. 2) 
stressed that the new approach to the EU’s partnerships ‘must be based on mutual 
accountability and a shared commitment to the universal values of human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law’. However, the Commission and HR (2011b, pp. 2-3) also 
reaffirmed that the EU did ‘not seek to impose a model or a ready-made recipe for political 
reform [and that the] initiative lies with the partner and EU support will be tailored 
accordingly’. In this way, the EU recommitted itself to the centrality of ethical norm 
promotion in its relationships with its southern neighbours, but also attempted to distance 
itself from critiques regarding imposition of values. Yet the guiding principle that 
informed the communication, also extending from the PfDSP, was the “more for more” 
approach, with its inherent positive and negative conditionality. Although this is 
presented as a “carrot without the stick” policy, the implied “less for less” is still a strong 
incentive for states that would otherwise be reluctant to instigate social and political 
reforms to do so. Thus, the EU provided an apparently more robust account of 
conditionality, which was present but not utilised in prior Euro-Mediterranean relations, 
as the regulatory mechanism regarding the provision of funding and support. 
In terms of ethical norm promotion, the NRCN’s most significant rhetoric concerned 
support for deep and sustainable democracy: 
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A functioning democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law are 
fundamental pillars of the EU partnership with its neighbours. There is no 
set model or a ready-made recipe for political reform. While reforms take 
place differently from one country to another, several elements are common 
to building deep and sustainable democracy and require a strong and 
lasting commitment on the part of governments. (European Commission 
and the HR, 2011b, p. 3, emphasis in original) 
According to the Commission and HR (2011b, p. 3), these common elements include free 
and fair elections, freedom of association, free press and media, independent judiciary, the 
fight against corruption, law enforcement reform and democratic control over armed and 
security forces. The NRCN also continued from the PfDSP in its renewed commitment to 
supporting and strengthening the role of civil society, with a more detailed account of 
how this facilitates deepened democracy. Reiterating a theme from the 2001 Regional 
Strategy Paper, and linking it to the ongoing uprisings, it stated that a thriving civil society 
enables citizens to hold governments to account, and is a particularly acute challenge for 
countries, such as those in the southern neighbourhood, currently ‘engaged in fast 
political change or where repressive political regimes continue to stifle pluralism and 
diversity’ (European Commission and the HR, 2011b, p. 4). The NCRN also introduced 
two new institutional developments, the European Endowment for Democracy and the 
Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility, which will be addressed below following an outline 
of the third significant policy document of 2011.  
The Agenda for Change 
In October 2011, the EU published its third overarching policy document in response to 
the Arab Uprisings, entitled ‘Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda 
for Change’. This publication was aimed at reforming the way in which EU development 
policy was targeted, in light of the events sweeping the MENA region. The European 
Commission (2015b) described this area of external policy as both seeking ‘to eradicate 
poverty in a context of sustainable development [and] a cornerstone of EU relations with 
the outside world’, noting that the EU is the world’s leading donor, providing over 50 per 
cent of all global development aid. Although the Arab Uprisings are only mentioned 
briefly in the communication itself, the Council of the European Union’s (2012, p. 1) 
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conclusions on the policy make an explicit connection between these events and the 
necessary change in approach to development aid: 
The rapidly changing global environment and the new international aid 
architecture require a more comprehensive, responsive and effective 
approach in EU external action and development policy. The Arab Spring is 
a case in point.  
In the communication itself, the European Commission (2011h, p. 3) used the social 
uprisings in the southern neighbourhood to highlight the interconnected nature of 
development policy, ethical norm promotion and interests such as security: 
Meanwhile, people-led movements in North Africa and the Middle East 
have highlighted that sound progress on the [Millennium Development 
Goals] MDGs is essential, but not sufficient. This leads to two conclusions: 
first, that the objectives of development, democracy, human rights, good 
governance and security are intertwined; second, that it is critical for 
societies to offer a future to young people.  
Moreover, the promotion of democracy and human rights are elevated to main principles of 
external development aid.  
According to EU Development Commissioner Andris Piebalgs, the new approach to the 
EU’s aid agenda would make assistance ‘more strategic, targeted and results-oriented’ 
(Euractiv, 2013), based on the main principles of human rights, democracy and good 
governance, on the one hand, and inclusive and sustainable growth, on the other 
(European Commission, 2015a). The communication itself called for a rights-based approach, 
with the European Commission (2011d) adding the need to strengthen ‘the contractual 
partnerships with developing countries [whereby] the partner country can demonstrate a 
commitment to fundamental values [putting] more emphasis on human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law’. An interviewee from the Policy and Coherence Unit of the 
Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation-EuropeAid (Interview #6, 
3/12/2013), who requested not to be named, stated that this new communication on policy 
priorities for development cooperation, was indeed a reaffirmation regarding the 
promotion of democracy, good governance and rule of law. Coming as it did, in a year in 
which EU external action was heavily influenced by events in the southern 
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neighbourhood, it is unsurprising that this aspect of development policy was also elevated 
to the status of main principle.  
Institutional developments 
Throughout 2011 a number of institutional developments occurred as a direct response to 
the Arab Uprisings. The EIDHR, which is able to circumvent foreign governments by 
offering financial support to NGOs and CSOs in countries where they are not officially 
recognised, was strengthened, and policies were instigated that empowered EU 
delegations to support activities for human rights groups, and to have at least one Human 
Rights Focal Point present at each delegation from 2012 onwards (Biscop & Borg, 2015, p. 
83). In December 2011, a new EU communication on the centrality of human rights and 
democracy to EU external action had ‘a strong MENA focus and promised better unity, 
implementation, and coherence on human rights policies, and also created the post of a 
human rights special representative’ (Youngs, 2014, p. 70). Additionally, the following 
three institutional initiatives were developed in response to the Arab Uprisings, reflecting 
the EU’s recommitment to its ethical norm promotion in the southern neighbourhood. 
Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility 
First mentioned in the PfDSP, and further articulated in the NRCN, the Neighbourhood 
Civil Society Facility was announced in September 2011 as an ‘EU response to the Arab 
Spring’ (European Commission, 2011e). Acknowledging the importance of civil society’s 
role regarding a contribution to policy-making and holding governments to account, the 
aims of the initiative, as set out by the European Commission (2011e), are 
supporting a greater role for them through a partnership with societies, 
helping non-state actors develop their advocacy capacity the ability to 
monitor reform and their role in implementing, monitoring and evaluating 
EU programmes.  
Although the initial budget of 26.4 million euros for 2011 was to be shared collectively 
between the eastern and southern neighbourhoods, an additional 11 million euros was 
made available for the southern neighbourhood in each of the following years (ENPi, 
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2015b). As noted above, although supporting CSOs had been an increasingly well-
established aspect of EU policies with its neighbours, through regional, bilateral and 
thematic instruments, the Arab Uprisings resulted in a re-evaluation, reaffirmation and 
readjustment of existing policy. Balfour (2012b, pp. 11-12) describes the CSF as an 
important shift towards more vigorous support of civil society, and argues that along with 
other initiatives, ‘the branching out towards understanding forgotten, marginalised or 
new political actors in the region all represent a departure from paying lip service to the 
previous regimes’ justification of its repression’.  
In its Action Fiche for the CSF, the Commission (2011a, p. 3) noted that a common issue 
regarding EU support to non-state actors in neighbouring countries has been its lack of 
visibility, which needed to be addressed in light of the current developments in the 
southern Mediterranean. However, a number of academic commentators on Euro-
Mediterranean relations, as noted in previous chapters, highlight the more pressing issue 
regarding the EU’s bias towards supporting some CSOs over others, notably those with 
Islamic foundations. Bishara Khader (2013, p. 39) argues that the selection of civil society 
partners in the Arab world ‘has often been inadequate and sometimes arbitrary: the EU 
engaged more with civil society organisations perceived more palatable and shunned 
others with a real social base’. Joel Peters (2012, p. xviii) notes that the Arab Uprisings, 
particularly in cases where Islamic political parties have achieved success in the elections 
which followed, require the EU to re-evaluate not only its engagement with those parties, 
and others across the region, but also its relationship with Islam itself. While the CSF 
certainly signaled the intent to undertake a re-evaluation in this spirit, it remains to be 
seen, in subsequent chapters, if a substantive shift has actually taken place. 
European Endowment for Democracy 
In its NCRN communication the EU also announced its support for establishing the 
European Endowment for Democracy. In the declaration of its establishment, published 
by the Council of the European Union (2011, p. 3), it stated that the ‘objective of the 
Endowment will be to foster and encourage “deep and sustainable democracy” in 
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transition countries and in societies struggling for democratisation’. Furthermore, it 
outlined an extensive list of potential beneficiaries, to be supported in a non-partisan 
manner, and provided they adhere to core democratic values, respect for human rights 
and principles of non-violence: pro-democratic movements; social movements and actors, 
CSOs; young leaders; independent media and journalists; and NGOs (Council of the 
European Union, 2011). HR Catherine Ashton stated that the ‘EED sends a concrete signal 
to our neighbours and beyond, that we are 100% committed to supporting democracy and 
the values upon which the EU was founded’ (European Commission, 2012). Although 
created to be an autonomous institution, it is predominantly funded by the EU and its 
member states. The European Endowment for Democracy (2015) itself states that it ‘will 
engage in regular consultations with relevant EU institutions and other actors in order to 
avoid duplication and ensure synergy, complementarity and added-value to EU 
instruments and Member States’ bilateral activities’.  
The issue of added-value is an important one, particularly in terms of how the EED 
differentiates itself from the existing EIDHR and the concurrently created CSF. Khader 
(2013, p. 40) explains that the difference with the latter initiative is that the EED ‘seeks to 
promote the creation of civil society organisations and provide assistance to trade unions 
and other social actors, such as non-registered non-governmental organisations’ [emphasis 
added]. This is particularly relevant with respect to the support required by local actors 
involved in the Arab Uprisings, where new organisations emerged rapidly to play a part 
in the political transition processes which ensued. The EIDHR seems, at first glance, to be 
closest in scope to the EED, but obliges recipients to make substantial contributions 
themselves, lacks flexibility in its programming cycles and budgeting, and has struggled 
to play a substantial role in partnering countries (Brudzinska & Youngs, 2012, p. 2). An 
interviewee who is familiar with both the development and functioning of the EED 
(Interview #8, 6/12/2013), who requested not to be identified, said its formation reflected a 
feeling that activists needed more support, and that they had not always been adequately 
supported in the past, necessitating the creation of something to complement existing 
instruments, but quicker, more flexible, and with a broader scope of persons and 
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institutions that they can reach out to. The development of the EED is a clear response to 
the social upheaval of the MENA region, reflecting the inability of existing organisations 
to act rapidly, flexibly and dynamically in supporting actors involved with the democratic 
transition process, provided there is a similar alignment with values such as human rights 
and non-violence.  
Support to Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth 
In September 2011 the EU announced a further initiative, the Support to Partnership, 
Reform and Inclusive Growth Programme, responding directly to the Arab Uprisings in 
the southern neighbourhood. The Commission’s (2011f) stated aim was 
to respond to the pressing socio-economic challenges that partner countries 
of the southern Mediterranean region are facing and to support them in their 
transition to democracy [...] concrete results are expected in the field of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, democratic governance, freedom 
of association, expression and assembly and free press and media.  
Behr (2012a, p. 10) describes the SPRING Programme as the centrepiece in relation to the 
package of measures adopted at this time, with 350 million euros available throughout 
2011 and 2012 to assist the transition process in the MENA region (European Commission, 
2011f). The SPRING Programme was designed, like the EED, to provide a flexible and 
rapid response to swiftly changing events in the southern neighbourhood, but guided by 
the “more for more” principle set out in the PfDSP and NCRN. The Action Fiche for the 
SPRING Programme cites the PfDSP directly to explain this point, stating that the ‘EU 
should be ready to offer greater support to those countries ready to work on such a 
common agenda, but also reconsider support when countries depart from this track’ 
(European Commission, 2011b, p. 2). The “common agenda” refers to deep and 
sustainable democratisation and lasting reforms in the context of human rights and the 
rule of law, and although initially expected to target Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco, 
the Commission was optimistic that all partner countries in the southern neighbourhood 
would benefit from the programme (European Commission, 2011f). Although there had 
been some debate as to whether or not the “more for more” approach would be effective, 
Rafaella Iodice (Interview #5, 29/11/2013) stated that the SPRING Programme involved an 
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umbrella amount in which countries were in competition with one another for funding, 
and that in no other EU budget is there a case where the amount of money changes on the 
basis of reports linked to governance and progress in this way.  
Financial response 
As well as overarching policy shifts which reemphasised and strengthened the EU’s 
commitment to its ethical norm promotion in the southern neighbourhood, and the 
institutional developments outlined above, a significant amount of additional financial 
resources were made available in 2011 to support the transition processes resulting from 
the Arab Uprisings. As Richard Youngs (2013, p. 4) notes, the fact that new resources were 
‘found in the midst of the euro zone crisis and economic recession indicates the priority 
attached to the Arab revolts’. An initial 30 million euros was made available to provide 
humanitarian aid in those areas most affected in early 2011 (European Commission and 
the HR, 2011c, p. 3), followed by an increase of 1.2 billion euros to the ENP funding 
instrument for 2011 and 2012 in direct response to the challenges brought about by the 
uprisings (Balfour, 2012b, p. 21).96 As well as a significant increase in available funding for 
the southern neighbourhood in 2011, the EU acknowledged that the magnitude of the 
recent changes in the region required a ‘re-focusing’ of aid in order ‘to better meet the 
current challenges and to ensure that our response meets peoples’ legitimate aspirations’ 
(European Commission and the HR, 2011c, p. 12).  
The European Council also agreed to an increase of one billion euros to the lending 
envelope of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in the period 2011-2013 for the southern 
Mediterranean (Peters, 2012, p. xvi), and provided financial cooperation to the Council of 
Europe to facilitate a 4.8 million euro ‘programme to support the building of political 
																																																								
96 In December 2011, the Commission’s request for 18.1 billion euros for the European Neighbourhood 
Instrument (ENI), the funding mechanism that replaced the ENPI from 2014-2020, represented a 40 per cent 
increase from the previous period of 2007-2014. Although this is not directly attributed to the Arab 
Uprisings, the ongoing events in the MENA region were clearly a factor with regard to this increase (Behr, 
2012a, p. 10 f/n). It should also be noted that the additional funding through the European Neighbourhood 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI) included the provisional allocations for initiative such as the SPRING 
Programme. 
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institutions, starting with Tunisia and Morocco’ (Gillespie, 2013, p. 126).97 Furthermore, the 
EU was instrumental in putting the democratic transitions in the MENA region onto the 
agenda of the Group of Eight (G8) summit in May 2011, calling for ‘strong and concrete 
support [to] stand with those who seek freedom and democracy’ (Barroso, 2011b). 
According to a joint statement from European Council President Van Rompuy and 
European Commission President Barroso (2011), the resulting Deauville Partnership 
‘builds very much on the EU’s new partnership with the region’, and the EIB’s president 
at the time, Philippe Maystadt, stated that the new partnership ‘enabled the resources 
deployed by the international financial institutions to promote democracy in the 
Mediterranean to be significantly increased’ (European Investment Bank, 2011). Also as 
part of the EU’s financial response to the Arab Uprisings, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) extended ‘its geographical coverage to include 
the Southern Neighbourhood’ and committed to provide annually up to 2.5 billion euros 
of public and private sector investment (European Commission, 2011g). 
The existing EIDHR also received additional funding in response to the Arab Uprisings in 
2011, as well as new policy initiatives as to how that funding could be utilised. An 
interviewee from the EIDHR (Interview #7, 3/12/2013), part of the Governance, 
Democracy, Gender and Human Rights Unit within the Directorate-General for 
Development and Cooperation-EuropeAid, who requested not to be named, stated that a 
new facility of 10,000 euros was made available to support human rights defenders, which 
could be channelled to them in two days, rather than the year usually required with 
regard to calls for proposals. Furthermore, direct funding was made available for 
countries in crisis, which was beneficial regarding support for Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, 
and the Country-Based Support Scheme (CBSS) allocations, given to the delegations for 
democracy and human rights projects, were increased and made available to countries 
across the region. According to the European Commission (2011c, p. 5), CBSS allocations 
to the region doubled in 2011, both in terms of actual funding, and as a percentage of total 
																																																								
97 The programme, entitled “Strengthening democratic reform in the southern Neighbourhood” is funded by 
the EU and implemented by the Council of Europe, both of whom ‘share the same objective, namely to 
promote democratic values and principles, as well as the respect for human dignity in the region’ (European 
Union and the Council of Europe, 2014).  
	 158	
CBSS allocations by EIDHR. Additionally, in 2011 both the number of EIDHR projects and 
value of EIDHR grants for the MENA region represented almost half of the previous four 
years combined (European Commission, 2011c, p. 5). In the following chapter, these 
figures will be revisited in the process of establishing whether or not the EU maintained 
the shift in policy regarding increased support for ethical norm promotion following 2011. 
European Neighbourhood Policy 
Much of this chapter has focussed on policy shifts, institutional developments and new 
initiatives associated with the review of the ENP throughout 2011; however, it is also 
possible to make some supplementary comments about the ENP in a more general sense. 
An interviewee familiar with EU external action (Interview #9, 6/12/2013), who requested 
not to be identified, stated that where the ENP was concerned regarding democracy in the 
MENA region prior to the Arab Uprisings, the EU as a whole had been fair in its 
assessment by acknowledging that it had neither foreseen the events of 2011, nor been 
directly involved in them. Sir Michael Leigh (Interview #1, 6/11/2013) goes further, 
arguing that the whole philosophy of the ENP was revealed to be largely irrelevant to the 
developments of the uprisings, and that the EU was tarnished in the eyes of some of the 
new people coming to power in that the ENP ‘had been developed under the ancien régime, 
whom we [the EU] had wholeheartedly embraced’. Regardless of the extent to which the 
ENP was deemed to be insufficient or detrimental, the Arab Uprisings precipitated a 
fundamental review which revolved ‘substantially around revisiting EU policies 
regarding the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights, and reinforcement of the 
rule of law in the Southern Mediterranean’ (Isaac, 2013, p. 41). This fundamental review of 
the ENP in 2011 resulted in: a significant increase in resources available to partners in the 
MENA region, particularly focused on ethical norm promotion; the “more for more” 
approach, with its implicitly associated “less for less”, where EU support depended 
conditionally on social and political reform; and a renewed focus on the strengthening of 
civil society.  
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A pivotal aspect of the shift in EU policy towards the southern neighbourhood following 
the Arab Uprisings has been the re-establishment of the ENP as the central EU policy 
towards the MENA region. The creation of the UfM in 2008, with its focus on regional 
infrastructure projects and indifference to ethical norm promotion, represented none of 
the EU’s priorities or principles in its revised neighbourhood policies. In both the PfDSP 
and NCRN, the European Commission and High Representative (2011c, p. 11) affirmed 
the value of regional and sub-regional mechanisms in the transformed southern 
neighbourhood, but noted that the implementation of the UfM ‘did not deliver the results 
we expected’, and that in the required process of reforming this institution and enabling it 
to fully realise its potential, the Commission and HR (2011c, p. 18) ‘are ready to play a 
bigger role in the UfM in line with the Lisbon Treaty’. Nathalie Tocci (2012, p. 10) argues 
that: 
The Arab spring has provided the Commission with an opportunity to 
sideline the UfM, which has been delegitimised by its neglect for political 
reform [...] Through its focus on the ENP (of which it is in charge), the 
Commission (and the External Action Service) have strived to retake the 
mantle of the EU’s Mediterranean policies.  
Although the UfM continues in its modest ambitions, its capacity to withstand the 
critiques concerning its disregard of political and social reform as part of its regional 
relationships changed considerably in light of the Arab Uprisings. In formulating their 
response to these events, the Commission, the HR and the EEAS showed a determination 
to reassert the centrality of ethical norm promotion to the EU’s neighbourhood policies, to 
which the UfM was deemed to be largely irrelevant.  
EU foreign policy objectives in the region 
The argument presented here is that 2011 represented a substantive shift in policy by the 
EU towards the MENA region in response to the Arab Uprisings. This is all the more 
significant in light of the usually glacial pace of EU external policy-making, the pertinence 
of the restrictive economic climate at the time, and the contemporary operational launch of 
the EEAS. After an initial period of confusion and inconsistency, the EU instituted a series 
of reforms intended to assist the transition processes unleashed by the Arab Uprisings, 
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each of them aiming to reanimate ethical norm promotion as a fundamental principle, thus 
aligning EU policy with the aspirations of the revolutionary movements in the region. 
Stefan Füle, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood 
Policy at the time, captured this sentiment in a speech to the European Parliament Foreign 
Affairs Committee in March 2011: 
[The PfDSP] expresses our belief that now is the time for a qualitative step 
forward in the relations between the European Union and its Southern 
neighbours that engage in a genuine transition towards democratisation. 
This new approach will be rooted unambiguously in a joint commitment to 
the values of democracy, human rights, good governance, rule of law and 
social justice (European Commission, 2011i). 
Discussing the various initiatives that the EU implemented to institutionalise this new 
approach, Behr (2012a, p. 14) argues that ‘[t]ogether, these measures represent real 
change’, and Hélène Michou (2011, p. 1) notes that ‘together they represent a notable effort 
to re-examine European foreign policy in light of a seismic shift in its southern 
neighbourhood’.  
Rhetorically, at least, the EU had always maintained that promoting human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law was a priority in the MENA region, dating back to its 
earliest formal agreements in the EMP. However, as highlighted in Chapter 4, the 
authoritarian regimes in the southern neighbourhood were increasingly seen as a bulwark 
against Islamic radicalisation and a securitised approach to migration, and supported at 
the expense of democratic reform. Similarly, human rights abuses were overlooked or 
ignored in the interests of stable trade and security partners, in what became an 
increasingly entrenched political status quo. As Peters (2012, p. xiv) argues, the reality was 
that European policy towards the MENA region prior to the Arab Uprisings ‘was a victory 
of pragmatism and vested interest over principle’.  
This is not to say that, however, that the EU was not amenable or committed to the 
promotion of ethical norms, but that there was an evident reluctance to prioritise it over 
other concerns and, for the most part, that this was at odds with its official rhetoric. 
Nevertheless, in 2011, led by the newly created EEAS and High Representative, the EU 
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eventually reprioritised its ethical norm promotion, bringing it into line with its rhetorical 
aspirations. An interviewee associated with the Human Rights and Democracy Division at 
the EEAS (Interview #23, 9/10/2014), who requested not to be named, stated that after 
initial hesitations in responding to the uprisings in Tunisia, Catherine Ashton did play a 
leading role in responding to the Arab Uprisings, prodded by the European Parliament to 
forego arguments linked with security and stability, and recognised the importance of the 
EU responding to the activists’ calls for more freedom and democracy. Whereas until that 
point the rhetoric had been ever-present but insubstantial, in 2011 the EU’s commitment to 
ethical norm promotion in the MENA region was matched by increased funding, new 
initiatives and an institutional overhaul of its policy architecture.  
In Chapter 6 I will ascertain whether or not this substantive shift in policy towards the 
southern neighbourhood was maintained in the period after 2011, and in Chapter 7 put 
forward an explanatory hypothesis to interpret the extent to which ethical norm 
























EU policy towards the MENA region post-2011 
Introduction 
Having outlined the EU’s policy towards the MENA region prior to the Arab Uprisings in 
Chapter 4, and maintaining that issues relating to security and stability took priority over 
the promotion of ethical norms during this period, despite the latter’s rhetorical centrality, 
the previous chapter argued that a substantive shift in policy occurred throughout 2011. 
After a cautious and ambiguous early response to the social upheaval which swept 
through the southern neighbourhood, EU policy-makers initiated a range of documents, 
strategies, communiqués, increased financial assistance, new initiatives and institutional 
developments to reinvigorate its commitment to ethical norm promotion, and to 
substantively support the transitions taking place in the region. 
This chapter will provide an overview of the EU’s MENA policy in the years following 
2011, leading up to the latest review of the ENP at the time of writing, in 2015. Once again, 
there will be a focus on those policies relating to norms such as human rights and 
democracy, which the EU continues to consistently frame in universal and ethical terms, 
although more general forms of support will also be addressed, as will the increasingly 
relevant issue of migration. Conditionality will also be covered in this chapter, as it relates 
to the “more for more” principle, as will the EU’s support for civil society in the southern 
neighbourhood; both of these were strongly emphasised and associated with ethical norm 
promotion in the policy shifts of 2011. In stark contrast to the high volume of policy 
initiatives put forward in 2011, the period that followed can be characterised by a waning 
of focus and support, particularly in terms of region-wide initiatives. Furthermore, as will 
become apparent with regard to policy objectives for the MENA region during this period, 
EU policy towards the southern neighbourhood has reverted back to a “business as usual” 
approach, where security and stability are once again prioritised, with an emphasis on the 
increasing exigency of migration resulting from violent conflicts in the region.  
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The chapter begins with a brief overview of developments in the southern neighbourhood, 
to provide some context for the environment affecting regional policy-making. To do so, 
however, it will be necessary to provide a description, albeit a limited one, of certain 
developments in particular countries of the MENA region: Libya, Egypt and Syria.98 
Although Part II of this thesis continues to focus on a regional analysis of EU-MENA 
relations and the impact of the Arab Uprisings, and Part III applies an extensive bilateral 
analysis to the EU’s relationships with Tunisia and Morocco in this context, the EU’s 
policy towards those countries in the southern neighbourhood most affected by the 
uprisings is relevant to certain aspects of the EU’s response. This is particularly the case 
with regard to the conditions impacting on the overarching themes of EU policy-making 
towards the MENA region, such as the tension between ethical norms and self-regarding 
interests. 
Overview of regional developments 
As early as 2012, Michelle Pace (2012, p. 134) argued that despite the plethora of 
declarations by EU officials expressing a sentiment of mea culpa regarding EU policy 
towards the MENA region prior to the Arab Uprisings, ’there does not seem to be any 
serious reflections on lessons learnt from past mistakes of supporting authoritarian 
regimes in the name of stability at the expense of the protection of human rights and civil 
liberties’. It is a damning statement, and one that deserves further investigation in light of 
the arguments presented in the previous chapter regarding the scope and substance of 
new policy initiatives throughout 2011. In terms of the regional environment to which the 
EU’s MENA polices were directed, the instability generated by the Arab Uprisings 
intensified throughout the latter part of 2011. In December of that year, the European 
Commission (2011g) stated that ‘[s]ince the first demonstrations in Tunisia in December 
2010, a wave of popular discontent has shaken the Arab world, with people calling for 
																																																								
98 As noted in the introduction, a number of significant protests occurred throughout the MENA region, and 
also in the Gulf Peninsula. However, with the exception of Tunisia and Morocco, which are covered in Part 
III, these three cases stand out in the southern neighbourhood as requiring specific attention in terms of 
providing a full account of the events associated with the Arab Uprisings relevant to a discussion of EU-
MENA relations during this period. 
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dignity, democracy, and social justice’, before going on to outline the many ways in which 
the EU had supported the transition processes in the southern neighbourhood. While this 
statement shows that by the end of 2011 the EU was maintaining the narrative of the Arab 
Uprisings as a cohesive, value-led event, in the MENA region the protests had fragmented 
in numerous different directions. As will be shown below, by the beginning of 2012, a 
number of armed conflicts were dominating the attention of both policy-makers and the 
international media, and would continue to do so for the following four years, during 
which time this research took place.  
Libya was one of the first countries to be swept up in the revolutionary fervour that had 
ignited in Tunisia. With Colonel Mu’ammar al-Gaddafi firmly in control at the beginning 
of 2011, however, as he had been for 42 years, ‘it would have been hard to imagine that 
anti-government protests would spread across Libya and evolve by late February into an 
armed conflict that would transform the oil-rich North African state’ (Amnesty 
International, 2012b, p. 16). In mid-February, anti-government protests had broken out in 
Benghazi, which quickly spread to other parts of the country, leading to a civil war 
between those for and against the Gaddafi regime. Under the auspices of several UN 
resolutions, a Western coalition intervened on the side of the protesters, nominally to 
protect civilians by imposing a no-fly zone.99 The resulting fall of Gaddafi and his allies led 
to increasing violence between Libya’s various tribal factions, and following disputed 
elections in 2014, the security situation has dramatically worsened, descending into civil 
war between two separate parliaments vying for control (European Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2015).  
In response to the initial brutality of Gaddafi’s repression of demonstrations, the EU 
suspended all technical cooperation and negotiations on the EU-Libya Framework 
Agreement, and adopted a series of sanctions against individuals and entities associated 
with his regime (European Commission, 2011g). Member states were deeply divided on 
the Western-led military intervention in 2011, with some, in particular France and the 
																																																								
99 Tanja Börzel et al. (2015, p. 5) argue that this action, which ultimately helped bring down Gaddafi’s 
regime, was actually motivated by concern for continued access to Libya’s rich oil and gas deposits. 
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United Kingdom, being leading participants, and others, along with the EU itself, 
providing humanitarian assistance and stabilisation funding (European Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2012, p. 102). In 2012, the EU opened a fully staffed delegation in 
Tripoli, sent an Election Assessment Team (EAT) for Libya’s first parliamentary elections 
of that year, and provided a number of funding initiatives for projects, assistance and 
sector support (European Commission, 2013b). Many of these measures would prove to be 
wildly optimistic in light of subsequent events, and all cooperation is now on hold due to 
the widespread violence and instability. Libya is currently viewed solely in terms of 
security and migration, in particular where those two issues intersect, which will be taken 
up later in the chapter. 
Egypt was also caught up very quickly in the wave of discontent sweeping across the 
Maghreb from Tunisia. At the beginning of 2011, ‘Egypt was a country whose people had 
been all but stifled by 30 years of oppressive emergency rule, ruthless repression of 
dissent, high levels of official corruption and endemic poverty’ (Amnesty International, 
2012b, p. 9). Yet within a month of protests erupting throughout Egypt in late January, the 
Mubarak regime had been ousted, replaced by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF). Mass protests continued, until a short respite following the parliamentary election 
success of the Islamist party Muslim Brotherhood, and the success of its presidential 
candidate Mohammed Morsi. A year later, however, protesters returned to the streets 
calling for President Morsi’s removal, leading to a military coup under the leadership of 
General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, and a suspension of the constitution (Börzel et al., 2015, p. 5). 
General el-Sisi has subsequently been elected President, instigated a brutal crackdown on 
Morsi’s supporters and the Muslim Brotherhood, incarcerated critics of the government, 
and introduced a series of repressive laws to stifle dissent (Amnesty International, 2016). 
The EU was slow to respond to the “Egyptian Uprisings”, as it had been in Tunisia, but for 
most of 2011 the EU consistently ‘defended the rights of the Egyptians to demonstrate 
peacefully, and condemned the use of force by the authorities’ (European Commission, 
2011g). Although ‘Europe has immense economic and political interests at stake in a 
successful transition in Egypt’, it has limited tools to engage, and those resources it is able 
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to commit are insufficient to create any leverage (European Council on Foreign Relations, 
2012). In light of its prior reservations regarding Islamist political organisations, the EU, to 
its credit, showed a pragmatic willingness to engage with the Morsi administration, 
receiving President Morsi in Brussels, restarting negotiations on an ENP Action Plan, and 
providing additional funding through the Neighbourhood Investment Facility, SPRING 
Programme and the ENPI (European Commission, 2013b). However, the EU’s limited 
response to the subsequent military coup, and continued engagement with the el-Sisi 
regime, despite the extreme nature of its authoritarian impulses, has demonstrated a lack 
of commitment to rule of law and democratic development to other actors in the region 
(European Council on Foreign Relations, 2014, p. 84).  
In Syria, where the al-Assad family had “ruled with an iron fist” for 40 years, the 
authorities unleashed an increasingly brutal response towards protesters inspired by 
events elsewhere in the region (Amnesty International, 2012b, p. 26). The largely peaceful 
early demonstrations became increasingly violent in response to repeated abuse and 
violations by President Bashar al-Assad’s security forces, a cycle of events resulting in a 
full-scale civil war that continues to this day. Adding to the intensity and carnage, a 
number of international actors have joined the conflict, either supporting fighters on the 
ground, or conducting bombing raids from above. Furthermore, into the security void of 
Syria and neighbouring Iraq, the Islamic militant group Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) has gained a significant foothold, and, as will be shown later in the chapter, it has 
begun projecting its fundamentalist ideology into Europe. The figures relating to those 
who have died, been displaced or are in urgent need of assistance are highly contested, 
but staggering by any account. According to Amnesty International (2014), by the end of 
2014 190,00 people had died, 10.8 million needed urgent humanitarian assistance, 45 per 
cent of the population had been displaced, and 3.8 million Syrian refugees had fled Syria 
for Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. All of these figures will be considerably 
higher at the time of writing, as the Syrian conflict intensified throughout 2015, 
particularly with the arrival of yet more foreign powers to the war.  
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After initially condemning the Syrian regime for its violent repression of demonstrators, 
the EU introduced targeted sanctions in May 2011, including an arms embargo, asset 
freeze and targeted travel ban, and eventually called for Bashar al-Assad to step aside, 
following an escalation of military attacks on protesters in August (European 
Commission, 2011g). Although some member states are actively involved in supporting 
various factions on the ground, mostly with targeted airstrikes, the EU itself has 
predominantly supported a political solution, working through diplomatic channels with 
the UN and principal actors, although this avenue has become increasingly complicated. 
The EU has been one of the biggest humanitarian donors to the crisis,100 but of all the 
member states, only Germany and Sweden have taken significant numbers of refugees 
(European Council on Foreign Relations, 2015, p. 74). In 2015, the EU, like many other 
international actors involved in the Syrian crisis, emphasised the establishment of a 
transitional government as opposed to complete regime change, which Peter Seeberg and 
Musa Shteiwi (2014, p. 9) argue, ‘represents explicitly the changing of the European 
narrative – from support of the “Arab Spring” to an increased focus on security and, 
especially in the context of Syria, on counter-terrorism’.  
In the previous chapter I argued that in the early stages of the Arab Uprisings, the 
widespread international media coverage, at least those targeting a Western audience, 
largely aligned itself with the protesters, and coalesced around a shared narrative in terms 
of values such as democracy, human rights and social justice. By the beginning of 2012, 
however, the international media coverage of unfolding events in the southern 
neighbourhood had significantly decreased, and, more importantly, had begun to focus 
predominantly on the violent conflicts in terms of security in the MENA region. A 
comprehensive study by Loughborough University’s Communication Research Centre 
(2012b, pp. 26-29) shows that the BBC’s coverage of the “Arab Spring” declined 
																																																								
100 ‘In December, the EU Regional Trust Fund for the Syrian crisis announced the launch of the biggest ever 
single EU response package, worth €350 million, to support the country’s refugees in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, 
and Turkey. EU funding mechanisms active in Syria and surrounding countries included the European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace, the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession, and the Development Cooperation Instrument’ (European Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2016, p. 94).  
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significantly from November 2011, as the focus shifted away from the demonstrations, and 
more towards ongoing conflicts. A Pew Research Centre report by Monica Anderson 
(2012) showed that attention to the “Arab Spring”, which had been the top media story in 
the US early 2011, had dramatically declined and was ‘now virtually off the media radar 
screen, with the focus shifting in 2012 to the violence in Syria’. Douglas Kellner (2012, p. 
232) also argues that in the latter months of 2011 and into 2012, Al Jazeera, the BBC and 
other global networks ‘focused heavy attention on spectacles of violence in Syria’. As part 
of the regional analysis in the following chapter, I will put forward an explanatory 
hypothesis regarding the shifting priorities of EU policy towards the southern 
neighbourhood, and will draw on both the actuality of the increasing conflicts in the 
region, and the international media coverage of them.  
In the following sections, I provide an overview of EU policy towards the MENA region 
post-2011, continuing on from some of the key developments with regard to the EU’s 
immediate response to the Arab Uprisings. A closer examination of the implementation 
process regarding the various initiatives of 2011, which I have argued represented a 
significant shift, reveals not only a flawed policy architecture in itself, but also a failure of 
political will, which developed and intensified over the following years.  
Financial response 
A substantial financial commitment was made in 2011 to support societies in the MENA 
region with their political transitions, with a particular emphasis on democracy and 
human rights, and a number of new institutions established to facilitate and direct the 
disbursal of this increased funding. However, these developments failed to live up to the 
levels of expectation exhibited in 2011, and the results of the much-hyped increase in 
financial support to the MENA region following the Arab Uprisings proved to be 
disappointing. By 2013, few disbursements of the proclaimed EBRD commitments were 
actually being spent on the ground, and the Deauville commitments were being uniformly 
rubbished by Arab interlocutors ‘as a smokescreen that masked the failure of G8 
governments to commit significant new funds themselves’ (Youngs, 2014, p. 107). 
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Although it was only one of the donors involved with the Deauville Partnership, the EU’s 
own ENP funding proclamations fell equally short. There emerged a significant 
discrepancy between money committed and money disbursed, and although there was ‘an 
increase in the number of technocratic actors with a responsibility for proposing small-
range EU initiatives towards the Arab countries’ (Bicchi, 2014b, p. 322), the results have 
mostly been underwhelming. As Federica Bicchi’s (2014a, p. 27) extensive analysis of 
financial flows from the EU to the Arab countries of the Mediterranean reveals, ‘while 
more has been promised, less has been delivered, as the disbursement rate has 
significantly worsened since 2011’. Bicchi (2014a, pp. 34-35) shows that while the Arab 
Uprisings did lead to a significant increase in funding commitments to the southern 
neighbourhood, in the following years the disbursement of funds has actually decreased, 
leading to, at the time of writing, an ever-widening gap between money promised and 
money spent.  
Richard Youngs (2014, p. 107) makes a further point about the efficacy of money actually 
spent in the region via the ENP following the commitments made in 2011: 
By 2013, 12 per cent of Commission aid was going to the MENA region, not 
more than before the Arab spring. Behind the headline figure of an 
additional €1 billion coming from the ENP policy, some reports pointed out 
that actual new money was really €250 million a year, and that split across 
sixteen countries this represented a drop in the ocean alongside the billions 
that the revolutions cost in lost production.  
In fact, a review of ENPI commitments between 2007 and 2013, including bilateral 
spending and regional/interregional programmes, shows that a jump in commitments 
occurred in 2010, followed by a steady incremental increase each year until 2013 
(European Commission, 2014c, p. 74). At the time of writing, the foreseen ENI indicative 
allocations for the southern neighbourhood were between 674 and 824 million euros 
(EEAS and the European Commission, 2014b, p. 12), which does not represent a significant 
increase. Youngs (2014, p. 107) notes that ‘[m]ember states rejected the Commission’s bid 
for increased funds for the neighbourhood in the 2014–20 budget, refusing to authorize 
any real-term expansion in aid for this period’. Be it the discrepancy between financial 
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commitments and their disbursement, or the failure of actual funding to have a 
meaningful impact, the required “re-focussing” of aid that the EU promised to meet the 
magnitude of changes in the southern neighbourhood and the Arab societies’ legitimate 
aspirations, failed to impact on the regional transitions taking place.  
SPRING Programme and the “more for more” principle 
The SPRING Programme, which was to be ‘the main vehicle for the “more for more” 
approach enshrined in the EU response to the Arab spring [...] has encountered limitations 
in absorption capacity on top of EU reluctance to disburse funds’ (Bicchi, 2014b, p. 329). 
Although it is designed to support democratic and economic transition in partner 
countries, a 2013 communiqué from the EU Delegation to the UN (2013) focused almost 
exclusively on the latter, and early questions on the specificities regarding benchmarking 
procedures, goal alignment with recipients and the balance between short-term and long-
term initiatives (Tissi, 2012) have yet to be addressed. Youngs (2012, p. 4) provides a 
further appraisal, arguing that while the SPRING Programme represented a quantitative 
change to the nature of reform support, namely a top-up of existing funding, it was not a 
qualitatively new departure regarding how money is actually spent, a factor both 
acknowledged by EU officials and bemoaned by partners in the region.  
Despite these critiques, however, it is worth examining the SPRING Programme purely 
with regard to actual allocations, both in terms of recipients and amounts. Regardless of 
what sectors SPRING funding is directed to, the programme was implemented first and 
foremost as a rewards system, conditional on reforms associated with the EU’s promotion 
of ethical norms in the MENA region. Therefore, one would expect to see allocations 
directed to those southern neighbours instigating the most significant reforms regarding 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law, with support being directed to the actual 
implementation of policies relating to the transition processes coming from this or other 
funding mechanisms. The SPRING Programme was divided into two funding periods, the 
first covering 2011-2012, and the second covering 2013. During the first period, the EU 
provided 390 million euros, allocated as follows: 100 million to Tunisia; 90 million to 
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Egypt; 80 million each to Morocco and Jordan; 30 million to Lebanon; and 10 million to 
Algeria (European Commission, 2014c, p. 82). Although there is some coherence, in that 
the two partners experiencing the greatest transitions, Tunisia and Egypt, are the main 
recipients, with Morocco and Jordan being rewarded for constitutional reforms, it is odd 
that there is so little difference between the allocations to the former pair and the latter. It 
is also unclear why Lebanon would warrant a significant allocation, and Libya, which held 
its inaugural parliamentary elections in 2012, is missing. During the second period, the EU 
provided 150 million euros, allocated as follows: 55 million to Tunisia; 48 million to 
Morocco; 21 million to Jordan and Lebanon; and 5 million to Libya (European 
Commission, 2014c, p. 82). Once again, there is some coherence, although the basis for 
allocations to Lebanon continues to be unclear, as does the similarity between the 
allocations for Tunisia and Morocco.101  
When the “more for more” principle is taken as a broader concept of EU aid and support 
than just the allocation of SPRING funding, as it logically must, the signs of incoherence 
and inconsistency in SPRING allocations become more pronounced. In a 2013 clarification 
of the “more for more” principle in the context of the ENP, the European Commission and 
High Representative (2013a, p. 6) stated that: 
There is an increasing divergence in democratic reforms in the 
neighbourhood countries. The EU will therefore respond in a more nuanced 
manner, based on the ‘more for more’ principle and a rigorous review of 
reform commitments. To remain credible, it must apply the same high 
standards to, and scrutiny of, democratic reforms, wherever and in 
whatever form they happen.  
By this rationale, countries such as Tunisia would receive the greater part of overall 
funding, and countries such as Egypt would not only have rewards withdrawn, but also 
be strongly condemned for the military regime’s authoritarian policies, which eclipse even 
those that preceded the revolution. However, as will become apparent in Part III, the EU’s 
assistance to Morocco has transcended that of Tunisia’s, despite the limited nature of the 
former’s reforms and the latter’s deserved reputation as the sole success story of the Arab 
																																																								
101 The significance of comparing SPRING funding between Tunisia and Morocco will be taken up as part of 
the bilateral analysis with regard to each country in Part III. 
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Uprisings. Furthermore, whereas Egypt was missing from the second period of SPRING 
funding,  
the European decision to co-operate with General Sisi’s regime to try to 
convince it of the benefits of a reformist approach has clouded the EU’s 
engagement with transitions across the region [and] sent a strong signal to 
other neighbouring countries that the EU had little commitment to 
supporting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law’ (European 
Council on Foreign Relations, 2014, p. 86).  
These issues regarding the use of positive conditionality, and others regarding the absence 
of negative conditionality, will be taken up in the following chapter.  
Civil society  
As noted in Chapter 5, one of the key developments to emerge from the 2011 shift in 
policy following the Arab Uprisings was an emphasis on civil society, particularly as a 
crucial factor in the success of the transitions taking place. The PfDSP was explicit with 
regard to the importance of CSOs in promoting the ethical norms that were central to this 
shift, and the EU’s focus on supporting civil society has been one of the few consistent 
aspects of its policies towards the MENA region post-2011. The new Civil Society Facility 
provided 12 million euros for the southern neighbourhood in the first phase of its 
operations in 2011, and a further 22 million euros for the second phase, covering 2012-2013 
(European Commission and the HR, 2013b, pp. 7-8). Dr Michael Köhler, Neighbourhood 
Director at the Commission’s Directorate-General (DG) for Development and Cooperation 
– EuropeAid, stated that the Arab Uprisings had caused a major rethink in terms of 
policies and partnerships in the MENA region, and that as a result, civil society actors 
‘have moved closer to the core of discussion’ (ENPi, 2014c, p. 5). According to the 
European Commission and HR (2014b, p. 9), consultations with CSOs ‘have become a 
structural element of EU cooperation’ and they are now ‘regularly consulted on policy 
elements as well as on operational issues in the preparation and programming of EU 
financial support’.  
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Also included in the framework of new policies and institutions to support civil society in 
the southern neighbourhood, particularly in its role of consolidating democracy and 
human rights, was the European Endowment for Democracy. The EED was created to fill 
a gap, highlighted by the Arab Uprisings, in the existing institutional framework for 
supporting CSOs in the region; to provide a quicker and more flexible response to local 
actors, particularly those not covered by existing instruments. The EED’s Executive 
Director, Jerzy Pomianowski, explains that recent political turbulence in places such as 
Egypt has 
underscored the need for a flexible rapid reaction mechanism for supporting 
civil and political society in the EU Neighbourhood, one that would be 
independent and complementary to the EU democracy support toolkit. The 
European Endowment for Democracy (EED) was set up precisely with this 
in mind: it is at arm’s length from EU member states and institutions, and 
can step in to support a radio station, a blogger or an NGO within days or 
even hours of receiving a request (ENPi, 2014a). 
Although its inauguration has been beset by contention amongst member states regarding 
its financing, remit and decision-making procedures (Leininger & Richter, 2012), and it has 
been slow to make any significant impact in the region (Asseburg, 2013, p. 58), it 
demonstrates a genuinely innovative approach to promoting democracy and human 
rights An interviewee familiar with the EED (Interview #8, 6/12/2013), who requested not 
to be identified, was optimistic that it would fulfill its potential to provide added-value 
regarding the EU’s support of civil society in the southern neighbourhood.  
However, the positive appraisal of the EU’s engagement with this domain following the 
Arab Uprisings comes with a caveat. While all of the EU’s existing instruments to support 
civil society in the MENA region have been bolstered as part of the shift in policy that took 
place in 2011, and new instruments have been initiated, the essential condition for 
supporting civil society actors across the board remains a shared commitment and 
adherence to the EU’s conception of universal human rights. Although this is an 
understandable position with regard to aid provision and support to external actors, 
particularly in light of the EU’s rhetoric on the centrality of these values to its international 
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identity, it automatically excludes many of the Islamist civil society actors that have 
attained prominence in the wake of the uprisings. As Timo Behr (2013, p. 20) notes: 
The rise of political Islam in the EU’s southern neighbourhood represents a 
political as well as conceptual challenge to the EU [where despite] a switch 
in EU policies from a strategy of containment to a strategy of engagement 
[...] problems remain as the EU continues to expect Islamist actors to adjust 
to its own discursive framework. 
If the EU wishes to be a partner in the various social and political transitions taking place 
in the MENA region, it will need to find a way to engage with many of these new Islamist 
civil society actors, a point which will be returned to in the interpretation of the regional 
analysis in Chapter 7.  
Migration and security 
Prior to the Arab Uprisings, the EU had established “stability partnerships” with the 
authoritarian regimes in the MENA region, offering various economic incentives in return 
for assistance in combatting terrorism, and stemming the flow of migrants trying to reach 
Europe’s shores. According to Assem Dandashly (2015, p. 40), ‘[s]ince the 
institutionalization of the EU-MENA relations through the Barcelona Process in 1995, 
maintaining security and curbing illegal migration have been the EU’s key goals’. 
Although the events of 2011 led to a re-emphasis on the promotion of democracy and 
human rights in the southern neighbourhood, the EU continued to develop a framework 
of policies to control the external borders of the Union.102 Perhaps nothing symbolises the 
uneasy interrelationship between the EU’s shift in policy towards ethical norms following 
the Arab Uprisings, and its ongoing concerns regarding migration issues, than the 
establishment of Mobility Partnerships with select Mediterranean partners. Although 
offered as both a reward and an incentive, they have been criticised for imposing 
disproportionate obligations on the partner states such as strict control of 
their external borders, cooperation with Frontex and negotiation of 
																																																								
102 This continuity can partly be explained by the EU’s institutional division of competences, which the 
Lisbon Treaty did not significantly change in this domain; the external dimensions of migration policies 
continue to be dominated by the Commission’s DG Home, certain EU agencies such as Frontex, and the 
working structures of the Council (Carrera, Hertog, & Parkin, 2013). 
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readmission agreements with the EU, against visa facilitation for restricted 
categories of their citizens (students, researchers, business leaders) and 
vague opportunities for legal migration to interested EU member states 
(Carrera, Hertog, & Parkin, 2012; Noutcheva, 2015, p. 25). 
The Mobility Partnerships, which have since been signed by Tunisia and Morocco, are part 
of the EU’s Global Approach on Migration and Mobility (GAMM), which was adopted in 
2011 and provides the general framework for migration issues in the southern 
neighbourhood, stemming from a ‘commitment to address root causes of displacement 
and forced migration by the use of foreign policy tools’ (European Commission, 2015f). 
While there are some commendable linkages between GAMM and a more value-centred 
approach, such as the inclusion of mobility and human security issues, the events 
unleashed by the Arab Uprisings quickly presented a major challenge to them both.  
A detailed analysis by Sergio Carrera et al. (2012, pp. 3-4) shows that while there were 
significant regional cross-border movements as a result of instability created by the 
uprisings in spring and summer of 2011, ‘the number of individuals that fled the 
upheavals in North Africa by crossing the Mediterranean to Europe was relatively minor’. 
According to Philippe Fargues and Christine Fandrich (2012, p. 4), ‘[w]hile Arab revolts 
did not produce any significant inflow of new migrants to Europe, neither regular nor 
irregular, apart from a short-lived movement of peopled smuggled from Tunisia in the 
first days of the revolution,103 events in Libya and in Syria resulted in considerable 
population displacement’. As these conflicts intensified, however, so the number of 
refugees and migrants willing to risk their lives to find safety and security in Europe 
increased: 
 As instability gained momentum in the region, the EU was alarmed to find 
its southern border flooded by migrants trying to escape the turmoil and the 
violence in North Africa. The migration control deals struck with previous 
dictators were in tatters and no longer delivering border security to the EU. 
The Mediterranean member states faced an increasing number of migrants 
																																																								
103  Although numbering several thousand, their arrival resulted in the situation being declared a 
humanitarian emergency by the Italian government, and dominated the media headlines (Seeberg, 2014, pp. 
59-60). 
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and highly mediatised instances of lost human life in the Mediterranean Sea 
as migrants sought safe haven (Noutcheva, 2015, p. 20).  
It is estimated that 22,500 refugees and migrants arrived in Italy, Greece, Spain and Malta 
via the Mediterranean in 2012, rising to 60,000 in 2013, and then 75,000 in the first half of 
2014 alone (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2014). However, these 
figures pale in comparison with those for 2015, which show a movement of people from 
the MENA region to the EU on an unprecedented scale. According to the latest FRONTEX 
(2015, p. 6) statistics at the time of writing, in the first three quarters of 2015 there were 
over 300,000 crossings on the Eastern Mediterranean route, predominantly involving 
Syrians fleeing the ongoing civil war, and over 600,000 crossings into the EU by all routes. 
It is now estimated that over 1.5 million asylum seekers arrived in Europe throughout 
2015, which has unsurprisingly consumed EU politicians, and put severe pressure on the 
entire European project (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2016, p. 30). 
Adding to Europeans’ sense of insecurity emanating from the southern neighbourhood is 
the threat of Islamic terrorism, and its linkages with migration. Although not a new 
phenomenon, the rise of ISIS in the Syrian conflict, where it has established political 
control over much of the north and a large part of neighbouring Iraq, has intensified the 
debate in Europe over the acceptance of refugees, the majority of whom are fleeing 
genuinely life-threatening situations in their countries of origin.104 As Seeburg (2013, p. 
159) notes: 
With the tendency since 9/11 of securitizing migration movements towards 
the EU and with the growing European focus on Islamist organizations in 
the MENA region throughout the new challenges in 2011 the 
interconnectedness between security and migration develops new 
dimensions in the narratives related to recent migration movements.  
Following the November 2015 terror attacks in Paris, which claimed the lives of 130 
people, some European politicians were quick to draw links between the attacks and the 
																																																								
104 The FRONTEX (2015, p. 6) statistics show that together with Syrians, refugees from Iraq and Afghanistan 
make up the majority of those entering the EU by these routes. 
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EU’s migration policies.105 In practical terms, the EU external policy response has been to 
increase naval and coast guard operations in the Mediterranean, attempt to stabilise Libya 
by helping to establish a national unity government, and plans to make three billion euros 
available to Turkey for its cooperation in stemming the flow of migrants to Europe from 
Syria (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2016, pp. 29, 96-98). However, in the wider 
context of the ENP, the result has been an exacerbation of the EU’s tendency, with the 
exception of the period immediately following the Arab Uprisings, to prioritise security 
and migration issues at the expense of its ethical norm promotion.  
European Neighbourhood Policy 
In the previous chapter I argued that throughout 2011 the EU responded to the Arab 
Uprisings with a substantial shift in policy. The ENP was reinvigorated as the primary 
accord between the EU and its southern neighbours, with a renewed commitment to place 
ethical norm promotion at the centre of the relationship. Aligning themselves with the 
Arab protestors who had risen up against the authoritarian regimes across the region, EU 
policy-makers pledged an increase in financial support, and a number of institutional 
initiatives with which to facilitate the disbursal of these new funds. As shown above, 
however, neither the additional financial support nor the institutional initiatives were able 
to adequately meet the challenges associated with the political transitions taking place in 
the MENA region. Maja Bozovic (Interview #26, 28/01/2014), Chairperson of the Council’s 
Mashreq/Maghreb Working Group, believes that no one on either side of the 
Mediterranean is happy with the new ENP, particularly its central credo of “more for 
more”. Bicchi (2014b, p. 330) argues that the policy responses to the Arab Uprisings 
produced 
a disconnect between, on the one hand, the discourse announcing a new 
approach and the institutional developments meant to further it and, on the 
other, a strong policy continuity marked by a lack of a regional vision and 
declining financial engagements with actors on the ground. 
																																																								
105 See, for example, Kaminski’s (2015) interview with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. 
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Richard Whitman and Ana Juncos (2013, p. 158; 2014, pp. 162-163) assess the programmes 
and policies put in place by the EU as overly focussed on technical cooperation at the 
expense of genuine political reform in partner countries, and argue that ‘the most serious 
lesson for the EU continues to be the inadequacies of the European neighbourhood policy 
(ENP) as a framework to deal effectively with events in the Middle East and North Africa’. 
Their description of the EU policy response as “old wine in new bottles” is shared by Sir 
Michael Leigh (Interview #1, 6/11/2013), former Commission Deputy Director-General 
with responsibility for the ENP and former Director-General for Enlargement, who stated 
that the changes to the ENP constituted a lighter version of what had worked for the EU in 
supporting the political transitions in Eastern Europe following the end of the Cold War, 
which proved both insignificant and largely ineffective in the MENA region as the Arab 
Uprisings took on their own momentum. 
It is clear that developments pertaining to the Arab Uprisings’ “own momentum”, as 
Leigh puts it, have been a major factor in the EU’s struggle to be an effective influence in 
the MENA region since they began, but this does not explain the steady shift away from 
the policies and discourse that took place in 2011. The major policy documents released in 
2011 as a direct response to the Arab Uprisings, in particular the PfDSP and NRCN, were 
unequivocal as to the goal of deep and sustainable democracy as both an essential starting 
point with which to base a more supportive relationship with the EU, and as the means by 
which the additional goals of fundamental freedoms, human rights, increased prosperity 
and a thriving civil society would be achieved. While conflicts in Libya and Syria 
demanded the consideration of very different short-term priorities, and, in cases such as 
Egypt, a pronounced disinterest in the ENP precluded effective dialogue, there were still a 
number of possibilities to influence partners in the southern neighbourhood concerning 
these values. Yet, in a European Commission (2013b) memo reflecting on the EU’s 
response to the Arab Uprisings after two years, there was a clear shift away from an 
emphasis on democratic reform, instead highlighting the necessity to provide economic 
support in order to stabilise the region. Patricia Bauer (2015, p. 36) also highlights this shift 
in terms of priorities, as well as in the EU’s image of the transition process, and notes that 
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the subsequent Joint Staff Working Document regarding the implementation of the ENP in 
2013 was a return to the style of reports before the upheavals in the southern 
neighbourhood, with the chapter on sustainable democracy being given comparatively 
little weight and specificity. The Working Document also made a number of references to 
the deteriorating security situation in the MENA region, stating that the ‘promotion of 
stability, security and sustainable development gave rise to the ENP and remains a major 
EU objective’ (European Commission and the HR, 2014b, p. 16).  
The ENP was once again reviewed in 2015, the details of which will be discussed at the 
end of the following section.  
EU foreign policy objectives in the region 
Regardless of the flawed nature of the policy architecture produced by the EU in response 
to the Arab Uprisings, the question persists as to whether or not the EU remained 
committed to promoting democracy and human rights in the MENA region, having 
unequivocally stated this as its central objective throughout 2011. While there is no doubt 
that the change in material circumstances in the region allowed the EU to pursue more 
substantive policies regarding ethical norm promotion, the EU itself acknowledged that 
there was more than pragmatism involved regarding its previous subservience to other 
priorities. In its 2011 revision of the ENP, the EU acknowledged the failure of previous 
Mediterranean policies to prioritise these goals, and affirmed that henceforth its ‘support 
for democracy and human rights would not be blinkered by a securitisation agenda’ 
(Michou, Lecha, & Torreblanca, 2013, p. 72). In responding to the Arab peoples’ call for 
dignity, social justice, freedom from oppression and accountable government, meaningful 
support for political change would no longer be seen as an opposing principle to stability 
in the MENA region (Pace, 2014, p. 978). The “more for more” doctrine was introduced as 
the driving force behind the EU’s new differentiated approach to its southern 
neighbourhood, in which partners would be incentivised to jointly pursue the EU’s 
amended and preeminent goal of deep and sustainable democracy, which in turn would 
provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of human rights and basic 
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freedoms, economic prosperity, and a stable platform from which to ensure regional 
stability and security.  
Despite the plethora of policies, pledges and institutional developments throughout 2011 
to prioritise democratisation, and by extension human rights, over the prior uncritical 
acceptance of “stability as a means to ensure security” approach, 2012 onwards has seen a 
steady shift by EU policy-makers back to the foreign policy objectives that existed towards 
the MENA region prior to the Arab Uprisings. Youngs (2013, p. 5) argues that while many 
aspects of its policy have improved, and lessons from the past internalised, the EU still 
treats the MENA region as something to protect itself against, rather than an area of 
positive opportunity. In a joint communication on supporting closer cooperation and 
regional integration in the Maghreb, published by the European Commission and High 
Representative (2012, p. 7) at the end of 2012, a significant amount of space and priority is 
given to the issue of “global threats”, which are construed as traversing the Maghreb 
region and directly threatening the EU’s own security. Susi Dennison (2013, p. 128) 
perceives a genuine willingness on the part of the EU to adjust its policy towards North 
Africa in response to the Arab Uprisings, but adds that ‘in the translation from ambitions 
on paper to the day-to-day realities of trying to implement a genuinely European foreign 
policy, old habits are re-emerging’ [emphasis added]. Börzel et al. (2015) also concede that 
the EU explicitly and substantively attempts to promote human rights and democracy, but 
like all external actors following the Arab Uprisings, has prioritised  ‘stability and security 
over democracy as the events unfolded’.  
The gradual return to favouring stable security partners in the southern neighbourhood, 
regardless of local ambitions concerning democratisation, or otherwise, has been severely 
compounded by an enormous increase in the levels of refugees and migrants flowing from 
all parts of the MENA region, much of which, as shown above, resulted from continuing 
unrest related to the Arab Uprisings. In the wake of the momentous events of 2011, the 
‘fragility of the post-revolutionary security situation and the sudden permeability of 
borders has increased European anxieties that the advent of democracy among the 
southern neighbours is just an additional source of insecurity’ (Driss, 2012, p. 100). As 
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noted in Chapter 4, the conflation by EU policy-makers of security issues, in particular 
Islamic terrorism, with migration, had become increasingly prevalent in the decade 
leading up to the Arab Uprisings. However, the regional instability that persisted from 
2011 and 2012 onwards served to exacerbate these tendencies: 
In the wake of the Arab Spring events and the increased instability and 
security threats, restoring stability in the MENA region is now a priority for 
the EU. The region’s instability and increase in the number of refugees, 
illegal migrants and asylum seekers have raised the potential for security 
concerns (Dandashly, 2015, p. 41).  
The increasing prevalence of terror attacks on European soil, with links to Islamic 
fundamentalism in the MENA region, further heightens the driving sense of insecurity, to 
the point where: 
The threat that the region’s conflicts could spill over into Europe – brought 
painfully home by the Paris attacks, and by hugely increased migration 
flows – is now the key driver of European thinking (European Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2016, p. 92).  
Despite the rhetoric and policies that followed the Arab Uprisings, as security concerns 
came to dominate the EU’s approach to the MENA region, democracy and human rights 
were largely discarded as a policy consideration (European Council on Foreign Relations, 
2016, p. 95), signaling a return to the inclination for “stability partnerships” that 
characterised EU policy prior to 2011. 
The 2015 review of the ENP demonstrated beyond doubt that EU priorities for the MENA 
region were once again security and stability, and that the shift to a substantive 
commitment to ethical norm promotion in the southern neighbourhood had been short-
lived. Not only was this a return to the priorities that had preceded the Arab Uprisings, 
but even the rhetorical commitment to the centrality of ethical norm promotion had 
greatly diminished: 
In the reviewed ENP the EU will focus on areas that matter most. The 
stabilisation of the region, in political, economic, and security related terms, 
will be at the heart of the new policy. The EU's own stability is built on 
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democracy, human rights and the rule of law and we will continue to make 
the case for these universal values (EEAS, 2015d, emphasis added). 
Discussing the ENP review, current HR Federica Mogherini singled out five pillars of the 
work that had started: economic development and job creation; cooperation on energy; 
security; migration; and neighbours of the neighbours (EEAS, 2015d). Democracy and 
human rights are noticeably absent. Tobias Schumacher (2016, p. 1) argues that the new 
ENP ‘is a turning point in Euro-Mediterranean relations’ and that henceforth the EU will 
restructure its relations with the southern neighbourhood, and end the practice of putting 
the promotion of reforms at the centre of its policies. According to the European Council 
on Foreign Relations (2016, p. 16), the 2015 ENP review ‘signalled a more hard-headed 
approach to the MENA region, prioritising security and stability [with] a greater focus on 
the EU’s interests and [...] an increased focus on migration’. 
There is no doubt that events taking place in the MENA region have had a significant 
impact on EU policy, with a number of armed internal conflicts breaking out in the 
aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, in particular in Syria and Libya, and a number of 
authoritarian regimes proving resilient to the revolutionary fervour of their citizens. 
However, this does not explain the re-establishment of an EU perspective that fails to see 
democracy and stability as anything other than a dichotomy, in light of the policies put 
forward in 2011. The gradual reversion back to the self-regarding interests, such as 
security and migration, that characterised the substance, if not the rhetoric, of EU policy 
towards the MENA region prior to the Arab Uprisings, accentuates the irregularity of the 
EU’s immediate responses to the social upheaval that resulted. Therefore, an explanatory 
hypothesis to understand the phenomenon of EU policy towards the MENA region in 











Interpretation of the regional analysis 
Introduction 
To conclude Part II of this thesis, the main points to emerge from the regional analysis of 
Euro-Mediterranean relations, in the context of the Arab Uprisings, will be outlined below 
and interpreted. The first section provides a brief overview of the EU’s foreign policy 
priorities in the MENA region before, during and after 2011. As Chapters 4, 5 and 6 have 
established, the objective of ethical norm promotion has not always been consistently 
prioritised, with 2011 standing out as an exception in terms of an alignment between 
substance and rhetoric. In this section, the influence of the EEAS on the driving narrative 
of the Arab Uprisings will also be discussed. The second section of this chapter advances a 
hypothesis of rhetorical self-entrapment, to explain the shift in the EU’s MENA policy as it 
responded to the Arab Uprisings. This hypothesis draws on Frank Schimmelfennig’s 
theory of rhetorical action, and the premise established earlier in Chapter 3, regarding the 
legitimising nature of ethical norm promotion to the EU’s self-perceived international 
identity. Both of these sections will be significant points of reference for the bilateral 
analysis of EU relations with Tunisia and Morocco in Part III, where the arguments will 
either be disputed or corroborated, or a more nuanced conclusion will be reached. The 
third and fourth sections concern theoretical threads that have featured in a number of 
preceding chapters: universalism, particularly as it relates to the EU’s civil society policies 
in the region; and conditionality, particularly as it relates to the EU’s “more for more” 
principle. Although both of these concepts are significant aspects of the EU’s regional 
approach to the southern neighbourhood, the overarching nature of policies such as the 
ENP can make it difficult to substantiate their impact. As their effect is more observable in 
bilateral relationships, particularly where it is possible to discuss them with the actors 
involved, an analysis of their influence on the regional policies will be discussed here, 
with reference to the relevant points made in Part I, as a means of clarifying both issues 
leading into the discussions regarding the EU’s relationships with Tunisia and Morocco.  
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EU foreign policy priorities in the region 
The three previous chapters of Part II have applied a regional analysis to Euro-
Mediterranean policy before, during and after the Arab Uprisings, with a particular focus 
on the EU’s promotion of ethical norms. The launch of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership in 1995 represented both the institutionalisation of the EU’s regional approach 
to its southern neighbourhood, and also the advent of formal procedures to promote 
human rights and democracy in the Middle East and North Africa. In the course of the 
following 15 years, during which time the EMP was reconstituted as the ENP and the UfM 
was added to the institutional architecture, the EU made an increasingly strong rhetorical 
commitment to the centrality of these values within the context of this relationship. 
However, throughout the same period EU policy-makers also increasingly perceived the 
MENA region through a securitisation lens, particularly following the 9/11 terror attacks 
in 2001. Although ethical norm promotion continued to be a stated regional priority by the 
EU, the benefits of strong, authoritarian regimes in the southern neighbourhood, able to 
take proxy responsibility for subduing extremist Islamist actors and stemming burgeoning 
migratory flows, presented an alluring alternative, despite the incompatibility between 
these two objectives. By the time of the Arab Uprisings, EU policy towards the MENA 
region was characterised by a rhetorical commitment to the former, and a substantive 
commitment to the latter.  
The early stages of the Arab Uprisings, which were interpreted and promulgated by the 
international media as a cohesive wave of protest demanding social freedom, economic 
equality and political accountability, led to an admission of mea culpa by EU officials, and a 
flurry of new policy initiatives and institutions. In an attempt to rehabilitate its 
commitment to ethical norm promotion in the southern neighbourhood, the EU produced 
three regional policy documents, the PfDSP, NRCN and Agenda for Change, which 
articulated the EU’s firm commitment to support the transitions taking place in the MENA 
region. Throughout 2011, EU policy-makers initiated a range of supporting documents, 
communiqués, financial assistance packages and institutional developments, all of which 
represented a significant shift in policy. The centrality of democracy and human rights to 
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each initiative and communication marked the first occasion, since the earliest conceptions 
by EU policy-makers of the Middle East and North Africa as a southern neighbourhood, 
when substantive and rhetorical commitments aligned with one another. A fundamental 
review of the ENP resulted in a reinvigorated approach to ethical norm promotion, 
marked by a significant increase in resources available to partners in the MENA region, 
the “more for more” approach to reward those partners most committed to value-led 
reform, and a renewed focus on the strengthening of civil society.  
One of the relevant features of the EU’s policy response to the Arab Uprisings was the 
contemporary inauguration of the EEAS and the position of High Representative. As 
noted in previous chapters, Catherine Ashton had strongly aligned her tenure with the 
idea that the EU was a normative and “civilising” force, and in the events of the Arab 
Uprisings she perceived an opportunity to consolidate her new role and differentiate the 
EEAS from other institutional actors. Niklas Helwig et al. (2013, p. 21) show that the Arab 
Uprisings ‘triggered a considerable increase in the number of CFSP statements being 
issued’ and that these statements helped the HR ‘to develop a stronger international 
profile’. After a hesitant start, the HR and the EEAS rhetorically aligned with the 
international media narrative, describing the Arab Uprisings in terms of freedom, 
democracy and human rights.106 This is evident in the overarching policy documents, but 
is even more pronounced in Ashton’s speeches to the European Parliament throughout 
2011. In a March address, Ashton (2011e) stated that ‘[a]cross the region, people are 
standing up for that core human aspiration: to be able to shape their own lives, 
economically and politically [calling] for political participation, dignity, accountability, 
justice and jobs’. Six months later, Ashton (2011a) described the Arab Uprisings as 
an event of truly historic proportions that will shape not only the future of 
the Arab World but our own future too. It is a revolution based on values: 
justice, dignity, freedom. Europe's response to these events will speak more 
than any form of rhetoric about its real commitment to democratic 
principles. 
																																																								
106 It should be noted that Ashton’s personal views were also in alignment with this narrative, having 
described the human rights as the “silver thread” that runs through her policy initiatives (Ashton, 2011b, p. 
6), and spoken about a ‘moral duty as well as a practical need to help our neighbors secure democracy and 
prosperity’ (Ashton, 2012). 
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In the same speech Ashton spoke about the necessity for ‘a team effort from all of Europe's 
institutions’ in order to ‘build deep and lasting democracy and prosperity in the Southern 
Mediterranean’.107 However, as instability in the southern neighbourhood increased in the 
aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, and the narrative changed, so too did the influence of the 
HR and the EEAS. 
In subsequent years, as the Arab Uprisings took numerous different forms and the media 
narrative fragmented, the EU demonstrated an increasing lack of political will to follow 
through on the policies initiated throughout 2011. In terms of what has been pragmatically 
feasible, the EU has been faced with resilient authoritarianism, increased security threats 
and spiraling refugee numbers flowing from the MENA region. Nonetheless, the EU has 
gone beyond the material constraints in the process of downgrading its material 
assistance, its ambition, and even its rhetoric, and furthermore, has demonstrated a 
tendency to revert back to “business as usual”, where ethical norm promotion is once 
again a subservient priority to the maintenance of stability partnerships which can 
effectively support the EU in addressing these areas of concern. The primary concerns for 
EU policy-makers have undoubtedly become security and migration, or to be more 
precise, the amalgamation of these two issues. Sergio Carrera et al. (2013) state that: 
Commentators have signaled the “business-as-usual” approach in the EU’s 
external relations policy on human mobility, with its continued emphasis on 
control and surveillance of the EU external borders and capacity building in 
third countries geared toward “migration management” and the obsession 
on the so-called “fight against irregular immigration”. 
The authors go on to comprehensively outline the many ways in which the EEAS has been 
sidelined from the decision-making process with regard to migration policy, and 
undermined by the interests of the member states. As Tanya Börzel et al. (2015, p. 140) 
note in the context of post-Arab Uprisings, ‘[w]hen it comes to implementation and 
																																																								
107 It should also be noted that Ashton demonstrated a remarkably astute vision about both the challenges 
and benefits of promoting democracy in the southern neighbourhood. In an interview with the Financial 
Times (Ashton, 2011c), where she also spoke about the necessity of taking the risks involved in supporting a 
democratic transition process in the MENA region, she noted that ‘we can no more force the people of a 
sovereign country to choose democracy than we can tell the sun to shine or the grass to grow. But when a 
nation comes together to claim its right to democracy, the EU will always offer to help its people to live their 
dream’. 
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utilization of the EU instruments, again, EU actions seemed to reflect the major concerns 
of the member states focusing mainly on security’. Although in 2011 the HR and EEAS 
were able to synthesise the EU’s MENA priorities with the international media narrative 
regarding freedoms and rights, and ‘made important advances in 2012 in developing an 
effective foreign-policy machinery’ (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2013, p. 96), 
as both the reality and the narrative in the southern neighbourhood came to be dominated 
by security and migration, other EU actors came to the fore. A communiqué on the 2015 
ENP review states that ‘[t]he aim is also to involve Member States more intensively in the 
definition and implementation of policy in neighbourhood countries’ (European 
Commission, 2015h). As Tobias Schumacher (2016, pp. 1-4) argues, this has led to a 
downgrading of the EU’s ambitions with regard to reform in the MENA region, and ‘is a 
blow for reform actors [and] anyone who was hoping that the EU was serious with its 
normative and values-based approach’. 
The Arab Uprisings brought into sharp relief the disparity between the EU’s rhetoric and 
practice regarding its policies towards the MENA region. Whereas the ENP itself 
conceives of stable and effective government as complementary with democratisation, the 
EU has clearly favoured the former over the latter, and continues to do so, despite its 
acknowledgement of mea culpa and promises to change its approach (Börzel & van Hüllen, 
2014, pp. 1044-1045). Yet, throughout 2011 there was a significant shift in policy, where 
rhetorical commitments to ethical norm promotion were substantiated with vastly 
increased funding and new institutional architecture. The promotion of human rights with 
deep and sustainable democracy, in line with the vocal demands of the Arab protesters, 
was, for a brief period, prioritised in terms of the EU’s foreign policy objectives for the 
region. Emilie Dromzèe (Interview #22, 9/10/2014), Maghreb Senior Advocacy Officer at 
the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, has also noted EU interest in the MENA 
region decreasing since 2011, reverting back to a “business as usual” approach which 
prioritises trade, stability, migration and security. Maja Bozovic (Interview #26, 
28/01/2014), of the Mashreq/Maghreb Working Group, agrees that there was a renewed 
focus on the promotion of human rights and democracy for the MENA region in 2011, 
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which has since subsided. Perhaps the clearest indication that the policy shift in 2011 has 
not been sustained comes from a recent article by Richard Youngs (2015, p. 5), in which he 
indicates a broad consensus within EU institutions that the new reality of the MENA 
region warrants a fundamental change to EU strategy, thinking and talking more 
explicitly in terms of protecting its tangible interests. Furthermore, revealing the extent to 
which even the “more for more” approach has diminished as a guiding principle, he cites 
new HR Federica Mogherini as saying that the EU ‘needs to move from an approach very 
much based on the evaluation of progress to a more political approach’, which strongly 
suggests reform and transition are no longer contemporary values (Youngs, 2015, p. 6). 
In the bilateral analysis carried out in Part III, I will investigate whether the pattern 
presented here applies also to the EU’s relationships with Tunisia and Morocco during 
this period.  
An explanatory hypothesis: rhetorical self-entrapment  
In order to explain why there was such a radical shift in the content of Euro-
Mediterranean policy in response to the Arab Uprisings throughout 2011, and why this 
shift has not been sustained, I will present a hypothesis based on Frank Schimmelfennig's 
theory of rhetorical action. Although the contexts differ in many ways, and some aspects 
of Schimmelfenning’s case study do not apply, the central premises on which his process 
of rhetorical action is established are both relevant and expository. I will show that the EU 
became rhetorically self-entrapped by its prior commitments to ethical norm promotion, 
when those values aligned with those of the protesters in the early stages of the Arab 
Uprisings. The extensive international media coverage of the protests framed the 
unfolding phenomenon in terms of values and norms that aligned with the EU’s own 
narrative, and served to highlight the disjuncture between the EU’s rhetoric and actions. 
This narrative was amplified by the HR and newly formed EEAS, as a means of 
establishing and asserting their institutions as relevant foreign policy actors. 
Consequently, EU policy-makers were compelled to substantively redress their position 
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with regard to the southern neighbourhood, in order to avoid a loss of credibility and 
legitimacy.  
Frank Schimmelfennig’s theory of rhetorical action 
In Frank Schimmelfennig's article “The community trap: Liberal norms, rhetorical action, 
and the eastern enlargement of the European Union”, he sought to understand the process 
by which five Central/Eastern European countries108 (CEECs) were given the opportunity 
to formally begin membership negotiations with the European Union in the 1990s, rather 
than being offered association negotiations towards a joint treaty of cooperation, as would 
be expected applying a rationalist approach to the study of international institutions. 
Schimmelfennig (2001) attempts to explain this “puzzle” by first applying Andrew 
Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism109 to the process of negotiations, analysing this 
decision of European integration in terms of state preferences, self-centred calculations 
reflecting national benefits and attitudes, and the outcomes of interstate bargaining, between 
those member states which favoured eastern enlargement and those member states which 
opposed it, and with the five CEECs themselves. Schimmelfennig (2001, pp. 57-58) finds, 
however, that while liberal intergovernmentalism is able to explain the EU’s initial 
decision to offer association to the five CEECs, it does not explain either the process by 
which the “association equilibrium” was disrupted, or the unexpected outcome regarding 
the EU’s decision to depart from the association regime and embark on the path to 
enlargement. 
Schimmelfennig (2001, p. 58) argues that the outcome of membership negotiations and 
eventual enlargement can be understood with a sociological approach to international 
organisations, which posits that their goals and procedures ‘are more strongly determined 
by the standards of legitimacy and appropriateness of the international community to 
which they belong’. Furthermore, the EU, being the main organisation of the European 
																																																								
108 The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. In fact ten Central and Eastern European 
countries were offered Association Agreements in the period following the end of the Cold War, and all of 
them were to eventually open accession negotiations, but Schimmelfennig’s theorising focuses on the 
procedural dynamics relating to this particular group.  
109 For more on this approach see Moravcsik (1993, 1998). 
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international community, is ‘based on a European and liberal collective identity [where] 
belief in and adherence to liberal human rights are the fundamental beliefs and practices 
that constitute the community’ (Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 59). Schimmelfennig (2001, pp. 
59-61) shows that the five Central/Eastern European governments were able to 
demonstrate their commitment to this liberal order, with its associated ideals of 
democracy, rule of law and a market-based economy, thereby sharing the collective 
identity of the European international community and adhering to its constitutive values 
and norms. However, although they were entitled to join the EU by this rationale, 
Schimmelfennig still requires an explanatory process to provide the missing link between 
the self-centred state preferences that a rationalist approach would expect to limit 
relationships in the east to that of association, and the norm-conforming outcome in line 
with a sociological approach.  
As Helene Sjursen (2006b, p. 5) shows, a large number of authors from different theoretical 
perspectives have posited that norms played an important part with regard to the EU’s 
decision to enlarge to Central/Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, it is Schimmelfennig’s attempt 
to find a theory that allows for both the rationalist and sociological approaches to this 
decision that results in his central argument, which will be adapted and applied to the 
EU’s shift in policy towards the MENA region in 2011. Schimmelfennig (2001, p. 48) 
proposes “rhetorical action” as the intervening mechanism to ‘explain how a rational 
outcome (association) based on egoistic preferences and relative bargaining power was 
turned into a normative one (enlargement)’, and suggested that: 
In an "institutional environment" like the EU, political actors are concerned 
about their reputation as members and about the legitimacy of their preferences and 
behavior. Actors who can justify their interests on the grounds of the 
community's standard of legitimacy are therefore able to shame their 
opponents into norm-conforming behavior and to modify the collective 
outcome that would have resulted from constellations of interests and 
power alone [emphasis added]. 
Based on this premise, Schimmelfennig (2001, p. 48) argues that as the ideology of a pan-
European community of liberal-democratic states had legitimated European integration 
since its beginnings, the CEECs were able to rhetorically entrap opponents to enlargement 
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by aligning themselves with these values; without sufficient material bargaining power, 
they based their claims on 
the constitutive values and norms of the EU and exposed inconsistencies 
between, on the one hand, the EU's standard of legitimacy, its past rhetoric, 
and its past treatment of applicant states and, on the other hand, its policy 
toward Central and Eastern Europe [emphasis added]. 
In this way, EU members opposed to enlargement towards Central/Eastern Europe were 
unable to oppose enlargement without damaging their credibility, becoming caught in 
what Schimmelfennig (2001, p. 77) describes as a “community trap”: 
In the institutional environment of an international community, state actors 
can strategically use community identity, values, and norms to justify and 
advance their self-interest. However, strategic behavior is constrained by the 
constitutive ideas of the community and the actors' prior identification with 
them. Once caught in the community trap, they can be forced to honor 
identity- and value-based commitments in order to protect their credibility and 
reputation as community members [emphasis added]. 
Schimmelfennig’s intervening mechanism of rhetorical action involves three distinct 
stages: rhetorical commitment, which provides the basis for rhetorical argumentation, which in 
turn leads to rhetorical entrapment. Although there are contextually specific elements of 
Schimmelfennig’s theory that do not apply beyond EU enlargement, these three stages can 
be further developed, as will be shown below, to provide a hypothesis explaining the EU’s 
reinvigoration of its ethical norm promotion in response to the Arab Uprisings.  
Rhetorical commitment: EU identity and ethical norm promotion 
The first stage of rhetorical action requires an actor’s prior identification with values and 
norms, which introduce a standard of legitimacy to which they may potentially be held 
accountable during the period in question. As noted above, the actors in Schimmelfennig’s 
theory are member states of the EU, and those CEECs wishing to join, and the EU is the 
international organisation that represents the values and norms of the community that 
provides the conditions for rhetorical action to occur between those in favour of 
enlargement and those opposed to it. However, as shown in Chapter 2, where the 
international community is concerned the EU is now widely considered to be an actor in 
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its own right. Member states can still be held accountable by association to the values and 
norms that the EU represents, but so too can the EU itself. As Charlotte Bretherton and 
John Vogler (2006, p. 40) point out, not only do member states suffer a loss of credibility 
when at odds with the values of the EU’s very public identity claims, the EU’s own actions 
and offerings are influenced and shaped by this insistent frame of reference.  
As highlighted throughout Chapters 2 and 3, since the 1970s the EU has attempted to 
establish a coordinated foreign policy amongst its member states, with which to project an 
external identity based on its foundational values, in particular democracy and human 
rights. With each subsequent treaty revision and overarching communiqué regarding the 
EU’s role on the international stage,110 it has reinforced the centrality of ethical norm 
promotion, with recourse to the universal values articulated by the UN, as both a guiding 
and legitimising principle. Although there is a broad range of arguments regarding the 
EU’s substantive commitment to the promotion of democracy and human rights, particularly 
in the southern neighbourhood, there is a broad consensus amongst scholars that the EU 
consistently uses a rhetorical commitment to these values as a means to both reinforce its 
actorness and legitimise its external identity. As such, the EU’s discursive construction of 
its international role is based on the universal validity of its ethical norm promotion, 
promulgated consistently and increasingly via its own rhetoric. According to 
Schimmelfennig’s (2001, p. 66) theory, by continually confirming this commitment in its 
rhetoric the EU creates the prerequisite for effective shaming, as will be shown below, where 
rhetorical commitment leads to a form of “rhetorical entrapment”.111  
The importance of rhetorical commitment to the process of rhetorical action is that it 
creates a standard of legitimacy by which an actor can be held accountable. Sjursen  
(2006a, p. 244) argues that ‘[a]s the EU’s constitutional norms embody the principles of 
																																																								
110 Schimmelfennig (2001, pp. 65-66) refers to these types of communications as “speech acts”, and notes that 
his method of rhetorical analysis ‘has the advantage of being able to draw on an abundance of publicly 
available data for the analysis of argumentative behavior, such as official documents, speeches, declarations, 
and statements at press conferences’. 
111 Whereas the rhetorical commitment presented here is to an external identity based on ethical norm 
promotion, Schimmelfennig’s rhetorical commitment was to the integration of all European liberal societies. 
These contextual specificities do not affect the relevance of rhetorical action as a process.  
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democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights’, in the realm of foreign policy the EU 
‘may also create expectations from third parties that it lives up to the standards it has 
identified and committed itself to’. In fact, the EU has gone well beyond the point of 
creating expectations based on its internal example and constitutional norms, by explicitly 
reinforcing its external image as based on the centrality of extending its foundational 
values onto the international stage. Although the Arab Uprisings ‘were seen as an 
important occasion for the EU to affirm its self-image’ (Hyvönen, 2014, p. 106), by clearly 
supporting these values in the transition processes taking place in the southern 
neighbourhood, the extent to which EU policy-makers had to respond to events in 2011 
was based on the exposition of inconsistency between its rhetoric and policies. As Erik 
Oddvar Eriksen et al. (2005, p. 238) note, 
under given conditions, normative commitments affect political behaviour 
[...] Verbal statements raise expectations of consistency between claims and 
their correctness and between words and actions. In certain situations 
double standards and cognitive dissonance will be problematic. Under 
certain conditions deliberation compels actors to explain and justify their 
preferences to critical interlocutors and revise them when criticized [emphasis 
added]. 
The given conditions in this situation, which compelled a justification of preferences to 
critical interlocutors, was the extensive international media coverage and its associated 
narrative, which resulted from the Arab Uprisings. 
Rhetorical argumentation: international media coverage 
The second stage of rhetorical action requires a form of rhetorical argumentation, by 
which an actor or actors can be shown to be behaving inconsistently in relation to their 
rhetorical commitment, thus creating pressure to change their position. In 
Schimmelfennig’s (2001, p. 68) case study, the Central/Eastern European governments 
were able to make enlargement an issue of credibility by demonstrating that the EU’s past 
rhetoric and practice were at odds with its current position, arguing that its commitment 
to prior values and norms obliged the EU to admit them. A key point of difference 
between the hypothesis presented here, regarding the impact of rhetorical action on the 
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response of EU policy-makers to the Arab Uprisings, and Schimmelfennig’s original 
theory, is the presence of intent in the stage of rhetorical argumentation. The CEECs, and 
those member states which supported their claims, fully intended to employ rhetorical 
argumentation to expose inconsistencies based on prior rhetorical commitment, which in 
turn “rhetorically entrapped” those actors who were opposed to enlargement. In 2011, 
there were no confrontational actors seeking to change EU policy by emphasising the 
mismatch ‘between political declarations [...] and actual behaviour’ (Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 
70, emphasis in original). However, the process of rhetorical action did occur, by which 
the extensive international media coverage that resulted from the Arab Uprisings not only 
served to highlight the disjuncture between the EU’s rhetoric and actions, but also framed 
the unfolding phenomenon in terms of values and norms which aligned with the EU’s own 
narrative.  
There is considerable debate regarding the extent to which the media, in particular social 
media,112 played a significant part in the Arab Uprisings instigation and momentum. 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt regarding the extent to which the protesters, and their calls 
for freedom and justice, were transmitted internationally, capturing the attention of a 
global audience. As Khair El-Din Haseeb (2012, p. 194) argues: 
The question of the precise strategic value or utility of the media in 
mobilization and fate of the uprisings aside, there is no doubt that the live 
coverage afforded by the internet and television, coupled with video footage 
from cell phones, served to communicate the various messages and themes 
of the revolutions to the global community and to draw a vast audience into 
the very heart of the uprisings.  
Dany Badran (2013, p. 65) refers to the amount of media coverage regarding the demand 
of so many Arab nations for freedom and democracy as ‘truly exceptional’ and Richard 
Gillespie (2013, p. 123) notes the public pressure placed on high-level actors, within the 
EEAS and other EU institutions, to make official declarations at the outbreak of popular 
protests, amid the massive media coverage of the events unfolding in North Africa. Across 
the range of media institutions covering protests from the Maghreb to the Middle East, the 
																																																								
112 For an account of the ways in which social media did impact on the unfolding uprisings, see Bellin (2012, 
p. 138). 
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dynamic of the Arab Uprisings was framed as a resistance to authoritarianism and a 
yearning by Arab societies for fundamental freedoms, social equality and political 
accountability. George Tzogopoulos’ (2014, p. 128) media analysis demonstrates 
that the reporting of the protests  in the Arab world moved from an initial 
absence of coverage to reporting that reflected widespread surprise and 
uncertainty and subsequently a commonly shared narrative of revolutionary 
liberal protests. 
The Loughborough University’s (2012b, p. 61) content analysis of the BBC’s coverage 
identified the dominant narrative as: the “protesters/the people” were engaged in a 
“revolution” against “regimes” in a struggle between “dictatorship” and “democracy”. 
The demands of the protesters were met with strong empathy in the European media, 
public and, eventually, Europe’s political class, chiefly ‘because the protesters’ calls were 
interpreted as an affirmation of values dear to Europeans: freedom, democracy, pluralism, 
rule of law, good governance’ (Asseburg, 2013, p. 55). The calls for social justice, basic 
rights and political accountability expressed by the Arab protesters aligned with precisely 
the ethical norms that the EU had made a rhetorical commitment to as a primary policy 
objective for its relationship with the southern neighbourhood.  
As noted above, there is no evidence of intentional strategic persuasion on the part of 
external actors to the EU, seeking to influence its policies towards the MENA region based 
on an exposure of inconsistency between rhetoric and actions. Neither the protesters 
themselves, nor the media institutions covering their struggle, had the intention to do so, 
and, as was the case with the five CEECs during the enlargement process, they lacked any 
form of compliance-inducing means even had they desired. Regardless of this absence, 
Schimmelfennig introduces an explanation for the way in which rhetorical argumentation, 
be it intended or otherwise, results in changed behaviour, through the social influence of 
shaming. Schimmelfennig (2001, p. 64) argues that the public exposure of illegitimate goals 
and behaviours is effective when ‘actors have declared their general support of the 
standard of legitimacy at an earlier point in time’, which results in them being shamed 
‘into compliance by exposing the inconsistency between their declarations and their 
current behaviour’. Schimmelfennig (2001, p. 65) goes on to claim that actors ‘must avoid 
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creating the impression that they use values and norms cynically and inconsistently’, 
meaning that where actors use a rhetorical standard of legitimacy they ‘can become 
entrapped by their arguments and obliged to behave as if they had taken them seriously’. 
According to Thomas Risse (2000, pp. 21-22), ‘[t]he existence of a public sphere ensures 
that actors have to regularly and routinely explain and justify their behavior’, and 
international public discourses are more likely to invoke identity-related and normative 
issues that are ‘directly linked to the social identities of actors’. The EU, by making a 
strong and consistent rhetorical commitment to its ethical norm promotion in the southern 
neighbourhood, despite supporting authoritarian stability and security partners, had 
essentially entrapped itself when the Arab Uprisings pitted those seeking the former against 
those representing the latter.113 The extensive international media coverage resulted in a 
well-publicised alignment of values between the EU and the Arab protesters, requiring a 
substantive policy shift in order to avoid a loss of credibility and legitimacy.  
Rhetorical self-entrapment: a crisis of legitimacy 
Prior to the Arab Uprisings, the EU’s approach to the southern neighbourhood, in its 
various institutional forms, had been characterised by the divergence between strong 
rhetorical commitment to ethical norm promotion and supporting authoritarian regimes 
in the region. As Bauer (2015, p. 30) notes: 
The contrast between the strong normative rhetoric and the poor outcomes 
of EU democracy promotion in the MENA countries was not only offensive 
to the idea of a ‘normative power EU’, but also promoted the assumption 
that the European Union was an interest-driven actor, concerned primarily 
with securing energy supplies and migration control, taming political Islam 
and fighting against international terrorism by cooperation with 
authoritarian Arab partner countries.  
																																																								
113 Risse (2000, pp. 32-33) uses the term “rhetorical self-entrapment” in a different sense, to describe a process 
of communicative behavior between a norm-violating government and its transnational and domestic critics, 
where the former accepts ‘norms rhetorically in order to decrease the international and domestic pressures 
against them’ but eventually becomes argumentatively self-entrapped, ultimately matching ‘words with 
deeds in terms of an improved human rights record’. 
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As 2011 approached, critiques of this disparity were limited to a narrow field of 
academics, many of whom featured in Chapter 3, focussing on EU foreign policy and/or 
MENA region politics. While this clearly did not fulfil Erikson et al.’s “certain conditions” 
which might compel the EU to explain and justify its preferences to critical interlocutors, 
much less revise them when criticised, the outbreak of region-wide protests calling for 
fundamental freedoms, economic equality and political accountability, all central elements 
of the EU’s ethical norm promotion, provided just such conditions. The media spectacle114 
that ensued circulated ‘images and discourses of revolt, insurrection, freedom, and 
democracy through global media’ (Kellner, 2012, p. 31), not only highlighting the role of 
external regional actors, such as the EU, but also framing the Arab Uprisings in terms 
which aligned with the EU’s own legitimising rhetoric. As I have noted in previous 
chapters, the EU’s rhetoric concerning the centrality of ethical norm promotion to its 
external action not only provided a standard of legitimacy to its policy towards the MENA 
region, but also to its self-perceived international identity. Thus, the highly publicised 
Arab Uprisings in 2011 represented both a test of credibility, and a crisis of legitimacy.  
Schimmelfennig (2001, p. 63) argues that the medium of rhetorical action as an influence is 
legitimacy, which in his case study is bestowed on member states by being a part of the 
European community. When the EU is taken as an actor in its own right, as it is here, the 
standard of legitimacy does not come from the wider international community,115 but from 
its own rhetoric regarding the centrality of ethical norm promotion to its external action. 
As an international political actor, the EU is concerned about its reputation and the 
legitimacy of its preferences and behaviours, which can be constrained by its prior 
identification of constitutive ideals and norms. Declaring a strong commitment to an 
ethical foreign policy creates the possibility that the EU becomes ‘caught in the web of [its] 
own rhetoric’ (K. E. Smith, 2003a, pp. 106-107), which is precisely what occurred as a result 
																																																								
114 Referring to ‘technologically mediated events, in which dominant media forms like broadcasting, print 
media, and the internet process contemporary historical events and struggles in a spectacular form’ (Kellner, 
2012, p. xi). 
115 Although the EU may well argue that this is the case, positing that its ethical norm promotion is based on 
the universal norms held by the UN, despite the fact that other international actors would counter-argue that 
these norms continue to be contested.  
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of the Arab Uprisings. The EU was forced to honour identity- and value-based 
commitments, which had aligned with the Arab protesters across the MENA region, in 
order to protect its credibility, and to avoid being de-legitimised by the sudden spotlight 
on its role in the southern neighbourhood. Peter Seeberg (2015, p. 51) argues that ‘[g]iven 
the developments related to the uprisings in the MENA region, the EU did not really have 
a choice but to declare that it stood behind processes of change’, and Youngs (2014, p. 63) 
notes that it became commonplace, in private, for diplomats to refer to the social upheaval 
in the southern neighbourhood as a litmus test for the EU’s international credibility. In 
discussing the policy documents in which the EU outlined its response to the Arab 
Uprisings, beginning with the PfDSP, Hyvönen (2014, p. 103) argues that  
a key aspect of the EU’s reactions to the ‘Arab Spring’ was an attempt to re-
energise the set of frames116 that present the Union as a legitimate, democratic 
actor and a plausible economic-political model – a force for good in global 
politics. The point was to demonstrate that the events re-revealed the 
legitimacy of the political order and the set of values that the EU represents 
[emphasis added]. 
Timo Behr (2012b, p. 76) agrees, adding that the EU reacted to the changes in the southern 
neighbourhood ‘by advocating a radical shift in the contents of its Mediterranean policies 
with the aim of creating a “democracy partnership” that legitimises itself through its 
support for the ongoing transition processes’. The hypothesis presented here, is that the 
radical shift in Euro-Mediterranean policy that occurred throughout 2011 resulted from a 
process of rhetorical action, whereby the EU became rhetorically self-entrapped by its own 
commitments to ethical norm promotion, the values of which aligned with the protesters 
of the Arab Uprisings, as captured and extensively conveyed by the international media.  
It is this last point, namely the influence of international media coverage in the process of 
rhetorical action, which partly explains why EU policy-makers made such a concerted 
effort to reinvigorate the EU’s substantive commitment to ethical norm promotion in the 12 
months following the dramatic self-immolation of Tarek Mohamed Bouazizi at the end of 
																																																								
116 Hyvönen (2014, pp. 94-95) utilises a frame-analytic methodology, which focuses on ‘the ways in which 
key actors (in this case the EU) seek to manage the flow of (external) events in order to fortify their self-
images’. 
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2010. It also partly explains why the radical shift in policy was not sustained, with a slow 
and steady return to “stability partnerships” that prioritise security and migration issues. 
As Schimmelfennig (2001, p. 65) shows, ‘shaming through rhetorical action does not equal 
persuasion [and] actors under social pressure (usually) do not change their interests’. By 
the end of 2011, each of the Arab Uprisings had taken dramatically different paths, with 
some regimes toppled and political transitions underway, and other regimes resisting 
fiercely, resulting in brutal suppression and civil wars. The narrative of the “Arab Spring” 
media spectacle fragmented, dissipating the unifying discourse of freedom and rights that 
existed in the early months. As shown in Chapter 6, in early 2011 the widespread 
international media coverage largely aligned itself with the protesters, promulgating a 
cohesive narrative in terms democracy, human rights and social justice, but by 2012 it had 
both significantly decreased, and begun to predominantly focus on the violent conflicts in 
terms of security in the MENA region. The conditions by which the EU was compelled to 
explain and justify its preferences to critical interlocutors, 117 and revise them when 
criticised, gradually ceased to exist.  
Intersecting with this dynamic was the role of the newly operational EEAS and the High 
Representative. As noted above and in previous chapters, having aligned her tenure with 
the idea of the EU as a normative and “civilising” force, the HR, and by extension the 
EEAS, utilised the Arab Uprisings as an agenda-setting event, in order to gain attention for 
these new institutions. The uprisings presented an ideal opportunity to bring the 
promotion of ethical norms at the heart of the normative Europe concept to the fore, 
linking EU action to a broader international objective and the particular perceived 
strengths of the EU as an external actor. The Arab Uprisings were the “perfect crisis” for 
the HR and the EEAS to assert themselves, by aligning with the narrative of freedom-
																																																								
117 Critical interlocutors might include: the European public, other states, particular member states, internal 
institutional actors, NGOs, CSOs and academics. As shown in Chapter 3, many of the latter have taken a 
critical approach to the EU’s self-proclaimed identity as an ethically normative actor, as have certain NGOs 
promoting human rights in the MENA region. Such was the scale of the international media coverage, 
however, and the obvious disparity it showed with regard to EU rhetoric and action, that identifying a 
particular actor is barely required for the EU to be effectively shamed, as its standard of legitimacy had no 
recourse to an acceptable defence, until the official expression of mea culpa and a substantive shift in policy to 
restore credibility.  
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seeking demonstrators, and facilitating a policy shift which represented that alignment. 
However, as shown above, not only did the Arab Uprisings fragment, along with the 
international media narrative, but the increasing instability in the MENA region brought 
about a securitised narrative that engendered a shift in policy decision-making towards 
member states, operating through the influential Council of the European Union, and 
those institutions responsible for the EU’s migration framework. As the rapidly changing 
events in the southern neighbourhood diverged from freedom- and democracy-seeking 
demonstrations to civil war and counter-revolution, both the overarching narrative and 
the EEAS/HR’s capacity to align with it dissipated, eliminating the necessary conditions 
for rhetorical action to occur.    
The hypothesis of rhetorical self-entrapment, presented here, explains both the substantive 
shift in policy that occurred as a response to the wave of protests which swept across the 
southern neighbourhood in 2011, and the EU’s gradual reversion back to the prioritisation 
of security and migration issues which characterised Euro-Mediterranean relations prior 
to the Arab Uprisings. Having made a strong and consistent rhetorical commitment to 
ethical norm promotion as a central feature of both its MENA region policy and 
international identity, the EU created a standard of legitimacy by which it could be held 
accountable.  The rhetorical alignment of values with the Arab protesters intersected with 
the legitimising function of ethical norm promotion, highlighting the disparity between 
EU policy and rhetoric, and necessitating a radical shift in policy so as not to lose 
credibility. The extensive international media coverage, which also framed the unfolding 
phenomena in terms of the EU’s own self-proclaimed values and norms, provided the 
medium by which the process of rhetorical action occurred, and this was amplified by the 
role of the HR and EEAS, who aligned with the media narrative. As the Arab Uprisings 
fragmented, however, so too did the media narrative of a unified protest movement based 
on rights and freedoms, shifting the focus away from ethical norm promotion, and 
alleviating the external pressure on the EU to maintain consistency between rhetoric and 
action. 
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It remains to be seen if this hypothesis, which is based on a regional analysis of the EU-
MENA relationship, will be further corroborated by applying it to selected bilateral 
partnerships within that relationship in Part III of this thesis. 
Universalism, Islamists and civil society 
In the opening chapter I noted that the most pervasive issue with regard to moral 
considerations in international affairs is the tension between universalism and cultural 
relativism, and that the ever-increasing recourse to the language of human rights with 
regard to moral consideration in international affairs in no way signifies a point of 
convergence concerning this divisive issue. As also noted in the opening chapter, those 
international actors, such as the EU, who conform to the UN Bill of Rights as a universally-
held code of moral justification, take a cosmopolitan approach to the legitimate scope of 
ethical foreign policy. Although the political elites in the southern neighbourhood have 
signed agreements with the EU that represents an accommodation with this position, it is 
at odds with many of the Middle East and North Africa’s citizens, whose conception of 
human rights is heavily influenced by deontic and religious values. The tensions and 
challenges regarding the EU’s universalist approach to the southern neighbourhood are 
further compounded by the colonial history of EU member states, outlined in Chapter 4, 
leading to charges of neo-colonialism regarding its promotion of ethical norms based on 
absolute values. Although, as shown in Chapter 3, the institutional rhetoric of governing 
regimes in the MENA region indicates a general acceptance of the legitimacy regarding 
the EU’s promotion of ethical norms, going some way towards countering the charge of 
moral imperialism, the situation becomes more complicated where the EU’s relationship 
with civil society actors in the region is concerned. While there is evidence to support the 
claim that Hyde-Price’s “harmony of interests” exists between the EU and the governing 
institutions of states in the MENA region, at least rhetorically, this is clearly not the case 
across the range of diverse civil society actors, many of which take shari’a law as the first 
and foremost authority where ethics are concerned.   
	 204	
One of the innovative outcomes to emerge from the policy shift in 2011 was an increased 
commitment and willingness to engage with civil society actors in the MENA region, 
including political actors, which Bicchi (2014b, p. 324) notes was a first for the EU. 
Gillespie (2013, p. 132) argues that the incorporation of civil society representatives into 
cooperation and dialogue is one aspect of the EU’s policy response to the Arab Uprisings 
that may be expected to enhance the legitimacy of the EU’s position, and as shown in 
Chapter 6, this practice has continued beyond 2011. Nonetheless, this would largely 
depend on a corresponding qualitative shift to the EU’s approach to civil society in the 
MENA region, which had previously been characterised by the exclusion of certain actors, 
particularly Islamist political parties and other civil society organisations with religious 
foundations, on the basis of competing universalist values. This position is incompatible 
with three important developments associated with the Arab Uprisings: the entry of 
Islamist parties into mainstream politics and burgeoning electoral processes; the opening 
up of some southern neighbourhood states to allow greater numbers and diversity of civil 
society actors; and the cognisance of Arab societies that the inherent autonomy-seeking 
nature of their protests extends beyond their relationships with their own regimes. 
Regarding this last point, Muriel Asseburg (2013, p. 57) argues that ‘for many in the 
region, the newly found freedom also means freedom from the (perceived and real) 
dominance in the form of legacies of European colonialism or the impact of neo-
colonialism’. An EU narrative of joint responsibility and locally-led reformation, is 
meaningless if the corresponding values are neither shared nor welcomed. As Behr (2013, 
p. 31) argues, ‘[t]he EU continues to expect Islamist actors to adjust to its own discursive 
framework by enshrining liberal rights and endorsing established power relations that 
many Islamists consider hostile’.  
The EU’s commitment to promoting and strengthening civil society in the southern 
neighbourhood is one of the few positive policy shifts to survive the return to stability 
issues, yet other problems persist. Associated with this shift is the concept of co-
ownership, and the EU “listening” to its neighbours regarding the types of transitions 
taking place, rather than imposing its values. The concept of deep and sustainable 
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democracy was problematic from the onset, as it was unclear if the EU’s traditional 
preference of liberal democracy, characterised by free and fair elections, had been adjusted 
in the process of re-prioritisation. According to Milja Kurki (2012, p. 6), the EU’s 
contemporary understanding of this concept can be summarised as 
a democracy which lasts and is socially and institutionally embedded in the 
target states. It is also a model of democracy which comes with inclusive 
economic development, including not only trade enhancement but also the 
narrowing of social inequalities, recognised to be of primary concern to 
MENA population.  
By this conceptual understanding, the EU attempts to acknowledge and transcend the 
different visions of democracy that are or have been held by itself, the people of the 
MENA region, and the regimes they sought to replace.118 As Michelle Pace (2014, p. 979) 
notes, in reconceptualising its approach to the democratisation of its southern 
neighbourhood, the EU’s language also changes from that of democracy promotion to that of 
democracy support, so as to distance itself from critiques of imposing its policy on the 
region. However, this has led to ‘Arab democratic activists most commonly judg[ing] the 
EU to have under- rather than over-played its hand’ (Dunne & Youngs, 2013, p. 5), and to 
the most evident examples of EU democracy support being electoral assistance with 
partners such as Tunisia, where the Arab Uprisings resulted in a sustainable process of 
democratisation.119 Thus, the EU becomes caught in a quandary when dealing with both 
governments and civil society actors in the MENA region, where it either becomes tied to 
a narrow, non-negotiable conception of democracy, much like the universal values that 
underpin it, or facilitates a wider dialogue with the possibility of compromise.  
While the new emphasis on Arab civil society has the potential to give more substance to 
the concept of a Euro-Mediterranean “partnership”, this approach can only be effective if 
it avoids the pitfalls associated with universalism, and also avoids becoming subservient 
to the tendency of EU policy-makers, outlined above, to prioritise security and stability. 
																																																								
118 Pace (2014, p. 979) refers to this as the EU attempting a “fusion of horizons”, although raises doubts as to 
the discrepancy between rhetoric and practice.  
119 The full extent of the EU’s support of democratisation in Tunisia, before, during and after the Arab 
Uprisings, will be outlined in the following chapter.  
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Although it is possible to highlight the increased support for civil society in the MENA 
region as a response to the Arab Uprisings, and outline the institutional mechanisms 
involved, such as the Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility, it is difficult to draw 
conclusions regarding efficacy when taking a regional level of analysis. Youngs (2014, p. 
109; 2015, p. 4) notes that much of the EU’s support to civil society in the southern 
Mediterranean is still channelled through NGOs associated with governing regimes, 
therefore not fully independent, and that while the EU is perceived as genuine in its help 
for reformers, a common criticism from CSOs in the region is that it is also too ready to 
welcome “faux reform” and “pseudo-democracy”. This would suggest that there is a need 
to transcend the challenges associated with supporting a more diverse range of civil 
society and political actors. Prior to the Arab Uprisings, Kristina Kausch (2009a) wrote a 
prescient article on the need for the EU to reach out to moderate Islamist political parties 
in the MENA region, highlighting both the growing awareness amongst EU policy-makers 
that this was unavoidable and necessary, and the almost complete lack of concrete 
measures to do so. She concluded by arguing that: 
The EU must shift its policy towards engaging with, encouraging and 
empowering moderate Islamists in order to prevent an undermining and 
reversal of the processes of moderation and political integration that it has 
itself been encouraging. If the EU fails to make the shift towards inclusion of 
all relevant actors, it will only reinforce the impression that its policies 
towards the MENA are actually about containing both Islamism and 
political change (Kausch, 2009a, p. 13). 
This sentiment has taken on increased significance in the post-Arab Uprising environment, 
where civil society and the political landscape in the southern neighbourhood are heavily 
influenced by the triumvirate relationship between moderate Islamists, radical Islamists 
and secularists.  
The relationship between the EU and civil society actors in the southern neighbourhood 
will be examined more closely in Part III, where a bilateral level of analysis will be better 
suited to assessing efficacy with regard to the issues highlighted above.  
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Political conditionality: “more for more”, or more of the same? 
In the opening chapter, I noted that EU policy-makers have in the last 30 years 
increasingly advanced the use of political conditionality in agreements with partner 
countries, including those of the southern neighbourhood. Viewed as a legitimate form of 
intervention, where its coercive aspects are justified with recourse to international norms, 
its proponents argue that they are offering a choice to rational actors for the sake of 
promoting international standards, in terms of positive conditionality, or withholding 
resources for the sake of protecting them, in terms of negative conditionality. Critics, on 
the other hand, argue that the inequality of power between the EU and its neighbours is 
the primary reason that transference of norms and values from the former to the latter is 
possible. If, as Nathalie Tocci suggested in Chapter 3, weak actors are under no illusion as 
to the asymmetrical nature of their bilateral relationships where conditionality is 
concerned, then this dynamic dovetails with the issues discussed above regarding the 
tension between universal and culturally relative values. This, in turn, impacts on both the 
efficacy and legitimacy of the EU’s ethical norm promotion.  
As noted throughout Chapter 5, a key sentiment used by EU officials to characterise the 
2011 policy response to the Arab Uprisings was the principle of “more for more”, which, 
together with its implicitly related “less for less”, represents a reaffirmation of 
conditionality as a primary means of policy implementation. Rosa Balfour (2012a, p. 33) 
argues that this ‘revision of conditionality seems to reflect an internal EU demand for a 
redefinition of “ethical” standards for engagement, following the exposure of EU 
contradictions in its relations with dictators’. Youngs (2014, p. 94), on the other hand, notes 
that an often-heard complaint from new governments in the MENA region, was ‘that the 
EU refused to impose conditionality on previous autocratic regimes, but now threatened 
to use it against newly democratic governments’. This is one of a number of contradictions 
inherent in the use of conditionality to promote ethical norms in the wake of the Arab 
Uprisings in the southern neighbourhood. Another relates to the tension between the EU’s 
strong emphasis on “listening without imposing” and local ownership of societal 
developments, as noted above, with its introduction of a more precisely defined standard 
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of legitimacy in the form of “deep democracy” (Biscop & Borg, 2015, p. 83). It is not yet 
clear how the EU will balance: the promotion of universal values with a clear asymmetry 
of power; the reaffirmation of conditionality with its previous unwillingness to implement 
it; and its apparent openness to difference with its unambiguous vision of how the post-
Arab Uprising region will be shaped.  
As with the relationship between the EU and civil society actors in the southern 
neighbourhood, a bilateral level of analysis will enhance an assessment of conditionality 
as a means of policy implementation. The “more for more” approach goes hand in hand 
with increased differentiation between partners, a result of EU policy-makers, according to 
Maja Bozovic (Interview #26, 28/01/2014) of the MAMA Working Group, attempting to 
make the ENP more in line with the changes taking place in the region. As Tocci (2012, pp. 
10-12) notes, the increased heterogeneity in the MENA region has strengthened the logic 
of EU differentiation and bilateralism, reflecting the view that the region is likely to be 
marked by greater polarisation as a result of the Arab Uprisings.  
********************** 
It is with this in mind that the discussion in Part III takes a more focused approach to 
Euro-Mediterranean policy, examining the EU’s bilateral relationships with Tunisia and 
Morocco. As with each of the preceding points to emerge from the regional analysis 
presented in Part II, the EU’s use of conditionality will be highlighted, in order to provide 
both a nuanced account regarding legitimacy, and a prescriptive assessment regarding the 
efficacy of future policy. The EU’s relationships with Tunisia and Morocco are analysed in 
terms of the EU’s policy objectives, before, during and after the Arab Uprisings. The 
observations from this approach will be interpreted at the end of each chapter, following 
the schematic structure of this chapter: EU objectives; rhetorical self-entrapment; civil 






























The self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, in the small Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid at 
the end of 2010, was a cataclysmic event that set in motion the wave of social uprisings 
that spread across the MENA region throughout 2011. Although it was not the first sign of 
social discontent with the authoritarian rulers of Tunisia, or even the first act of self-
immolation as a means of protesting the social, economic and political injustice felt by the 
majority of Tunisians, its timing and widespread promulgation proved to be the 
beginning of the end for the Ben Ali regime, which had long been courted by the EU as a 
bastion of stability and a reliable security partner. The symbolism of Tunisia as the 
birthplace of the Arab Uprisings, the profound institutional changes that have resulted 
from the social upheaval of the “Tunisian Spring”, the amplitude of EU policy regarding 
its partnership before, during and after 2011, and the continuing evolution of the political 
transformation that emanated from Bouazizi’s desperate act of protest in 2010, all 
constitute a compelling case to apply a bilateral analysis to this southern neighbourhood 
partner, with regard to the conclusions that emerged throughout Part II of this thesis.  
 Accordingly, the schematic structure of this chapter follows the conceptual framework of 
the regional analysis. The chapter begins with an outline of EU policy towards Tunisia 
prior to the Arab Uprisings, followed by a brief overview of the local uprising itself. The 
subsequent section addresses the response of EU policy-makers to the events in Tunisia 
throughout 2011, followed by the ways in which these policy innovations developed in the 
succeeding years. Each of these sections will be supported with recourse to official EU 
documents, academic commentary, and interviews conducted in both Brussels and Tunis 
during 2013 and 2014. The final section provides an analysis of the EU’s relationship with 
Tunisia in the context of the Arab Uprisings, with the four points of reference resulting 
from the prior regional analysis: the centrality, or otherwise, of ethical norm promotion; 
the relevance of rhetorical action; the role of civil society, in particular those with Islamist 
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foundations; and the use of conditionality, in particular the application of the “more for 
more” principle.  
EU policy towards Tunisia prior to 2011 
The relationship between the EU and Tunisia, as noted in Chapter 4, is almost as old as the 
European Community itself, dating back to the 1957 protocol in the Treaty of Rome in 
which a provision for the conclusion of an agreement between the two was included 
(Vasilyan, 2011, p. 178). Having secured its independence from France the previous year, 
Tunisia was initially able, with the backing of the departed colonial power, to gain 
preferential trading terms with the EC, followed by the signing of an Association 
Agreement in 1969 and a cooperation agreement in 1976 (Willis, 2012, p. 312).120 The EEAS 
(2015j) highlights the long-standing and special nature of its relationship with Tunisia,121 
noting the opening of an EC Delegation in 1979, later becoming a Delegation of the 
European Union as a result of the Lisbon Treaty. The early decades of the EU’s 
relationship with Tunisia focussed almost exclusively on issues such as trade, financial 
assistance and technical support, with Richard Youngs (2002, p. 52) noting that 
‘[q]uestions of human rights and political reform were almost entirely absent from the 
EU's relations with the Mediterranean from the 1970s into the 1990s’. Although Zine El 
Abidine Ben Ali, who would rule Tunisia until the year of the Arab Uprisings, instigated a 
brief period of political liberalisation after ousting President Habib Bourguiba in 1987, this 
trend was quickly reversed throughout the 1990s, with widespread controls on opposition 
parties, increasingly severe repression against Islamists, and the establishment of absolute 
dominance by Ben Ali’s Democratic Constitutional Rally party122 (Youngs, 2002, p. 49).  
																																																								
120 Christopher Alexander (2010, p. 94) notes that these early agreements failed to boost trade between 
Tunisia and the EC as dramatically as many had hoped, largely due to the entry into the EEC of Europe’s 
southern Mediterranean states in the late 1970s, whose similar agricultural products proceeded to enjoy 
protected access to European markets. 
121 ‘L'Europe entretient de très longue date des relations privilégiées avec la Tunisie, un voisin du sud de la 
Méditerranée’ (EEAS, 2015j). 
122 More commonly known by the acronym RCD, after the French Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique, 
or by its Arabic Et-Tajamu‘ ed-Dostūrī ed-Dīmoqrāṭī. 
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Despite the increasing authoritarianism of Ben Ali’s regime during this period, the 
inauguration of the EMP in 1995 proved to be a watershed in EU-Tunisia relations, 
heralding the advent of closer economic partnership rather than the commitment to ethical 
norm promotion highlighted by EU officials at the time. In 1995, Tunisia became the first 
country in the Mediterranean to sign an Association Agreement, which entered into force 
in 1998 and continues to form the legal basis and framework of bilateral cooperation 
(EEAS, 2015k).123 According to Brieg Tomos Powel (2009, p. 194), a central feature of the 
EMP ‘are demands that Mediterranean partner states promote and strengthen practices of 
democratic government, with “Association Agreements” acting as country-specific 
blueprints for intended reforms’. However, despite the preamble commenting on the 
importance of each party’s commitment to the UN principles of human rights and political 
freedom, and a passage in Article 2 highlighting respect for human rights and democratic 
principles as an essential element of the accord, the Association Agreement is almost 
entirely devoted to trade regulations and economic liberalisation (European Union and 
Tunisia, 1995). Ben Ali perceived the Association Agreement with the EU, designed 
specifically to provide greater access to European markets and reduce local tariffs, as 
validation from Europe for his economic and security policies (Alexander, 2010, p. 95). 
From the European side of the partnership, throughout the 1990s Ben Ali continued to be 
seen as a valuable pro-Western bulwark in the region (Youngs, 2002, p. 62), regardless of 
the human rights violations and political repression carried out to maintain stability and 
security. 
The period from the late 1990s to the onset of the Arab Uprisings can be characterised by 
three dynamics between the EU and Tunisia: both partners willing to pursue progress on 
trade and economic liberalisation; neither partner willing to pursue progress on political 
liberalisation; and the EU, but generally not Tunisia, willing to pursue progress on human 
rights issues. In the latter domain, the EU did begin to use the platform of association 
councils with Tunisia to raise the issue of human rights, going as far as “pressing hard” on 
																																																								
123 ‘La Tunisie a été le premier pays du sud de la Méditerranée à signer un Accord d'Association avec 
l'Europe, en 1995. Cet Accord, entré en vigueur le 1er mars 1998, forme la base juridique et le cadre légal de 
la coopération bilatérale’ (EEAS, 2015k). 
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the Ben Ali regime in relation to certain individual human rights cases (Youngs, 2002, p. 
77). Vera Van Hüllen (2011, p. 123) notes that during this period the EU repeatedly raised 
concerns about human rights issues, and issued several critical statements referring to 
harassment of human rights NGOs and repression of freedom of expression, a situation 
which culminated in a political crisis between the two partners between 2005 and 2007. A 
joint Subcommittee on Human Rights and Democracy was established in 2007, and 
although dialogue continued with regards to the former, little progress was made on the 
implementation of democracy assistance projects or political reform (Van Hu ̈llen, 2011, pp. 
123-124).124 However modest the level of coercive pressure applied to human rights 
violations, it still contrasted with the eschewal of such pressure where democratisation 
was concerned, despite both being put forward as essential elements of the EMP (Youngs, 
2002, p. 77).  
In 2004 the ENP became the predominant overarching policy governing Euro-
Mediterranean relations, resulting in differentiated bilateral relationships based on 
comprehensive individual Action Plans with MENA partners. The most significant 
development associated with the ENP was the implementation of positive conditionality 
to reward progress associated with the new Action Plans. Nonetheless, although this new 
measure was quickly approved by the EU-Tunisia Association Council in 2005, there were 
‘only a few vague references to ongoing efforts at reform in Tunisia which [did] not 
identify specific objectives or measures of cooperation between the EU and Tunisia’ (Van 
Hu ̈llen, 2011, p. 124). This was not the case where economic reform was concerned, and 
since its adoption Tunisia’s record in this sphere leading up to 2011 had been outstanding, 
whereas in the area of political reform its record had not improved but worsened (Kausch, 
2010c, p. 1). Youngs (2002, p. 80) argues that EU financial support to the MENA region has 
long been conditional on economic rather than political reform, as demonstrated by 
Tunisia’s disproportionately high share of 14.5 per cent of the aid package in 1999. This 
sentiment appears to be corroborated by overall amounts of aid from the EU to Tunisia 
																																																								
124 It should be noted that Van Hu ̈llen attributes the lack of willingness to pursue democracy-related issues to 
the level of resistance presented by the Tunisian regime, rather than a lack of commitment by the EU prior to 
2011, as argued here.  
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increasing throughout the decade prior to the Arab Uprisings, from around 70 million 
euros a year to 100 million euros a year (Kausch & Youngs, 2009, p. 973). Combined with 
the lack of anything resembling sanctions or negative conditionality, it is unsurprising that 
Ben Ali continued to assume tacit European approval for his domestic policies.  
Of these domestic policies, the repression and manipulation of Tunisian civil society 
organisations prior to 2011 produced two significant benefits for the Ben Ali regime, both 
of which impacted on EU policy. As well as controlling opposition parties and restricting 
press freedoms, the government often set up its own civil society groups, which 
“mirrored” emerging critical actors while at the same time serving as a transmission belt 
for government policy (Youngs, 2002, p. 49). Thus, EU policy-makers faced a genuine 
predicament distinguishing those civil society groups that were truly independent from 
the regime, and even when doing so, maintaining a relationship with them and providing 
support.  Even in those areas where the EU did wish to support human rights in Tunisia, 
they were met with firm resistance from the Ben Ali government. Gianandrea Villa 
(Interview #11, 14/5/2015), overseeing human rights and democracy for the Political 
Section of the EU Delegation in Tunis, expressed frustration at the limitations affecting his 
role prior to 2011, where funds were available but blocked by the Tunisian authorities, and 
NGOs associated with the EU were routinely harassed. However, where the suppression 
of Islamist political groups and civil society organisations were concerned, no such tension 
between local and EU policy-makers occurred. Based on interviews with officials from the 
Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2006, Powel (2009, p. 200) shows that in the process 
of securitising Islamist actors, Tunisian officials were ‘keen to emphasize how both Tunisia 
and the EU share a common threat and a responsibility to “fight terror” [and the] Tunisian 
government frequently includes references to Islamists in its security discourse’. In light of 
the increasingly securitised agenda regarding Euro-Mediterranean relations, highlighted 
throughout Part II, policy-makers in Brussels received this sentiment positively. In a 
further series of interviews, Powel (2009, p. 202) shows that ‘[d]espite a decade and more 
of democracy promotion within the EMP framework, Commission officials, member state 
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diplomats, and European and Tunisian NGO representatives stated that the EU never 
engages Tunisian Islamist political or civil society organizations’.  
A convergence of self-serving interests in the decade leading up to the Arab Uprisings led 
to an increasingly stability-centric policy towards Tunisia, despite a continued rhetorical 
commitment to ethical norm promotion. Michael Willis (2012, p. 330) argues that EU 
concerns over migration and terrorism issues led to a more conciliatory and less critical 
approach being taken to regimes such as Ben Ali’s, whereas for their part, 
Tunis understood this very well and sought to reinforce this view. 
Moreover, they moved to exploit it by ensuring that favourable terms were 
secured in other areas such as trade and, more importantly, in the neutering 
of any official criticisms of the lack of democracy and human rights in the 
states.  
Citing Tunisia as one of the foremost examples, Anthony Dworkin and Nick Witney (2012, 
p. 39) argue: 
As is now generally acknowledged, European policy towards North Africa 
in the years leading up to the Arab revolutions was basically a charade. The 
autocrats pretended to reform, and the EU pretended that its assistance to 
the southern neighbourhood rewarded good behaviour.  
Immediately prior to the Arab Uprisings, the disparity between EU rhetoric concerning 
ethical norm promotion and its auxiliary conditionality mechanisms, on the one hand, and 
its positive support to the Ben Ali regime, on the other, could not have been more marked. 
With regards to events in Tunisia throughout 2010, a Human Rights Watch (2011) report 
stated that the ‘human rights situation remained dire’, and noted the recent amendment to 
the penal code criminalising persons who ‘directly or indirectly, have contacts with agents 
of a foreign country, foreign institution or organization in order to encourage them to 
affect the vital interests of Tunisia and its economic security’. Despite this, in the same 
year the EU agreed to work towards bestowing advanced status upon its bilateral 
relationship with Tunisia. At the correspondent press conference, EU Commissioner for 
Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle described Tunisia as ‘an important 
and reliable partner [and] an economic pioneer among the European Union Neighbours’ 
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(ENPi, 2010). This positive reinforcement for the Ben Ali regime, only months before the 
events in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid would ignite a social revolution across the 
MENA region, adequately captured the essence of EU policy at the time, one which 
favoured self-serving interests over issues such as human rights and democracy.  
The “Tunisian Spring” 
To say that the events that took place in Tunisia in December 2010 and their aftermath 
took the world by surprise is a gross understatement: 
When protests started in December 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, an unheard of place 
for many, no one could have predicted that they would lead to the fall of 
one of the most notorious police states in the Middle East and North Africa 
region. Yet on 14 January, after less than a month of largely peaceful 
protests, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia, abruptly 
ending 23 years of autocratic rule. (Amnesty International, 2012b, p. 3) 
The situation in Tunisia leading up to the uprisings was one of contradictory indicators in 
terms of the momentous changes that took place. On the one hand, Tunisia enjoyed the 
best educational system in the Arab world, its largest middle class, and its strongest 
organised labour movement; on the other, the governing regime had tightly restricted 
freedom of expression and political parties, and had cultivated a modern, cosmopolitan 
façade that masked a bleak, under-developed reality containing few meaningful prospects 
for the majority of Tunisians (L. Anderson, 2011). A number of academic commentators 
have since attempted to ascertain the principal causes of the Arab Uprisings of 2011, in 
Tunisia and throughout the MENA region. Stephen Saideman (2012, p. 717) notes that 
Tunisia shared many inflammatory properties with its neighbours, such as ‘high 
unemployment,125 a corrupt regime, a frustrated public, and more information about the 
regime from outside the country’.126 Maria Cristina Paciello (2011, pp. 2-5) highlights the 
deteriorating labour market conditions, the retrenchment of state welfare systems, 
																																																								
125 ‘Official figures reported unemployment to be running between 14 and 17 per cent, whilst unofficial 
sources suggested rates nearer 22 per cent for the general population and over 40 per cent for Tunisian 
youth’ (Murphy, 2011, p. 300). 
126 Although this information came from a variety of sources, of particular note were the recent Wikileaks 
revelations, in which American diplomats were shown to be discussing the oppressive nature and endemic 
corruption of Ben Ali and his family (Kellner, 2012, p. 36). 
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worsening living conditions, authoritarianism and the regime’s control over the economy. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this discussion to analyse the causes of the uprisings 
themselves, it is worth noting that some commentators, such as Emma Murphy (2011, p. 
299) attribute the international support for the Tunisian government, particularly from the 
EU and America, as a significant factor sustaining the authoritarian nature of the Ben Ali 
regime leading up to 2011. 
On 17 December 2010, a local street vendor from the small town of Sidi Bouzid set himself 
alight in front of the municipal buildings to protest against the injustice of his relationship 
with the authorities inside. As Julia Clancy-Smith (2013, p. 16) notes: 
While Muhammad Bouazizi’s sacrificial act of self-immolation in December 
2010 provided the trigger for collective nationwide action, this was not the 
first case of political suicide. A number of young people had killed 
themselves before 2010 in order to draw attention to the plight of youth, 
poverty, and the lack of life opportunity, which together created a pervasive 
sense of hopelessness. 
Yet it was this particular sacrificial act of self-immolation that ignited Tunisian society in a 
series of large-scale demonstrations, climaxing between 24-27 December 2010, at which 
time a number of Tunisian protesters were killed by the security forces (Pinfari, 2012, p. 
136). Protests continued throughout the first two weeks of January, culminating in the 
departure of Ben Ali, who fled to Saudi Arabia on 14 January. In the period immediately 
following, 
the main revolutionary force - a grassroots coalition of Trade Unionists, 
leftists, human rights groups, and Islamists - turned Tunis's central Casbah 
Square into a site both for intense political discussion and protests against 
any attempt by the members of the old regime to re-establish their control. 
(Gerges, 2014, p. 259) 
By February, according to Murphy (2011, p. 303), an ‘astonishing turnaround had 
happened – it was not just that the previous regime had been decimated, but that the 
balance of power had shifted fundamentally from the state to the people’. An interim 
government, under former Prime Minister Mohammed Gannouchi, underwent a number 
of permutations in the following months, often in response to continuing protests. Political 
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parties, the media and civil society organisations were freed from the shackle of the Ben 
Ali era, and in October 2011, Tunisia held its first democratic elections since it had gained 
independence, with the Islamist Ennahda Party winning the largest number of seats 
(Amnesty International, 2012b, p. 8).  
In terms of international media coverage, the Loughborough University (2012a, p. 50) 
study shows that in the early stages, the Tunisian Uprising ‘was not deemed significant 
enough to be reported on’. Kristina Kausch (2010a) notes that Tunisia had long been 
considered a ‘bulwark of stability’ and that ‘no news from Tunisia was good news’. 
Youngs (2014, p. 55) adds that the EU had ‘apparently missed a growing series of low-level 
riots and protests after 2008 [emphasis added]’. However, as the intensity of the local 
protests increased, and also began to spread to other parts of the region, Western 
broadcasters awoke to the significance of these events (Loughborough University, 2012b, 
p. 31). According to Murphy (2011, pp. 300-301): 
The local and international television coverage reaffirmed the protesters’ 
growing confidence and it was not long before their demands transformed 
from the language and motifs of economic grievance to direct calls for 
political freedom.  
The fusion of global media, social networking and other forms of communication ‘helped 
circulate the Tunisian Uprising to Egypt and then the Egyptian Uprising to the entire 
Middle East and beyond’ (Kellner, 2012, pp. 35 & 26-29). The Loughborough University 
(2012b, p. 36 & 43) study states that ‘the dominant narrative of Tunisia and Egypt [was] as 
democratic revolutions’, but also shows that ‘[a]udiences in later spring and summer 
could be forgiven for thinking that the “revolutions” in Tunisia and Egypt had finished 
and that the conflicts were over rather than on-going’. This correlates with the research 
presented in Chapter 6, showing that the global media coverage dramatically dissipated 
after 2011, with the media attention that remained focusing on the violent conflicts 
elsewhere in the region.  
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EU policy in response to the Tunisian Uprising 
As was the case with the EU’s response to the MENA region as a whole, there was a sharp 
increase of support and policy initiatives directed towards the EU’s bilateral relationship 
with Tunisia, particularly those associated with ethical norm promotion, throughout 2011. 
However, also correspondingly, the initial reaction to the social upheaval unfolding in 
Tunisia was ‘unsure and hesitant’ (Dworkin & Witney, 2012, p. 27), betraying a desire to 
keep faith with the stability-centric policies of the past.127 Although High Representative 
Catherine Ashton visited Tunis a month after Ben Ali’s departure, saying that the ‘EU is 
wholeheartedly behind the Tunisian people’s aspirations for freedom and democracy [and 
wants] to be Tunisia's strongest ally in their move towards democracy’ (Ashton, 2011d), 
her incipient offer of 17 million euros in additional aid was deemed as “ridiculous” by 
new Tunisian Minister of Industry Mohamed Afif Chelbi, and not seen as a wholehearted 
support of democracy in light of the rapidly unfolding events (Huber, 2012, p. 4). 
Nonetheless, the EU rapidly became more supportive of the Tunisian Uprising and its 
subsequent political transition, not least because its ‘utter failure in Tunisia drew 
considerable criticism from the press and civil society organisations’ (Behr, 2012b, p. 79). 
Ashton’s visit was swiftly followed by high-level visits from European Commission 
President Barroso, Commissioners Füle, Malmström, Georgieva, Barnier and De Gucht, as 
well as European Parliament President Buzek (European Commission, 2011g). For their 
part, the Tunisians, according to EEAS Head of Maghreb Division Bernard Savage 
(Interview #4, 26/11/2013), very quickly after the revolution made it clear that they wanted 
to establish a close relationship with the EU.  
The most immediate, and widely promulgated, form of support came in the form of 
increased financial assistance. Youngs (2014, p. 72) notes that EU officials 
invariably talked about the main focus [of post-uprising reform funding] 
being on Tunisia in the hope of creating a success that would serve as both 
																																																								
127 Contributing to the EU’s apparent unwillingness to desert longstanding stability and security allies in 
Tunisia, were public comments made by member states’ representatives, including French Foreign Minister 
Michèle Alliot-Marie’s offer to send paratroopers to Ben Ali in order to help quell the protests in early 
January (Pace, 2014, p. 977).  
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justification of EU efforts to sceptical publics and as an inspirational reference 
point for other states [emphasis added]. 
In December 2011, it was announced that the EU had increased the funds available for 
bilateral cooperation, doubling the allocation for 2011, and increasing the budget for the 
period 2011-2013 from 240 million euros to 400 million (European Commission, 2011g). In 
terms of how this financial assistance was to be spent, it is interesting to note that National 
Indicative Programme priorities for 2011-2013 diverged from their previously exclusive 
economic and development focus to include “Governance and Justice”, although 
admittedly as a comparatively small percentage (European Commission and the HR, 
2014a, p. 70). Kausch (2013, p. 15) asserts that the initial 240 million euros actually 
increased to 390 million for the period 2011-2012, and EU officials eventually put the 
assistance figure to Tunisia for 2011-2013 at 545 million euros (EEAS, 2013b, p. 6). Laura 
Baeza (2013, p. 6), head of the EU Delegation in Tunis, stated that in terms of financial aid 
in the aftermath of Tunisia’s revolution of January 2011, the EU immediately responded to 
the expectation of the Tunisian people.128  
As well as increased financial assistance through the ENPI’s National Indicative 
Programme, an additional 155 million euros was allocated to Tunisia for the period 2011-
2013 from the newly established SPRING Programme (European Commission, 2014c, p. 
35), the incentive-based approach formalising the “more for more” principle of the revised 
ENP (European Commission, 2013d, p. 1).129 As noted in Chapter 5, this programme 
originated as a direct response to the Arab Uprisings, allowing the EU to support those 
countries working towards a “common agenda” of deep and sustainable democratisation, 
and lasting reforms in the context of human rights and the rule of law. In September 2011, 
the European Commission confirmed that Tunisia’s progress had enabled it to become the 
first beneficiary of the SPRING Programme, highlighting that recipients are those 
‘Southern Mediterranean partners countries most advanced in the democratisation 
																																																								
128 ‘...je tiens à souligner qu’au lendemain de la Révolution de janvier 2011, l’UE a immédiatement répondu 
aux attentes du peuple tunisien...’ (Baeza, 2013, p. 6). 
129 A significant proportion of the 350 million euros earmarked for the entire southern neighbourhood during 
the same period. 
	 222	
process’ (EEAS, 2011a, p. 3). Baeza (2013, p. 6), in her foreword to a report on cooperation 
between the EU and Tunisia, noted that Tunisia was the first recipient of this instrument 
encouraging those countries embarking on the road to democratic transition, and framed 
the reward as an expression of solidarity between the two partners.130  
A response to the uprisings in the southern neighbourhood with a distinctly bilateral 
quality was the formation of country-specific task forces, described as ‘grand bilateral 
meetings bringing together not only EU member states but also international financial 
institutions, big private sector players, and other potentially helpful third parties’ 
(Dworkin & Witney, 2012, p. 28). The first of these EU-sponsored events took place in 
Tunis, 28-29 September 2011, set up to 
better understand and identify the challenges and needs of Tunisia in its 
democratic transition process [and] to coordinate more efficiently the 
support of the international community and accelerate and better target the 
support of the EU, with a particular focus on short term measures and 
initiatives. (EEAS, 2011a, p. 1) 
At this first meeting, chaired jointly by High Representative Catherine Ashton and 
Tunisian Prime Minister Béji Caĭd Essebsi, four billion euros of provisional funds were 
made available to support Tunisia’s transition over the following three years (European 
Commission, 2011g). Furthermore, negotiations were initiated ‘to establish a privileged 
partnership in all areas of mutual interest’ (EEAS, 2011a, p. 2), and institute a Mobility 
Partnership ‘mainly aiming at granting visas to Tunisian students, researchers and 
businesspeople’ (Huber, 2012, p. 5). In December 2011, the EU also instigated the 
preparatory process regarding future negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area (DCFTA) with Tunisia, to be launched in early 2012 (European Commission, 
2011g). 
Following her visit to Tunisia in February 2011, the EU’s High Representative Catherine 
Ashton (2011d) noted the importance of supporting civil society and providing technical 
																																																								
130 ‘La Tunisie a également été le premier bénéficiaire de l’instrument SPRING, créé en réponse au Printemps 
Arabe, pour encourager les pays s’engageant le plus rapidement sur la voie de la transition démocratique. 
Ces dons sont l’expression de la solidarité de l’UE vis-à-vis de la Tunisie’ (Baeza, 2013, p. 6). 
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assistance for the electoral process, with regard to the county’s democratic transition. In 
terms of the former, the PfSDP noted that the 17 million euros allocated for immediate and 
short-term support for democratic transition includes ‘support to establish an appropriate 
legal framework for the holding of elections and for an EU Election Observation Mission 
in support of the work of the National Commission for Constitutional Reform and 
Elections’ (European Commission and the HR, 2011c, p. 4). On 23 October 2011, Tunisians 
freely voted to choose their representatives for the first time, with EU officials 
commending the electoral process, the candidates and parties that took part, and the 
Ennahda Party’s garnering of the highest percentage of votes (European Commission, 
2011g). It marked the first occasion that a plurality of political parties and civil society 
organisations participated in the process of Tunisian governance, reflecting the 
importance attributed by participants in the EU-Tunisia task force the previous month to 
‘the role of non state actors in the democratisation process’ (EEAS, 2011a, p. 6). In order to 
provide further assistance in this domain throughout 2011, 5.2 million euros was 
contributed by EIDHR, 1.4 million euros by the newly created Civil Society Facility, and 
1.2 million euros by the thematic instrument for Non-state Actors and Local Authorities 
(NSA-LA) (European Commission and the HR, 2014a, p. 71).  
EU policy towards Tunisia post-2011 
Although substantial financial support continued to flow from the EU to Tunisia from 
2012 onwards, 2011 represented the peak in most spending domains. Regarding the 
figures cited at the end of the previous section: the EIDHR figure dropped to 1 million 
euros for both 2012 and 2013, compared to the 5.2 million contribution in 2011; the Civil 
Society Figure dropped to 1 million euros for 2012 and nothing for 2013, compared to the 
1.4 million contribution in 2011; and the NSA-LA dropped to three hundred thousand 
euros for 2012 and nothing for 2013, compared to the 1.2 million contribution in 2011 
(European Commission and the HR, 2014a, p. 71). In terms of ENP bilateral assistance, 
whereas 545 million euros was provided throughout 2011-2013 via ENPI National 
Indicative Programme allocations and the SPRING Programme (EEAS, 2013b, p. 6), a 
significant increase compared to the 2007-2010 period, a provisional figure of 725-886 
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million euros was to be provided throughout 2014-2020 via ENI Single Support 
Framework allocations (European Commission and the HR, 2015, p. 53). Relevant to these 
figures, which show increased financial support following the Arab Uprisings, peaking in 
2011, is the evolution of priorities regarding this EU funding for Tunisia. Whereas bilateral 
assistance priorities for the 2007-2010 period focused exclusively on economic and 
development, priorities for the 2011-2013 period include governance and justice (European 
Commission and the HR, 2014a, p. 70), and for the 2014-2020 period included 15 per cent 
towards ‘strengthening fundamental elements of democracy’ (European Commission, 
2014a).  
In terms of assessing the EU’s commitment to ethical norm promotion following the Arab 
Uprisings, however, an indication of priorities is an insufficient barometer, particularly in 
light of the disparity between rhetoric and action prior to 2011. Of the projected 
governance and justice figure for the 2011-2013 period, the EU’s official statistics show that 
none of the allocation was actually spent, with the majority of actual spending going 
towards business competiveness (European Commission and the HR, 2014a, p. 70). This is 
not to say that human rights and democracy promotion were absent from EU aid and 
assistance following 2011. In 2014 the EU spent seven million euros supporting gender 
equality, 15 million euros on justice sector reform, and EIDHR figures showed a slight 
increase from 2013 at 1.2 million euros (European Commission, 2015c). However, these 
figures pale in comparison to those regarding socio-economic reform and development, 
for both 2014 and the preceding 2011-2013 period (European Commission and the HR, 
2015, p. 53; EEAS, 2015i). The new Action Plan, agreed to by the EU and Tunisia at the 
Association Council meeting on 19 November 2012, enshrined a Privileged Partnership, 
and contained ambitious commitments in terms of democracy, the rule of law, governance 
(Title II of the political cooperation section), dialogue and cooperation on issues relating to 
human rights and to fundamental freedoms (Council of the European Union, 2013, p. 53). 
However, a Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (2013b) report on the Privileged 
Partnership noted that despite it representing an important political commitment to 
promote human rights and ensure civil society participation in all sectors covered by the 
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agreement, some civil society actors had expressed concern about the lack of transparency 
and the absence of real involvement in defining these objectives.  
Indeed, a lack of clarity concerning the objectives and priorities of the Privileged 
Partnership agreed to in 2012 has been a significant feature of EU-Tunisia relations. This 
has been the case particularly when tensions have emerged between the promotion of 
human rights, on the one hand, and democracy, on the other. While official documents 
and communiqués continue to claim that ‘the EU-Tunisia partnership is based on 
principles of mutual responsibility, shared values of democracy, rule of law, good 
governance and human rights’ (EEAS and the European Commission, 2014c, p. 1), this is 
clearly not the case where the latter are concerned. In the extended version of the Single 
Support Framework 2014-2017, it is noted that the democratisation of the political 
landscape in Tunisia opened a lively debate, marked by tensions on issues such as equality 
between men and women and the role of religion in the country, amongst others (EEAS 
and the European Commission, 2014a, p. 2).131 Susi Dennison (2013, p. 126) argues that: 
The EU has been relatively united in a ‘hands-off’ approach to domestic 
political debates about references in the constitution to blasphemy and the 
role of women, focussing attention instead on the process and the precarious 
economic situation. The signature at the EU–Tunisia Association Council in 
November 2012 of a ‘Privileged Partnership’ underlined the EU’s collective 
view that the overall direction of travel on building a democratic state in 
Tunisia was positive, even if there were obstacles along the path. 
As noted above, the economic situation in Tunisia has indeed received substantial EU 
support since the Arab Uprisings; and, as will be addressed below, in terms of “process” 
the EU continues to focus on, and support, the institution of free and fair elections. 
However, some violations of human rights and freedoms have persisted, and even 
increased, in the wake of the Arab Uprisings, leading to international human rights 
organisations calling on EU officials to focus on these issues in their meetings with the 
Tunisian government in 2013 (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 2013c). While 
																																																								
131 ‘Cette démocratisation du paysage politique de la Tunisie a ouvert un débat vivace, marqué par des 
tensions, sur des sujets tels que l'égalité entre hommes et femmes, le ro ̂le de la religion dans le pays...’ (EEAS 
and the European Commission, 2014a, p. 2). 
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the Tunisian Constitution of 2014 was correctly, in this author’s view, hailed as a very 
positive example for the region and a carrier of universal values such as human rights 
(EEAS and the European Commission, 2014a, p. 7),132 there are still worrying articles on 
the relationship between religion and state (Human Rights Watch, 2014), and continuing 
human rights abuses directed at homosexuals (Human Rights Watch, 2015a), freedom of 
expression (Human Rights Watch, 2015b), and journalists (Human Rights Watch, 2015c).  
Although over-focusing on the democratic transition process at the expense of other 
principles, such as human rights, is problematic for the EU as a self-professed bastion and 
promoter of universal values, with regard to the former it should be noted that the EU has 
continued to support Tunisia in the years following the Arab Uprisings, principally in the 
domain of continuing free and fair elections. As was the case in the October 2011 elections, 
in the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2014 the Tunisian government invited 
the EU to deploy an Election Observation Mission, which deemed the proceedings to be in 
accordance with democratic principles and international standards, and also to assist in 
the strengthening institutional and operational capacities of the Independent High 
Authority for Elections (EEAS, 2014b, p. 12).133 As it had been in response to the victory of 
the Ennahda Party in 2011, the EU was fulsome in its praise of the victorious Nidaa 
Tounes Party and newly elected President Béji Caïd Essebsi, affirming that the EU would 
‘continue to back the efforts of the new authorities with political and financial support 
commensurate with both the progress already achieved and the challenges faced’ (Council 
of the European Union, 2015a). Furthermore, according to the EU, the remarkable progress 
of Tunisia was perfectly in line with the Action Plan between the partners, particularly 
																																																								
132 ‘L'adoption de la nouvelle Constitution a eu lieu le 26 janvier 2014 et représente une étape importante 
dans l'avancement du processus de transition et un exemple très positif pour la région. C'est une 
Constitution résolument moderne et porteuse de valeurs universelles comme les droits de l'Homme (EEAS 
and the European Commission, 2014a, p. 7). 
133 ‘Sur demande du gouvernement tunisien, l’Ue a fourni une assistance électorale à renforcer les capacités 
institutionnelles et opérationnelles de l’Instance su- périeure indépendante pour les élections [et à] l’instar 
des élections d’octobre 2011 pour l’ANC, une invitation par les autorités tunisiennes a été adressée à l’UE 
pour déployer une mission d’observation electorale [qui] a vérifié que le processus électoral s’est déroulé 
selon des principes démocratiques, conformément aux normes et aux bonnes pratiques internationales 
(EEAS, 2014b, p. 12). 
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regarding the democratic transition and the important role of civil society (EEAS, 2014b, p. 
12).134 
In Tunisia, a burgeoning, and increasingly relevant, civil society is another domain in 
which the EU dramatically increased its support following the Arab Uprisings. Moreover, 
in terms of reaffirming its commitment to ethical norm promotion in response to the 
“Tunisian Spring”, it is an area in which the EU can aberrantly be shown to have 
maintained its support well beyond 2011. Delegation chief Baeza (2014) notes that support 
for Tunisian civil society has not only intensified in terms of grants, but also, as of 2014, by 
their close association in the preparation of EU-Tunisia subcommittees.135 The European 
Commission (2015c) states that: 
In Tunisia, support to civil society has become a pivotal aspect of EU 
cooperation in the country. Under thematic programmes, the EU Delegation 
is currently responsible for a total of 54 projects worth €24.8 million, funded 
by the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), 
the Instrument for Stability (IfS), the Non State Actors programme (NSA), 
the Civil Society Facility and the ENPI/ENI instruments. 
At the time of writing, a specific Programme to Support Civil Society (PASC) was under 
implementation, in partnership with the Tunisian Ministry of Development and 
International Cooperation, with the aim of supporting the capacity building of civil society 
organisations, facilitating dialogue and partnerships between civil society organisations 
and public actors, and making recommendations for legislative reviews related to actions 
promoted by NGOs (European Commission, 2015c). The EU has also provided funds and 
technical support for the development of the Jamaity Project, a civil society platform 
designed to facilitate links between local civil society actors and funding opportunities 
with external donors. Nour Kaabi (Interview #12, 15/5/2014), the Project Coordinator at 
Jamaity, stated that the EU’s support had actually increased each year since 2011, not only 
																																																								
134 ‘[L]es progrès remarquables de la Tunisie s’inscrivent parfaitement dans le Plan d’action, en particulier en 
ce qui concerne la transition démocratique et le ro ̂le important de la société civile (EEAS, 2014b). 
135 ‘Parallèlement, le soutien à la société civile s’est intensifié, par le vecteur des subventions accordées à des 
organisations non gouvernementales, mais également - autre avancée de l’année 2014 - par leur association 
étroite dans la préparation des sous-comités UE-Tunisie sur les différentes politiques sectorielles’ (Baeza, 
2014, p. 8).  
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providing a welcome link between Tunisian civil society and potential donors, but also 
encouraging the latter to support the Jamaity Project itself.  
With regard to the EU’s foreign policy priorities towards Tunisia post-2011, as noted 
above, there are a number of positives, including electoral support and a maintained focus 
on Tunisian civil society. However, as was the case regionally, the EU has steadily 
returned to viewing North Africa, including Tunisia, through a securitised lens, with a 
particular focus on the dangers regarding uncontrolled flows of migrants and refugees to 
European shores. In terms of the EU’s shift towards ethical norm promotion in response to 
the Tunisian Uprising, Kristi Raik and Ruxundra Dinesen (2015, p. 910) argue: 
While these steps expressed a change of attitude from the EU’s side with a 
stronger emphasis on democracy and human rights, the immediate security 
interests of the member states continued to be very much present as well.  
Citing comments made by Commission President Barroso (2011a), they go on to note that 
in connection with the extra money allocated for the 2011-2013 period, the 
EU made it conditional that the Tunisian government took ‘strong and clear 
action’ to prevent its citizens from leaving for Europe and take back the 
thousands that had already made it to Italy (Raik & Dinesen, 2015, p. 910). 
In fact, as Katterina Natter (2015) shows, after a temporary hike in migration from Tunisia 
to Europe in 2011, numbers have dropped each subsequent year, ‘partly due to the 
restoration of border controls by Tunisian authorities and increased EU financial and 
technical support’, but also on account of Libya’s increased role as a departure point in 
light of the increasing instability there.136  
Details of declining migrant arrivals from Tunisia have had little effect on the EU’s 
inclination to pursue increasingly robust security and migration arrangements with 
partners in the Maghreb, and in Tunisia’s case, this has been exacerbated by increasing 
instances of local Islamic terrorist attacks. Shortly after the 2015 Bardo Museum attack in 
Tunis, which killed 21 people, European Council President Donald Tusk commented 
during a visit to Tunisia: 
																																																								
136 Furthermore, ‘more than 15,000 Tunisians were forcibly returned from Europe between 2011 and 2013’ 
(Natter, 2015). 
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All Europeans were affected by the attack on the Bardo, because through 
Tunisia, it is freedom and democracy which were targeted. The EU is more 
determined than ever to step up its cooperation with Tunisia in the face of 
this common terrorist threat, and to further strengthen our relations 
[working] together to address the root causes of regional instability and its 
consequences, such as irregular migration and terrorism (European Council, 
2015). 
He was accompanied on his visit by EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gilles de 
Kerchove, and unsurprisingly, the issues of security and migration are once again 
becoming conflated by EU policy-makers; even in Tunisia, where remarkable progress has 
been made in the democratic transition process. The Mobility Partnership, promised to 
Tunisia and Morocco as both a reward and an incentive towards social and political 
reform, was eventually signed in 2014, described by the EU as ‘a means to facilitate the 
movement of people between the EU and Tunisia and to promote a common and 
responsible management of existing migratory flows, including by simplifying procedures 
for granting visas’ (European Commission, 2014b). Yet, rather than reflect the hopes of 
Tunisians regarding job opportunities, migrants rights and visa facilitation (Fargues & 
Fandrich, 2012, p. 8), the provisions in the Mobility Partnership offer only extremely 
limited opportunities to Tunisian citizens, while obliging Tunisia to cooperate with the EU 
regarding ‘tighter border controls, cooperation with Frontex, and the signature of a 
readmission agreement’ (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 2013a). Regardless 
of the actual number of migrants crossing from Tunisia itself in 2015, increasing terrorist 
attacks on both sides of the Mediterranean, and huge numbers of migrants and refugees 
arriving in Europe by other routes, has engendered a sense of insecurity in EU policy-
makers to the point where once again, self-regarding interests are prioritised ahead of 
ethical norm promotion, even with regard to one of the few lights still shining in the wake 
of the Arab Uprisings.   
Finally, as was the case with EU-Tunisia bilateral funding in its entirety, additional 
funding in line with the “more for more” principle diminished after 2012. Of the 155 
million euros of SPRING funds provided immediately after the Arab Uprisings, 20 million 
was allocated in 2011, 80 million was allocated in 2012, and 55 million was allocated in 
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2013 (European Commission, 2015c). For the 2014-2020 financial framework, SPRING 
funding was replaced by the so-called Umbrella programme funds,137 and, as was the case 
with the former, in 2014 Tunisia was the first recipient of Umbrella funds with an amount 
of 50 million euros, followed by 71.8 million euros in 2015 (European Commission, 2015c). 
This last figure appears to buck the trend with regard to diminishing positive 
conditionality, and in light of successful presidential and parliamentary elections the year 
before, and the recent adoption of a widely endorsed constitution, would be strong 
evidence in favour of the argument that the EU has coherently applied the “more for 
more” principle in the MENA region in response to the Arab Uprisings. As noted on the 
EU Delegation to Tunisia’s webpage, the two key principles guiding the ENI are “more for 
more” and differentiation based on each countries needs, ambitions and progress on the 
path of reforms, adding that Tunisia has made remarkable progress in terms of democratic 
governance (EEAS, 2015c).138 However, as will be discussed below and in the following 
chapter, some of Tunisia’s “rewards” for its remarkable progress are mitigated by the 
wider context, and the Tunisians themselves deem others insufficient.  
Interpretation of bilateral analysis 
In the regional analysis presented in Chapter 7, four main points emerged:  
• That EU-MENA relations became increasingly securitised leading up 
to 2011, followed by a recommitment to ethical norm promotion in 
response to the Arab Uprisings, then a return to self-serving interests 
being the primary motivator in terms of southern neighbourhood 
policy-making; 
• That the spike in ethical norm promotion throughout 2011 can be 
explained by an adaption of Schimmelfennig’s theory of rhetorical 
action, where a rhetorical commitment to a standard of legitimacy 
leads to rhetorical self-entrapment;  
																																																								
137 ‘[U]mbrella programmes of up to 10% of the ENI budget to be allocated to the partner countries based on 
their progress in deep and sustainable democracy; progress in implementing agreed reform objectives 
contributing to that goal should also be taken into account’ (EEAS, 2015g).  
138 ‘Deux principes clefs guident [l’ENI]: L’incitation aux pays qui avancent le plus dans leurs réformes, à 
travers l’approche “more for more” [et la] différenciation sur la base des besoins, des ambitions et des 
avancées sur la voie des réformes propres à chaque pays [...] les avancées remarquables accomplies par la 
Tunisie en matière de gouvernance démocratique’ (EEAS, 2015c, emphasis in original).  
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• That an innovative and sustained approach to MENA civil society 
developed as part of the 2011 policy shift, although related issues 
remain concerning universalism and the role of Islamists;  
• That a reaffirmation of conditionality associated with ethical norm 
promotion has suffered from charges of inconsistency and 
incoherence. 
Each of these points will be addressed below in the context of EU-Tunisia bilateral 
relations before, during and after the Arab Uprisings. 
EU policy objectives towards Tunisia  
With regard to the evolution of EU priorities in its bilateral relationship with Tunisia, the 
period before the Arab Uprisings mirrors that of the regional analysis. As shown above, 
despite an increasing rhetorical commitment to ethical norm promotion following the 
inauguration of the EMP in 1995, the EU continued to support the Ben Ali regime, despite 
the latter’s repudiation of social and political reforms. Although there was an objection to 
some human rights violations via the EU-Tunisia Association Council in the decade 
leading up to the Arab Uprisings, both partners demonstrated an unwillingness to address 
issues concerning democratisation. EU policy-makers focussed on economic reform and 
trade liberalisation, the benefits of which were perceived by Ben Ali as validation of his 
domestic policies. Furthermore, the increasingly securitised agenda regarding Euro-
Mediterranean relations led to a convergence of self-serving interests, particularly where 
the perceived threat from Islamists was concerned, and this was highlighted by Tunisian 
officials in their discourse with EU counterparts. The result was a stability-centric policy 
towards Tunisia, despite a growing disparity between Tunisian policies and the EU’s 
rhetorical commitment to ethical norm promotion.  
The dramatic events in Sidi Bouzid at the end of 2010, and the departure of Ben Ali less 
than a month later, led to a radical shift in EU policy objectives throughout 2011, also in 
line with the regional analysis. Official EU discourse states that the ‘revolution in January 
2011 radically transformed the perspectives for Tunisia's relations with the European 
Union’ (ENPi, 2012), with the latter rapidly responding by offering packages of financial 
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support, and a number of policy initiatives and institutional developments. In a series of 
high-level visits by the heads of the European Commission, EEAS and the European 
Parliament, amongst others, the EU signaled its endorsement of the political transition that 
was taking place in Tunisia, and put forward significant and tangible offers of support. 
Notwithstanding that much of the additional funding throughout 2011 continued to be 
channeled towards development and economic assistance, the substantive return of ethical 
norms was evident in the source of funding itself. Tunisia became the first beneficiary of 
the regional SPRING Programme, designed to reward deep and sustainable 
democratisation, and meaningful reforms regarding human rights and the rule of law. The 
EU also provided financial aid and technical assistance for the burgeoning electoral 
process, and showed a willingness to support and promote Tunisian civil society as a 
means of ensuring the success of the transition process.  
Although the regional pattern of eventually returning to a prioritisation of security and 
migration issues was evident in EU-Tunisia bilateral relations, some significant differences 
from the interpretation of the regional analysis emerged. The shift in EU policy persevered 
for a longer period, lasting well beyond 2011. A European Council of Foreign Relations 
(2013, p. 99) report notes that the EU continued its aim of supporting a stable democratic 
transition in 2012, with new announcements of support punctuating the year. Although 
financial support through National Indicative Programme allocations, and thematic 
instruments such as EIDHR and NSA-LA, peaked in 2011, SPRING programme allocations 
reached their highest point in 2012. Support for the practicalities of Tunisia’s political 
transition continued, principally in terms of assisting the electoral process, and the EU has 
remained committed to supporting the growth and development of Tunisian civil society 
up until the time of writing, a point that will be discussed further below. However, despite 
these particular domains, the affirmation of norms such as democracy and human rights 
waned, as the twin priorities of security and migration returned to the fore. Maja Bozovic 
(Interview #26, 28/10/2014), the Chairperson of the Council’s Mashreq/Maghreb Working 
Group, stated that the interest of member states decreased with regard to Tunisia 
following 2011, reaching a level of fatigue by 2014, which resulted in the Council going 
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back to a “business as usual” approach. As shown above, the EU has chosen to focus more 
on democratisation than human rights, considering that consolidation of the former will 
lead to the promotion of the latter. Youngs (2014, p. 115), however, argues that in the years 
following Tunisia’s revolution ‘EU cooperation with Tunisia on migration control was 
more extensive than any support for democracy’, formalised with the EU–Tunisia 
Migration Cooperation Agenda. The increasing instability in the MENA region, violent 
terrorist attacks in both Tunisia and Europe, and a generalised approach to Maghreb 
migration issues, have combined to place Tunisia, despite its progress, it the same 
securitised basket as the rest of the southern neighbourhood.  
Rhetorical self-entrapment 
The hypothesis advanced in Chapter 7 attempts to explain the brief shift in priorities 
towards ethical norm promotion in the EU’s response to the Arab Uprisings. Although the 
substantive support to promoting democracy and human rights in Tunisia was 
maintained for a longer period than the pattern that emerged from the interpretation of 
the regional analysis, there was still a significant shift from the EU’s priorities towards 
Tunisia prior to the Arab Uprisings, and also an eventual return to those priorities in 
subsequent years after 2011. In terms of rhetorical self-entrapment as an explanatory 
hypothesis to show why this shift occurred, and why it was not sustained, the bilateral 
case of Tunisia largely corroborates the regional interpretation. This position has to be 
qualified by noting that there has been less research of Tunisia as a specific media event 
than there has been of the “Arab Spring” as a regional event. As noted in the introduction, 
the dearth of detailed media analysis with regard to individual cases in the MENA region 
represents a notable limitation regarding this research. Nonetheless, Ahmed Driss (2013) 
notes that ‘political freedoms and socio-economic rights were at the heart of the revolution 
in Tunisia [and the] slogans that have dominated debate since late 2010 are related to a 
quest for freedom and dignity’. This is in keeping with the regional narrative, where the 
international media framed the events of the Arab Uprisings in terms freedom, democracy 
and the basic provision of rights. The studies that have been conducted regarding the 
international media coverage of the “Tunisian Spring”, as shown above, demonstrate that 
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the temporal dimensions of the Tunisian Uprising mirror those of the regional analysis, 
peaking in the early part of 2011, and then decreasing in the latter part of the year, as 
violent conflicts in other parts of the region took precedence. While it is evident that EU 
support for democracy and human rights in Tunisia has continued, particularly in terms 
of civil society and electoral aid, it is also clear that EU support has vastly decreased from 
that which was offered in 2011 and 2012, reflecting the absence of the earlier conditions by 
which rhetorical self-entrapment occurred.  
Universalism, Islamists and civil society 
Despite the EU’s reaffirmation of its commitment to ethical norm promotion in response to 
the “Tunisian Spring” becoming eventually subordinated to security and migration issues, 
the associated and complementary domain of civil society has continued to receive EU 
support. In this context, the EU has managed to maintain the sense of innovation 
expressed in the NRCN: 
In contrast to the scholarly critique, which the European response to the 
Arab Spring encounters in general, Tunisian civil society activists describe 
Europe as a very visible actor in their country that has substantially changed 
its policy since the beginning of the transition in January 2011. (Krüger & 
Ratka, 2014, pp. 22-23) 
Michel Michiroud (Interview #14, 28/5/2015), Programme Manager for Civil Society, 
Media and Culture at the Delegation of the European Union in Tunisia, acknowledged 
that while funding and support will not be sustained at the levels provided in 2011 and 
2012, the EU nevertheless remains committed to facilitating the emergence and growth of 
Tunisian civil society, particularly in terms of their role and responsibilities as actors of 
change and democracy. Although not directly targeting democratisation or human rights 
issues, support for Tunisia’s emerging civil society has a number of positive impacts on 
ethical norm promotion. The EU’s delegations have also been reinforced and enlarged, 
which increases the EU’s comprehension of local actors and contexts (Bisard, 2015, p. 2).  
It is difficult to say unequivocally whether the EU’s success in supporting Tunisian civil 
society following the Arab Uprisings is a result of it own increased willingness and an 
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innovative approach, or the contemporary opportunities afforded by the fall of the 
authoritarian Ben Ali regime. Prior to 2011, the regime had successfully repressed and 
manipulated Tunisian civil society organisations, controlled opposition parties and 
restricted freedom of expression and assembly. In the aftermath of the revolution, 
however, the situation changed rapidly, culminating in the repeal of laws previously 
criminalising political parties and associations. With the adoption of a new press code and 
decree laws in 2011, ‘Tunisians were allowed to demonstrate, express themselves, and 
form parties and associations to an extent unmatched since independence in 1956’ 
(Human Rights Watch, 2012). Michiroud (Interview #14, 28/5/2015) noted that the capacity 
of the EU to support Tunisian civil society and human rights defenders prior to 2011 was 
indeed significantly dependent on the governing regime, making it difficult to do more 
than maintain a discreet dialogue, particularly with those groups being actively repressed. 
However, he stated that not only has this capacity changed following the Arab Uprisings, 
but the willingness on the part of the EU to actively engage civil society actors in Tunisia 
has been advanced, following its inclusion in the policy shifts of 2011. Regardless of the 
exact correlation between capacity and disposition, it is important to note that the EU’s 
approach to engaging with Tunisian civil society did change significantly in response to 
the Arab Uprisings, and in terms of promoting ethical norms, albeit indirectly, it is one of 
the few domains to be maintained in the following years.  
There are, notwithstanding, some issues previously highlighted in the regional analysis, 
which need to be addressed with regard to EU-Tunisia bilateral relations. The first of these 
concerns the choice of civil society organisations that the EU supports, and the dynamic 
between them as a result of the EU’s historical relationship with Tunisia and its current 
values-based criteria. In a series of interviews with Tunisian civil society actors in 2014,139 
Laura-Theresa Krüger and Edmund Ratka (2014, p. 19) found that while the interviewees 
felt generally positive about the EU’s support since 2011, most showed some reservations 
																																																								
139 The research project applied a qualitative methodology, linking EU external perception literature with 
concepts of foreign policy and Europeanisation. The series of semi-structured interviews consisted of three 
question blocks: ‘(1) the actorness of Europe in Tunisia before and after the revolution of 14 January 2011, on 
(2) the quality of this actorness with regard to impact and effectiveness, and on (3) the coherence of Europe 
as a foreign policy actor’ (Krüger & Ratka, 2014, p. 17). 
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about external interference in Tunisia’s affairs, and scepticism towards the intentions of 
international actors. Although this scepticism was felt less keenly towards the EU than the 
US or the Gulf states, there was a lingering memory of Europe’s colonial heritage. Not 
only does the EU’s image suffer from its relationship with Tunisia prior to independence, 
but, according to Gianandrea Villa (Interview #11, 14/5/2014) of the Tunis Delegation’s 
Political Section, Tunisian civil society also accuses the EU of being too close to the ousted 
regime, a position that the EU finds difficult to defend against. It is clear that EU support 
to Tunisian civil society is being maintained, and counterbalancing the direction of that 
support between programmes such as PASC and initiatives such as the Jamaity Project 
will allay some concerns. It may take a prolonged period of time, however, and an evident 
consistency in approach, before some local actors regard the EU as a genuine partner in 
their transition process.  
The second issue regarding the EU’s relationship with Tunisian civil society concerns the 
role of Islamist organisations in the ongoing political transition following the Arab 
Uprisings. As Anne Wolfe (2013, p. 571) notes, ‘[i]n an environment of unprecedented 
freedom and religious rights, Tunisia still has to find its own equilibrium, weighting the 
demands of its secularists, moderate Islamists and Salafists’.140 Throughout the uprisings 
of 2011, ‘one of the most surprising aspects of the demonstrations that led to the demise of 
Arab dictators across the region was the absence or at least very low profile of Islamists at 
helm of the protests’ (Dalmasso & Cavatorta, 2013, p. 225). However, many Tunisians 
strongly associate the social and political sphere with their Islamic faith, and since the 
revolution of 2011 ‘Islamist parties and movements have reappeared to take centre stage 
in Tunisian politics and society’ (Donker, 2013, pp. 207-216). Where the entry of Islamist 
parties into the political mainstream is concerned, the EU has shown itself to be a willing 
																																																								
140 This is a common distinction in contemporary discussions of Islamism in the MENA region. Jeffrey 
Haynes (2013, p. 171), drawing on the work of Moataz Abdel Fattah (2006), conceptualises these three 
generic categories as Muslim secularists, modernist Islamists and traditionalist Islamists. He argues that one 
of the ways that the three groups can be distinguished, is in their relationship to “western-style/liberal 
democracy”: the secularists, who are also Muslims, are willing to adopt many of its characteristics, while 
being aware of cultural differences relating to Muslim societies; the modernist, or moderate, Islamists are 
typically willing to engage with democratic structures and processes, but may have an aim to Islamise 
society over time; and the traditionalist Islamists, which includes the Salafists, are wary, even censorious, of 
these structures and processes, believing that they deny God’s sovereignty over the people. 
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partner to the moderate Islamist Ennahda party during its parliamentary control of 
government between 2011 and 2014, and EEAS Head of Maghreb Division Bernard Savage 
(Interview #4, 26/11/2013) states that the EU has tried to support the changes in Tunisia 
regardless of the party in power.  
Yet, where Islamist civil society actors in Tunisia are concerned, the EU continues to face 
problems aligning its intention to facilitate bottom-up change based on listening to local 
citizens with its universal approach to the ethical norms it hopes to promote as part of this 
process. As Melanie Bride (Interview #15, 28/5/2015), Cooperation Attaché for Civil Society 
and Gender at the EU Delegation in Tunis, highlighted, the principal criterion for Tunisian 
civil society actors to receive funding and support from the EU continues to be an 
adherence to the pantheon of rights set out in the UNDHR. As Driss (2013) points out, 
there is a sharp divide in Tunisian society between those in the secularist camp, who agree 
with the universal nature of human rights, and those in the traditionalist camp, who 
strongly oppose them. According to Rosa Balfour and Richard Youngs (2015), who are 
part of the EUSpring project currently exploring the concept of democratic citizenship and 
local attitudes to EU support in the MENA region, European donors do not involve 
themselves in countryside areas where Islamist support is the highest, and the EU needs to 
focus more on ‘connecting with local dynamics to support democracy change’. For a truly 
Tunisian-led model of political transition, the success of the EU’s involvement may require 
a compromise with Islamist civil society actors who contest some aspects of European 
values.  
Political conditionality: “more for more”, or more of the same? 
One of the key features of the EU’s 2011 response to the Arab Uprisings was the emphasis 
on a differentiated approach to the MENA region, which rewarded those who made most 
progress in achieving ethically normative goals. Encapsulated as the “more for more” 
principle, the EU pledged to provide additional support to partners who demonstrated 
substantive advancement towards promoting democratic governance and rule of law, and 
the protection of human rights. Although positive and negative conditionality had been 
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part of the EU’s policy repertoire for the southern neighbourhood prior to the Arab 
Uprisings, its use of the former had been inconsistent with its rhetoric regarding the 
centrality of ethical norm promotion in the region, as was its unwillingness to utilise the 
latter to further these goals. However, as was shown in the earlier regional analysis, 
charges of inconsistency and incoherence continue to plague the EU’s position in this 
domain.  
In some ways the EU’s bilateral relationship with Tunisia shows that the “more for more” 
principle has been effectively applied and produced positive results. Tunisia has been far 
and away the most successful country of those affected by the Arab Uprisings in 
transitioning from an authoritarian regime to a democratically accountable government, 
and despite the continuation of numerous human rights violations, has advanced many 
rights and freedoms that had been repressed under the Ben Ali regime. Freedom House 
(2011, 2015) ratings show that Tunisia made dramatic improvements in civil liberties and 
political rights between 2011 and 2015, transitioning from an overall status of “not free” to 
“free” in this time. As noted above, during this period Tunisia was the first recipient of 
both the SPRING Programme and Umbrella funds, receiving the largest share in the 
southern neighbourhood of the former. According to Youngs (2014, p. 75), the ‘most 
visible manifestation of the rewards-based approach was the offer of a Privileged 
Partnership to Tunisia in 2012’ and in 2013 ‘some diplomats even talked of a status similar 
to that of European Free Trade Association states eventually being possible’. 
Even when taken on its own, however, Tunisia’s experience of “more for more” must be 
tempered by certain qualifications. Where rewards of increased trade benefits are 
concerned, talk of a free trade agreement in 2012 and 2013 remained exactly that, with 
further negotiations being launched in 2015 (European Commission, 2015e). As for the 
Privileged Partnership itself:  
Tunisian activists frequently pointed out that such advanced status was 
already ‘debased’ by virtue of having been given to still-authoritarian 
Morocco, so could not be sold as a reward for democratic revolution 
(Youngs, 2014, p. 94). 
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Tunisian democrats also complained that the ENP failed to accelerate after the country’s 
revolution, criticising the EU for still thinking in “pre-revolutionary mode”, arguing that 
tools such as an advanced status agreement were behind the pace of immediate 
challenges, despite being a useful instrument over the long term (Youngs, 2014, p. 94). 
According to the European Council on Foreign Relations (2015, p. 3), 
if the EU was serious about using diplomatic engagement and investment in 
the region to recognise political progress, Tunisia could have been expected 
to have benefited most from relations with its European neighbours. Yet it is 
not evident that it has.  
When taken in the wider context, the comparison with Morocco by Tunisian activists, 
regarding the reward of advanced status, could equally be made in terms of additional 
funding provided by thematic instruments such as the SPRING Programme. As pointed 
out in Chapter 6, Morocco received a substantial amount of SPRING funding in return for 
progress relating to political transition, as did Jordan and Lebanon. In the following 
chapter it will become clear that in Morocco’s case, the transition in no way resembles 
Tunisia’s, despite the rewards being similar. If positive conditionality, both in general 
terms and regarding that which is specifically orientated towards progressing ethical 
norms, is offered inconsistently and incoherently, then little has changed since prior to the 





















The dramatic events in Tunisia late 2010 and early 2011 led to a revolutionary zeal that 
quickly spread throughout the Maghreb, and eventually the entire MENA region. 
Although not every country in the southern neighbourhood experienced the level of 
protest that led to regime change in Tunisia, many of the southern neighbours underwent 
sustained social upheaval that forced the governing regime to respond with significant 
measures. In Morocco, large groups of protesters, inspired by the regional narrative of 
freedom and equality taking shape, demanded political and economic reforms to match 
the aspirations of ordinary Moroccan citizens. Many of these protests were met with 
violence and repression, but ultimately produced a prominent and persuasive response 
from King Mohammed VI in the form of constitutional changes. Whilst this response had 
the effect of mitigating the increasing strength and direction of the protest movement, not 
all Moroccans were convinced by the substance of the reforms, and smaller-scale protests 
continued throughout 2011. The EU, which emphasises the close nature of its relationship 
with Morocco, and its willingness to support economic and political reforms (EEAS, 
2015e), has welcomed the King’s proposed changes, and treated Morocco as a progressive 
partner in the context of its own response to the Arab Uprisings. A bilateral analysis of the 
EU-Morocco relationship during this period will provide a more nuanced assessment of 
the EU’s commitment to ethical norm promotion in the southern neighbourhood.  
As was the case in the previous chapter, the schematic structure follows the conceptual 
framework of the regional analysis. The chapter begins with an outline of EU policy 
towards Morocco prior to the Arab Uprisings, followed by a brief overview of the local 
uprising itself. The subsequent section addresses the response of EU policy-makers to the 
events in Morocco throughout 2011, followed by the ways in which these policy 
innovations developed in the succeeding years. Each of these sections will be supported 
with recourse to official EU documents, academic commentary, and interviews conducted 
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in both Brussels and Rabat during 2013 and 2014. The final section interprets the analysis 
of the EU’s relationship with Morocco in the context of the Arab Uprisings, with the four 
points of reference resulting from the regional analysis: the centrality, or otherwise, of 
ethical norm promotion; the relevance of rhetorical action; the role of civil society, in 
particular those with Islamist foundations; and the use of conditionality, in particular the 
application of the “more for more” principle. 
EU policy towards Morocco prior to 2011 
In common with Tunisia, the EU’s relationship with Morocco goes back to the early days 
of the European Community itself, with a provision for the conclusion of an agreement 
between the two also included in the 1957 Treaty of Rome protocol (Vasilyan, 2011, p. 
178). In 1963 Morocco requested that negotiations be opened towards a trade agreement, 
eventually concluded in 1969, and this evolved into an updated cooperation agreement, 
including both trade provisions and socio-economic development grants, in 1976 (EEAS, 
2015b).141 Unlike Tunisia, however, Morocco has consistently signalled its intention to 
maintain a close partnership with the EU. Speaking in the context of Morocco’s ambitions 
for its relationship with the EU following the Arab Uprisings, EEAS Head of Maghreb 
Division Bernard Savage (Interview #4, 26/11/2013) stated that this kind of positive 
signalling goes back decades, and was particularly evident during the 1980s when King 
Hassan II promoted the idea of Morocco becoming a member of the European Economic 
Community. This culminated in a formal requested for membership in 1987, an example, 
notes Bradford Dillman (2003, p. 174), that no other Arab country has followed since. 
Although Morocco’s membership was denied at the time, the relationship flourished in 
the subsequent years, with a constant strengthening of ties taking place in the period 
leading up to the Arab Uprisings.  
As shown in previous chapters, the launch of the EMP in 1995 signalled the EU’s formal 
intention and rhetorical commitment to begin putting ethical norm promotion at the 
																																																								
141 ‘Dès 1963, le Maroc a demandé l'ouverture de négociations pour conclure un accord commercial en 1969. 
Cette coopération a ensuite évolué pour aboutir à un nouvel Accord en 1976 contenant à la fois des 
dispositions commerciales et une participation financière sous forme de dons au développement socio-
économique du Royaume’ (EEAS, 2015b). 
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forefront of its relations with its partners in the southern neighbourhood. Morocco at the 
time had a mixed record in terms of political accountability and the protection of human 
rights. A report by Amnesty International (1995, pp. 214-216) of the same year highlighted 
the incarceration of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience, often following unfair 
trials and the use of torture, but also praised a royal amnesty for some prisoners and the 
commutation of the death penalty for others. An earlier Human Rights Watch (1990) 
report highlighted major human rights violations and persecution of human rights 
defenders, but also noted the formation of a Consultative Council on Human Rights which 
included organisations independent to the government; yet another report stated that 
‘[d]espite significant improvements in its human rights record, Morocco's transition to a 
democratic state complying with international human rights standards was far from 
complete’ (Human Rights Watch, 1996).  
The process of introducing minimal reforms that essentially maintain the status quo has 
been a familiar approach by the Moroccan monarchy and its inner circle, in response to 
both internal and external pressures. Dillman (2003, p. 176) notes that:  
Throughout the 1990s, in response to both the EU and domestic opposition, 
King Hassan II introduced progressive political reforms by creating a 
human rights council and amending the Constitution, but these changes can 
be seen as “pre-emptive strategies” designed to co-opt opposition parties 
and appear to be in the forefront of the reform process. 
Indeed, the use of top-down reforms in order to appear progressive, while at the same 
time maintaining a hold on centralised power, was the central dynamic in the relationship 
between the Moroccan regime and the EU throughout the EMP and its ENP permutations. 
With the ascension to the throne of King Mohammed VI in 1999, human rights progress 
occurred via a 2004 family code that granted women greater marriage and child custody 
rights, and an Equity and Reconciliation Commission that investigated human rights 
abuses since independence; nonetheless, those responsible for abuses were not prosecuted, 
arbitrary arrest and torture still took place, and freedom of expression continued to be 
limited, particularly where criticism of the monarchy was concerned (Dennison, Popescu, 
& Torreblanca, 2011, p. 3). Against this backdrop the EU and Morocco signed an 
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Association Agreement in 1996, entering into force in 2000, which led to large increases in 
European aid (EEAS, 2015b).142 The preamble of the Association Agreement emphasised 
the importance of the United Nations Charter’s principles, and an official description of 
the agreement stated that:  
The respect for human rights and democratic principles guides the internal 
and international policy of both Morocco and the Community and 
constitutes an essential and positive element of the Agreement (EEAS, 
2015a). 
Yet despite this joint commitment to ethical norms, neither side in the partnership showed 
a willingness to prioritise them above other concerns.  
Such was the lack of success in EU efforts to instigate Moroccan reform in the years 
following the inauguration of the EMP, despite Morocco being one of the biggest 
recipients of aid in the southern Mediterranean during this period, Dillman (2003, pp. 190-
193) argues that it was unclear whether the EU actually wanted to promote democracy, in 
light of their interest in stability and fear of Islamism. Where the latter is concerned, the 
situation in Morocco follows the regional pattern, in that the securitisation of EU policy in 
the decade prior to the Arab Uprisings led to a distrust and exclusion of Arab Islamists. 
Kristina Kausch (2008, p. 3) argues that:  
Against the background of regional conflict, transnational terrorist 
networks, trafficking of human beings and organised crime, Europeans 
value Morocco’s stabilising influence in the region, and are reluctant to risk 
this for the sake of ‘optimising’ Moroccan democratic standards.  
As a result, Moroccan Islamist NGOs and civil society organisations were habitually 
prevented from accessing European aid to civil society and ethical norm promotion 
initiatives by both the EU and the Moroccan authorities, as a detailed analysis by Federichi 
Bicchi (2006, pp. 198-200) has shown.143 Both a domestic interest in repressing the Islamists 
																																																								
142 ‘Suite à la conférence de Barcelone de novembre 1995, le partenariat UE-Maroc s'est matérialisé par la 
signature d'un accord d'association signé dès 1996 et entré en vigueur en 2000. Ce nouvel agenda a aussi 
entrainé de fortes augmentations de l’aide européenne au Maroc’ (EEAS, 2015b). 
143 Francesco Cavatorta (2009) goes further in his critique of EU policy during this period, arguing that in its 
‘preference for securitization over normative change’ the EU not only excluded Islamists from its stated 
policy of building democracy through civil society activism, a failure which paradoxically contributed to an 
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as a social and political force, and an external interest in containing perceived security 
threats that could potentially be exported to Europe, converged. EU concerns regarding 
terrorism and migration led to a more conciliatory and less critical line towards Morocco, 
a position which was reinforced and exploited by the Moroccan regime to neuter criticism 
concerning its lack of democracy and human rights (Willis, 2012, p. 330).  
The perceived links between Islamic terrorism and migration served to intensify an issue 
that has always been at the heart of EU-Morocco relations. The geographical proximity of 
Morocco to Europe has resulted in large numbers of regular and irregular migration 
crossing the short distance across the Strait of Gibraltar to Spain, and in ‘a post-9/11 
securitization context, high fences have been constructed around both territories [which] 
have heightened tensions between Morocco and the EU’ (Hennebry, Kopinak, Miras, 
Requena, & Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2014, p. 67). The Moroccan government has demonstrated 
a keen willingness to keep the legal migration routes open and accessible, not least 
because of the importance to the Moroccan economy of inward remittance flows,144 and 
has therefore cooperated with the EU in trying to prevent inflows of illegal migration from 
both Morocco and other parts of Africa (Dennison et al., 2011, p. 4). In 2002-2004, the 
European Commission allocated 40 million euros to the Moroccan government for 
migration management and border control (Kausch, 2008, p. 3), and in 2003, under 
increasing pressure from the EU, Morocco passed law 02-03 to provide a framework for 
managing irregular emigration and immigration, a framework which critics claim largely 
ignores migrants’ rights (Hennebry et al., 2014, p. 68; Sadiqi, 2004). The extent to which 
Morocco has responded to EU pressure by heightening security and policing its borders, 
often at the expense of foreign nationals’ rights, while at the same time attempting to 
protect the rights and opportunities for Moroccans themselves, has resulted in tensions 
with the EU and a highly differential system regarding treatment and protection for 
Moroccans and non-Moroccans (Hennebry et al., 2014, p. 69). Both of these aspects relating 
																																																																																																																																																																																								
increase in Moroccan authoritarianism, but also indirectly prevented strategic cooperation between Islamists 
and secularists that could lead to democratic reform.  
144 World Bank (2011, pp. 3,13) figures for 2010 show that Morocco received 6.4 billion US dollars in 
remittances, and had 3 million emigrants.  
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to migration are a feature of the relationship between the EU and Morocco in the period 
following the Arab Uprisings.  
In terms of ethical norm promotion, the EU funded a number of small-scale initiatives to 
support democracy and human rights prior to 2011, mainly through National Indicative 
programming and EIDHR (Bicchi & Martin, 2006, pp. 198-200; Kausch, 2008, pp. 9-10). In 
the decade leading up to the Arab Uprisings, ‘[h]uman rights violations, legal and 
practical restrictions to freedom of association and expression, and the use of 
disproportionate force by the Moroccan authorities [had] repeatedly been raised in EU 
official documents’ (Kausch, 2008, p. 4), and in 1992 Morocco had been deeply insulted by 
a European Parliament vote ‘to suspend a financial protocol in response to the growing 
international criticism of its human rights record during the early 1990s’ (Willis, 2012, p. 
313). For its part, Morocco was the first ENP partner to establish a sub-committee on 
human rights, democratisation and governance as part of the EU-Moroccan Association 
Council (Kausch, 2008, p. 8),145 and an academic researcher of the Maghreb region for 
many years (Interview #20, 24/6/2014) stated that the King’s reformation of family law and 
introduction of a human rights commission in 2004 showed a commitment to progressive 
values.  
However, despite regular critiques of human rights abuses and the superficial nature of 
Morocco’s democratic reform,146 the EU rewarded Morocco by granting it advanced status 
in 2008. According to Kausch (2010b, pp. 1-2), the benefits for Morocco entailed ‘being 
singled out as the EU’s closest partner in the Mediterranean, and boosting the Moroccan 
economy; and for the EU, important factors included ‘Morocco’s symbolic choice for 
Europe, opening up Morocco’s market for EU exports, and Morocco’s cooperation on key 
European interests such as energy, migration, organised crime and counter-terrorism’. 
																																																								
145 According to some European diplomats, these sub-committee meetings offer an appropriately discreet 
environment to openly discuss reforms associated with ethical norm promotion; others, however, see the 
assignment of such issues to “closed committees” as evidence of the EU’s lack of interest in giving greater 
priority to in-depth democratisation in Morocco (Kausch, 2008, p. 8).  
146 Morocco’s ENP Action Plan, for example, contained selective reforms that indirectly followed the 
Moroccan elite’s course of modernisation, without the systemic-level reforms required for a representative 
democracy with a balance of power and rule of law (Kausch, 2008, p. 1). 
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Furthermore, in 2007 Morocco became the first southern partner to ‘receive additional 
allocations from the “Governance Facility”, an additional fund rewarding countries that 
have made most progress in the field of democracy and human rights’ (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2006; Kausch, 2008, p. 7), making Morocco prior to the Arab 
Uprisings ‘one of the few countries in the region that [had] repeatedly benefited from the 
positive conditionality introduced with the ENP’ (Van Hu ̈llen, 2011, p. 122).  
Thus, as was the case region wide, Morocco’s position regarding democratic reform and 
the protection of human rights came under no significant pressure from the EU prior to 
the Arab Uprisings, with, on the contrary, rewards offered regardless of progress. Richard 
Whitman and Ana Juncos (2009, p. 208) argue that the focus of EU-Morocco bilateral 
relations during this period were ‘trade, investment and security co-operation, primarily 
in areas of migration and anti-terrorism, while issues of democratization, human rights or 
participation of civil society feature little on the agenda’. Dillman (2003, p. 175) 
characterises Morocco as a “reluctant democratiser”, taking significant steps to liberalise 
its politics, but without the key institutional and electoral changes required for a full 
democratic transition. Despite little advancement of the EMP’s political objectives, 
including democracy and respect for human rights (Willis, 2012, p. 314), the EU continued 
to adhere to its rhetorical position regarding the centrality of ethical norm promotion.  
Furthermore, in the case of Morocco, the EU consistently highlighted the positive aspects 
of incremental changes and sporadic reform. Although numerous observers raised 
suspicions about electoral engineering during the 2007 Moroccan elections, ‘European 
reactions to the elections were highly positive [and the] EU praised Morocco for the 
election’s transparency’ (Kausch & Youngs, 2009, p. 970). Regarding the principles of the 
above-mentioned Governance Facility, the European Commission (2006, p. 4) noted that it 
was ‘essential to concentrate on the achievements of the best performers’ in order to 
convince reluctant partners elsewhere in the neighbourhood of the positives associated 
with ENP Action Plans. Kausch (2008, p. 7) observes in an earlier draft of this policy 
document, an allusion to Morocco being a good example of positive “signaling effect”, 
whereby its rewards-based allocations were well advertised in the media and presented 
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by the Moroccan government as justification of its continued reform efforts. The 
inclination of the EU to highlight Morocco as a success story of ENP policy, regardless of 
progress in ethical norm promotion, will be seen to be a feature of its response to the Arab 
Uprisings later in this bilateral analysis.  
The “Moroccan Spring” 
Albeit not on the scale of the protests that shook countries such as Tunisia and Egypt, 
Morocco experienced significant social upheaval as part of the Arab Uprisings. 
Encouraged by events taking place in neighbouring North African countries, early 2011 
saw unprecedented public protests in Morocco (Haynes, 2013, p. 183). Morocco, although 
appearing more stable and advanced than its neighbours, proved to be vulnerable to the 
four factors widely accepted as triggers for the revolutionary fervour that swept through 
the MENA region: ‘unequal economic development; demography; a lack of political 
freedom; and corruption’ (Dennison et al., 2011, p. 2). As noted above, Moroccans had 
become accustomed to top-down incremental changes of the political sphere, led by the 
King and his inner circle. In stark contrast to past processes of change, however, the Arab 
Uprisings vitalised Moroccans to demand reform through widespread public protest, and 
led by the 20 February movement147 – named after the date of the first protests – 
demanded overall political change (Maggi, 2013, pp. 22, 25). Although the mainly young 
protesters did not challenge the legitimacy or institutional position of the monarchy itself, 
their demands included enhanced political freedoms and improved economic 
opportunities (Haynes, 2013, p. 182), in keeping with the ideals of protesters across the 
region. According to Amnesty International (2012a, pp. 242-243; 2012b, pp. 42-43), many 
Moroccans took part in protests throughout 2011, which included demonstrations and 
self-immolations, some of which were met with unwarranted levels of force by the 
security services, arbitrary arrests, torture and ill-treatment of detainees, and the 
imprisonment of activists on charges of threatening Morocco’s “internal security”.  
																																																								
147 The 20 February movement was ‘made up of student activists, the more radical parts of the left, and the 
non-parliamentary Islamist movement Jama’at al-Adl wal-Ihsan [and although they came] from diverse 
parts of the political spectrum, the protesters [were] united around the slogans of democracy, dignity and 
justice for the Moroccan people ‘(Dennison et al., 2011, p. 6). 
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Despite localised instances of excessive force and institutional abuses by Moroccan 
security forces, the nation-wide protests engendered an urgent and, seemingly, 
substantive response from king:  
[T]he Moroccan monarch, King Mohammed VI, acted swiftly at the onset of 
popular unrest. As soon as he realized that the protests could jeopardize his 
reign, he sought to take the momentum away from protesters by placing 
himself at the forefront of political reform. On March 9, 2011, the king 
acknowledged the legitimacy and validity of the opposition’s demands, and 
formed a committee to revise the constitution. (Barari, 2015, p. 106) 
The committee, although falling short of its stated aim to move Morocco in the direction of 
a constitutional monarchy, proposed a number of amendments which were approved by 
an overwhelming majority in a subsequent referendum, and paved the way for 
parliamentary elections in November 2011 (Haseeb, 2012, p. 192). Baudouin Dupret 
(Interview #17, 10/6/2014), Director of the Jacques Berque Centre in Rabat, stated that the 
regime cleverly provided a political answer in response to the protesters’ demands, 
without addressing the many questions they raised concerning social equality, and that 
this succeeded in diffusing the protests and stopping the country falling into any 
revolutionary process. Furthermore, by acting quickly and taking charge of the reform 
process, the king was able to adopt the regime’s preferred strategy of top-down, carefully 
managed political change, avoiding any substantial shift in power and influence. The main 
oppositional group in Morocco, the Islamist Justice and Development Party, supported the 
King’s top-down political reforms and gained the most votes in the 25 November 
elections, becoming the strongest force in the new parliament and, based on the new 
constitution, appointing its own secretary general Abdelillah Benkirane as prime minister 
(Fritzsche & Lu ̈bben, 2013, p. 144). Despite this, King Mohammed VI remained Morocco’s 
commander of the armed forces, chairperson of the Council of Ministers and highest 
religious authority (Amnesty International, 2012a, p. 242). Furthermore, few of the 
constitutional amendments had been given legal status at the time of writing, five years 
after their proposal.  
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EU policy in response to the Morocco Uprising 
By the time the Moroccan protest movement mobilised in February 2011, inspired by the 
“Arab Spring” narrative of democracy and freedom sweeping the southern 
neighbourhood, the EU had abandoned its initial hesitancy and scepticism towards the 
unfolding events in Tunisia and Egypt, and was demonstrating a noticeable willingness to 
engage with protesters’ demands across the MENA region. What was distinct about the 
EU’s reaction to developments in Morocco, however, is the lengths to which the EU went 
to accentuate King Mohammed VI’s proposed reforms as a satisfactory and sufficient 
response to those demands. In March, High Representative Catherine Ashton and 
Commissioner Stefan Füle (2011) enthusiastically welcomed the constitutional reforms as 
‘a commitment to further democratization’, ‘a qualitative leap in the process of reforms 
already initiated by Morocco’ and ‘in line with the ambitions of the Advanced Status’. 
Richard Youngs (2014, p. 98) argues that there was no sympathy shown by Europeans for 
the Moroccan protest movements when it became apparent that the new constitution 
actually reinforced the power of the king, and that February 20 leaders ‘lamented bitterly 
in private that they received little European support after the repression and deaths they 
suffered at the hands of the regime’. EU officials also greeted results of the referendum on 
the proposed reforms, which recorded an unlikely 98.5 per cent of Moroccans in favour 
(Behr, 2012b, p. 79). The authenticity of this figure is offset by the continuance of protests 
throughout 2011, a factor seemingly missed by Europe, 
even though it was clear by the autumn that the monarchy intended to 
retain wide executive powers [...] the EU in general welcomed the 
constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections, and did not pay too 
much attention to the ongoing protests (European Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2012, p. 103). 
An official with the Political Affairs, Press, Culture and Information section at the EU 
Delegation in Rabat (Interview #18, 20/6/2014), who requested not to be identified, stated 
that the EU responded to the constitutional reforms, which allowed the regime to promote 
change while also controlling it, as if they were more significant than they were. Thus, the 
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EU was able to appear consistent with both the renewed emphasis on ethical norm 
promotion in response to the Arab Uprisings, and its support of the Moroccan regime.  
Unlike Tunisia, Morocco’s ENPI allocations were not revised and increased in 2011, and 
no task force was initiated to bolster international donor spending (Behr, 2012a, p. 20). 
Nevertheless, Morocco was still one of the highest recipients of ENPI funding that year, in 
both the southern and eastern neighbourhoods, with only Tunisia and the occupied 
Palestinian territories receiving more generous aid allocations (European Commission and 
the HR, 2011a, p. 35; Youngs, 2014, p. 93).148 Furthermore, the indicative budget for 2011-
2013 represented a 20 per cent increase from that of 2007-2010 (European Commission, 
2011g), and in response to the Arab Uprisings, the EU increased planned funding to the 
governance and human rights sector from 4.3 per cent in the 2007-2010 period, of which a 
meagre 1.1 per cent was actually spent, to a more ambitious 15 per cent for the 2011-2013 
period (European Commission and the HR, 2014a, p. 64). Morocco was also included in 
the SPRING Programme funding for 2011-2012, receiving 80 million euros ‘[i]n accordance 
with the “more for more” principle, allocations [having] been determined based on 
partner countries’ commitment and progress towards democracy and human rights’ 
(European Commission, 2013d, p. 1). In addition to the SPRING Programme funding, a 
new four million euro programme was launched by the Commission in Morocco and 
Tunisia, targetting judicial reform, corruption and human rights, and the ‘European 
Parliament beefed up its exchanges with Moroccan parliamentarians to focus more 
specifically on concrete implementation of reform promises under the advanced status 
agreement’ (Youngs, 2014, p. 71). 
Throughout 2011, there was no doubt that the EU considered Morocco to be in the same 
class of revolutionary transition as countries such as Tunisia and Egypt. As well as being 
included in the above funding initiatives as a response to the Arab Uprisings, Morocco 
was also ‘offered DCFTA negotiations, in reward for reforms and as an incentive for fuller, 
genuine democratization’ (Youngs, 2014, p. 71), and was given more generous access for 
																																																								
148 In 2011 the EU committed 166.6 million euros to Morocco, up from 158.9 million in 2010 and 145 million in 
2008, although less than the amount of two years prior (European Commission and the HR, 2014a, p. 41). 
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its agricultural goods and the opportunity to export at preferential tariffs (Youngs, 2014, p. 
78). Furthermore, European leaders granted Morocco access to funding from the Deauville 
Partnership (Behr, 2012b, p. 79), which as noted in Chapter 5, was an EU-led initiative 
within the G8 to further support social and political reforms as a result of the Arab 
Uprising transitions. EIDHR funding, which had amounted to approximately one million 
euros annually over the previous five years, was raised to 1.2 million euros in the 2011 
Country-Based Support Scheme (Debnárová, R ̌iháčková, Colombo, & March, 2012, p. 36; 
Khakee, 2010, p. 3). The new Civil Society Facility, another direct response by the EU to 
the Arab Uprisings, allocated 1.4 million euros to Morocco in 2011, and the thematic 
instrument for Non-state Actors and Local Authorities provided a further 750 thousand 
euros (European Commission and the HR, 2014a, p. 65). On the whole, there was a 
marginal increase in all areas of pre-existing bilateral support for Morocco, financial and 
commercial rewards in recognition of democratic reforms, and additional funding through 
new initiatives associated with the EU’s response to the Arab Uprisings. The EU, both 
rhetorically and substantively, underscored Morocco’s credibility as an “Arab Spring” 
reformer, and supported the circumscribed reform process set out by King Mohammed VI.   
EU policy towards Morocco post-2011 
As was the case with the comparable Tunisian figures, the thematic instruments cited in 
the previous section dropped or remained constant in the following two years after 2011: 
the EIDHR figure dropped to 1 million euros for 2012 and returned to 1.2 million euros for 
2013; the Civil Society Figure dropped to 200 thousand euros for both 2012 and 2013; and 
the NSA-LA remained constant at 750 thousand euros for 2012 and dropped to nothing for 
2013 (European Commission and the HR, 2014a, p. 65). In terms of ENP bilateral 
assistance, the EU allocation for Morocco rose again in 2012, to 207 million euros, and 
again in 2013, to 334 million euros, marking the first time that Morocco overtook the 
occupied Palestinian territories to become the paramount recipient of bilateral funding 
(European Commission and the HR, 2014a, p. 41). This trend continued beyond the end of 
the 2007-2013 funding cycle, with an indicative allocation for the 2014-2020 period of 1.323 
billion euros to 1.617 billion euros (EEAS, 2014c, p. 2), making Morocco, at the time of 
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writing, the largest recipient of EU funding within the framework of the ENP (European 
Commission, 2015g). In terms of bilateral assistance priorities, governance and human 
rights increased from 4.3 per cent for the 2007-2010 period to 15 per cent for the 2011-2013 
period (European Commission, 2014c, p. 28), and again for the projected 2014-2017 period, 
to an ambitious 25 per cent for support to democratic governance, rule of law and mobility 
(European Commission, 2014a).  
As was the case with Tunisia, however, an indication of priorities is an insufficient 
barometer when assessing the EU’s commitment to ethical norm promotion following the 
Arab Uprisings. While it is clear that actual spending has increased, as has an official 
commitment to democratic reform, there is no evidence to suggest that either the EU or 
Morocco have significantly changed their approach following 2011. The EU’s own 
statistical annexes to the implementation of the ENP show that between 2011 and 2014 
Morocco’s state of democracy and levels of corruption, as measured by the Transparency 
International Corruption Perception Index and the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 
Democracy index, barely changed, and that its rating and status concerning human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, as measured by Freedom House, had not changed at all 
(European Commission and the HR, 2011a, pp. 7-9; 2015, pp. 9-11). A recent report from 
the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (2015) shows that the constitutional 
reforms proposed in 2011 have still not materialised, and a contemporary Amnesty 
International (2015, p. 255) assessment of Morocco notes that: 
The authorities continued to restrict rights to freedom of expression, 
association and assembly. They curtailed dissent, prosecuting journalists 
and imprisoning activists, restricted human rights groups and other 
associations, and forcibly dispersed peaceful and other protests. Torture and 
other ill treatment in detention persisted due to inadequate safeguards and 
accountability.  
Against this backdrop the EU continues to support a number of projects promoting ethical 
norms, and the EIDHR budget for Morocco actually increased in 2015 to 1.9 million euros 
(European Commission, 2015g). Notwithstanding, democracy and human rights projects 
are still channeled through the Moroccan regime’s own institutional system (Council of 
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the European Union, 2013, p. 57), and as Leila Mouhib (2014, pp. 362-363) shows, initial 
decisions regarding the choice of projects are themselves heavily influenced by an 
acceptance of the Moroccan regime’s vision for reform. Furthermore, based on the latest 
figures for bilateral sectorial spending in 2014 and 2015 (European Commission, 2015g), 
the EU seems as unlikely to meet its governance priority target for the current funding 
cycle as it had for the previous two.149   
As noted earlier in the chapter, the geographical proximity of Morocco to the EU has 
meant that security and migration issues have always been a factor in the bilateral 
relationship. Although much of the contemporary focus on migration is to the east, where 
the Syrian conflict continues to be a source of staggering amounts of refugees fleeing the 
violence there, ensuring Morocco continues to be a reliable partner in the EU’s 
increasingly securitised approach to the MENA region remains a priority for EU policy-
makers. From the Moroccan side of the partnership, there is a keen awareness of EU 
priorities in this respect, reflected in their own approach to reforms: 
In Morocco, progress in the implementation of commitments enshrined in 
the constitutional reform of 2011 remained slow, although the reforms of the 
migration policy and of military justice were positive steps (European 
Commission, 2014d). 
Furthermore, Moroccan officials regularly attempt to manipulate European fears 
regarding security and migration. Youngs (2014, p. 116) notes that during a recent forum 
‘Morocco played on European fears heavily, with a constant retort of: if you press us to 
reform, the migration floodgates will open’. A survey by Philippe Fargues and Christine 
Fandrich (2012) for the Migration Policy Centre also shows a tendency by senior Moroccan 
officials to link their interests to the threat of unmitigated migration crossing the Strait of 
Gibraltar. 
The promised Mobility Partnership, that accompanied the shift in policy throughout 2011, 
matched the inadequacies of the Tunisian experience from a Moroccan point of view, 
																																																								
149 For the 2007-2010 period, the EU committed 1.1 per cent of its programmed target of 4.3 per cent, and for 
the 2011-2013 period, the EU committed 6.4 per cent of its programmed target of 15 per cent (European 
Commission, 2014c, p. 28). 
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being much more weighted to the EU’s security interests than supportive of Moroccan 
citizen’s mobility. The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (2014a, 2014b) notes 
‘that strategies to reinforce and implement instruments to combat irregular migration 
dominate the spirit of the proposal’ and that some of the measures pose substantial risks 
to the lives and safety of the migrants it is supposed to help protect. Official EU discourse 
highlights the joint nature of both the challenges and approaches to migration between 
Morocco and Europe (European Commission, 2013c), ignoring the fact that the costs and 
benefits are both heavily weighted in the EU’s favour. The EU currently supports Morocco 
with 20 million euros towards migration-related issues, making it the biggest recipient in 
the southern neighbourhood for this domain behind Libya and Syria (European 
Commission, 2015f), both of which are currently in the midst of civil wars. In terms of EU 
priorities regarding its bilateral relationship with Morocco, most aspects of the EU’s 
reinvigoration and commitment to ethical norm promotion in response to the Arab 
Uprisings, has long since been sidelined to its traditional approach concerning security 
and migration issues.  
Having said that, in Morocco, as in Tunisia, the EU signaled its intention to increasingly 
support civil society actors in 2011, as part of reaffirming its commitment to ethical norm 
promotion, and this continues to represent a positive development. Eneko Landaburu 
(2013), previously head of the European Commission’s External Relations Directorate and 
EU Ambassador to Morocco between 2009 and 2013, stated that ‘the biggest novelty is the 
help which the EU now provides to the civil sector in Morroco, reflecting a re-orientation 
of the EU's aid policies after the Arab Spring’. Fatiha Hassouni (Interview #19, 20/6/2014), 
Civil Society Sector Programme Officer at the EU delegation in Rabat, noted that the EU’s 
willingness to work with Moroccan civil society had begun in 2004, in tandem with King 
Mohammed VI’s limited political reforms of that year, but that the protests of 2011 
accelerated this process. Although the allocation of 1.4 million euros by the Civil Society 
Facility, for the implementation of new programmes in Morocco for the period 2013-2015 
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(EEAS, 2013a, p. 2),150 is the same as that which was allocated in 2011 alone, it is still a 
significant commitment to this domain. The stated priorities for the 2014-2017 bilateral 
funding include an aspirational 20 per cent towards complementary support for capacity 
development and civil society (EEAS, 2014c, p. 2), although, as shown above, the actual 
figures for committed funds do not always reflect that which is programmed at the 
beginning of a funding period. According to the Council of the European Union (2015b, p. 
3), the EU wishes to include civil society actors in the process of consolidating the rule of 
law and democracy, and proposes the establishment of a tripartite dialogue, via the 
Association Council sub-committees, between the authorities, civil society actors and EU 
representatives. However, it is precisely this approach, which demonstrates a consistent 
modus operandi of channelling EU support through regime-controlled institutions, which 
impedes the EU in achieving the shift in policy signalled in response to the Arab 
Uprisings, a point that will be taken up below in the interpretation of the bilateral analysis.  
In the years following the Arab Uprisings of 2011, the bilateral relationship between the 
EU and Morocco has been strengthened, with Morocco being held up by EU policy-
makers as a genuine reformer in the southern neighbourhood. Despite doubts as to the 
real power conceded to the new parliament by King Mohammed VI (Burke, 2012, p. 2), 
and little evidence of real political reform taking place in Morocco (European Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2013, p. 102), negotiations took place to conclude the Mobility 
Partnership and a new ENP Action Plan on the basis of Advanced Status in 2013, as did 
continuing negotiations towards increasing trade liberalisation and a future DCFTA 
agreement (European Commission, 2013b). SPRING Programme funding decreased from 
80 million euros in 2011-2012 to 48 million in 2013, but still remained second only to 
Tunisia (European Commission, 2014c, p. 82), and as noted above, Morocco became the 
largest recipient of ENP funding in the MENA region. Štefan Füle (ENPi, 2014b), in one of 
his last official visits as Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood 
Policy, described the EU-Morocco relationship as a "success story" in the southern 
																																																								
150 ‘Par ailleurs, la nouvelle Facilité Société Civile permettra de contribuer au renforcement des capacités de 
la société civile (y compris de plaidoyer et monitoring des politiques publiques) avec la mise en œuvre d'un 
nouveau programme qui couvre la période 2013- 2015 avec un budget global de 1.4 millions EUR’ (EEAS, 
2013a, p. 2). 
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neighbourhood, and reaffirmed the strategic importance of the EU-Morocco partnership, 
based on mutual interests and concerns. In the interpretation of analysis section below, on 
the subject of conditionality, the EU’s relationship with Morocco will be addressed in the 
context of the “more for more” principle, in light of the disparity between its lack of 
progress promoting ethical norms and the high levels of bilateral support and rewards it 
receives.  
Interpretation of bilateral analysis 
As was the case in the previous chapter on Tunisia, the following four points to emerge 
from the regional analysis will be addressed below in the context of EU-Morocco bilateral 
relations: 
• That EU-MENA relations became increasingly securitised leading up 
to 2011, followed by a recommitment to ethical norm promotion in 
response to the Arab Uprisings, then a return to self-serving interests 
being the primary motivator in terms of southern neighbourhood 
policy-making; 
• That the spike in ethical norm promotion throughout 2011 can be 
explained by an adaption of Schimmelfennig’s theory of rhetorical 
action, where a rhetorical commitment to a standard of legitimacy 
leads to rhetorical self-entrapment;  
• That an innovative and sustained approach to MENA civil society 
developed as part of the 2011 policy shift, although related issues 
remain concerning universalism and the role of Islamists;  
• That a reaffirmation of conditionality associated with ethical norm 
promotion has suffered from charges of inconsistency and 
incoherence. 
EU policy objectives towards Morocco  
With regard to the evolution of EU priories in its bilateral relationship with Morocco, the 
period before the Arab Uprisings also mirrors that of the regional analysis. Although 
Morocco demonstrated more of a willingness than Tunisia to maintain a close partnership 
with the EU, and instigated more reforms targeted at promoting human rights and 
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democracy, neither partner committed substantively to the rhetorical shift regarding the 
importance of ethical norms at the launch of the EMP in 1995. King Hassan II and King 
Mohammed VI both instigated top-down reform programmes and promulgated their 
progressive credentials, while at the same time maintaining the status quo in terms of 
centralised power, and allowing the continuance of numerous human rights abuses. The 
EU, for its part, placed no significant pressure on Morocco regarding democratic reform 
and the protection of human rights, instead rewarding it with additional funds from the 
Governance Facility and granting Morocco advanced status in 2008. Like Tunisia, the 
increasing securitisation of Euro-Mediterranean relations led to a convergence of self-
serving interests between the EU and Morocco, particularly regarding the perceived threat 
from Islamists, a factor accentuated by the latter’s proximity to Europe in terms of 
migration. EU concerns about links between terrorism and migration were reinforced and 
exploited by the Moroccan regime, resulting in a less critical and more stability-centric 
policy towards Morocco, despite a lack of progress concerning ethical norms. Both the EU 
and the Moroccan government consistently highlighted the positive aspects of incremental 
changes and sporadic reform, while at the same time prioritising trade, security and 
migration leading up to 2011.  
The EU’s willingness to accentuate the Moroccan regime’s restricted social and political 
reforms was also a significant feature of its response to the localised events of the Arab 
Uprisings. Albeit not on the scale of the Tunisian revolution, Morocco experienced 
widespread and unprecedented protests, compelling the regime to introduce limited 
constitutional reforms. The Moroccan government and the EU were able to portray these 
reforms as an adequate response to the protesters’ demands, allowing the former to 
maintain stability, and the latter to include Morocco as a beneficiary of its shift in policy 
throughout 2011, rewarding those partners most in line with a renewed focus on ethical 
norm promotion. Although to a lesser degree than the support offered to Tunisia 
immediately following the Arab Uprisings, Morocco did experience an increase in funding 
in 2011, and benefited from policy initiatives and institutional developments associated 
with the EU’s reaffirmed priorities. Morocco was the largest recipient of SPRING funding 
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behind Tunisia, had its ENP allocation increased, and was one of the first recipients of the 
new Civil Society Facility. Mouhib (2014, p. 362) states that EIDHR projects in Morocco, 
according to her own interviews and the organisation’s calls for proposals, revised its 
priorities in 2011 to be more orientated towards fundamental freedoms and civil society,151 
and Morocco’s EIDHR funding was also increased.  
Where the EU’s bilateral relationship with Morocco differs from that of Tunisia, however, 
is that in the years following the 2011 Arab Uprisings general funding and support 
continued to rise. Whereas both relationships felt the impact of the EU’s return to 
“business as usual” in the southern neighbourhood, prioritising issues such as security 
and migration, Morocco received increasing levels of support with less lingering emphasis 
on ethical norm promotion, in line with the regional analysis. Baudouin Dupret (Interview 
#17, 10/6/2014), Director of Jacques Berque Centre in Rabat, argues that Morocco 
represented a “port of stability” in the eyes of EU policy-makers after the Arab Uprisings, 
and that the EU was careful not to disrupt the governing regime, which was favourable to 
the West and promoted a brand of “tolerant Islamism”. Furthermore, according to Dupret, 
Morocco was considered emblematic of the slow institutional changes that the EU has 
always favoured, and in the interest of continued stability, it was willing to accept the 
Moroccan regime’s incremental reforms, which changed very little for ordinary Moroccan 
citizens. With regard to the EU’s increased and reinforced cooperation since 2011, despite 
progress towards democracy which has been superficial, to say the least, Silvia Colombo 
and Benedetta Voltolini (2014, p. 48) ask: 
[H]ow can this situation of “business as usual” be explained, despite the 
declaratory changes underwent by the EU’s policies towards the 
Mediterranean region as a result of the Arab Uprisings? 
The proposed hypothesis of rhetorical self-entrapment may go some way towards 
answering this question.  
																																																								
151 Although, as noted above, eventual choice of projects continued to be influenced by an institutional 




In some ways the case of Morocco says very little about the rhetorical self-entrapment 
hypothesis, neither corroborating nor repudiating it. As shown above, the EU’s regional 
shift in policy towards ethical norm promotion in 2011 was also evident in its bilateral 
relationship with Morocco, as was a return to “business as usual” in subsequent years, 
although both dynamics to a less pronounced degree. Despite the many insights and 
observations on offer when researching the EU’s relationship with Morocco, a significant 
limitation is that there are no specific studies, as yet, regarding the international media 
coverage of Morocco’s demonstrations and protests, despite their intensity and resulting 
constitutional reforms, nor is there an analysis of how these events were framed in terms 
of the dominant regional narrative. However, one particularly interesting feature emerges 
from the bilateral analysis with regard to this area, namely the contribution of EU rhetoric 
in the process of aligning the situation in Morocco with wider regional events. Not only 
did the EU provide a blanket endorsement to the partial reform efforts undertaken by the 
Moroccan monarchy (Behr, 2012b, p. 86), but it did so in a way that aligned the rather 
superficial reforms with the “Arab Spring” narrative of freedom and democracy. In an 
effort to maintain stability in its relationship with a key partner in the region, the EU 
strategically framed both the events in Morocco and its own response to them, in a way 
that enabled it to show that it was restoring credibility. Although only some of the 
conditions were present in Morocco with regard to the EU’s rhetorical self-entrapment, the 
EU utilised the Moroccan situation to rhetorically show that it was now meeting its 
standard of legitimacy, without disrupting its “stability partnership” with the Moroccan 
regime. Finally, as the international media coverage shifted away from the “Arab Spring” 
narrative, there was no need to continue framing events in this way, or measure up to its 
own standard of legitimacy in the eyes of critical interlocutors, and therefore the EU-
Morocco relationship returned to a prioritisaton of mutually-reinforced interests.  
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Universalism, Islamists and civil society 
Prior to 2011, the EU had already signalled its intention, in its 2002-2007 Strategy Paper, to 
promote human rights and democracy by strengthening civil society in authoritarian 
regimes and monarchies across the MENA region, and Cavatorta (2009, p. 144) links this 
with ‘the emergence of movements dedicated to reforming radically all aspects of 
Moroccan politics and society’. Although, as will be shown below, it is precisely these 
movements that have least benefited from EU funding, it is important to note that unlike 
Tunisia, the EU had well-established contacts with Moroccan civil society before the Arab 
Uprisings. However, Fatiha Hassouni (Interview #19, 20/6/2014) stated that the new 
impetus and commitment to Moroccan civil society in 2011 did not involve a qualitatively 
different approach, in that the advanced dialogue between the EU and civil society 
organisations was still controlled by the Moroccan government. While, like Tunisia, 
support to civil society in Morocco has continued beyond 2011, as evidenced by the Civil 
Society Facility allocations, two issues strongly impede the efficacy of the EU’s stated 
policy in this domain: the role of Islamists, which correlates region-wide; and the EU’s 
relationship with the regime, which is specific to Morocco.  
As was the case with both the Tunisian and regional analysis, the EU’s relationship with 
Morocco’s Islamist civil society actors has long suffered from a perceived link between 
Islamism and terrorism in the increasingly securitised approach to the MENA region 
following the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001. Prior to the Arab Uprisings, Dillman (2003, p. 
187) notes that although the EU devoted some resources towards the development of 
Moroccan civil society as part of the EMP, these efforts did little to promote bottom-up 
democratic socialisation, and were noteworthy for their effort to ignore or marginalise 
Islamist parties and organisations. Federici Bicchi and Mary Martin (2006, p. 200), citing 
their own interviews with EU officials in Brussels and Rabat, add that there was a 
reluctance to include Islamist organisations, despite their well-rooted presence in 
Moroccan civil society, and there is no evidence to suggest that this has changed following 
the Arab Uprisings. Even accepting a genuine willingness to engage more with local 
Islamist actors, the issue of clashing universal values impedes any initial attempts to begin 
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discussion about possible areas of support. Hassouni (Interview #19, 20/6/2014) affirmed 
that where civil society partners in Morocco are concerned, the EU’s universal values are 
non-negotiable and clearly defined in the selection criteria of calls for proposals, and 
furthermore, there were cases where the EU had said it would stop programmes where 
Islamic values threatened to dilute its human rights proposals. In order to facilitate the 
bottom-up change that the EU professes to favour, it may need to seek a compromise 
point in order to engage with all aspects of the Moroccan civil society that it envisions 
leading the process of political and social transition.  
Although the EU has shown a willingness, both rhetorically and substantively, to continue 
supporting Moroccan civil society in the years following the Arab Uprisings, the 
peculiarities of the EU-Morocco relationship have added a further impediment to success, 
independent to the familiar issues concerning universalism and Islamists. The main 
problem with the EU’s approach to supporting this domain, is that in its reluctance to 
pressure the Moroccan palace over political reforms, ‘the EU has sought to be a partner in 
the regime-led process of modest change, with less of a bottom-up focus on citizen 
initiatives (Balfour & Youngs, 2015). The EUSpring project, currently exploring the 
concept of democratic citizenship and local attitudes to EU support in the MENA region, 
found that in Morocco, ‘groups expressed some unease over the EU’s provision of advice 
and advisors in constitutional processes that legitimise incumbent regimes [failing] to 
capture the real political dynamics beyond whatever formal provisions are included in a 
new constitution’ (Balfour & Youngs, 2015, emphasis added). The tendency of Moroccan 
civil society groups to associate a legitimising function to the EU’s relationship with the 
regime is particularly concerning when the same groups surveyed by the EUSpring 
project insisted that the principal breach in their societies was not between secularists and 
Islamists, as implied in Western debates on the region’s politics, but rather between 
citizens and entrenched elites (Balfour & Youngs, 2015). Youngs (2014, p. 110) cites a 
European diplomat in Rabat, who admitted that little funding went to NGOs not seen in a 
favourable light by the palace, and a leader of the February 20 movement, who maintained 
that these types of elitist NGOs lacked legitimacy in the eyes of a new generation of 
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protesters. Thus, the charge of neo-colonialism leveled at the EU by some civil society 
actors in Tunisia, who perceive the EU as a strong actor imposing cultural norms on a 
weak one, becomes redundant in the Moroccan context, where Europe’s support for an 
entrenched elite looks much more like the traditional colonialism of old.  
Political conditionality: “more for more”, or more of the same? 
The “more for more” principle, another key feature of the EU’s 2011 response to the Arab 
Uprisings, signalled the EU’s intention to reward those partners in the southern 
neighbourhood who made most progress in achieving ethically normative goals. This 
differentiated approach to promoting democratic governance, rule of law and the 
protection of human rights the MENA region, while not entirely new, was meant to 
answer charges of inconsistency and incoherence in the EU’s application of conditionality 
prior to 2011. This was particularly evident in EU-Morocco bilateral relations during the 
decade leading up to the Arab Uprisings, where the EU used conditionality to ensure 
cooperation on issues such as economic reform, migration and border security, but did not 
link incentives to the advancement of democracy and human rights (Eder, 2011, pp. 441-
442; Kausch, 2009b, p. 178). EU policy-makers stated that the “more for more” principle 
would align the EU’s support with the regional protest movement sweeping the southern 
neighbourhood in early 2011, and demonstrate its commitment to reward substantive 
social and political reforms in partner countries.  
In terms of rewards in the post-Arab Uprising period, Morocco has been one of the biggest 
recipients of all the EU’s bilateral partners in the MENA region. SPRING Programme 
allocations of 80 million euros in 2011-2012 and 48 million euros in 2013 (European 
Commission, 2014c, p. 82), the most direct form of “more for more”, were second only to 
Tunisia for this combined period, and as noted above, bilateral allocations increased in 
each subsequent year, making Morocco the largest recipient of EU funding within the ENP 
framework at the time of writing. Furthermore, according to Colombo and Voltolini (2014, 
pp. 47-48), ‘[i]n line with the “more for more” approach, the alleged progress achieved by 
Morocco has been rewarded with further agreements (and the related financial support) in 
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the fields of trade, migration and fisheries’. This is all the more noteworthy in that the 
progress achieved by Morocco is mainly alleged by the Moroccan regime itself and EU 
officials, and not always by the latter. The European Commission (2014e) noted that in the 
years following the adoption of the new constitution, the implementation of reforms had 
been rather limited,152 and Rafaella Iodice (Interview #5, 29/11/2013), Head of the Regional 
Programmes Neighbourhood South Unit in the Directorate-General for Development and 
Cooperation-EuropeAid, stated that although Morocco was moving in the right direction, 
after eighteen years working in the region, she had no expectation that things were going 
to change very quickly. The fact that Morocco continues to receive “more” seems 
independent of ethical norms, despite the rhetoric surrounding the new approach to 
conditionality in 2011. Eneko Landaburu (2013), former ambassador to Morocco, stated 
that the EU’s support for Morocco was not conditional on human rights, putting him at odds 
with both the EU’s post-Lisbon Treaty position regarding all external action (EEAS, 
2015h), and its “more for more” principle regarding the southern neighbourhood.  
There are significant consequences for the EU’s regional MENA policy as a result of its 
unconditional support to Morocco where ethical norms are concerned. As noted in the 
previous chapter, Tunisians are not unaware of the benefits that Morocco receives, both 
being viewed as privileged partners, despite differences in their readiness to reform 
(European Council on Foreign Relations, 2015, p. 73). EU officials admit ‘that Morocco 
remained ahead of Tunisia in benefiting from EU “rewards” [...] even though its 
democratic reforms were more limited’ (Youngs, 2014, pp. 97-98). According to Susi 
Dennison et al. (2011, p. 9): 
For too long, the EU has rewarded Morocco very richly, for progress on 
limited areas of human rights that was actually very thin, because it was at 
least doing better than its neighbours and acting as a relatively reliable 
security partner in the region. The competition for status as the “most 
committed to the path of democracy” has become much fiercer in North 
Africa in 2011, and the EU should work with this by rewarding genuine 
																																																								
152 ‘Si le programme de réformes politiques envisagé dans la nouvelle constitution était ambitieux, on doit 
relever que plus de deux ans après son adoption, le bilan de la mise en œuvre des réformes est plutôt limité’ 
(European Commission, 2014e). 
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progress against international standards, not accepting rhetoric about 
reform from regimes who intend to do no such thing.   
In the five years since 2011, Tunisia has dramatically improved in terms of civil liberties 
and political rights and Morocco struggles to implement a limited set of reforms, yet it is 
the latter which receives more support within the ENP. Such an outcome only serves to 
delegitimise the “more for more” principle, opening it up to the same criticisms of 
inconsistency and incoherence that were applied regarding its previous approach to 
conditionality, prior to the Arab Uprisings.  
The bilateral analysis of the EU’s relationships with Tunisia and Morocco provides a more 
nuanced conclusion with regard to each of the four points to emerge from the regional 
analysis. In the following, and final, chapter I will integrate the regional and bilateral 
analysis, initially following the schematic structure that has organised the four main 
points, above and in the previous two chapters. Finally, I will draw some theoretical and 















The purpose of this thesis has been to analyse the content of, and commentary relating to, 
EU foreign policy, and evaluate the role of ethical norm promotion, namely the promotion 
of values that the EU associates with itself as a normative and ethical international actor. 
The approach of this research has been to examine the EU’s promotion of ethical norms in 
the context of its relationship with the MENA region, conceived as the southern 
neighbourhood by EU policy-makers, in particular with reference to the Arab Uprisings of 
2011. Most importantly, however, the ambition of this thesis, and its supporting research, 
has been to attain a deeper understanding about the nature of the EU as an international 
actor, and consider what that demonstrates about the very concepts of ‘normative’ and 
‘ethical’ in international affairs.  
This conclusion begins with a brief overview of the main arguments presented in the 
thesis, and a summary of the supporting research. Rather than a linear summation of each 
chapter, this overview will provide a more holistic approach to the material covered, so as 
to better inform the conclusions that follow: EU foreign policy priorities; rhetorical self-
entrapment; universalism, Islamists and civil society; and political conditionality. The 
main points concerning each of these four topics have already been made in the respective 
sections of analysis interpretation, therefore the purpose here will be to synthesise the 
regional and bilateral analysis, so as to present a more nuanced evaluation. Each of these 
four topics will be accompanied by an acknowledgement of the relevant limitations, and 
an assessment regarding the possibilities for future research. The final two sections of the 
conclusion will: address the theoretical implications of this research, in terms of the NPE 
framework and the themes presented in Part I; and provide a normative/prescriptive 
assessment of EU policy towards the MENA region and beyond, based on the findings of 
the research presented in this thesis.  
Overview 
In order to analyse and evaluate the role of ethical norm promotion in EU foreign policy, 
certain assumptions had to be addressed and premises established. First and foremost, a 
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discussion of this nature assumes that ethics exist in international affairs, or at the very 
least, are a relevant concern for international actors. Utilising IR theory as an organising 
framework, I showed that realist scholars, rather than deny the existence of ethics as is 
commonly assumed, see them as a relevant feature of international affairs, albeit limited or 
subordinated to the primacy of national interest. Liberal scholars, on the other hand, 
contend many of the premises that inform the realist position, arguing not only that ethics 
are a driving force in international affairs, but also succumbing to the “metaphysical 
seduction”, ascribing them with a universality that can be applied to everyone on a global 
scale. I argued that social constructivism makes an empirical argument as to the co-
constitutive development of ethical international norms, providing evidence as to what is 
actually achievable in a diverse, socially constructed reality. Building on this premise, I 
argued that the concept of human rights had become the lingua franca of ethical discourse 
in international affairs, and that actors such as the EU accede to the UN framework in this 
domain to confer legitimacy to their actions.  
The EU, which I argued can be conceived of as an international actor in its own right, not 
only looks to human rights discourse to legitimise its external actions, but also its 
international identity. The EU has increasingly made a rhetorical commitment to the 
promotion of international ethical norms, thus creating a standard of legitimacy to which 
it can be held. The centrality of ethical norm promotion to the EU’s international identity 
is particularly evident in its relationship with its southern neighbourhood, where it has 
been consistently prioritised, at least rhetorically. Chapters 4 to 6 analysed the EU’s policy 
towards the MENA region before, during and after the Arab Uprisings. As will be 
reiterated below, the EU’s rhetorical commitment to ethical norm promotion was seldom 
matched by substantive policy, leading to a disjuncture between the two that became 
widely comprehensible in the glare of the international media coverage that flooded the 
Middle East and North Africa during the coverage of the “Arab Spring”. The ensuing 
narrative, of a region-wide movement of protesters calling for freedoms and rights, 
peaked in 2011 and then slowly dissipated, as did the EU’s reinvigoration of its ethical 
norm promotion as the principal priority of its southern neighbourhood policies.  
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The main focus of this thesis has been the role and influence of ethical norms, in particular 
the promotion of democracy and human rights, on the evolution of the EU as an 
international actor, on its institutional architecture, on its regional policies towards the 
MENA region, and on its bilateral policies towards Tunisia and Morocco. However, two 
related theoretical threads have traversed the research, connecting elements of the theory 
in Part I to specific aspects of EU policy towards the southern neighbourhood: 
universalism, and its pertinence to the EU’s civil society policies; and intervention in the 
form of political conditionality, which was a feature of the EU’s 2011 shift in policy, and 
was widely referred to as the “more for more” principle. With regard to the former, by 
framing its ethical norm promotion in the contemporary discourse of universal human 
rights, the EU takes a cosmopolitical approach to their promotion, despite that 
universality being disputed by its target audience. While this has rarely impeded a robust 
relationship with the political elites of the MENA region, it is a point of contention 
regarding the EU’s contemporary pivot to the region’s citizens themselves. Where political 
conditionality is concerned, it is considered by many to be a coercive form of intervention, 
the justification for which rests on a shared perception as to the nature of international 
human rights. As a means of ethical norm promotion in an asymmetrical partnership, as is 
the case for the EU in the southern neighbourhood, it is imperative for both the efficacy 
and underpinning moral justification that the EU’s partners perceive the means to be as 
normative as the values. These two theoretical threads inform secondary conclusions in 
later sections.  
EU policy objectives towards the MENA region 
It is uncontroversial to say that EU policy towards the MENA region pre-2011 
demonstrated an evident disjuncture between rhetoric and action where the promotion of 
ethical norms were concerned. The regional analysis presented in Part II highlighted the 
increasing rhetoric regarding the centrality of democracy, human rights and the rule of 
law to EU policy in the region, despite robust “stability partnerships” with its 
authoritarian regimes. These regimes proved to be willing partners in addressing EU 
concerns regarding security and migration issues, and in return benefited from increased 
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trade, aid and development funding. The bilateral analysis of Tunisia and Morocco 
corroborated this perspective of EU-MENA relations prior to the Arab Uprisings. In 2011, 
however, the EU responded to the unfolding events in the southern neighbourhood with a 
formal recognition of previous shortcomings in its promotion of ethical norms in the 
region, and a substantive overhaul of its policies and institutions. Few commentators have 
regarded the policy initiatives during this period positively, regarding them as either 
“new wine in old wineskins”, or as a further example of window-dressing to conceal self-
regarding interests. Nonetheless, I have argued that the new initiatives and institutional 
developments reflected a substantive shift in policy in response to the Arab Uprisings, both 
regionally and in the cases of Tunisia and Morocco. Yet despite this shift, for reasons that 
will be outlined below, there has been a regional return to “business as usual”, where 
security and migration issues are once again prioritised at the expense of ethical norm 
promotion. While this regional dynamic is evident with regard to the two bilateral cases, it 
is less pronounced in Tunisia, where the democratic transition continues to be supported, 
albeit at significantly reduced levels. This dynamic also has a particularly distinct 
character in the case of Morocco, where although the shift towards ethical norms also 
regressed, general levels of financial support have continued to increase, in line with a 
trend originating prior to the uprisings. 
The explanatory hypothesis for the substantive shift in policy in 2011 will be addressed in 
the following section, and the theoretical implications of this will then be engaged with 
later in the conclusion, in the context of the NPE paradigm. Before doing so, however, it is 
worth considering what can be extrapolated from the findings presented above, both 
within the MENA region and beyond. The pattern of behaviour exhibited by the EU 
suggests that it has a strong preference for stability in the southern neighbourhood, 
regardless of social and political reform. This is hardly a ground-breaking observation! 
Yet, as the Tunisia case shows, there comes a point in a transition process of this nature 
when the EU perceives supporting the process as the most effective means of influencing a 
return to stability. This was also evident with regard to the other major protests in Egypt 
and Libya. As has been shown in previous chapters, and will be reiterated below, the key 
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to this dynamic is a rhetorical convergence of values between the EU and the 
demonstrators, ideally given widespread international media coverage, and in this case 
intersecting with a complementary HR/EEAS narrative. The questions for future research, 
then, are what would need to be different with regard to Morocco, or Jordan, or indeed 
anywhere in the world where citizens gather together to call for social and political reform 
from entrenched authoritarian regimes? At which point does the EU decide to bolster the 
regime, as opposed to fully support the protesters’ demands for the ethical norms that the 
EU stands for and promotes? Does the governing regime have to collapse or flee in order 
for the EU to perceive the sovereignty of the citizens as the path to stability? As noted in 
the introduction, there were certain limitations regarding the choice of cases within the 
southern neighbourhood. A comparative study of similar protests in a wider selection of 
cases, within and beyond the MENA region, utilising process tracing to closely follow the 
decision-making with regard to the EU’s response, would positively build on the research 
presented here. 	 
Rhetorical self-entrapment 
Having established throughout Part II that there was a significant shift in policy regarding 
the EU’s response to the Arab Uprisings, with a substantive commitment to the promotion 
of ethical norms that had long been a rhetorical priority, I advanced an explanatory 
hypothesis to show why this shift occurred, and to explain its ephemeral nature. Although 
there is some credibility to the contention that the EU pragmatically took its opportunities 
in 2011, gradually withdrawing as the material circumstances deteriorated, by its own 
admission the EU declared that securitisation had taken precedence over ethical norms in 
terms of priorities prior to 2011, and the evidence demonstrates that this dynamic returned 
in the following years. Thus, an alternative, or at the very least accompanying, explanation 
was proposed. Drawing on Frank Schimmelfennig’s theory of rhetorical action, I argued 
that the EU had created a standard of legitimacy for itself by making a repeated rhetorical 
commitment to ethical norm promotion in the southern neighbourhood, which had been 
established as a premise during the discussion of ethics, norms and EU identity in Chapter 
3. The EU’s rhetorical commitment to ethical norm promotion was shown to be 
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inconsistent with its MENA policies in the spotlight of the widespread international media 
coverage that accompanied the Arab Uprisings, which settled on a cohesive narrative that 
described the protests in terms of the values to which the EU was committed. The HR and 
newly operational EEAS, who contributed and reinforced this narrative as a means of 
setting the agenda for external policy, and thus drawing attention to their new institutions 
and the strengths of the EU that they had identified with, amplified this dynamic. The EU 
became rhetorically self-entrapped, resulting in a reinvigoration of its ethical norm 
promotion in the MENA region, and the initiation of new policies and initiatives to 
support this new position, in order to prevent a crisis of legitimacy. The decrease in 
international media coverage, the shift in the narrative towards conflict and security 
issues, and the side-lining of the HR and EEAS by member states and other EU 
institutions, all contributed to the conditions for rhetorical action dissipating, and the EU’s 
prioritisation of ethical norms dissipated with them.  
The bilateral case of Tunisia largely corroborates this hypothesis, although this position is 
limited by there being less research of Tunisia as a specific media event than there has been 
of the “Arab Spring” regionally. The studies that have been conducted, as shown in 
Chapter 8, show that the temporal dimensions of the Tunisian Uprising mirror those of the 
regional analysis, peaking in the first part of 2011, and then decreasing in the latter part of 
the year, as violent conflicts elsewhere in the region took precedence. As noted earlier, EU 
support for democracy and human rights in Tunisia has continued, the EU having 
committed to Tunisia’s social and political transition, but at a vastly decreased level to that 
which was offered in 2011. In the bilateral case of Morocco, there are no specific studies 
regarding the international media coverage of the local demonstrations and protests, or 
analysis of how these events were framed in terms of the dominant regional narrative. 
Notwithstanding, the Moroccan case provides a particularly interesting feature, namely 
the contribution of EU rhetoric in the process of aligning the situation in Morocco with 
wider regional events, and in particular, the credibility and appropriateness of the 
monarchy’s response, so as to maintain stability and justify its increasing levels of support. 
In tandem with the possibilities for future research suggested in the previous section, it is 
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hoped that further studies will be conducted with regard to a comprehensive media 
analysis of particular cases in the MENA region throughout the Arab Uprisings. It would 
be expected, on the basis of this research, that in other cases that the EU would attempt to 
frame events in terms of its preference for stability rather than reform, although this may 
not always be possible. The hypothesis that the EU can become rhetorically self-entrapped 
suggests that particular conditions reduce the capacity of EU policy-makers to formulate a 
response to certain situations carte blanche. This has a number of implications for future 
policy, and is particularly relevant to understanding the nature of the EU as an 
international actor, both points that will be taken up in later sections.  
Universalism, Islamists and civil society 
One of the few features of the EU’s policy shift in 2011 to be clearly sustained in the period 
between ENP reviews has been the recommitment to support civil society actors in the 
MENA region. Although this had been a formal objective prior to the Arab Uprisings, at 
least after 2001, the strategy papers that emerged from the ENP review of 2011 were 
unequivocal regarding the importance of civil society in the southern neighbourhood, 
particularly in its role of holding governing regimes accountable during difficult transition 
periods. Institutional instruments, such as the Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility and 
the EED, were established, and funding provided through ENP budget lines. Both the 
regional and bilateral analysis showed that the EU has maintained its support and 
commitment to a burgeoning civil society in parts of the MENA region, although this is 
evidently harder where authoritarian regimes are still firmly in charge and resistant to the 
development of NGOs and CSOs. As noted in previous chapters, interviewees from 
Brussels, Tunis and Rabat, from both sides of the EU-MENA partnership and including 
civil society actors themselves, positively described the evolution of the EU’s civil society 
policies since the Arab Uprisings. As a means of promoting ethical norms, with which EU 
policy-makers have explicitly linked it, it is a noteworthy realisation.  
The increased and consistent substantive support to MENA civil society corresponds to a 
principle highlighted by EU policy-makers in the various documents and communiqués 
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that accompanied the response to the Arab Uprisings, namely an indication that the EU 
would “listen more” to partners in the southern neighbourhood, both civil and 
governmental, by facilitating a wide-ranging dialogue to engender a shared vision of the 
transitions taking place. The EU declared that it would be a receptive and reflexive partner, 
acknowledging its previous shortcomings, and providing support on the basis that the 
region comprises a diverse array of civil and political actors, all of which had a part to play 
in shaping their rapidly changing societies. This is precisely the point at which certain 
qualifications become necessary, to highlight the shortcomings of current policy, and 
allow for some prescriptive comments moving forward in subsequent sections.  
As shown in Part I, the sacrosanct nature of universal human rights is the legitimising 
principle that underpins the EU’s interpretation of ethical norms, and entails its duty to 
promote them externally. It is also the primary criterion by which the EU has filtered 
potential civil society partners in the southern neighbourhood, before, during and after the 
Arab Uprisings, and it is non-negotiable. This leads to the exclusion of certain actors, 
particularly Islamist political parties and other civil society organisations with religious 
foundations, disparaging the rhetoric of shared visions, co-ownership and locally-led 
transition. It is a particularly pronounced disconnect in the new social and political terrain 
resulting from the Arab Uprisings, where Islamist actors have become more influential at 
all levels of society. Regardless of how much dialogue the EU undertakes, and how much 
support it offers, the EU suffers from an understandable lack of credibility by limiting its 
relationships to a conspicuously limited conception of civil society in the southern 
neighbourhood. Furthermore, this negative perception is compounded by the EU’s 
apparent willingness to engage with Islamists once they reach government, as was the 
case with the Ennahda Party in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and 
authoritarian regimes, whose approach to shared values is cynical at best.  
There were few limitations to this aspect of the research, although as is generally the case, 
a more comprehensive and nuanced conclusion would result from more interviews and 
more case studies. Where future research is concerned, the issues around the EU’s 
approach and preferences with regard to civil society partners are linked with the 
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questions presented above: at which point, and under what conditions, does the EU fully 
commit to civil society partners, when the citizens and the state are opposing forces in a 
transition process? The fact that Tunisia’s civil society has burgeoned with EU support in 
the subsequent absence of dictatorship, and that Morocco’s civil society receives EU 
support only when sanctioned by the governing regime, suggests that the onus of 
precipitating meaningful transition lies squarely with Arab civil society itself.  
Political conditionality: “more for more”, or more of the same? 
Another key feature of the EU’s response to the Arab Uprisings, directly associated with 
the reinvigoration of its ethical norm promotion, was the “more for more” principle. This 
reaffirmation of positive conditionality was intended to provide substantive rewards for 
those partners who demonstrated a willingness to progress furthest with social and 
political reforms, and was epitomised by the SPRING Programme. The funding provided 
for this three-year programme, which was additional to ENPI indicative allocations, was 
granted to seven of the southern neighbours, the division of which, as shown in Chapter 6, 
was a mixture of credibility, enigma and incongruity. Nonetheless, the “more for more” 
principle must be evaluated with regard to all aspects of EU support, not just specific 
thematic instruments designated by EU policy-makers as testimony to their principled 
convictions. The two bilateral cases demonstrated the continuing inconsistency regarding 
the EU’s approach to positive conditionality. Both countries received significant 
allocations of SPRING funding, as would be expected for rapidly reforming Tunisia, and 
“justified” in the case of Morocco by the EU’s own effusive appraisal of King Mohammed 
VI’s reform proposals. However, in terms of general support, including ENPI/ENI funding 
and trade provisions, Morocco, which struggles to implement a limited set of reforms, 
receives significantly more than Tunisia, which has dramatically improved in terms of 
civil liberties and political rights. As noted in the previous chapter, such an outcome only 
serves to delegitimise the “more for more” principle. 
Where negative conditionality is concerned, the EU’s position becomes even more 
incoherent. While this is rarely emphasised by EU policy-makers, implicit in “more for 
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more” is “less for less”. By highlighting positive conditionality based on differentiation 
and, most importantly, the willingness of partners to adopt social and political reforms, the 
EU attempts to avoid charges of neo-colonialism regarding its promotion of ethical norms 
based on universal values. Yet, while explicitly focusing on “more for more” based on 
partner-led enthusiasm for reform avoids the attribution of cultural imperialism, and is 
more in keeping with the values underpinning the ethical norms themselves, the converse 
is that the EU abdicates responsibility for using its considerable leverage to initiate reform 
with recalcitrant regimes. If all EU aid and support was rewards-based, distributed 
according to the “more for more” principle as a means of encouraging ethical norm 
promotion, the EU would be on safe ground in terms of both coherence and avoiding the 
charge of neo-colonialism. This is clearly unrealistic, and there is no doubting the 
challenges involved in finding a balance between the two, but the current approach of 
inconsistent rewards, non-progress related support and an aversion to applying negative 
conditionality, results in an incoherent and ineffective approach. A much more detailed 
and specific account regarding the EU’s use of conditionality is required, but in light of the 
failure of this policy to promote ethical norms in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, it is 
no surprise to see almost no mention of the “more for more” principle in the recent 2015 
ENP review. 
Theorising the EU’s policy towards the MENA region  
Allegations of incoherence or inconsistency regarding EU policy, such as those pertaining 
to the “more for more” principle, can often be attributed to the tension between ethics and 
interests. As shown throughout Chapter 3, within the context of the NPE literature, there 
is an ongoing debate concerning the type of international actor the EU represents. On one 
side are those who argue that the EU is concerned primarily with the pursuit of its self-
regarding interests, and that it uses the promotion of democracy and human rights 
instrumentally to achieve its objectives. On the other side are those who argue that the EU 
is a normative actor, used in this sense to mean that it promotes ethical norms as an other-
regarding interest, where the interests of other actors are dominant, notwithstanding that 
the EU may derive an indirect benefit. As this research of the EU’s policy towards the 
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southern neighbourhood has shown, despite consistently maintaining that ethical norm 
promotion is central to its external relationships, there are times when the EU is driven by 
interests, such as security and migration, and other times when it is driven by a 
commitment to promoting values such as democracy and human rights, as was the case in 
its response to the Arab Uprisings in 2011. Analysing any theoretical dichotomy, in this 
case that of interests versus ethics, and arguing that the reality is somewhere in the 
middle, or a blend of the two, is hardly paradigmatically earth-shattering! However, the 
contribution of this research to the NPE literature is not a definitive answer as to whether 
or not the EU is an ethically normative actor, but a determination of when the EU is an 
ethically normative actor, or more specifically, under what conditions. 
One of the most revelatory aspects of the series of interviews conducted as part of this 
research, with EU officials in Brussels, Tunis and Rabat, was not that there was a 
profusion of interviewees who supported the claim that the EU was either an interest-
driven or normative-driven actor, but that there was disparity between them on this 
subject, sometimes even within specific departments of particular institutions. Such was 
the extent of the disparity, that despite the enormous value and insight gained from the 
interviews in general, utilising individual statements concerning this particular subject 
carried no informative weight, disregarding the reluctance of many EU officials to “go on 
record” with their views. What this demonstrates, however, is that the lack of academic 
consensus regarding this dichotomy is mirrored within the EU itself, which also supports 
the claim that the EU’s inconsistency and incoherence is partly explained by a tension 
between the two positions. The EU clearly aspires to be an ethically normative actor, and it 
is not the opinion of this author that it uses the promotion of democracy and human rights 
instrumentally. However, throughout almost the entire history of EU-MENA relations, it 
has been either unwilling or unable to transcend the perception that the reforms 
associated with ethical norm promotion are incompatible with stability and security, with 
the latter taking precedence.  
Yet, in 2011, the conditions were such that the EU made a substantive commitment to 
support its rhetorical position concerning ethical norm promotion in the southern 
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neighbourhood. The events of the Arab Uprisings drew international media coverage, 
which settled on a unified narrative of the demonstrations highlighting the alignment 
between the values of the protestors and the values that the EU stated were central to its 
MENA policies. The EU became rhetorically self-entrapped by its own standard of 
legitimacy, which necessitated a radical shift in policy to maintain credibility in the eyes of 
a critical international audience. This is not to say, however, that the EU is generally 
averse towards a full commitment of its ethical norm promotion; far from it. What this 
dynamic shows is that under certain conditions, when faced with a public loss of 
credibility, the potential loss of legitimacy is a powerful enough incentive to transcend the 
EU’s customary inclination towards stability and security. Of course, it could be argued 
that supporting democracy in the case of Tunisia was indeed the path to stability, and by 
extension security, but this does not explain the wide-ranging regional shift that occurred. 
The appearance of Algeria on the list of SPRING Programme recipients, the positive 
reception of the Muslim Brotherhood’s short-lived electoral success in Egypt, and the 
establishment of the EED, all point to a more all-encompassing shift than “stability by any 
means”.  
The explanatory hypothesis of rhetorical self-entrapment took many of its foundational 
premises from Frank Schimmelfennig’s theory of rhetorical action, which itself was an 
attempt to connect the seemingly incompatible rationalist and sociological explanations 
for CEEC enlargement in 2004. Indeed, the perceived incompatibility between interests 
and ethics in the NPE framework closely reflects the debate between the realist/rationalist 
tradition and social constructivism in the context of IR theory. However, the analysis of 
EU policy towards the MENA region before, during and after the Arab Uprisings shows 
that a firm dichotomy between the two is equally redundant. There are times when a 
realist account of ethics has explanatory value, when ethics are rationally subordinated to 
the (supra-) national interest, and times when a constructivist approach explains the 
importance of ethics to identity as a motivating force, as perceived by the self and 
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others.153 Once again, the contribution of this research has been to demonstrate plausible 
conditions by which the latter might prevail over the former, despite the former’s 
customary relevance. Moreover, showing that the two approaches coexist explains much 
of the inconsistency and incoherence of EU policy, particularly in the context of the 
southern neighbourhood.  
A further theoretical point to emerge from this research, with implications for policy-
makers both within and outside of the EU, is the nature of the given conditions leading to 
self-entrapment, and their eventual dissipation. Schimmelfennig is clear that an actor’s 
change in behaviour as a result of rhetorical action does not also entail a change in 
preferences. Not only was the role of the international media coverage in the stage of 
rhetorical argumentation unintentional, in terms of changing EU policy, but also 
ephemeral. As the media turned its attention to more “newsworthy” events in the 
aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, the conditions by which the EU was compelled to 
explain, justify and revise its policies gradually ceased to exist, resulting in a reversion to 
preferences for stability and security partnerships. This hypothesis does, however, suggest 
that there are stronger potential paths to entrapment, more in keeping with 
Schimmelfennig’s original theory. If, in the subsequent fifteen years, the EU’s standard of 
legitimacy has developed to the point that self-entrapment can occur in the conditions 
outlined above, then the potential for intentionally holding the EU to account must 
reasonably be more existent. Although the means of doing so are by no means clear, 
should actors with a preference for ethical norm promotion, be they member states, 
external governments, NGOs or other civil society organisations, wish to do so, there is 
evidence to support the possibility of effectively shaming the EU based on its prior 
normative commitments. 
With regards to the EU’s international actorness, there is nothing to emerge from a 
comprehensive analysis of EU policy towards the MENA region to counter the claim that 
the EU can be considered as an international actor in its own right. Be that as it may, this 
																																																								
153 This is particularly the case with regard to the EU, where the preservation of a socially constructed 
identity requires rational action under certain conditions, in order to avoid a loss of legitimacy. 
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research does shed light on the type of actor the EU represents, namely one that is 
genuinely conflicted in its pursuit of a common foreign policy that reflects both a 
commitment to exporting the foundational values of the Community, and also secures its 
interests in an increasingly volatile international environment. The policy trends since 
2012 show that those institutional actors that perceive the southern neighbourhood 
through a strictly securitised lens are dominating both regional and bilateral policy-
making. The results of the latest ENP review and the related comments by new HR 
Federica Mogherini, cited in Chapter 7, suggest that the previous affinity by the HR and 
EEAS for the ethically normative qualities of the EU have dissipated, although it is too 
early to tell whether this represents a capitulation to the demands of other actors, or an 
internal shift resulting from the appointment of a new HR. Despite the EU’s reluctance, or 
inability, to remain committed to its promotion of ethical norms in the face of an unstable 
security environment, and the consequent displacement of huge numbers of refugees 
desperately trying to find safe haven in Europe, its response to the early stages of the Arab 
Uprisings shows that this is not an intractable state of affairs. While it is extremely 
unlikely that the exact conditions of 2011 will reoccur, it is quite possible that the different 
elements leading to rhetorical self-entrapment may do, and that they may even be 
manipulated by other actors, bringing the hypothesis even closer to Schimmelfenning’s 
own conclusions on the instrumental use of rhetorical action.  
Policy implications: a prescriptive assessment  
Finally, what conclusions can be drawn from this research regarding future policy 
implications in terms of both legitimacy and efficacy? The imperative requirement, that 
towers over all other details and critiques, is to establish the former in order to cultivate 
the latter. In almost every facet of the EU’s policy towards the MENA region, efficacy is 
impeded by a lack of clarity regarding objectives, a lack of consistency in the application of 
resources, and a lack of correspondence between rhetoric and action. Individually and 
collectively, these issues impact on the credibility of the EU as an international actor, thus 
delegitimising its assertion that it is an ethically normative power, and in turn hindering 
the possibility of efficient policy implementation. There is no overstating what a difficult 
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task it is to find the balance between the other-regarding promotion of ethical norms and 
the self-regarding protection of interests, and it is completely unrealistic to suggest that 
the EU should devote the majority of its attention to the spread of democracy and human 
rights at the expense of its security and material concerns. However, it is equally 
problematic to continue “doubling down” on the centrality of ethical norms in each 
subsequent treaty revision and over-arching external policy document, without 
maintaining a corresponding substantive shift. The absence of a responsible rhetoric leads 
to a consequent lack of credibility, and therefore legitimacy, resulting in an inability to 
develop meaningful relationships with the necessary partners in the MENA region, with 
the exception of authoritarian regimes, whose cynicism only serves to amplify the 
inadequacies of the EU’s policy.  
On a practical level, the promotion and consolidation of civil society in the MENA region 
is one of the strongest, and most resilient, features of the EU’s recommitment to ethical 
norms in response to the Arab Uprisings, and should be bolstered with increased 
resources and a wider remit. There are indications that the EU is prepared to expand its 
dialogue with a more diverse range of civil society partners, and it is essential for its 
credibility that it does so. The “more for more” principle, on the other hand, has been a 
categorical failure, and appears to be receding from the ENP vocabulary. There is 
enormous potential, however, for the EU to use its considerable leverage and resources to 
initiate reform, and it is hoped that future research projects will focus on procedural ways 
of achieving this. Once again, in order to avoid the many critiques that impede efficacy by 
delegitimising the EU as a credible international actor, absolute clarity and honesty will be 
required on the part of EU policy-makers with regards to its limitations and objectives. 
Indeed, herein lies the essence of policy prescription derived from this research. Above all, 
the EU needs to articulate policy that honestly outlines goals and priorities, whatever the 
balance, or otherwise, between ethics and interests. Where ethical norm promotion is 
concerned, part of this process requires a genuine acknowledgement of past failures, and a 
frank appraisal of its current relationships in the southern neighbourhood.  This is all the 
more necessary in light of the current climate of conflict and instability. There are 
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indications that the EU’s return to a “business as usual” approach to the MENA region is 
not only hardening, but becoming more pronounced than it was even before the Arab 
Uprisings, which is a desolate state of affairs for those encouraged by the ethically 
normative shift in 2011. 
Of course, each of these policy prescriptions assumes that the EU should be an ethically 
normative power, actively promoting democracy and human rights in the MENA region. 
It is the opinion of this author that this is the case, and despite the many criticisms made 
here, that the EU is in a unique position to support the establishment of a neighbourhood 
in which the needs and demands of the “Arab Spring” protesters are met. The EU benefits 
from a strong framework of established internal values, a cadre of passionate officials 
contributing to the formulation and implementation of external policy, and in this author’s 
opinion, a genuine willingness to promote ethical norms, in the southern neighbourhood 
and beyond. In such challenging times for the region, it is hoped that the EU fulfils the 
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